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Significant reductions in greenhouse emissions from personal transportation will 
require a transition to an alternative technology regime based on renewable energy 
sources.  Two bodies of research, the quasi-evolutionary (QE) model and the multi-level 
perspective (MLP) assert that processes within niches play a fundamental role in such 
transitions.  This research asks whether the description of transitions based on this niche 
hypothesis and its underlying assumptions is consistent with the historical U.S. transition 
to motor vehicles at the beginning of the 20th century. 
Unique to this dissertation is the combination of the perspective of the 
entrepreneur with co-evolutionary approaches to socio-technical transitions.  This 
approach is augmented with concepts from the industry life-cycle model and with a 
taxonomy of mechanisms of learning.  Using this analytic framework, I examine 
specifically the role of entrepreneurial behavior and processes within and among firms in 
the co-evolution of technologies and institutions during the transition to motor vehicles. 
I find that niche markets played an important role in the development of the 
technology, institutions, and the industry.  However, I also find that the diffusion of the 
 
automobile is not consistent with the niche hypothesis in the following ways: 1) product 
improvements and cost reductions were not realized in niche markets, but were achieved 
simultaneously with diffusion into mass markets; 2) in addition to learning-by-doing and 
learning-by-interacting with users, knowledge spillovers and interacting with suppliers 
were critical in this process; 3) cost reductions were not automatic results of expanding 
markets, but rather arose from the strategies of entrepreneurs based on personal 
perspectives and values.  This finding supports the use of a behavioral approach with a 
micro-focus in the analysis of socio-technical change 
I also find that the emergence and diffusion of the motor vehicle can only be 
understood by considering the combination of developments and processes in multiple 
regimes, within niches, and within the wider technical, institutional, and ecological 
complex (TIEC).  For the automobile, the process of regime development was more 
consistent with a fit-stretch pattern of gradual unfolding and adaptation than one of niche 
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1.0 Introduction 
Steering an economy with positive feedbacks into the best of its many 
possible equilibrium states requires good fortune and good timing – a feel 
for the moments when beneficial change from one pattern to another is 
most possible. 
-- W.B Arthur, 1990 
1.1 Statement of the Problem 
For the last twenty years, the international community has engaged in negotiations 
to stabilize the atmospheric concentration of greenhouse gases (GHGs). Yet scientific 
concern over GHG emissions arose at least fifty years ago.  As Revelle and Suess (1957) 
succinctly stated, “[h]uman beings are carrying out a large scale geophysical experiment 
of a kind that could not have happened in the past nor be produced in the future.  Within a 
few centuries, we are returning to the atmosphere and the oceans the concentrated organic 
carbon stored in sedimentary rock over hundreds of millions of years.”   
This experiment was enabled by the development of energy technologies and 
infrastructures that have vastly improved the human condition, even while threatening 
human and ecosystem health on local, regional, and global scales.  While the energy 
intensity of the U.S. economy has declined, total energy use continues to rise and has 
tripled since 1950.  During that time, transportation has accounted for around one quarter 
of the nation’s energy consumption, though that fraction has risen slightly to 28% (EIA, 
2007).  Because the U.S. transportation system is almost entirely dependent on 
petroleum, this sector is currently responsible for about 28% of the nation’s total GHG 
emissions.  Transportation contributes the largest fraction of U.S. carbon dioxide (CO2) 
emissions from the combustion of fossil fuels by end use sector at 33%.  Light vehicles 
generally used for personal transport (automobiles and light trucks) alone account for 
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20% of U.S. CO2 emissions from the combustion of fossil fuels (U.S. EPA, 2007a).  In 
addition to being a significant contributor to emissions, the personal transportation 
system poses unique problems for control because of the extremely large number and 
wide distribution of sources, as well as the fact that vehicle purchasing decisions involve 
more than rational cost considerations.   
Carbon dioxide emissions from personal vehicles are a function of carbon content 
of the fuel, total fuel consumption, and engine properties.1  Consumption is in turn a 
function of vehicle fuel efficiency and vehicle miles of travel (VMT).  This lends four 
approaches to addressing the issue of greenhouse gas emissions from personal 
transportation: efficiency, substitution, travel demand reduction, and carbon capture and 
sequestration.  Technological options addressing efficiency and substitution are generally 
considered necessary components of any greenhouse gas reduction strategy.   
Improving the efficiency of vehicles slows consumption of oil, reduces annual 
greenhouse gas emissions, and allows more time to develop and deploy alternative 
technologies.  Substitution of alternative fuels displaces demand for petroleum and can 
reduce GHG emissions, depending on the selected alternative fuel and its production 
process.  While there are renewable fuels and end-use technologies with lower life-cycle 
GHG emissions that currently are technologically feasible, they pose challenges in terms 
of relative cost, performance, safety, and infrastructure.  Meanwhile, petroleum remains 
plentiful and relatively inexpensive in the near term.  Should the availability or price of 
petroleum become problematic, due to depletion or socio-political factors, higher fuel 
prices might stimulate more fuel efficient vehicle technologies and use patterns, thereby 
                                                 
1 Carbon is emitted as carbon dioxide, carbon monoxide, soot (black carbon), methane, and various organic 
compounds, depending on engine properties. 
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slowing the growth of GHG emissions.  However, liquid fuels for transportation could be 
obtained from other plentiful fossil resources (e.g. unconventional petroleum, coal, and 
natural gas) and used with little alteration of the existing vehicle technology paradigm 
that has evolved over a period of more than 100 years (Johnson et al., 2003).  Yet if road 
transport remains the dominant mode for personal mobility, significant reductions in 
emissions will require widespread transition to an alternative technology regime based on 
renewable energy sources. 
In 1973, OPEC production cuts and the Arab oil embargo resulted in a dramatic 
increase in petroleum fuel prices as well as shortages at gasoline stations.2  In an effort to 
decrease U.S. dependence on foreign oil, Congress passed the Energy Policy and 
Conservation Act (EPAct) of 1975.  Since then, there have been numerous federal and 
state policies directed at improving vehicle efficiency and developing alternatives to 
petroleum fuels.  Despite these efforts, personal transportation remains almost entirely 
dependent on petroleum and improvements in fuel economy have largely stalled.  This 
failure raises the following questions for policy: 
• What conditions would foster the transition of the U.S. personal transportation system 
from the existing socio-technological regime based on petroleum to one which 
produces lower carbon emissions?  
• Can the development of alternate technology alone enable this transition or are other 
factors critical in stimulating a transition? 
                                                 
2 In 1973, Egypt, Syria, and the Arab members of OPEC embargoed shipments of oil to countries that 
supported Israel during the on-going Yom Kippur War.  They specifically targeted the United States and 
the Netherlands, the latter having supplied arms to Israel and allowed U.S. use of Dutch airfields. 
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• What are the policy leverage points for facilitating a transition and steering the 
system to a desired outcome?   
1.2 Background: Policy Approaches 
Policy approaches to improve the energy efficiency of U.S. light vehicles and 
promote the development and use of alternative fuel can be grouped into four categories: 
research and development (R&D), market incentives, regulations, and what I will call 
niche approaches.  These categories relate to explanations for the lack of a market for 
such technologies and the underlying theoretical assumptions of these explanations.  This 
section discusses these underlying assumptions and demonstrates that niche approaches 
have emerged as the only policies that attempt to address the underlying dynamics of 
technical transitions. 
1.2.1 Research and Development (R&D) 
The first explanation for that lack of a market for alternative technologies is that 
they simply are not mature enough and that additional research and development (R&D) 
is needed to overcome cost and performance issues.  Government sponsored R&D is 
justified because private industry generally under-invests in innovation and in particular 
under-invests in research to solve social problems that promise little profit or in 
technologies with potentially high payoff but high risk.  R&D policy therefore directs 
innovation toward the solution of specific socially significant problems and may also 
determine the search space. Federal support of R&D includes research programs at 
federal laboratories, research grants to other research institutions, and public-private 
partnerships such as the Partnership for the Next Generation Vehicle (PNGV) established 
in 1993 and FreedomCAR which replaced PNGV in 2002.   
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The underlying assumption, then, is that technical and cost hurdles are the only 
barrier to market development.  The new technology will compete successfully once it is 
developed to the point where it is competitive, which is to say it provides equivalent 
service at lower cost or better service at an appropriate marginal cost.   
1.2.2 Market Incentives 
Proponents of market incentives argue that alternative technologies should not be 
required to compete on the same cost basis because the price signals are incorrect.  
Market incentives are recommended to correct for various market failures – public goods, 
externalities, inadequate or asymmetric information, and natural monopolies – that lead 
to inefficient markets or inequitable distribution of welfare.  Tax incentives to fuel 
producers have been used to stimulate production of ethanol and bio-diesel as well as 
stimulate further research.  Federal and state fuel taxes may also be restructured to 
decrease the relative cost of alternative fuels, on an energy content basis, to the 
consumer.  Tax incentives and disincentives have also been applied to vehicles, such as 
the federal ‘gas guzzler’ tax imposed on the most inefficient new cars.  Recently, federal 
and state income tax incentives have also been offered for the purchase of hybrid electric 
vehicles and alternative fuel vehicles (AFVs).  However, experience has shown that 
market incentives may need to be extreme to influence consumer behavior.   
1.2.3 Regulations 
Both R&D and market policies fundamentally rest on the assumptions of neo-
classical economics, with the understanding that true markets violate these assumptions 
in a limited sense.  However, experience has shown that these policies, even when 
combined, are not necessarily sufficient to insure that new technologies are deployed and 
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adopted.  The problem is that neo-classical economics relies on static analysis and has 
little to offer in terms of explaining the dynamic processes involved in transitioning from 
one equilibrium state to another. 
The establishment of regulations or standards can circumvent the difficulties 
posed by the dynamics of transitions by ‘forcing’ innovation in a particular direction and 
ensuring deployment.  This policy approach may be justified by the existence of market 
failures but is often criticized as being economically inefficient; there is no guarantee that 
the cost of meeting the regulation is equivalent to the value of the benefits.  Therefore, 
regulations are most often recommended when market failures lead to fairness or ethical 
issues which are difficult to place in monetary terms, such as the value of ecosystem 
services or human life. 
Historic examples of regulations related to vehicle fuel consumption include the 
federal Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards and California’s Zero 
Emission Vehicle (ZEV) mandates.  Such regulations alter the product’s design 
specifications by establishing functional standards, e.g., for fuel economy or tailpipe 
emissions.  Manufacturers must determine the best technological solution to meet the 
politically established requirements while simultaneously satisfying consumer demands.  
Thus, policy ‘forces’ innovation toward the solution of a particular problem, but does not 
define the search space. 
However, the politically established functional requirements may conflict with 
those of the market; existing or near-term technology may be unable to satisfy both at 
reasonable cost.  If manufacturers are unable to find an innovative solution, product cost 
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rises or performance falls as measured by consumer preferences.3  In this case, 
manufacturers may seek to modify the regulations or delay (or even halt) implementation, 
as has occurred with the California ZEV mandates.  Another possibility is that complex 
system dynamics may over time result in the innovation of new products that do satisfy 
both consumer preferences and the regulations as written, but this evolution may 
undermine the goals of the regulations.  For example, although vehicle manufacturers 
have generally met the CAFE standards, the overall fleet fuel economy has fallen since 
1987 due to changes in product offerings and an increasing light truck market share.  
Meanwhile, average weight and horsepower have risen appreciably 
1.2.4 Niche Approaches 
Where regulations tend to treat dynamic processes as a black box, niche 
approaches aim to influence them directly.  Niche approaches may be seen as arising 
from a theoretical model that departs drastically from neo-classical economics.  This 
model asserts that the difficulties faced in transitioning to alternative fuels arise because 
the transportation system is a complex dynamic system where positive feedbacks 
reinforce the dominance of the existing paradigm.  The existence of these feedbacks – 
learning, adaptive expectations, network effects, and economies of scale – pose 
significant challenges to the development and adoption of promising new technologies. 
In general, a niche can be defined as a distinct application domain, small in scale 
and scope, characterized by specific functional requirements (Hoogma et al., 2002; 
Raven, 2005).  Because of the special functional requirements of the niche, users are 
                                                 
3 Under CAFE, fuel economy standards are established for a manufacturer’s entire sales fleet.  Thus, if the 
cost of meeting the standard exceeds consumers’ willingness to pay, manufacturers must adjust prices to 
encourage the purchase of more efficient vehicles over less efficient ones, thus lowering profits, or opt to 
pay fines established by the regulations. 
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willing to accept higher cost or lower performance on other non-essential functionalities 
compared to those attained with any other products available in the market.  Niche 
approaches may be divided into two categories of policies, the first relating to 
experimental niches and the second to market niches.  Analogous to Hoogma’s (2000) 
‘technological niche,’ the term experimental niche refers to non-commercial exploration 
of a technology in a temporary ‘societal experiment’ where it is protected from market 
selection pressures and from the engineering and use practices established by the existing 
regime.  Market niches involve commercial production and occur naturally but may also 
be created by policies that provide varying degrees of protection from the selection 
environment. 
Explorations that create experimental niches include demonstration and pilot 
projects.  These experiments serve as a test-bed where production and use are 
investigated in an environment approaching real-world conditions. The goals of these 
projects vary.  In the most limited sense, they are used to test production processes and 
product performance, improve them, and reduce costs.  In the broader sense 
recommended by an emerging policy approach known as strategic niche management 
(SNM), experimental niches can be used to stimulate both behavioral and technical 
change as a stepping stone to a socio-technical transition.  According to Elzen et al. 
(2003, p. 177), “[r]adical change can initially begin at the fringes, in so-called niches, 
from which it spreads in conjunction with other developments.  SNM is directed at 
overcoming barriers to broader diffusion by exploiting niche dynamics.”  SNM identifies 
two key processes in such regime shifts: learning and institutional (or societal) 
embedding.  Therefore, the goals of SNM are to investigate user needs and to 
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simultaneously adapt both the technology and the social environment in which it is 
produced and used.  By altering agent (producer and user) perceptions and behavior 
toward the new technology, it becomes ‘embedded’ in a new rule set. 
Market niche policies guarantee a small market for new technologies.  Examples 
include federal fleet and fuel provider mandates for AFVs under EPAct and local fleet 
projects under the Clean Cities program.  Because of the structure of the California ZEV 
mandates, we may also consider that this policy intended to create a market niche for 
electric vehicles.  Only a percentage of vehicles sold by each manufacturer were required 
to meet the ZEV criteria of zero tailpipe and zero evaporative emissions, which, at the 
time the regulations were promulgated, could only be met by the battery-powered electric 
vehicle. 
One aim of market niche creation is to overcome the “chicken-and-egg” problem 
posed by network effects: manufacturers are unwilling to produce the alternative 
technology until there is market demand and an available fuel infrastructure, while fuel 
providers are unwilling to invest in infrastructure until there is demand for the fuel.  
While establishment of a stable market niche initiates commercial manufacturing, 
substantial emission reductions can only occur through widespread adoption.  Thus, the 
expectation is that processes within the niche market will facilitate development of a 
viable mass market. 
1.3 Theoretical Basis of Niche Approaches: An Overview 
Niche approaches have emerged as the only policies that target the dynamic 
processes underlying transitions in complex socio-technical systems.  These approaches 
clearly assert that processes within niches facilitate such transitions.  According to Elzen  
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et al. (2003), “Technological niches appear a necessary component of a regime renewal.  
They help to create a pathway to a new regime without which there will not be a new 
regime.  Niches act as stepping stones.”  The assertion of the fundamental role of niches 
in technological transitions, or the ‘niche hypothesis,’ is supported by two streams of 
research which arise from the tradition of evolutionary economics.  This section provides 
a brief overview of this research, summarizes the basic assumptions, and discusses some 
difficulties with this theoretical basis.  These findings are then used to construct a series 
of specific research questions that could help illuminate the over-arching issue presented 
in section 1.1.  Chapter 2 presents a more complete discussion of the research literature. 
1.3.1 The Quasi-Evolutionary Model 
The approach of SNM introduced in section 1.2.4 emerged from a body of 
research involving the ‘quasi-evolutionary’ (QE) model of innovation which arises from 
the tradition of evolutionary economics.  Evolutionary economics traces to Schumpeter 
(1939, 1942), but its application to innovation, which forms the basis of research on 
technological transitions, is based primarily on the work of Nelson and Winter (1977) and 
Dosi (1982, 1988). 
Evolutionary economics is a behavioral approach that departs from static analysis 
and rational behavior and instead focuses on learning processes and adaptive behavior.  
Drawing from the analogy with biological evolution, innovation is viewed as a complex 
interaction among firms, the economy, and society that is characterized by three 
processes (Witt, 1992; Metcalfe, 1994; Malerba, 2002): variation, or the generation of 
novelty; selection through social, political, and market mechanisms; and the retention of 
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successful variations through imitative and conservative behavior, routines, heuristics, 
and culturally learned behavioral patterns.   
A main theme that arises from evolutionary theory is the cumulative nature of 
knowledge and learning which leads to path dependence.  Thus, technological innovation 
proceeds along relatively well defined paths or trajectories.  This is not to say that 
technical progress is deterministic, but rather that past innovation makes improvements in 
certain directions easier.  In fact, the self-reinforcing nature of cumulative effects 
combined with the stochastic element of variation results in an inherent unpredictability 
of evolutionary systems. 
However, according to the QE literature, evolutionary descriptions of 
technological progress lack a sufficient description of the sociological dimensions of 
technological regimes (Schot, 1992; Kemp, 1994).  Therefore, a body of research has 
combined evolutionary theory with sociological and historical co-evolutionary models.  
In the resulting QE theory, a socio-technical regime is defined as “the whole complex of 
scientific knowledges, engineering practices, production process technologies, product 
characteristics, skills and procedures, and institutions and infrastructures that make up the 
totality of a technology” (Rip and Kemp, 1998).  The existence of technological 
trajectories, then, is accounted for by the fact that existing technologies are embedded in 
broader technical systems, production practices and routines, consumption patterns, 
engineering and management belief systems, and cultural values – collectively referred to 
as rules (Kemp et al., 1998).  In regime transitions, then, “both the technology and the 
system in which it is produced and used change through a process of co-evolution and 
mutual adaptation” (Kemp et al., 1998). 
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The key feature of the QE model is the “focus on the way variation and selection 
processes are partly independent and yet coupled” (Schot et al., 1994).  Heterogeneous 
actors link variation and selection in three ways (Schot, 1992).  First, entrepreneurs may 
anticipate selection and adjust the search heuristics used in innovation (ex ante selection).  
Second, institutional links between actors in the two processes create a ‘technological 
nexus’ which mediates between social and market requirements (selection) and 
technological opportunities and constraints (variation).    Third, actors may create a niche 
to protect variation against harsh selection. 
Raven (2005), based on Geels (2004), notes that the stability found in regimes 
results from the alignment of various rules, e.g. user preferences, automobile design, and 
government regulations.  This stability is dynamic; rules do change, with or without 
erosion of stability.  However, the alignment and embedded nature of rules that provides 
stability also results in resistance to change, and change is therefore incremental.  
Incremental change within a regime results in ‘regime optimization’ while radical 
innovation results in ‘regime renewal’ or transition (Elzen et al., 2003). 
In the QE model, new technologies gain momentum when the dominant 
technology cannot adapt to a changing selection environment or when they are protected 
against a harsh selection environment through niche creation.  Niches allow the 
technology to be developed in terms of user needs and to achieve wider use through 
learning processes and simultaneous adaptations in the selection environment.  A 
technological regime shift is conceptualized as a process of niche proliferation or niche 
branching as the new technology is adapted to new niches defined by new geographical 
regions or new application domains. 
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1.3.2 The Multi-level Perspective 
Geels (2002, 2004, 2005a, and 2005b) presents a second model of technical 
change based in the evolutionary tradition.  In the multi-level perspective (MLP), socio-
technical systems of innovation consist of a nested hierarchy of three heuristic levels: (1) 
the meso-level consists of socio-technical regimes, (2) the micro-level consists of 
technological niches; and (3) the macro-level is formed by the socio-technical landscape.  
The MLP stresses that system innovation occurs when simultaneous processes acting on 
multiple dimensions and levels “link up and reinforce each other” (Geels, 2005a). 
The MLP conceptualizes the innovation process through three phases.  In the first 
phase, novelties emerge within the context of the existing regime, in part due to 
landscape developments.  Entrepreneurs experiment with designs in an attempt to 
determine users’ requirements, and a variety of technical forms may compete with each 
other.  In the second phase, the novelty is adopted in niche markets which serve as 
incubators.  The innovation develops a technological trajectory and improves due to 
learning processes, while users explore new functionalities.  This phase results in the 
articulation of user preferences and the development of a dominant design.  The third 
phase is characterized by widespread diffusion of the innovation and competition with the 
established regime.   
Two patterns of transition emerge from the interplay between the levels in the 
perspective.  The ‘technological substitution route’ has a technology push character, 
where radical innovations emerge in niches and break into mainstream markets when 
they have sufficient momentum and when landscape developments put pressure on the 
existing regime. The ‘wider transformation route’ has a demand-pull character, where the 
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existing regime becomes unstable due to persistent problems or landscape changes.  
Simultaneous changes on multiple dimensions stimulate actors to experiment with new 
technical options. After a prolonged period of experimentation and strategic 
maneuvering, a particular option may acquire dominance and lead to the creation of a 
new socio-technical regime.  In both routes, three factors contribute to the wide diffusion 
of a new, radical, technology: 1) niche markets that act as incubators; 2) the penetration 
of the novelty into new application domains, leading to ‘niche-accumulation;’ and 3) 
circumstances at the regime or landscape level that create windows of opportunity.   
1.3.3 Summary 
Both the QE and MLP approaches integrate technological and sociological factors 
to describe the dynamic processes underlying technological transitions.  Both approaches 
also stress the role of niches – distinct application domains that are small in scale and 
scope.  The MLP describes a socio-technological regime transition as a process of ‘niche 
accumulation,’ while the QE model describes it as a process of ‘niche branching’ or 
‘niche proliferation.’  Based on the QE literature, I identify five fundamental assertions of 
the role of niches in regime transitions: 
1) Within the niche, manufacturers learn about users’ needs and users learn about 
product performance through “learning-by-interacting.” 
2) Manufacturers improve the technology in terms of those needs and achieve lower 
costs through “learning-by-doing.” 
3) As a result of these learning processes, the new technology becomes embedded in a 
new rule set which reflects the adaptation of institutions.  Both the technology and the 
system in which it is produced and used are altered in this co-evolutionary process 
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linking variation and selection which arises from the interaction of agents in the 
technological nexus. 
4) Growth of niche markets (or niche branching or niche proliferation) allows 
manufacturers to reduce costs through economies of scale. 
5) These changes facilitate diffusion into wider markets. 
The MLP and Raven (2005) add regime dynamics and instability as a significant 
factor in the growth (or lack of growth) of niches.  Instability may be due to three 
sources: 
1) Success of niche technology. 
2) External forces – changes at the landscape level – which influence the direction and 
rate of variation by altering regime agents’ perceptions and expectations or altering 
the resources available for variation; or alter the selection environment by altering 
prices or consumers’ preferences. 
3) Internal regime forces – difficulties with the expanding scale or scope of the existing 
regime or achievement of technological or economic limits of existing technology – 
which lead regime actors to view the new technology as a solution. 
1.3.4 Theoretical Issues 
Ultimately, a theory of transitions must be based on a complete theory of 
innovation that includes existing regimes as well as emerging technologies.  While early 
research on the quasi-evolutionary (QE) model began developing a robust theory of 
technical change, the literature has stressed the role of niches and recent work has shifted 
to a focus on SNM.  I believe this leaves important aspects of the QE theory of 
innovation under-developed, leaving promising opportunities for policy unexplored. 
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First, the focus on the coupling between variation and selection leads to an 
exclusive emphasis on learning-by-doing (learning curve effects) and learning-by-
interacting with users.  This yields an incomplete description of the innovative process 
behind product and process improvements that are critical for wide diffusion. 
Second, the technological nexus that links variation and selection is discussed as a 
key aspect of the process of embedding, yet remains an underdeveloped concept.  Who 
are the relevant agents?  How do new networks form and how are they sustained?  Are 
elements of existing networks important?  If so, how are they altered?   
Third, the focus on a single dominant regime neglects interactions with other 
existing regimes which may help or hinder market growth (Raven, 2005).  New 
technologies may address problems in multiple regimes or be based on fundamental 
innovations with applications that cut across regimes.  This relates back to the first and 
second issues, in that the process of innovation is more complex than is reflected in QE 
theory.  It involves multiple learning mechanisms and networks that tie the innovators to 
a relevant knowledge base.  These networks may link seemingly unrelated industries, 
particularly in the early phases of a technology’s life cycle. 
Fourth, as Raven (2005) notes, the focus on the operation of niches in competition 
with a stable regime results in a simplistic description of niche-regime interaction.  It 
neglects the dynamic processes within stable regimes (incremental change) that may 
either hinder or assist the diffusion of the new technology.  In particular, it neglects 
regime response to internal and external forces of change which cause instability.  Such 
challenges may be interpreted as opportunities for innovation, either for change within 
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the regime or for radical new technologies that lead to a complete regime transition.  This 
leads to the last issue.  
The dichotomy of regime optimization (incremental change) versus renewal 
(radical change and transition) is overly simplistic for complex technologies.  It places 
policy focus on transformation of the socio-technical regime in its entirety, which 
requires a complete alteration of both producer and user interpretations of technology and 
the related institutions.  Meanwhile, it discounts innovations which make only part(s) of 
the existing regime obsolete but could still radically reduce environmental impacts.  More 
significantly, it neglects intermediate or transitional technologies that may form a bridge 
to a new regime, such as hybrid and plug-in hybrid vehicles as a pathway to full electric 
or fuel cell vehicles.  In such a transition, only part(s) of the regime may be transformed 
at a given time. This deficiency is interesting, because early works on QE theory 
highlighted the significance of compatibility issues: new technologies that may be easily 
embedded in the existing production, use, and institutional systems will diffuse more 
rapidly.  According to Kemp (1994), “[o]nly in a few respects did radically new products 
constitute a radical break with the past, which suggests that the term ‘radical’ is 
somewhat misleading.  Radical innovations often combined the new with the old (or even 
combined older technologies) and often rightly so because this helped the product to 
survive the initial harsh market selection and establish itself in the market place.”  Thus, 
transitions can occur as a more gradual unfolding and adaptation of the existing regime 
than the path described by ‘regime renewal.’   
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1.3.5 Research Questions 
These findings from the literature lead to the following research questions related 
to the assumptions underlying the niche hypothesis, the role of the technological nexus in 
niche dynamics and the diffusion to wider markets, and regime dynamics and stability: 
• Is the role of niche markets as described in the literature historically accurate for the 
transition from horse-drawn to motorized vehicles? 
▫ Were learning-by-interacting with users and learning-by-doing the primary 
processes involved in improving the performance and cost of early motor 
vehicles? 
▫ Did growth in niche markets facilitate economies of scale? 
▫ Is niche branching, niche proliferation, or niche market growth an accurate 
description of the diffusion of the gasoline motor-vehicle into wider markets? 
• Is the linkage between selection and variation described by the technological nexus an 
accurate account of the interactions that produced the technological and institutional 
adaptations that facilitated wider diffusion of the automobile? 
▫ Who were the agents involved and from what regimes were they drawn? 
▫ How did elements of the existing regime(s) influence their identities and roles?  
How were these identities and roles altered? 
▫ What formal institutions were developed and what contributed to their stability 
and longevity? 
▫ How were the variation and selection environments altered?  Did this co-
evolution occur within the context of niches? 
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▫ Was the selection-variation linkage the most significant network contributing to 
technological and institutional adaptations? 
• Were other factors related to niche-regime interaction important in facilitating the 
transition to motor vehicles? 
▫ In what ways were early motor vehicles compatible with the existing regime(s)?  
How did this compatibility evolve and eventually diverge? 
▫ Did regime instability contribute to the transition?  If so, what were the causes of 
this instability? 
▫ What role did unexpected exogenous events play in existing and emerging regime 
instability and the adaptation of institutions? 
1.4 Approach 
To answer the research questions posed above, I review the historical transition 
from horse-drawn to gasoline-powered motor-vehicles within a co-evolutionary 
framework of innovation based in evolutionary and quasi-evolutionary theory.  However, 
in order to account for the issues discussed in section 1.3.4, this framework is constructed 
using contributions from two additional bodies of research:  the industrial lifecycle model 
(Abernathy, 1978; Abernathy et al., 1983; Abernathy and Utterback, 1978; Utterback and 
Abernathy, 1975; Anderson and Tushman, 1990) and mechanisms of learning in 
innovation.  In this fashion, I attempt to take advantage of the explanatory power of some 
of the technical details found in these approaches while avoiding their shortcomings in 
describing the sociological dimensions of technical change.  This framework is not 
proposed as a new model of innovation or a complete theory of technological transitions, 
but rather uses concepts and insights from several bodies of theory to provide the 
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structure and vocabulary to trace the historic development of motor vehicle technology 
and its diffusion to wider markets.  This section provides a brief overview of this analytic 
framework which is developed in Chapter 2. 
1.4.1 Analytic Framework 
First, I take from Malerba (2002) the perspective of the sectoral system of 
innovation and production which is defined as “a set of new and established products for 
specific uses and the set of agents carrying out market and non-market interactions for the 
creation, production and sale of those products.”  This sector operates within a socio-
technical system with a technological and social history, all of which is embedded in the 
natural environment.  Therefore, the actions and interactions of the agents are shaped by 
institutions.  Institutions in this context are analogous to QE’s rules and are defined to 
include any form of social construct or constraint on human interactions.  Viewing the 
sectoral system within an institutional context then approaches the concept of a socio-
technical regime, but the focus is clearly on the agents involved in innovation and 
production.  In addition, the focus remains on system dynamics: “Over time, a sectoral 
system undergoes processes of change and transformation through the co-evolution of its 
various elements” (Malerba, 2002). 
Second, I take from industrial lifecycle models the concept that technologies, 
firms, industries, and markets typically progress through a series of phases: emergent, 
transitional, specific, and senescent (Utterback and Abernathy, 1975; Abernathy and 
Utterback, 1978).  Although the phases lie on a continuum with indistinct boundaries, the 
character of a sector at a given time can be related generally to this typology.  The 
emergent phase is characterized by new technologies, niche markets, rapid innovation, 
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and a focus on product improvement.  The specific phase is characterized by dominant 
technologies, mass markets, incremental innovation, and a focus on process 
improvement.  A dominant design is a (temporarily) stable description of the functional 
requirements of the technology and the product attributes used to fulfill them.  The 
specific phase thus exhibits the stability of a socio-technical regime that results from the 
alignment of institutions (rules) and a mature technology. 
I borrow from Anderson and Tushman (1990) the idea that innovation is cyclic; 
after an industry attains the specific phase, incremental innovation is punctuated by 
periods of ‘ferment.’  This is represented by movement from the specific phase into a 
new transitional phase. However, where Anderson and Tushman describe these periods 
as initiated by stochastic technological breakthroughs, I allow for the possibility that non-
technical phenomena (social, political, economic) may create instability which presents 
opportunities for innovation or even forms the basis of the innovation of new production 
processes or usage norms.  Thus, the phase typology gives structure to the dynamics of 
niche-regime interactions and the central role of stability.  In addition, the cyclic aspect of 
this framework accounts for transition within an existing regime which is understood as a 
redefinition of the product’s functional requirements and the realignment of the 
technology through the emergence of a new dominant design. 
I then add a richer description of the learning mechanisms in innovation, relying 
primarily on Malerba (1992), but incorporating the work of various other researchers.  
This provides the vocabulary to explore the processes underlying product and production 
process improvements that facilitate the movement from niche to wider markets.  I 
identify four learning mechanisms: internal research and development, learning-by-doing, 
22 
learning-by-interacting, and spillovers.  The boundaries of these classifications are not 
necessarily distinct since entrepreneurial activities often fall within more than one class.  
In addition, the ability of entrepreneurs to learn by each mechanism is influenced 
activities in other classes.  All four sources are expected to contribute to the advance of a 
given technology at any point in time.  However, industry lifecycle models predict that 
the relative importance of these mechanisms will depend, among other things, on the 
industry’s and technology’s phase of development.   
This conceptual framework has the following advantages: 
1) It places focus on the behavior of entrepreneurs (agents of change) which allows 
examination of learning processes within and among firms and is consistent with the 
fundamentally behavioral nature and micro-focus of evolutionary theory.  According 
to Kemp (1994), “the relationship between firm behaviour and technological regime 
shifts is a relatively underresearched area.” 
2) It allows further exploration of the network of agents involved in variation (the 
entrepreneurs) and selection (consumers, policy makers, and society at large) and the 
two-way linkage between the two processes through the technological nexus.  
According to Schot (1992), “The activities of a technological nexus result in a 
learning process, which takes place both in the firm, a place where an important part 
of the variation process is located, and in its environment.” 
3) It allows exploration of the full range of learning processes underlying innovation and 
transitions to determine whether learning-by-doing and learning-by-interacting with 
users are indeed the appropriate focus for policy. 
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4) It allows exploration of the dynamic processes of innovation and transition within a 
regime in response to internally and externally generated challenges.  This in turn 
determines how regime instability will influence the growth of niches. 
1.4.2 Data 
As developed in this research, innovation is a synthetic process whereby 
entrepreneurs combine existing artifacts and threads of thought with personal inspiration 
and insight to create a new whole that is more than the sum of its individual and, to some 
extent, preexisting components (Rycroft and Kash, 1999).  This dissertation applies that 
very process to a study of the history of innovation in the automotive industry in order to 
develop insights on the sources of technological progress and transitions to new 
technological regimes.  It is largely an historical study that presents no new data, but 
rather presents a new organization and re-analysis of the work of many very able 
historians and analysts.  In defense of this approach, I borrow the words of Flink (1970, 
p. 9):  “…in the interest of economy of research and in the belief that the writing of 
history must be a cumulative process based upon considerable trust in one’s predecessors, 
I have not hesitated to deal synthetically, in the main, with those aspects of the history of 
the automobile industry that have already been examined in detail by others and to 
eschew firsthand reexamination of the various industry sources upon which previous 
studies have been primarily based.”  By using a variety of such sources, I hope to 
minimize selection and interpretation biases. 
1.5 Significance of the Dissertation 
Addressing climate change will require a transition to alternative transportation 
technologies.  Constructing effective policies to facilitate such socio-technical transitions 
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requires an understanding of the underlying mechanisms and processes of innovation and 
the mutual adaptation of technology and institutions.  Therefore, this research adds to the 
policy debate on stimulating innovation and diffusion of new technologies to address 
climate change. 
Prior analysis of the transition to motor vehicles has followed two general 
approaches.  The first approach describes transition as a process of logistic substitution 
where old and new technologies compete for market share beginning with the initial 
introduction of the new innovation (Grübler, 1998); Nakićenović, 1986).  While the data 
supports a logistic substitution, this aggregate representation masks the underlying 
process of change.  The second approach, found in the MLP literature, attempts to 
remedy this issue by examining the dynamics between niches, socio-technical regimes, 
and the wider socio-technical landscape (Geels, 2005b).  However, by focusing on 
interactions between the regime and the wider socio-technical context, this approach still 
has an aggregate representation of the components of sectoral systems of innovation and 
production and is ill-structured to examine processes within that system.  In other words, 
innovation processes found within and between firms in the regime remain inside the 
black box.   
This research takes a unique approach and examines socio-technical change from 
the perspective of the entrepreneur.  Thus, this research adds to the literature on socio-
technical transitions by examining specifically the role of entrepreneurial behavior and 
learning processes within and among firms in the historical co-evolution of technologies 
and institutions during the transition to automobiles.  As a result of this unique approach, 
I show that the conception of innovation in theories of socio-technical transitions is 
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overly simplistic and would benefit from a richer description of mechanisms of learning 
such as the one used in this research.  I also show that firm-specific histories and rules 
constraining interaction shaped the strategies and adaptive capabilities of firms.  These 
strategies, and thus firm-specific rules, had a large impact on the development and 
diffusion of the technology.  This finding supports the use of a behavioral approach with 
a micro-focus in the analysis of innovation and socio-technical change. 
1.6 Organization of the Dissertation 
This dissertation is organized as follows.  Chapter 2 reviews the analytical 
literature on evolutionary approaches to innovation and socio-technical transitions.  This 
section identifies the fundamental assumptions and assertions of the literature as well as 
some shortcomings.  It then reviews several strands of innovation research that may be 
used to illuminate and improve on these shortcomings.  In the final section of this chapter 
I synthesize these approaches to formulate a framework for analysis.  Chapters  3 through 
5 then review the historic development of gasoline motor vehicles and places this history 
within the framework developed in chapter 2 to analyze the development of the personal 
transportation regime based on this technology.  These chapters are roughly 
chronological but overlapping.  Chapter 6 provides a summary of the findings and 
discusses the implications for theories of socio-technical transitions and policies intended 
to foster technological innovation and transitions.  I conclude this chapter by outlining 
areas for future research.
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2.0 Innovation and Technological Transitions 
…the scope for policy is not to optimise with respect to some objective 
function… but rather to stimulate the introduction and spread of 
improvements in technology.  At the core of this approach are complexity, 
cognitive limitations, and the role of organizations… 
-- Metcalfe, 1994 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Although the role of innovation in the economy has long been recognized, the 
underlying mechanisms of learning and progress are less understood, particularly as they 
relate to transitions.  The study of innovation is complicated by the fact that it does not 
fall neatly into a single academic discipline.  According to Smits (2002), “the discipline 
of innovation studies is not a firmly integrated theoretical bastion,” but rather “can be 
typified as an evolving (inter)discipline that finds itself at the crossroads of sociological 
and historic scientific and technological research, economic innovation studies and policy 
studies.”  The literature on innovation is therefore vast with wide variation in goals, 
scope, and approach. 
The earliest research in technical progress considered the role of innovation in 
economic progress and international competitiveness.  This research therefore focused on 
macroeconomic impacts and treated the innovative process as a “black box.”  Other areas 
of innovation research have been concerned with economic progress in developing 
countries, innovation market failures, firm decision-making and strategy, firm survival, 
industrial and institutional change, explaining the success or failure of specific 
technologies, and most recently, advancing technologies for mitigating climate change.  
As these bodies of research have grown, frameworks for studying innovation have 
evolved from static, neoclassical economic models to complex system dynamic models.  
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The evolutionary approach to innovation is a subclass of dynamic system theories which 
is distinguished by a behavioral theory of the firm and a focus on learning and adaptation 
(Metcalfe, 1994). 
Because a transition is by definition dynamic – a process of moving from one 
state to another – the study of technological transitions has built on these later models.  
This dissertation is concerned primarily with the assertions of two streams of research on 
technological transitions that have emerged from the evolutionary approach: the quasi-
evolutionary model (QEM) and the multi-level perspective (MLP). 
This chapter presents a selective review of the literature on innovation and 
technological transitions.  In sections 2.2 and 2.3 I review the origins and significant 
contributions of evolutionary systems theories of innovation as it relates to understanding 
innovative processes.  In section 2.4 I review the literature on the QEM and the MLP.  
This review presents the assertions of these models in regard to the role of niches in 
technological transitions and discusses a number of theoretical difficulties.  In section 2.5 
I review two additional bodies of innovation research – the industry life-cycle model and 
mechanisms of learning in innovation – that I then use in conjunction with the QEM and 
MLP to construct an analytical framework that accounts for these difficulties.  This 
framework is summarized in section 2.6 and serves as a guide for analysis of the history 
of the transition to automobiles. 
2.2 From Neoclassical Economics to System Theories 
Systems theories of innovation arose largely due to dissatisfaction with the 
neoclassical economic view in handling two separate classes of research: management of 
research and development in industrialized countries and economic growth in developing 
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countries (Sahal, 1981).  This dissatisfaction rests on four main criticisms of neoclassical 
economics: the focus on static analysis; the focus on aggregate phenomena; the treatment 
of innovation as an exogenous process; and the simplistic characterization of firm 
behavior based on rational agents.   
Section 2.2.1 describes the neoclassical conception of innovation and introduces 
the shortcomings of this approach in studying the process of technological change.  
Section 2.2.2 presents the earliest dynamic model of innovation and the progression of 
understanding that led to the development of complex systems models of innovation, 
which are discussed in section 2.2.3. 
2.2.1 Neoclassical Conception of Innovation 
In neoclassical economics, technology is conceptualized by means of the 
production function, which represents the relationship between combinations of inputs of 
production and the resulting output.  Theoretically, the production function specifies all 
technically feasible modes of production under existing knowledge (Sahal, 1981).  The 
production function is typically illustrated by a convex isoquant, which represents the 
various combinations of inputs required to produce a fixed amount of output.  
Technological advance is then defined as an increase in productivity such that fewer 
inputs are required to produce the same quantity of output, thus shifting the production 
function toward the origin.   
Schumpeter (1939) defines innovation as the “setting up of a new production 
function.”  Solow (1957) defines technical change as a “…shorthand expression for any 
kind of shift in the production function.  Thus slowdowns, speedups, improvements in the 
education of the labor force, and all sorts of things will appear as ‘technical change.’”  In 
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other words, innovation allows the economy to produce at a given level of output using 
fewer resources (e.g., capital and labor).4   
While developed theoretically at the level of the individual firm, research 
applying the production function typically considers the aggregate function of an entire 
industry or nation.  Although this concept has provided insight for macroeconomic 
policy, it leads to a number of theoretical and practical difficulties, the full details of 
which are beyond the scope of this discussion (Sahal, 1981).  What is important to note is 
that a static analysis of the impact of technical change on the aggregate output of an 
entire sector or economy provides little insight into the internal drivers and dynamics of 
that change, and is therefore of little use to those seeking to manage or influence 
innovation (Grübler, 1998).  For this purpose, we must examine the innovative process, 
i.e. the activities involved in setting up a new production function.   
Unfortunately, neoclassical economic theory has little to say about the process of 
moving from one production function to another.  At worst, innovation is treated as an 
entirely exogenous process and a new production function is simply imposed.  At best, 
innovation is treated as a response to an exogenous change in data, namely the price of 
labor or capital.  Attempts to explain technical change within neoclassical growth models 
rely on the familiar assumptions of rational, maximizing behavior and static equilibrium.  
The resulting theory of induced innovation introduces the innovation possibilities 
function (IPF) which represents the envelope of all alternative production functions 
attainable with available innovative resources (time and skill) (Ahmad, 1966).  In 
                                                 
4 More recently, researchers of economic development have shifted focus from the mechanics of the 
production function to how innovation creates a “learning society,” that in turn indirectly improves an 
economy’s productivity.  In this view, the most important product of the innovative process is expansion of 
the knowledge base (Conceiçãoa et al., 2003). 
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response to exogenous changes in factor prices, firms are assumed to choose a level of 
investment in research that will maximize expected profits, possibly within the 
constraints of a research budget. 
Researchers have pointed out difficulties with the theory of induced innovation, 
including theoretical criticisms of the IPF, the single focus on productivity enhancements 
through reductions in capital and labor inputs, and the assumption of profit maximization 
as the basis of entrepreneurial effort.  While a complete review of these shortcomings is 
beyond the scope of this discussion, it is worthwhile to note two points.  First, the IPF is 
independent of history; the returns to research effort in a given time period are 
independent of what research was pursued and what production techniques were used in 
the past (Nordhaus, 1973).  Second, the assumption of profit maximizing behavior, even 
when uncertainty and risk are considered, is overly simplistic.  In reality, research is often 
under-taken by individuals and organizations not motivated by profit.  Further, 
entrepreneurs face cognitive and resource limitations when selecting from an enormous 
range of possible research projects with uncertain prospects.  According to Nelson and 
Winter (1977), the assumption of profit maximizing behavior “suggests an unrealistic 
degree of inevitability and correctness in the choices made, represses the fact that 
interpersonal and interorganizational differences in judgment and perception matter a lot, 
and that it is not at all clear ex-ante, except perhaps to God, what is the right think to do.” 
In addition, shifting focus from static analysis to dynamic processes alone is not 
sufficient.  A macro-level conception of technological progress based on aggregate 
phenomena and macro-level innovation policies are ill-suited to address research 
questions such as those studied here.  Research has shown that rates of innovation vary 
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greatly among economic sectors and industries, and policies must therefore be designed 
to influence the sector of interest.  Effective policies must consider the nature of current 
and appropriate institutional structures, which in turn depends on the underlying 
technologies themselves (Nelson and Winter, 1977; Nelson and Langlois, 1983).   
Further, neoclassical theory of innovation focuses on productivity measures, and 
essentially assumes that product characteristics are fixed.  However, in manufacturing 
firms as much as 90% of research and development (R&D) effort and 75% of R&D 
results relate to changes in product characteristics or development of new products.  In 
addition, a number of econometric studies have indicated that a large proportion of 
productivity growth is attributable to changes in the quality of inputs (Sahal, 1981). 
2.2.2 Dynamic Models of Innovation 
The need for a more satisfying conceptualization of the dynamic process of 
innovation has led to the development of a large number of system dynamic models.  
Schumpeter (1939, 1942) was perhaps the first economist to emphasize the role of the 
dynamic process of innovation in the economy, a process that “incessantly revolutionizes 
the economic structure from within, incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly 
creating a new one.”  While most economists stressed the price equalizing effect of 
competition for homogenous goods, Schumpeter (1942) instead asserted that the process 
of “Creative Destruction” was “the essential fact about capitalism” and “the powerful 
lever that in the long run expands output and brings down prices.”  
Schumpeter described three distinct processes of innovative activity: invention, 
innovation, and diffusion.  Invention creates new ideas that may be scientific, 
technological, or even organizational.  While the creative process may be stimulated by 
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economic and social conditions, the product of invention is only a potential with no 
realized economic or social value.  It is the entrepreneur’s role5, through innovation, to 
create economic value, “to reform or revolutionize the pattern of production by exploiting 
an invention or, more generally, an untried technological possibility for producing a new 
commodity or producing an old one in a new way, by opening up a new source of supply 
of material or a new outlet for products, by reorganizing an industry and so on” 
(Schumpeter, 1939).  From this definition, innovations can by classified as either product 
innovations (producing a new commodity) or process innovations (producing an old 
commodity in a new way).6  The entrepreneur temporarily occupies a monopolistic 
position in the market and realizes economic profits.  In the final process of diffusion, 
imitators bring competition to the market, bidding down the price, eroding the 
entrepreneurs’ profits and moving the market toward economic equilibrium (Schumpeter, 
1939 and 1942; Langlois, 2002; Godin, 2005). 
Consistent with Schumpeter’s description, one of the first frameworks used to 
study the innovative process followed a sequential linear model that traced the flow of 
information and the time progression from scientific research and invention, to 
technological innovation and development, to production and market diffusion.  The 
linear model underpins the “science-driven” or “technology-push” theory of innovation 
that holds that invention creates the possibility for new products or processes, and thus 
drives innovation.  It is not clear when the framework was first articulated, though some 
                                                 
5 In this discussion, the term ‘entrepreneur’ refers to all innovating units, including individuals, teams, or 
entire firms. 
6 The distinction between process and product innovations depends on the unit of analysis.  One 
entrepreneur’s product innovation may be applied in the manufacture of an existing product.  Thus the new 
product becomes a process innovation for the adopting entrepreneur (Abernathy and Utterback, 1978).  
Often the two entrepreneurial units are the same, as when new process equipment is developed within the 
user firm or industry (Pavitt, 1984).  
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attribute the origin of linear model to Schumpeter’s “trilogy” of invention, innovation, 
and diffusion.  However, Schumpeter himself clearly refuted linear dependence and 
causality by asserting that innovation “is possible without anything we should identify as 
invention and invention does not necessarily induce innovation” (Schumpeter, 1939).  
According to Godin (2005), “[t]he precise source of the linear model remains nebulous, 
having never been documented.”  Godin suggests that it developed in stages over a period 
of decades, and “is a theoretical construction of industrialists, consultants and business 
schools, seconded by economists.” 
The linear model has been heavily criticized beginning as early as the 1960s 
(Godin, 2005).  A main criticism of the model is its independence from the economic and 
social environment.  According to Dosi (1982), “extreme forms of technology-push 
approaches, allowing for a one-way causal determination (from science to technology to 
the economy) fail to take into account the intuitive importance of economic factors in 
shaping the direction of technical change.”  Economic, institutional, and social factors all 
serve to focus innovative activities on certain technological problems and to select certain 
trajectories to the exclusion of others (Rosenberg, 1976; Dosi, 1982).  
Griliches (1957) and Schmookler (1962, 1966) found empirical evidence of the 
importance of market demand in stimulating inventive activities.  This research has been 
used to support the “demand-pull” theory of innovation, which holds that unmet 
consumer needs drive investment in invention and innovation – ‘necessity is the mother 
of invention.’  However, demand-pull theory assumes the “possibility of knowing a 
priori… the direction in which the market is ‘pulling’ the inventive activity” (Dosi, 1982; 
emphasis in original).  This requires that consumers’ needs are effectively articulated as 
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demands in the market via price and quantity signals, and that they are interpreted by a 
responsive industry (Mowery and Rosenberg, 1979; Freeman, 1996; Dosi, 1982).  There 
is little doubt that the market plays an important role in stimulating innovative activity by 
presenting problems, opportunities, and targets that focus the search process.  Freeman 
(1982) lists market forecasting among the factors that distinguish successful attempts at 
innovation.  However, researchers find insufficient evidence to conclude that consumer 
needs articulated through market signals are the primary drivers of innovation (Mowery 
and Rosenberg, 1979; Dosi, 1982).  Indeed, the entrepreneurs of major innovations of the 
last century, including the telephone, computer, and laser, often underestimated the 
importance of and market for their products (Rosenberg, 1996).  The ultimate range of 
application for these products depended on unforeseeable advances in the technologies, 
the development of complimentary technologies, and co-evolutionary processes.  Market 
demand, then, is more appropriately considered a necessary, but not sufficient, condition 
for successful innovation. 
Further, Dosi points out the “general weakness of market mechanisms” in 
selecting the direction of technological progress, especially in the early phase of an 
industry’s development, and the inability of demand-pull theories in explaining why and 
when certain innovations occur (Dosi, 1982).  Freeman (1994) asserts that the empirical 
evidence of innovations characterized as demand led were “actually minor innovations 
along established trajectories.”  Meanwhile technology push patterns have been shown to 




In 1991, Rosenberg claimed, “Everyone knows that the linear model of 
innovation is dead.”  Yet according to Godin (2005), the linear model survives, “despite 
regular criticisms… due to statistics. Having become entrenched…, the linear model 
functioned as a ‘social fact’.  Rival models, because of their lack of statistical 
foundations, could not easily become substitutes.” 
2.2.3 Systems View of Innovation 
In reality, innovation is a complex dynamic process that is neither independent of 
the economy nor purely demand driven.  Indeed, the history of individual innovations 
often is characterized by an iterative and co-evolutionary socio-cultural process whereby 
firms respond to demand, supply, and institutional forces (Mowery and Rosenberg, 
1979).  Innovation, then, is more accurately viewed as a complex interaction among 
firms, the economy, and society that links “potential users with new developments in 
science and technology” (Freeman, 1996, emphasis added).  The systems approach to 
innovation is therefore founded on the idea that innovation cannot be understood solely 
by examining independent decision-making at the level of the firm.  Rather, researchers 
must consider the interaction of firms with their environment, which is taken to include 
not only customers and suppliers, but also the broader factors shaping firm behavior.  
This includes the social and cultural context; institutional and organization frameworks; 
and infrastructures (Smith, 2000).   
By definition, a system is composed of a group of independent yet functionally 
interrelated elements that together comprise a unified whole.  These interdependent 
elements or subsystems are linked by a network of feedbacks.  A system’s characteristics 
then derive from the functional properties of the whole, which are more than the simple 
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aggregation of its subsystems or parts.  In the systems view, “technology is best 
understood in terms of its functional attributes” (Sahal, 1981).  Among its advantages, the 
systems view clearly maintains a focus on dynamics in terms of change in functional 
performance.  In addition, it emphasizes the continuous and cumulative nature of 
innovation, as improvements in functional performance build upon prior achievements. 
Complex systems models highlight the systemic nature of innovation and are 
characterized by multidirectional links among the sources and stages of technical change 
at any point in time.  Such a model blurs the lines between types and phases of research 
and innovation, and instead stresses the exchange and exploitation of new knowledge by 
researchers, engineers, designers, manufacturers, suppliers, and users.  While there is 
wide variation in the focus and goals of system dynamics studies, these models of 
innovation share the following important characteristics (adapted from Freeman, 1996; 
Soete and Arundel, 1993).  These characteristics are discussed further in section 2.3.2 in 
relation to evolutionary systems. 
1) Multidirectional links at the same point in time between the stages of technical 
change; 
2) Complex interactions of firms within the industry, with supporting industries, and 
with seemingly unrelated industries; 
3) Complex interactions with the socio-economic environment; 
4) Central role for knowledge and assimilation through learning; 
5) Cumulative and self-reinforcing processes; 
6) Increasing complexity over time in technology, industry, and innovative process. 
There has been a recent surge in systems approaches within the innovation 
literature, with authors describing our society as increasingly complex and nonlinear 
(Rycroft and Kash, 1999) with a trend toward “a system with strongly linked fuzzy 
 
37 
components” Smits (2002).  This thinking, however, is not new.  Rosenberg (1963) 
referred to the industrialization of the 19th century as “involving, not only growing 
specialization, but also growing complexity and differentiation.”  Abernathy and 
Utterback (1978) recognized the importance of understanding the production process as 
“a system of linked productive units” and noted that “[m]ajor change at one level works 
its way up and down the chain…”     
Systems themes can be found in studies of the role of innovation in economic 
progress, how firms manage innovation and survive industry transitions, and the forces 
behind sector transitions.  In considering the challenges to firms and policymakers 
managing innovation, Smits (2002) asserts that “[i]n the network society…innovating in 
chains, networks and systems becomes more and more important.”  Conceiçãoa et al. 
(2003) consider the role of innovation for promoting growth in developing countries, and 
assert that “…innovation should be understood as a broad social and economic activity: it 
should transcend any specific technology, even if revolutionary...”   Dijkema et al. (2006) 
assert that fostering environmental sustainability requires a shift in our “techno-economic 
paradigm.”  Rather than focusing on corporations, production plants, or individual 
technologies, they claim that sustainability research must consider innovation in the 
entire lifespan of a product; the entire production network; and the stakeholders and 
decision processes, including business organization, public institutions, and policy and 
regulatory frameworks. 
Most relevant, however, is the research in sectoral systems of innovation.  
Ultimately, technologies provide societal functions, such as transportation.  The need for 
a social function is satisfied, not by a single technology or industry, but rather by a 
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complex system of social, technical, and institutional elements, including supply 
networks; related industries; physical infrastructures and maintenance industries; 
government, industry, and research institutions; markets; and society (Unruh, 2000; 
Geels, 2005b).  How such a system is defined – its elements, its boundaries, and its 
linkages and interactions with the external environment – varies greatly among 
researchers.  Unruh (2000) refers to a techno-institutional complex (TIC); Nelson and 
Winter (1977) refer to a technological regime; Geels (2002) defines a socio-technical 
regime embedded in a socio-technical landscape.  For the purpose of discussing 
evolutionary theory in general, I will refer to the socio-technical system and its 
environment.  The socio-technical system is composed of heterogeneous elements of 
three general types: physical artifacts; human actors and organizations; and a complex set 
of constraints on human interactions with each other and with the physical elements in 
the system (Geels, 2004).  Various authors refer to these constraints as institutions or 
rules, which include formal constraints such as legislation, economic rules, and legal 
contracts and informal constraints such as social conventions, moral codes, and shared 
knowledge and beliefs.   
2.3 Evolutionary Systems Theory of Innovation 
The evolutionary approach to innovation represents a special class of complex 
systems theories and adds an additional and distinctive feature: “its adoption of a 
behavioural theory of the firm and its focus upon learning processes and adaptive 
behavior” (Metcalfe, 1994).  Thus, the shift away from static analysis to dynamic 
processes – from ‘being’ to ‘becoming’ – and from a macro to a micro focus is captured 
in evolutionary approaches.  There is wide variation in the scope and methods found in 
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evolutionary economics, but all focus on the process of economic change which is 
endogenously generated (Witt, 1992; Metcalfe, 1995).  In fact, endogeneity is a central 
hypothesis, and Witt (1992) defines evolution as the self-transformation of a system over 
time.  According to Metcalfe (1995), “evolution means two things: the gradual unfolding 
of phenomena in a cumulative and thus path-dependent way; and quite separately, a 
dynamics of system behaviour which creates change and emerging structure from variety 
in behaviour.” 
Evolutionary economics discards the global objective function, well defined 
choice sets, maximizing behavior, rational choice, and the global production function.  
Instead, it “places emphasis on cognitive dimensions such as beliefs, objectives and 
expectation, in turn affected by previous learning and experience and by the environment 
in which agents act” (Malerba, 2002).  Drawing from Witt (1992), Dosi (1997), Ruttan 
(1997), Metcalfe (1995), and Malerba (2002), the methodological building blocks central 
to an evolutionary approach can be summarized as: 
1) The emphasis on dynamics: becoming, rather than being. 
2) Behavioral, or micro, focus: what agents do, and why. 
3) Imperfect understanding and bounded rationality, broadly defined. 
4) Heterogeneity of agent knowledge, perception, behavior and learning. 
5) Continuous creation of novelty or variety in technologies, products, processes, 
firms and organizations due to the local search for innovation. 
6) Interactions of agents that collectively act as selection mechanisms, reducing 
variety and generating system inertia and continuity, including: 
a) imitation of the practices of other agents; 
b) conservative behavior; 
c) culturally learned interpretation patterns, world views, and paradigms; 
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d) satisficing economic behavior; 
e) market selection. 
7) Aggregate phenomena are emergent properties of non-equilibrium interactions 
and heterogenous learning, and have a ‘metastable nature’, i.e. they persist longer 
than the processes that generate them, but disappear eventually.  
2.3.1 Basic Evolutionary Concepts 
Evolutionary approaches entail three processes based on the biological analogy: 
variation, selection, and retention.  These basic evolutionary concepts are summarized in 
this section.  A more complete discussion is included in section 2.3.2 elaborating the 
characteristics of evolutionary systems models. 
The generation of variety in biological systems is a process of mutation caused by 
random errors in replication.  In evolutionary economics, the generation of variety or 
novelty is the “outcome of human creativity and of the discovery of new possibilities for 
action” (Witt, 1992).  Some researchers have interpreted the biological analogy rather 
literally, asserting that “[v]ariation is driven by stochastic technological breakthroughs” 
(Anderson and Tushman, 1990; Tushman and Rosenkopf, 1992) that result from research 
by “trial and error” (Raven, 2005).7  This interpretation is unnecessarily restrictive and 
inconsistent with the main goal of evolutionary theory to explain endogenous processes.  
In one of the foundational evolutionary works, Nelson and Winter (1977) conceptualize 
innovation as “purposive, but inherently stochastic.”  Metcalfe (1994) asserts that “it is 
central to the evolutionary approach that the creation of diversity is neither blind nor 
                                                 
7 Tushman and Rosenkopf (1992) interpret variation as a blind process driven by chance events (stochastic 
technological breakthroughs), while technological advance resulting from the “puzzle-solving actions of 
many organizations learning-by-doing” is treated as a retention process.  In this research, I interpret 
variation to include all processes that result in new or enhanced products or processes, regardless of 
whether the advance is incremental or ‘radical.’ 
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unbounded.”  Instead, innovative behavior is “intentional and guided” (Metcalfe, 1994) 
which results in trajectories of development.   
Innovation – the accumulation of knowledge and its application to new domains – 
is the result of a fundamental characteristic of the restless capitalist economy: the search 
for profit opportunities and the pursuit of competitive advantage.  Witt (1992) proposes 
two additional motivations for agents to experiment with new technologies: preference 
for novelty and frustration with the status quo.  Preference for novelty explains a basic 
rate of innovation, while frustration explains innovation in response to crises.  It is 
notable that rational choice models cannot explain such emotional motivations as 
frustration.  Witt, therefore, adopts an adaptive aspiration and satisficing model for 
decision-making. 
In biology, selection refers to the Darwinian concept of ‘survival of the fittest.’  In 
evolutionary economics, variations in technologies (products and processes) and 
organizations are selected through social, political, and market mechanisms.  Most 
evolutionary research focuses on market selection and stresses social and political 
selection factors only for ‘non-market’ sectors such as public education and defense.8  
Market selection entails the introduction of technologies and entry of new firms; the 
elimination of unprofitable technologies and firms; and changes in the relative 
importance or market position of surviving technologies and firms.  Selection reduces 
variety, as “competition consumes its own fuel” (Metcalfe, 1994).  Because survival or 
‘fitness’ of a firm or technology is judged relative to the average of its rivals (the 
                                                 
8 See, for example, Nelson and Winter (1977) and Dosi (1997). 
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population), evolutionary systems do not guarantee optimal outcomes; any optimum that 
is achieved is only local (Witt, 1992; Metcalfe, 1994).   
However, markets represent only one mode of selection.  According to Metcalfe 
(1995), “[a]ny framework in which agents interact in order to choose between competing 
patterns of behaviour has selective properties.”  Of particular note are selection 
environments internal to innovating organizations.  Agents learn from experience, 
anticipate future market selection, and use this information to choose from a vast array of 
alternative research projects and approaches.  Thus technological variation and selection 
are linked. 
In biological systems, the final evolutionary process of retention is accomplished 
through the replication of successful variations through reproduction.  In economic 
systems, retention occurs through imitative and conservative behavior; the development 
of routines; culturally learned interpretation patterns; world views and paradigms.  Most 
evolutionary theories of innovation treat retention as a cognitive process within the minds 
of researchers and engineers (Raven, 2005).  For example, Nelson and Winter (1977) 
describe a broadly defined ‘technological regime’ as a cognitive concept “relating to 
technicians’ beliefs about what is feasible or at least worth attempting.”  Co-evolutionary 
processes result in a core technological framework or paradigm which is shared by the 
entire community of technological and economic actors (Kemp, 1994) and which guides 
innovation.  In this vein, the majority of evolutionary research focuses on routines, rules 
of thumb, and search heuristics within firms which lead to the establishment and 
maintenance of technological trajectories.  This rather limited view of retention is a major 
criticism addressed by the QEM and MLP approaches. 
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As discussed in the following sections on learning and cumulative effects, 
evolutionary systems are inherently path dependent and unpredictable, which is at odds 
with deterministic tools used for policy analysis.  “…evolutionary economic processes 
are essentially open ended and unpredictable.” (Metcalfe, 1995, p. 28)  According to 
Ruttan (1997), the evolutionary approach has not “become a productive source of 
empirical research,” possibly because simulation methodology “lends itself to the easy 
proliferation of plausible results.  At present, the evolutionary approach must be regarded 
as a ‘point of view’ rather than as a theory.”  Dosi (1997), however, disagrees, asserting 
that “an interpretation of technological dynamics which significantly relaxes the 
commitments to equilibrium, rationality and inter-agent homogeneity is straightforwardly 
born by the current evidence, and is also beginning to generate formalized theoretical 
tales.”  Nonetheless, taking an evolutionary perspective requires that one abandon the 
ideas of determinacy and prediction because “[t]heories of evolution, whether biological 
or social, are not predictive ones – they are retrospective and historical” (Holling,1994). 
2.3.2 Characteristics of Evolutionary Systems Models 
The characteristics of systems models introduced in section 2.2.3 have 
implications unique to evolutionary models of innovation.  A discussion of these 
characteristics therefore illuminates the distinctive features of evolutionary theory and the 
development of technological paradigms and trajectories. 
2.3.2.1 Multi-Directional Links Among Phases 
Since the stages of technical change are connected by multidirectional links at a 
given point in time, the classic phases of development – invention or basic research; 
innovation or applied research and product development; and diffusion – are not clearly 
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defined and cannot be isolated for analysis.  Notably, feedback from the diffusion process 
(selection) is one of the critical elements in technology development, and therefore, 
innovation and diffusion are “inseparable and mutually reinforcing” (Metcalfe, 1994; see 
also Metcalfe, 1995).   
Nelson and Winter (1977) point out that many uncertainties with a new 
innovation “cannot be resolved until an innovation actually has been tried in practice.”  
When first introduced, new technologies are often poorly developed in terms of 
performance (Kemp, 1992) and sometimes even functional definition, such that 
determining users’ needs and improving the technology are critical to diffusion.  This is 
supported by Freeman’s (1982) finding that successful innovations are frequently 
characterized by greater interaction with and attention to feedback from users. 
In addition, information from the selection environment feeds back into the 
variation process by influencing the kinds of research that firms believe are likely to be 
profitable in the future.  In this process of ex ante selection, entrepreneurs attempt to 
anticipate future market selection and use such forecasts as a factor in selecting from a 
large number of possible research choices.  According to Dosi (1982), the “economic and 
social environment affects technological development in two ways, first selecting the 
‘direction of mutation’ (i.e. selecting the technological paradigm) and then selecting 
among mutations, in a more darwinian manner (i.e. the ex post selection among 
‘schumpeterian’ trials and errors).”   
However, recognizing the importance of feedbacks in the innovative process and 
the indistinct nature of the stages of research and development does not mean that phase 
characterizations are not useful.  In section 2.5.1 I review the industry life-cycle model 
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which describes how industries, products, and markets mature over time.  This model 
provides a guide for studying the dynamics of established technological regimes and for 
evaluating the changing relative role of various agents and learning mechanisms as a 
technology and industry evolve.  This evaluation should allow the identification of 
opportunities to introduce alternative technologies. 
2.3.2.2 Complex Firm and Industry Interactions 
The unit of analysis used in innovation studies ranges from an individual 
assembly line, to a complete production department within a firm, to an entire firm, entire 
industry, entire sector, or entire national system.  A central theme of the evolutionary 
systems view is that the “innovation activities of firms involve a wider range of other 
institutions supplying the knowledge and skills which underpin the efforts of firms” 
(Metcalfe, 1994).  Systems models recognize that innovation and production are 
influenced by complex interactions within and between firms in the industry, with 
supporting industries, and with seemingly unrelated industries.  Malerba (2002) describes 
innovation as a ‘collective process.’  Therefore, systems models stress the importance of 
networks, both formal and informal, between firms and all institutions producing 
knowledge, skills and artifacts within the technology system, as well as user-supplier 
interactions.  According to Freeman (1996), “[f]eedback loops and interdependencies can 
be important at every stage, so that networking and cooperation between research 
institutions and firms should be continuously encouraged.”  As a result, we cannot study 
a single product, firm, or industry in isolation. 
According to Abernathy and Utterback (1978), examining a single product type 
and firm is “of little use in understanding innovation.  Technological change causes these 
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terms to change their meaning, and the very shape of the production process is altered.”  
In addition, management of operations and management of innovation within a firm or 
industry are intrinsically linked and co-evolve with product and process changes.  Whipp 
and Clark (1986) define strategic innovation as “changes in technology and forms of 
work organization at all levels, which includes boards of directors or the various 
interfaces between a company and its suppliers or potential customers.”  In their analysis 
of a British auto manufacturer’s innovation project in the 1970s, the authors include the 
overall organization of the firm, and the processes and politics involved in order to 
analyze the firm’s capacity to undertake design and innovation.  
The unit of analysis for a technology must include all the characteristics of the 
manufacturing unit that produced it, which may include several firms, often not even in 
the same industry, depending on the level of diversification or fragmentation.  This idea 
traces back to Rosenberg (1963), who recognized the interdependence of apparently 
unassociated industries in 19th century manufacturing.  “For many analytical purposes it 
is necessary to group firms together on the basis of some features of the commodity as a 
final product; but we cannot properly appraise important aspects of technological 
developments… until we give up the Marshallian concept of an industry as the focal 
point of our attention and analysis.  These developments may be understood more 
effectively in terms of certain functional processes which cut entirely across industrial 
lines...”   
Rosenberg points out that products from apparently disparate industries can share 
fundamental production technologies and processes, and therefore suffer from common 
problems and limiting conditions.  This ‘technological convergence’ creates synergies 
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that are of critical importance for the innovation and diffusion of production technologies 
and techniques.  Innovations that are developed as a solution for a narrow range of 
problems in a single industry can be generalized for wide ranging applications.  Raven 
(2005) finds that applications of new technology in multiple regimes help explain the 
development of niches for bioenergy technologies.  Mowery and Rosenberg (1998, p. 5) 
assert that the inter-sectoral flow of new technologies is a “fundamental characteristic of 
20th-century innovation in the U.S. economy.”   
Further, while emerging and growing industries are characterized by high rates of 
internal innovation, mature industries may experience significant productivity growth 
resulting from external sources of innovation.  Under these conditions, the degree of 
vertical integration in an industry has significant implications for a firm’s ability to 
appropriate new production technologies.9   
It is significant to note that the interactions among firms and industries are 
multidirectional.  According to Rosenberg, advances in machine tools used for the 
manufacture of firearms, sewing machines, and bicycles, made possible the rise of the 
automobile industry.  As the industry developed, solutions to problems in automobile 
design were incorporated into and improved the performance of the specialized machine 
tools used in their manufacture.  These improvements were then generalized into and 
again revolutionized the machine tool industry. 
                                                 
9 According to Rosenberg, in the late 1900s, increasing vertical disintegration of individual industries was 
accompanied by technological convergence in a larger group of industries.  He attributes the high degree of 
machinery specialization to the combination of vertical disintegration and technological convergence.  
Stigler (1951) theorized that vertical disintegration is generally a feature of growing industries, while 
increasing vertical integration is typical of declining industries.  At the birth of a new industry, firms must 
produce their own input materials, design and possibly manufacture their own specialized equipment, and 
recruit skilled labor.  When the young industry attains a certain size, it becomes profitable for other firms to 
assume and become specialists in these tasks.  As the industry declines, it can no longer support 
independent firms for these functions and surviving firms must re-assume them. 
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2.3.2.3 Complex Interactions with the Environment 
A growing body of innovation research expands on the role of the environment in 
which innovation occurs, and the constant interplay among technology, society, and 
institutions.  According to Smith (2000), systems approaches to innovation are founded 
on the idea that innovation cannot be understood purely in terms of independent decision-
making at the level of the individual, firm, or industry.  Rather, innovation involves 
complex interactions between these entities and their environment.  Therefore, large 
technological systems that are a product of decades of innovative efforts cannot be 
understood by analyzing the existing set of technological artifacts, but must be viewed 
“as complex systems of technologies embedded in a powerful conditioning social context 
of public and private institutions” (Unruh, 2000). 
Evolutionary systems theories of innovation follow Schumpeter’s definition of 
innovation as the creation of value by exploiting change, but expand the notion of what 
change is relevant.  Innovation occurs when entrepreneurs exploit a new invention or 
changes in any element of the socio-technical system or its environment.  In addition to 
scientific and technical knowledge, such change may include relative prices, 
demographic makeup, consumer tastes and practices, cultural meanings, physical and 
institutional infrastructures, regulatory frameworks, and even geopolitics (Dijkema et al., 
2006).  For example, successful energy technologies and policies simultaneously must 
satisfy multiple and often conflicting economic, environmental, and security goals.  
While technologically feasible alternatives to conventional oil currently do exist, their 
development and diffusion is impeded by economic (too costly), social (too inconvenient, 
too disruptive, too dangerous, etc.), and environmental (too polluting) considerations 
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(Holdren, 2006).  Cowan and Hultén (1996) identify six “extraordinary events” that could 
facilitate the transition from internal combustion engines: (1) a crisis in the technology, 
(2) regulations, (3) technological breakthroughs, (4) changes in consumer preferences, (5) 
niche markets, and (6) new scientific results.  I interpret these events, along with shifts in 
social values, as innovation opportunities that could be exploited by entrepreneurs. 
Further, innovation creates ripples of change throughout the elements of the 
socio-technical system and its environment.  For example, the introduction of a new 
technology can alter consumers’ expectations and even social structures, as witnessed by 
the automobile in the first half of the last century and the computer in the latter half.  In 
the words of Schon (1967), “…technological innovation belongs to us less than we 
belong to it.  It has demands and effects of its own on the nature and structure of 
corporations, industries, government-industry relations, and the values and norms that 
make up our idea of ourselves and of progress.  We do not remain the same throughout.”  
Success changes the game (Gharjedaghi, 2006).  Thus, technological innovation and 
changes in the socio-technical system and its environment are co-evolutionary processes, 
marked by positive feedbacks, associated path-dependent behavior, and potential lock-in 
(Unruh, 2000). 
The multi-directional linkages between the environment and the process of 
innovation are a major issue in the quasi-evolutionary model and the multi-level 
perspective discussed in section 2.4.  As these approaches point out, most evolutionary 
studies include interactions with the environment in a very limited fashion.  Economic 
and social factors are incorporated as ‘focusing devices’ which entrepreneurs factor into 
the process of determining which technical problems and solution spaces to pursue – i.e. 
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the direction of variation (Rosenberg, 1976; Dosi, 1982).  Little to no attention is paid to 
the more co-evolutionary interactions involved in aligning product designs and 
behavioral rules – engineering perspectives, production processes, usage norms, cultural 
meanings, and world views. 
Note that with co-evolutionary models of innovation, it is impossible to attribute 
simple linear causality.  Changing environmental conditions provide opportunities and 
focus innovation in particular directions at a given time, but at the same time, the 
introduction, diffusion, and use of new technologies alter the environment.  This is 
particularly true for a transition to a new socio-technological paradigm.  This inability to 
attribute causality is discussed further in section 2.3.2.6.   
2.3.2.4 Knowledge and Learning 
In the latest economic thinking, the ability to continuously generate knew 
knowledge through learning is the ultimate determinant of a firm’s success and a nation’s 
long-run prospects; knowledge is the new competitive resource (Rycroft and Kash, 1999; 
Dijkemaa et al., 2006).  Evolutionary approaches in economics and innovation are 
fundamentally behavioral theories that focus on learning processes and adaptation 
(Metcalfe, 1994).  Dosi (1982, 1988) describes innovation as the process of solving 
technological problems using information drawn from previous experience and formal 
(codified) knowledge as well as tacit (uncodified) capabilities of the entrepreneurs.  The 
current state of a particular technology can be considered as a multidimensional frontier 
that represents the current trade-offs among technological and economic factors (Dosi, 
1982).   Problem solving activity along the current trajectory can be represented by the 
search for changes in the trade-offs among the technological and economic variables that 
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the entrepreneurs consider relevant.  Since the entrepreneurs determine what variables 
are relevant, they define the search space based on their knowledge and interpretation of 
the technical problems and possibilities, economic realities, user needs, and social 
constraints. 
Dosi uses the term “technological paradigm” to encompass the definition of the 
relevant problems as well as the set of procedures and specific knowledge required for 
their solution.  According to Metcalfe (1994), “The concept of a paradigmatic framework 
for a technology also provides a natural unit of analysis for the technology policy maker 
in terms of the knowledge base, theories, facts and concepts, which define the technology 
and the institutions in which its development is taking place.”  Following Dosi (1988), a 
knowledge base is the set of information inputs, knowledge, and capabilities that 
inventors or entrepreneurs draw on when looking for innovative solutions to problems.  A 
knowledge base has a distinct character along a continuum from tacit and specific to 
public and universal.   Tacit knowledge and capabilities are ill defined, uncodified, 
unpublished and difficult to express.  However, it is to some degree shared by, and 
therefore specific to, inventors and entrepreneurs with common experience. 
Pavitt (1984) provides empirical evidence that the knowledge base is a key 
determinant of the direction of innovation, finding that the innovative choices of 
industrial firms in the U.K are constrained by their “existing range of knowledge.”  In 
addition, an organization’s ability to assimilate and exploit new knowledge from external 
institutions, such as advances in basic science or competitors’ production processes, is a 
critical determinant of the rate of innovation.  Cohen and Levinthal (1989, 1990) assert 
that this “absorptive capacity” is a function of the existing knowledge base, as well as 
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investments in research and development (R&D).  This assertion is supported by 
Lieberman (1984), who finds statistical evidence that R&D expenditures increase the 
learning rate in the chemical industry.10   
2.3.2.5 Cumulative Processes 
Let us return to Dosi’s (1982, 1988) description of innovation as the process of 
solving technological problems, where the direction of innovation depends on what 
specific problems are addressed (the search space) and what information is used for their 
solution.  The determination of the search space and techniques for solution is influenced 
by two internal forces (Rosenberg, 1963).  The first is a reactive force, driven by the 
technology itself, as advances “tend to create their own future problems, which compel 
further modification and revision.”  The second is self-reinforcing and relates to the 
origination and expansion of the entrepreneur’s knowledge base.  These forces, which I 
discuss in turn, are cumulative processes that result in path dependence and potential 
lock-in.  As a result, the history of a technology matters and the details of the 
development path and diffusion process for each technology are unique. 
The reactive force arises because “complex technologies create internal 
compulsions and pressures which, in turn, initiate exploratory activity in particular 
directions” (Rosenberg (1963).  In any production process, the component elements vary 
in their ability to exceed current performance (e.g. capacity, quality, cost), and one 
particular element may therefore be considered the limiting factor of production.  This 
element may be related to any aspect of firm or industry operations, including supply 
                                                 
10 Lieberman (1984) finds a statistically significant correlation between the reduction in product price and 
both cumulative output and an interaction term for R&D investments and cumulative output, while 
controlling for other sources of cost reductions. 
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lines, input materials, product design, machinery, plant layout, firm organization, 
distribution, marketing, etc.  Innovation efforts are commonly directed at improving this 
limiting factor.  However, such an improvement may exceed the capacity of the next 
most restrictive factor, possibly even causing a production failure, thereby stimulating 
further innovations.  Consequently, the direction of technical change depends on the 
technology’s cumulative history. 
The concept of the limiting factor of production can be generalized to the entire 
socio-technical system, and the factors may include economic (e.g. input prices), political 
(e.g. regulations), social (e.g. cultural norms), and environmental conditions.  These 
focusing devices help entrepreneurs select a subset of technological problems from a 
large set of possible directions for development (Rosenberg, 1976).  For example, 
congestion could be considered a limiting factor for the automobile market.  Although 
commuters could switch to alternative modes of mass transit, those inside the automotive 
industry would be motivated to maintain the existing dominance of personal vehicles.  
One possible solution is so-called “intelligent transportation,” where vehicle spacing and 
speed are automatically controlled. 
The viewpoint of the agents is of particular significance in this example.  Those 
inside the mass transit industry see congestion as an imperative to develop bus or rail 
innovations.  Those in the information technology industry see an opportunity for 
telecommuting innovations such as telecommuting centers, satellite broadband, or web-
based teleconferencing.  This brings us to consideration of how the entrepreneur 
determines not only what problems on which to focus but also the solution space – the 
applicable scientific principles, material properties, and technological options. 
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As asserted in the previous section, the entrepreneur determines the search space 
and solution techniques based on his existing knowledge and skills.  Since technological 
innovation and changes in the socio-technical system and its environment are co-
evolutionary processes, these factors are determined by the socio-technical history.  As a 
technological regime develops, industry organizations arise and academic disciplines 
emerge.  Such organizations create self-sustaining networks, develop standard 
approaches, and train ‘like-minded’ professionals (Unruh, 2000).  Unions and user groups 
arise, as do trade and enthusiast publications.  The perspectives of these organizations 
become an integral part of the knowledge base and technological framework shared by an 
entire community of technological actors.  These groups reinforce expectations and 
influence the political process.  Eventually, a technological system becomes an integral 
part of daily life, leading to the emergence of behavioral norms, customs and rituals. 
Since the entrepreneurs’ skills, knowledge base, and social view are a product of 
their experience, the socio-technical system, and its environment, the search space is to 
some extent circumscribed by the existing technological paradigm.  Except perhaps in 
early in a technology’s life-cycle, innovation seldom consists of a radical breakthrough, 
but rather results from the synthesis of numerous minor advances (Sahal, 1981).  Often, a 
standard design may emerge that persists for decades while innovation continues 
incrementally.  This overall configuration of the technology remains relatively 
unchanged, serving as a technological ‘guide-post’ that points in the “general direction of 
technical advance” and partially determines the boundaries of further development 
(Sahal, 1981).  Thus, the state of the technology and its history determine both the 
industry’s perceived needs and the tools available for change.  As a result, innovation 
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follows a particular technological trajectory: a pattern of solution of selected 
technological problems, based on selected scientific principles and on selected material 
technologies.   
For the most part, these innovative choices are made within firms and are 
constrained by their existing range of experience and knowledge.  As a result, “technical 
change is largely a cumulative process specific to firms” (Pavitt, 1984). With investments 
in innovation and experience in production, the entrepreneur continues to develop the 
technology and his capabilities along the existing technological trajectory.  According to 
Rosenberg (1963), “in technological change…one thing often leads to another – not in a 
strictly deterministic sense, but in the more modest sense that doing some things 
successfully creates a capacity for doing other things.”  In addition, firms and research 
organizations develop a corporate culture including search heuristics, rules of thumb, and 
standard operating procedures based on past activities, successes and failures. 
Gharjedaghi (2006) identifies three strategic behaviors of firms that maintain the existing 
trajectory.  Firms are likely to imitate the strategies of the most successful firms, stick 
with their own past strategies if they were successful (inertia), and may possibly take 
their past strategy to a greater extreme (sub-optimization), believing it will solve new 
problems that arise.  The forces behind imitation, inertia, and sub-optimization are the 
result of economic as well as institutional factors.  For example, the firm may have 
accumulated large investments in specialized equipment and expertise that makes moving 
in new directions expensive and time consuming.  This is especially true in mature 
industries where efforts have been focused on process innovations; productivity and 
flexibility are often at odds (Abernathy, 1978). 
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Of course, the technological trajectory is not entirely self-determined.  Rosenberg 
(1994) refers to the sequence of technological development as a “‘soft determinism,’ in 
which one historical event did not rigidly prescribe certain subsequent technological 
developments, but at least made sequences of technological improvements in one 
direction easier.”  As discussed, economic, political, social, and environmental factors 
serve to focus innovative activity in a particular direction at any one time.  However, 
these factors often stimulate progress along an existing technological trajectory, as when 
intelligent transportation systems are proposed as a solution to congestion.  The 
accumulation of knowledge, artifacts, and societal experience with the predominating 
technology tend to “lock” society and industry into the existing technological paradigm.  
According to Dosi (1982), radical shifts along new technological directions “emerge 
either in relation to new opportunities opened-up by scientific developments or to the 
increasing difficulty in going forward on a given technological direction” for 
technological, economic, or other reasons. Thus a shift of paradigm may be by design 
(learning and unlearning) or out of frustration (Gharjedaghi, 2006). Note also that the 
focusing factors and difficulty going forward actually may be due to success of the 
existing technological paradigm, which has altered elements of the socio-technical 
system and its environment and possibly posed unforeseen problems as it expanded in 
scale and scope.  Thus cumulative processes may also overcome system lock-in by 
forcing a shift in paradigm, either in terms of our understanding of the nature of reality 
(philosophy), our analytical and technological approach, or both (Gharjedaghi, 2006). 
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2.3.2.6 Increasing Complexity 
The increasing complexity exhibited by evolutionary systems models derives 
from two sources: the continual generation of variety (a distinctive feature of 
evolutionary systems) and the co-evolution of technology, supporting industries and 
organizations, society, and behavioral rules, i.e., the socio-technical system and its 
environment.  Evolutionary models of innovation therefore demonstrate increasing 
complexity in any and possibly all of the elements of the system, including the product; 
its manufacture, sale and use; markets; and the process of technological innovation.  
However, evolutionary systems involve both positive and negative feedbacks, and 
selection processes reduce both the variety of products and the number of firms in an 
industry as a dominant design emerges.  For example, Simons (1995) and Klepper and 
Simons (1997, 2005) find evidence that the ‘shakeout’ dynamic that reduces the number 
of firms in an emerging industry is largely due to a process of continual technological 
change.  In mature markets, the introduction of a new competing innovation can also 
begin a new process of ‘creative destruction’ that decreases the market for the established 
technology, the number of firms producing it, and eventually possibly eliminating the 
industry altogether. 
How this last phase occurs for complex socio-technical systems is exactly the 
question addressed in this research.  In the foregoing sections, I have discussed the 
complexity of firm interactions with other firms, other industries, research institutions, 
suppliers, users and the firm’s socio-economic environment.  These interactions make it 
difficult to attribute linear causality, and make such relationships less meaningful 
(Rycroft and Kash, 1999).  However, the increasing complexity of the product itself, its 
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production process, and the environment in which innovation occurs has a host of 
implications regarding the process and sources of innovation, as well as the outcome of 
market selection. 
In general, a complex product or system is composed of many interconnected 
parts, resulting in a whole that is complicated and difficult to understand.  According to 
Rycroft and Kash (2002), “[c]omplex technologies are those that cannot be understood in 
detail by an individual expert, and cannot be precisely communicated among experts 
across time and distance.”  Hodbay (1998) uses the term ‘complex’ to “reflect the number 
of customised components, the breadth of knowledge and skills required and the degree 
of new knowledge involved in production,” and defines complex products and systems as 
“high cost, engineering-intensive products, systems, networks and constructs.”  Hodbay 
is concerned with a specific class of products that are manufactured in small batches or as 
“one-of-a-kind” goods, and does not consider the automobile to be ‘complex’.  I argue, 
however, that his definition does apply to automotive technology. 
Consider that today’s automobile consists of multiple subsystems – powertrain, 
body, interior, emission control, cabin environmental control, navigation, stability, safety, 
etc. – each of which requires specialized engineering expertise. Further, the interaction of 
these subsystems can result in unexpected behavior, such that the integration of 
subsystem designs is also a specialized task.  No single engineer has complete detailed 
knowledge in all of these areas.  Therefore, no single individual is capable of undertaking 
innovation in all areas of automotive design.  Building on Rycroft and Kash (2002), I 
define a complex technology or system as one that consists of many, interacting and 
interdependent subsystems, the behavior of which cannot be predicted by isolated 
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analysis of any one subsystem, and the whole of which cannot be understood in detail by 
an individual expert nor precisely communicated among experts across time and distance. 
The (increasing) complexity of a technology, its production process, and its 
production and use systems has significant implications for those trying to influence 
innovation.  Rycroft and Kash (1999) describe the development of technologies and their 
manufacturing processes as a progression from craft production of a simple technology, 
where innovation is undertaken by individuals; through mass production of intermediate 
technologies, where innovation is undertaken by in-house R&D units; to what the 
authors’ call ‘synthetic production’ of complex technologies, where innovation occurs 
through organization.  Rycroft and Kash define ‘innovation by synthesis’ as “creating 
new and enhanced technological products and processes with previously unattained 
performance by combining components, knowledge, and capabilities in ways that deliver 
synergism.”   
According to the authors, “[a]ll complex technologies manifest a process of 
coevolution between the technologies and the organizational networks that produce and 
use them.  Embedded in these organizational networks is a capacity for creativity and 
innovation that in earlier times was provided by inventors and entrepreneurs like Edison 
and Ford.” Therefore, successful innovating organizations are networks that facilitate 
rapid learning and purposefully organize to “learn to learn.”  In these organizations, 
teams of experts from every commercialization activity, including suppliers and users, 
work concurrently to innovate new technologies.  Complexity of product and production 
process means that components and subsystems are “synthesized by widely dispersed, 
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rapidly evolving, and often obscure organizations.”  Thus, the focus and targets for 
technology analysts, strategists, and policy makers become difficult to identify. 
Increasing complexity means that production and use systems are increasingly 
nonlinear, and the process of innovation is altered by emphasizing continuous learning 
and adaptation, celebrating speed to market rather than efficiency, and shifting key 
decision-making roles to groups rather than individuals.  Furthermore, according to 
Tushman and Rosenkopf (1992), the more complex the product, the greater role for non-
technical factors in influencing technological evolution, and the “less likely the selection 
process reflects economic efficiency.”  
2.4 Technological Transitions 
Much of evolutionary theory is concerned with innovation within existing 
technological regimes and the forces that reinforce technological trajectories and regime 
stability.  Although this stability is dynamic, it resists radical change and impedes the 
introduction and diffusion of alternative technologies.  In general, evolutionary research 
provides only suggestions of how new trajectories and paradigms emerge.  Most describe 
two factors that provide new opportunities for ‘radical’ change:  1) scientific or 
technological breakthroughs and 2) difficulty moving forward on the current trajectory.  
These difficulties include looming theoretical limits (real or perceived); increasing 
marginal costs of improvements in the current technology; problems posed by the 
increasing scale or scope of the existing paradigm; and economic or institutional factors. 
While the bulk of research in evolutionary economics has neglected a full 
exploration of the emergence and development of new trajectories, two strands of 
research specifically target these transitions: the quasi-evolutionary model (QEM) and the 
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multi-level perspective (MLP).  Therefore, this research addresses the core question of 
how radical technologies emerge, compete, and gain momentum despite the barriers and 
myopia presented by the existing technological system (Schot et al., 1994).  The QEM 
and the MLP arose due to dissatisfaction with the description of the sociological 
dimensions of technological regimes found in most evolutionary theories of technological 
progress (Schot, 1992; Kemp, 1994).  Therefore, this body of research has combined 
evolutionary theory with sociological and historical co-evolutionary models.  Because of 
its focus on managing transitions, it has also built on constructive technology assessment, 
which holds that “during the course of technological development, choices are constantly 
being made about the form, the function, and the use of that technology and, 
consequently, that technological development can be steered to a certain extent” (Schot, 
1992). 
Sections 2.4.1 and 2.4.2 review the literature on the quasi-evolutionary and multi-
level perspective theories of technological transitions.  Section 2.4.3 summarizes the 
assertions of these two bodies of theory regarding the role of niches in the development 
and diffusion of new technologies, or what I have called the niche hypothesis.  Section 
2.4.4 then raises some theoretical issues with QE theory and the niche hypothesis that 
give rise to the set of research questions posed in chapter 1. 
2.4.1 The Quasi-Evolutionary Model 
The quasi-evolutionary (QE) literature identifies three main criticisms of 
‘mainstream’ evolutionary theory that arise from an inadequate description of the 
sociological dimensions of technology.  To some extent, this critique describes errors of 
emphasis and depth rather than errors of omission.  This section describes these 
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deficiencies in evolutionary theory, the elements of the QE model that seek to rectify 
these deficiencies, and the QE description of technological transition.  
2.4.1.1 Elements of the Quasi-Evolutionary Model 
According to the QE literature, evolutionary theory fails to adequately account for 
the sociological dimensions of technology as it relates to regime stability (retention 
mechanisms), the selection environment, and the linkage between variation and the 
selection environment.  First, evolutionary theory stresses the importance of a core 
technological framework which encompasses the shared engineering beliefs and 
expectations of the community of technological and economic actors involved in 
innovation (see sections 2.3.2.4 and 2.3.2.5).  This framework forms the basis for 
competition and guides the search for improvements in process efficiency and product 
performance.  Thus evolutionary theory conceptualizes the technological paradigm or 
regime, which serves as a retention mechanism, as a cognitive concept that relates to 
technologists perceptions regarding the relevant problems and the solution spaces worth 
pursuing (Nelson and Winter, 1977).  While QE theory acknowledges the importance of 
shared engineering beliefs, it asserts that “there is a clear socioeconomic dimension 
involved in the stability of search activities and the patterns of technological change” 
(Kemp, 1994).  
QE theory therefore re-conceptualizes retention as a process of embedding that is 
more in line with the co-evolution of a techno-institutional complex described by Unruh 
(2000).  Innovation choices depend “not just on the prevailing interpretative framework 
of engineers,” but also on the embedding of technologies in “engineering practices, 
production plants and organizational routines,” as well as the embedding of products in 
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consumption and usage patterns and in supporting and complimentary systems (Kemp et 
al., 1998).  Thus, while QE theory uses the term ‘regime’ first introduced by Nelson and 
Winter (1977), it redefines the technological regime as “the rule-set or grammar 
embedded in a complex of engineering practices, production process technologies, 
product characteristics, skills and procedures, ways of handling relevant artifacts and 
persons, ways of defining problems – all of them embedded in institutions and 
infrastructures” (Rip and Kemp, 1998, p. 338).  The term regime is used in a sense 
similar to that of a political or regulatory regime in that it refers to rules as a set of 
commands and requirements and also as roles and practices that guide the research 
activities of firms, the solution spaces explored, and the strategies of actors.  The focused 
nature of socio-technical change is “accounted for in large part by the embedding of 
existing technologies in broader technical systems, in production practices and routines, 
consumption patterns, engineering and management belief systems, and cultural values – 
much more than it is by engineering imagination” (Kemp et al., 1998).   
Second, while evolutionary theory recognizes that the selection environment 
includes social and political mechanisms, these interactions generally are discussed only 
in non-market sectors such as government services.  Thus, market interactions are the 
main focus for both ex ante and ex post selection (see section 2.3.2.1).  However, social 
and political conditions are included peripherally as ‘focusing devices’ in ex ante 
selection; entrepreneurs’ perceptions of these conditions may focus attention to particular 
research directions (problems and solution spaces) that are likely to be profitable at a 
given time (see sections 2.3.2.3 and 2.3.2.5). 
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The view of the selection environment in QE is closer to Metcalfe’s (1995) 
assertion that “[a]ny framework in which agents interact in order to choose between 
competing patterns of behaviour has selective properties.”  Therefore, the selection 
environment includes institutional and geographical factors as well as economic markets 
(Schot, 1992).  New technologies must become embedded in existing socio-technical 
system, making non-market interactions a significant factor in adoption and diffusion.  
Thus, “[t]he selection environment is defined by the capital outlays, physical 
infrastructure, supplier-user linkages, production routines, skills, technical standards, 
government rules, norms, people’s preferences and beliefs” (Kemp, 1994).  These 
existing institutions, linkages, and patterns of behavior are determined by the socio-
technical history and are therefore aligned with existing technologies.  According to 
Kemp (1994), “[t]he key problem for new technologies to become incorporated into the 
socioeconomic system is that of compatibility… New technologies that can easily be 
embedded in the production system and people’s ways of life will diffuse more rapidly 
than technologies which require the replacement of capital goods, a new infrastructure, 
different skills, new ideas about production and consumption, and regulatory changes.”   
However, the embedding of a new technology alters the environment such that 
technology and the wider socioeconomic system co-evolve in a process of mutual 
adaptation.  This brings us to QE’s third and most significant criticism: evolutionary 
theory of technical change lacks a complete understanding of the coupling between 
variation and selection processes.  As discussed above, evolutionary theory fails to 
adequately account for the influence of social factors on variation via ex ante selection.  
In addition, evolutionary theory neglects how the introduction of new technology changes 
 
65 
the selection environment through the process of embedding.  To realize successful 
design, ‘heterogeneous engineers’ must be involved in overcoming technical, economic, 
and social obstacles.   As a result, they often must design elements of the environment in 
which the technology is marketed, sold, and used – i.e. the selection environment (Schot, 
1992).  As a result, social, political, and economic factors are embedded in technology 
development, and successful variations change the selection environment.  As a 
technology comes into wider use, new institutions arise and old ones adapt.  Consumer 
tastes, lifestyles, and habits also adapt.  As user feedback is incorporated into product 
improvement, new functions emerge and the technology and consumer tastes co-evolve.  
While the selection environment has a certain momentum that tends to block some 
variations and encourage others, it can be altered by the introduction and embedding of 
new technology.  Therefore, the distinguishing characteristic of the QE model is its focus 
on “the way variation and selection processes are partly independent and yet coupled” by 
the regime (Schot et al., 1994). 
This coupling occurs through ex ante selection, but also through interactions 
involving institutional linkages that QE theory calls the ‘technological nexus.’  The 
active, boundary-spanning nexus role is carried out by a broad range of agents who link 
selection and variation by translating information from both realms; shaping interactions; 
and harmonizing social and market needs with the results of scientific and technological 
research.  A number of actors within and external to firms shape the process of variation 
either through the direct formulation of research objectives and search heuristics or by 
attempting to influence the process from the outside (e.g., government regulators and 
environmental activists).  However, actors serving in the nexus role translate the 
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requirements of the selection environment into objectives for technological development 
and also impose the requirements of technology on the selection environment.  These 
activities result in a learning process that occurs simultaneously in firms and in the 
environment (Schot, 1992). 
QE theory asserts that the co-evolutionary nature of technology and the socio-
economic environment in which it is produced and used results in regime stability and 
gives rise to trajectories of technological development.  According to Kemp (1994), “the 
dominance of particular trajectories is related to the ‘dynamic scale and learning effects’ 
from which prevailing technologies have benefited and the adaptation of the ‘selection 
environment’ to the old technological regime” (Kemp, 1994).  Thus, cumulative learning 
effects and alteration of the selection environment via the coupling of variation and 
selection together serve as a retention mechanism.  
2.4.1.2 Quasi-Evolutionary Theory of Transitions 
While co-evolutionary forces lead to stability in technological regimes, this 
stability is dynamic.  Innovation continues along the current technological trajectory, to 
some extent constrained by the regime as described above.  Elzen et al. (2003) refer to 
these incremental improvements within the existing regime as ‘regime optimization.’  On 
the other hand, ‘regime renewal’ refers to radical innovations that depart from the 
existing trajectory and require a change in the architecture and rules of the existing 
regime.  The distinguishing feature of regime renewal is that it requires considerable 
change in “the behavior of various actors in relation to various relevant technologies” 
(Elzen et al., 2003).  For example, these changes may include new interpretation of the 
function of technology, new usage norms, and new forms of ownership.  While 
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incremental innovations in regime optimization may accumulate to yield significant 
improvement in system function, regime renewal has much greater potential to yield 
societal benefits.  The question then arises as to how radical innovations emerge and 
diffuse despite the inertia presented by regime stability.   
Much innovation research has asserted that radical innovations depend on the 
opening of new technological and economic opportunities by new scientific insights or 
advances in engineering and material technology.  However, novelty may emerge due to 
pressing technological needs that arise from bottlenecks in development due to the 
growth in technological systems, from pervasive shifts in consumer preferences, or from 
external crises such as war which produce new demands or create resource scarcities.  In 
addition, looming theoretical limits to current technology, real or perceived, may 
stimulate the search for innovation along a new trajectory (Kemp, 1994).   
Schot et al. (1994) list two possible routes for new technologies to compete and 
gain momentum despite the “myopia of the existing technological system.”  First, the 
existing system may lose viability due to a changing selection environment which 
presents new challenges that the existing technology cannot meet or can only meet at 
excessive marginal cost.  Second, new technologies may “use a niche that protects them 
against too harsh selection and provides space to grow.”  A niche can be defined as a 
distinct application domain, small in scale and scope, characterized by specific functional 
requirements (Hoogma et al., 2002; Raven, 2005).  Because of the special requirements 
of the niche, users are willing to accept higher cost or lower performance on standard 
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functionalities compared to existing products available in established mass markets.11  
This first route, which I will refer to as ‘regime instability,’ remains relatively unexplored 
within the QE literature.  Meanwhile, a predominant theme found in the QE literature is 
the critical function of early market niches in the development and eventual diffusion of 
radical technologies.  The remainder of this section describes the basic tenets of this 
‘niche hypothesis.’ 
According to Rip and Kemp (1998, p. 338), novelty arises within existing regimes 
“starting at the micro-level of local practices.”  These radical technologies are relatively 
immature at the time of introduction, require improvement, and are only able to compete 
in specialized markets or market niches.  Kemp (1994) asserts that “market niches may 
be an important stepping stone for the further evolution of radically new energy 
technologies.  It helps suppliers better to understand user needs, to identify and overcome 
critical problems, to achieve cost reductions in mass production, and, perhaps most 
important, to build a constituency behind the new product to sustain a new technological 
trajectory.”  In reviewing the historical evidence of transitions, Kemp et al. (1998) 
conclude: “Apart from demonstrating the viability of a new technology and providing 
financial means for further development, niches helped to build a constituency behind a 
new technology, and to set in motion interactive learning processes and institutional 
adaptations – in management, organization and the institutional context – that are all-
important for the wider diffusion and development of the new technology.” 
A brief review of Strategic Niche Management (SNM), a policy recommendation 
that emerges from the QE literature, helps illuminate the assumptions regarding processes 
                                                 
11 In contrast to niche markets, mass markets are understood to be large in scale and scope.  Thus, products 
provide functions with wide appeal and demand is sufficient to allow high volume production.  
Competition in mass markets is based mainly on cost and quality. 
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that occur within niches.  Kemp et al. (1998) define SNM as “the creation, development, 
and controlled phase-out of protected spaces for the development and use of promising 
technologies by means of experimentation.”  SNM seeks to create linkages between users 
and other actors to stimulate learning and facilitate institutional adaptation. Critical to this 
process is the alignment of agent expectations; the articulation of technological 
characteristics, policies, cultural and psychological meanings, the market (users and their 
needs), and production and maintenance needs; and the formation of networks.  The four 
aims of SNM are: 
1) To articulate the changes in technology and institutional framework necessary for 
economic success; 
2) To learn more about the technical and economic feasibility and environmental 
benefits of the technology; 
3) To stimulate further development of the technology, achieve cost efficiencies in 
mass production, promote development of complementary technologies and skills, 
and stimulate changes in social organization important to wider diffusion; and  
4) To build a constituency behind the technology. 
Niches, then, serve as temporary protected spaces that allow the technology to be 
developed in terms of user needs and to achieve wider use through learning processes and 
adaptations in the selection environment.  The technology may then be adapted to new 
niches which are defined by new geographical regions or new applications.  Thus, a 
technological regime shift is conceptualized as a process of niche proliferation or niche 
branching.  “Eventually, [the protected] technology might compete head-on with the 
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dominant technological option in a part of its market or markets” (Hoogma et al., 2002, p. 
4). 
While the QE conversation concentrates on niche development as an independent 
process, there are two notable exceptions to which we will return later.  First, Kemp 
(1994) comments that “[o]nly in a few respects did radically new products constitute a 
radical break with the past, which suggests that the term ‘radical’ is somewhat 
misleading.  Radical innovations often combined the new with the old (or even combined 
older technologies) and often rightly so because this helped the product to survive the 
initial harsh market selection and establish itself in the market place.”  Thus, new 
paradigms emerge and develop within the previous one.  Second, Kemp et al. (1998) 
refer in passing to the importance of niche-regime interactions and developing regime 
instability: “The processes of niche formation occur against the backdrop of existing 
technological regimes… The success of niche formation is, therefore, linked to structural 
problems, shifts and changes within the existing regime(s).  The ultimate fate of 
processes of niche formation depends as much on successful processes within the niche 
as on changes outside the niche: it is the coincidence of both developments that gives rise 
to niche development patterns.”   
2.4.2 The Multi-level Perspective 
The multi-level perspective (MLP) compliments the QE model and arose from a 
similar perspective of the sociological shortcomings of evolutionary theory.  The MLP 
integrates the findings from various literatures, including evolutionary theories, the 
sociology of technology, and the history of technology, into a set of analytical concepts to 
study the complex dynamics of socio-technical change.  In the MLP, technological 
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transitions are seen as evolutionary processes, where evolution is both a process of 
variation, selection and retention, and also a process of unfolding and reconfiguration.  
This follows from Metcalfe (1995), who states that “evolution means two things: the 
gradual unfolding of phenomena in a cumulative and thus path-dependent way; and quite 
separately, a dynamics of system behaviour which creates change and emerging structure 
from variety in behaviour.” 
The MLP builds on the concept from actor-network theory that technical systems 
are configurations or networks of linked heterogeneous elements (technical and social) 
where the linkages among elements provide stability.  However, the MLP distinguishes 
among three types of elements: systems, consisting of resources and material aspects; 
actors involved in maintaining and changing the system; and the rules which guide 
actors’ perceptions and behavior.  The concept of a regime in the MLP then closely 
follows the QE model but the term ‘socio-technical regime’ is used to refer to the “semi-
coherent set of rules carried by different social groups.”  The MLP identifies three types 
of rules: cognitive, normative, and formal/regulative.12  Rules provide structure for and 
coordinate human interactions yet leave room for perception and strategic action (Geels, 
2004).  The alignment of rules and the linkage of elements results in system stability and 
trajectories of development.  Thus in a regime, the rules of all relevant social groups 
(users, engineers, producers, policy-makers, etc.) are aligned with a particular 
technological system or artifact (e.g. personal automobiles) (Raven, 2005).  The regime 
thus serves as a selection and a retention mechanism (Geels, 2002).   
                                                 
12 The MLP distinguishes rules from institutions, the latter referring specifically to public organizations. 
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Despite this stability, the system remains dynamic and interactions between 
elements are multidirectional.  As illustrated in Figure 2-1, while rules shape human 
action, they are also carried and reproduced by humans and can therefore be changed by 
human action.  Similarly, artifacts are created by human action but also shape further 
action.  Rules are both embedded in and shaped by artifacts.  This multidirectional 
interaction allows for co-evolution and endogenous change. 
 
Figure 2-1 Interaction of System Elements 
(reproduced from Geels, 2004) 
To analyze technological transitions, the MLP (Geels, 2002, 2004, 2005a and 
2005b) conceptualizes a nested hierarchy of three heuristic levels: (1) the meso-level 
consists of socio-technical regimes, where cognitive rules are embedded widely in the 
knowledge base, engineering practices, corporate structures, manufacturing processes, 
product characteristics, etc.; (2) the micro-level consists of technological niches; and (3) 
the macro-level is formed by the socio-technical landscape.  The socio-technical 
landscape provides an external structure or context, containing the material aspect of 
society (e.g., cities, factories, and highways) and heterogeneous factors such as oil prices, 
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economic growth, wars, cultural values, and environmental problems.  The transition to a 
new system involves crucial interactions between the socio-technical regime (the meso-
level) and the two other levels.  
Regimes are embedded within the landscape which undergoes slow change and 
provides ‘gradients’ for the technological trajectories of regimes.  As in the QE model, 
innovation within the regime is incremental.  Radical innovations emerge in niches in the 
context of the specific problems, rules, and capabilities of the existing regimes and 
landscapes.  These innovations require protection because they “have relatively low 
technical performance, are often cumbersome and expensive” (Geels, 2002).  Niches 
insulate the novelty from the selection environment represented by the regime and 
provide space for learning processes (learning-by-doing, learning-by-using, and learning-
by-interacting) and for building social networks, such as supply chains and user-producer 
relationships.   
Thus, the MLP conceptualizes innovation as a process involving three phases 
(Geels, 2005a).  First, novelties emerge in within the context of the existing regime, in 
part due to landscape developments.  Entrepreneurs experiment with designs in an 
attempt to determine users’ requirements, and a variety of technical forms may compete 
with each other.  Second, the novelty is adopted in niche markets which serve as 
incubators.  Within the niche market, the innovation develops a technological trajectory 
and improves due to learning processes, while users explore new functionalities.  This 
phase results in the articulation of user preferences and the development of a dominant 




However, successfully breaking out of niche markets depends not only on 
processes within the niche but also on developments within the regime and landscape.  
Technological transitions therefore occur when simultaneous processes on multiple 
dimensions, both technological and social, align and reinforce each other (Geels, 2002, 
2004, 2005a).  In particular, when the activities of social groups are ‘mis-matched,’ the 
resulting tension provides windows of opportunity for radical innovations to break into 
wider markets. Geels (2004) identifies five sources of tension and misalignment: 
1) Changes at the landscape level that put pressure on the existing regime and cause 
internal restructuring. 
2) Technical problems internal to the existing regime, such as bottlenecks, 
diminishing returns to innovative activities, and looming (real or perceived) 
theoretical limits. 
3) Negative externalities of existing regime. 
4) Changing user preferences due to negative externalities, cultural changes, changes 
in relative prices, policies, or endogenous change. 
5) Strategic and competitive games between firms. 
Two patterns of transition emerge from the interplay between the levels in the 
MLP.  In the ‘technological substitution route:’  
…the existing sociotechnical regime is initially relatively stable, characterised by 
incremental developments. Radical innovations emerge in niches… 
Breakthrough of the novelty in mainstream markets may occur when the novelty 
has acquired enough internal momentum, and when landscape developments put 
pressure on the existing regime… This may lead to creative destruction and the 
downfall of established firms. The breakthrough triggers all kinds of adaptations 
and transformations in the regime, leading to an ‘era of ferment.’  Hence, this 
route has a technology push character. Once a new sociotechnical regime has 
been formed, the dynamic shifts back to incremental change (Geels, 2004). 
In the ‘wider transformation route:’  
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…the regime becomes unstable and opens up in an early phase, because of 
persistent problems or landscape changes. Simultaneous changes occur on 
multiple regime dimensions, e.g., policy, user preference, technology, 
infrastructure, culture, etc. The loosening up of the existing regime stimulates 
actors to experiment with other technical options. There is a prolonged period of 
experimentation, and strategic maneuvering. Such a period of heating up is 
eventually followed by a period of ‘cooling down,’ i.e., narrowing down the 
number of technical options. A particular technical option may come to be seen 
as ‘universal,’ push other options out of the market and acquire dominance. This 
is complemented by the creation of a new sociotechnical regime (Geels, 2004). 
Geels (2002) clearly identifies niche accumulation as the primary mechanism 
leading to wider diffusion of radical technologies. “The step from niche to regime-level 
does not occur at once, but gradually, as radical innovations are used in subsequent 
application domains or market niches.”  However, the penetration of new niches is not 
necessarily easy, and involves “experimentation, learning processes, adjustments and 
reconfigurations” (Geels, 2002).  If the specific characteristics of the innovative 
technology lead to the articulation of new functionalities, the novelty may penetrate new 
application domains without competition from the existing technology.  In a stable 
regime, this process of ‘niche branching’ allows the technology to develop within niches 
where the new functionality is especially suited and ‘below the surface’ of the existing 
regime.  In the absence of new functionalities, the novelty must conquer new niches by 
battling head-on with existing technology.  In an unstable regime, problems in the regime 
or landscape present opportunities for the new technology to serve as a solution, 
effectively creating new niches.  New functionalities may be articulated early in the 
process as regime actors search for new options and niche actors present their innovation 
as a solution.  Thus, the novelty may link up with and reinforce processes in many 
dimensions, leading to transformation and co-evolution early on (Raven, 2005).   
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In the case of unstable regimes, Geels (2002) identifies a second mechanism of 
diffusion: technological add-on and hybridization.  In this process, new technologies are 
merged with existing ones to solve particular problems by forming a symbiosis.  Thus, 
the two technologies are used in conjunction with as few regime modifications as 
possible.  However, the hybrid technology may gradually evolve into a new form defined 
by the functional capabilities of the novelty.  This is mechanism is consistent with a more 
general ‘fit-stretch’ pattern often found in the co-evolution of a new technology’s form 
and function as illustrated in Figure 2-2.  The fit-stretch pattern satisfies the issue of 
compatibility raised by Kemp (1994; see section 2.4.1.1).  New technologies are likely to 
diffuse more rapidly when both form and function fit closely with the existing regime.  
However, continuous development eventually leads to the articulation of new 
functionalities and new technical designs tailored specifically to these functions. 
 
Figure 2-2: Fit-Stretch Pattern in the Co-evolution of Form and Function 




Geels (2002) identifies a third and final mechanism of diffusion: “new 
technologies may break out of niches by riding along with growth in particular markets.”  
Though Geels does not identify the forces behind such growth, I will posit that growth of 
a particular niche may be due to landscape development or endogenous changes in 
consumer tastes and preferences. 
In summary, the distinct contribution of the MLP is the inclusion of two factors in 
the transition to new socio-technical regimes: 1) the socio-technical landscape as a 
constraint and an opportunity; and 1) the stability of the existing regime and resulting 
niche-regime dynamics.  The MLP conceptualizes technological transitions as gradual 
reconfigurations involving a series of adaptations that take place “on all dimensions of 
the socio-technical regime (e.g. markets, user groups and user practices, technologies, 
production networks, policies)” Geels (2002).  Three primary factors contribute to the 
wide diffusion of a new, radical, technology: 1) niche markets that act as incubators; 2) 
‘niche-accumulation;’ and 3) circumstances at the regime or landscape level that create 
windows of opportunity.  The MLP has identified two transition routes distinguished by 
the initial stability or instability of the existing regime.  Within each route, the transition 
path is also defined by articulation of new functionalities for the novelty or the lack 
thereof.   
2.4.3 The Niche Hypothesis 
Both the QEM and MLP stress the role of niches – distinct application domains 
that are small in scale and scope – in the emergence, development, and diffusion of 
radical innovations.  The transition to a new technological regime, defined and stabilized 
by a set of rules shaping the interactions of social and technical elements, is described as 
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a process of niche branching, niche proliferation, and niche accumulation.  Based on the 
QE literature, I identify five fundamental assertions of the role of niches in regime 
transitions, which I will call the niche hypothesis: 
6) Within the niche, manufacturers learn about users’ needs and users learn about 
product performance through “learning-by-interacting.” 
7) Manufacturers improve the technology in terms of those needs and achieve lower 
costs through “learning-by-doing.” 
8) As a result of these learning processes, the new technology becomes embedded in 
a new rule set which reflects the adaptation of institutions.  Both the technology 
and the system in which it is produced and used are altered in this co-evolutionary 
process linking variation and selection which arises from the interaction of agents 
in the technological nexus. 
9) Growth of niche markets, niche branching, or niche proliferation allows 
manufacturers to reduce costs through economies of scale. 
10) These changes facilitate diffusion into wider markets. 
The MLP and the work of Raven (2005) add regime dynamics and instability as a 
significant factor in the growth (or lack of growth) of niches.  Instability may arise from 
three sources: 
4) Success of niche technology. 
5) External forces – changes at the landscape level – which: 
a. influence the direction and rate of variation by altering regime agents’ 




b. alter the selection environment by altering prices or consumers’ preferences. 
6) Internal regime forces – difficulties with the expanding scale or scope of the 
existing regime or achievement of technological or economic limits of existing 
technology – which lead regime actors to view the new technology as a solution. 
2.4.4 Theoretical Issues 
The niche hypothesis has led to a specific policy recommendation within the QE 
literature called strategic niche management (SNM).  The literature has thus shifted focus 
to SNM, which I believe leaves important aspects of the QE theory of innovation under-
developed.  Section 1.3.4 listed four related theoretical issues with the QEM and the 
niche hypothesis which I repeat here.   
First, the focus on the coupling between variation and selection leads to an 
exclusive emphasis on learning-by-doing (learning curve effects) and 
learningbyinteracting with users.  This yields an incomplete description of the innovative 
process behind product and process improvements that are critical for wide diffusion. 
Second, the technological nexus that links variation and selection is discussed as a 
key aspect of the process of embedding, yet remains an underdeveloped concept.  Who 
are the relevant agents?  How do new networks form and how are they sustained?  Are 
elements of existing networks important?  If so, how are they altered?   
Third, the focus on a single dominant regime neglects interactions with other 
existing regimes which may help or hinder market growth (Raven, 2005).  New 
technologies may address problems in multiple regimes or be based on fundamental 
innovations with applications that cut across regimes.  This relates back to the first and 
second issues, in that the process of innovation is more complex than is reflected in QE 
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theory.  It involves multiple learning mechanisms and networks that tie the innovators to 
a relevant knowledge base.  These networks may link seemingly unrelated industries, 
particularly in the early phases of a technology’s life cycle. 
Fourth, as Raven (2005) notes, the focus on the operation of niches in competition 
with a stable regime results in a simplistic description of niche-regime interaction.  It 
neglects the dynamic processes within stable regimes (incremental change) that may 
either hinder or assist the diffusion of the new technology.  In particular, it neglects 
regime response to internal and external forces of change which cause instability.  Such 
challenges may be interpreted as opportunities for innovation, either for change within 
the regime or for radical new technologies that lead to a complete regime transition.  
While the MLP begins to address regime dynamics, it only does so in relation to the 
presentation of opportunities for innovations that fall outside the regime.  The 
consideration of change within the regime leads to the last issue.  
The dichotomy of regime optimization (incremental change) versus renewal 
(radical change and transition) is overly simplistic for complex technologies.  It places 
policy focus on transformation of the socio-technical regime in its entirety which requires 
a complete alteration of both producer and user interpretation of the technology, its 
function, and the related organizations and rules.  Meanwhile, it discounts innovations 
which make only part(s) of the existing regime obsolete but could still radically reduce 
environmental impacts.  More significantly, it neglects intermediate or transitional 
technologies that may form a bridge to a new regime, such as hybrid and plug-in hybrid 
vehicles as a pathway to full electric or fuel cell vehicles.  In such a transition, only 
part(s) of the regime may be transformed at a given time. This deficiency is interesting, 
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because early works on QE theory highlighted the significance of compatibility issues: 
new technologies that may be easily embedded in the existing production, use, and 
institutional systems will diffuse more rapidly.  According to Kemp (1994), “[o]nly in a 
few respects did radically new products constitute a radical break with the past, which 
suggests that the term ‘radical’ is somewhat misleading.  Radical innovations often 
combined the new with the old (or even combined older technologies) and often rightly 
so because this helped the product to survive the initial harsh market selection and 
establish itself in the market place.”  Thus, transitions can occur as a more gradual 
unfolding and adaptation of the existing regime than the path described by ‘regime 
renewal.’  This suggests that the concept of transition as gradual reconfiguration and the 
mechanism of hybridization introduced by Geels (2002) should be more prominent in the 
formalization of a model of innovation and transition. 
2.5 Additions to Theory 
In order to develop a structured framework for analysis that addresses the 
theoretical issues raised above and allows exploration of the research questions, I draw 
from two additional themes within the evolutionary systems of innovation literature.  
Section 2.5.1 reviews the industry life-cycle model which provides a structure for 
analyzing regime dynamics, specifically the emergence of regimes, the stability of 
existing regimes and innovation within established regimes.  In section 2.5.2, I introduce 
a more complete description of the learning mechanisms involved in innovation that will 
provide the nomenclature for analyzing the learning processes involved in improving the 
performance and cost of early motor vehicles.  I then develop a conceptual framework in 
section 2.6 that will be used to explore the research questions posed in section 1.3.5.  This 
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framework begins with the sectoral system of innovation which focuses more directly on 
the entrepreneurs and the linkages that facilitate learning and innovation.  This provides 
the perspective to analyze innovation processes within and between firms, the both the 
development of the technological nexus, and the learning mechanisms involved in 
transitioning the automobile from niche markets to a regime. Each of these approaches 
used in constructing this framework has its limitations.  However, by integrating them, I 
hope to take advantage of their explanatory power while compensating for their 
shortcomings.  
2.5.1 Industry Life-Cycle Model 
As discussed in section 2.3.2.1, the classic phases of development – invention, 
innovation, product development, and diffusion – are not clearly defined in systems 
models of innovation.  However, a number of researchers have noted general patterns in 
the development of technologies, industries, production processes, and markets.  The 
number of stages of development identified by these researchers varies, as does their 
nomenclature.  This section provides an overview of the concepts found in the literature 
consolidated into four phases: emergent, transitional, specific, and senescent.  While 
development might be more accurately considered along a continuum, the phases 
described here and summarized in Table 2-1 provide a useful structure and vocabulary 
for studying technological progress. 
Let us consider first the early, or emergent, phase of a new technology that begins 
with the first practical application of a new idea.  This phase is characterized by radical 
innovation, flexible production capacity, and the emergence of new firms (Dosi, 1982; 
Freeman, 1996; Utterback and Abernathy, 1975; Abernathy and Utterback, 1978). New 
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knowledge is generated by directed research activities and is largely tacit, existing as 
uncodified knowledge of the entrepreneurs (Grübler et al., 1999a and 1999b; Cowan et 
al., 2004).  At this stage, primary importance must be attributed to the institutions which 
produce and direct the accumulation of knowledge, the existence of risk-taking actors or 
‘product champions’, and the exchange of knowledge among R&D units within firms and 
external research institutions (Dosi, 1982; Kantrow, 1980).  Because no supporting 
industries exist, entrepreneurs must either use off-the-shelf parts and process equipment 
or manufacture their own custom parts and equipment.  Thus, craft production techniques 
and a high degree of vertical integration are typical early in the emergent phase.
 
 
Table 2-1 Phases of Technological Development 
Phase  
Emergent Transitional Specific Senescent 
Innovation Innovation is rapid, product 
oriented and radical. 
Primary importance of risk-
taking product champions. 
Focus on defining users’ 
needs and reducing risk. 
Refinement of users’ needs. 
Focus shifting to production 
cost and product quality. 
Innovation becoming more 
process oriented. 





Interaction with users, 





Interacting with users and 
suppliers. 
IR&D. 





Industry produces its own 
supplies and process 
equipment. 
Emerging support industries 
and institutions. 
Vertical disintegration. 
Complex web of supporting 
and complementary 
industries and institutions. 
Supporting industries unable 
to survive. 
Vertical re-integration. 
Knowledge Base Uncodified knowledge of 
entrepreneurs. 
Institutional knowledge is 
increasingly codified. 
Institutional knowledge of 
sector and supporting 
network, codified in plants, 
capital equipment, and 
operating procedures. 




Craft Craft → Mass Mass → Synthetic Synthetic 
Product Variety of product 
configurations. 
Competition based on product 
differentiation. 
Emerging dominant design. 
Competition based on product 
differentiation. 
Products proliferate around 
dominant design. 
Competition based on product 
price and quality. 
Products tailored to niche 
markets with special 
requirements or those 
requiring heritage designs. 
Market Niche Growing Established Niche 
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 After the feasibility of the product has been demonstrated it is still unable to 
compete on a cost basis with existing technologies in mainstream markets.  However, it 
may have performance advantages in specific uses which lead to competitive application 
in niche markets.  In fact, Christensen (1997) finds that the very attributes that make 
disruptive technologies uncompetitive in mainstream markets may actually count as 
positive attributes in initial markets.13  Within the niche market, various technical 
approaches and product configurations may be competing.  At this point, there is a great 
deal of uncertainty about the product and its potential market.  Therefore, entrepreneurs 
must interact with suppliers, customers, manufacturers of complementary products, and 
competitors to reduce these uncertainties (Afuah and Utterback, 1997).  Freeman (1982) 
finds that successful attempts at innovation are distinguished by greater attention to the 
education of users, to publicity, to market forecasting and selling, and to the 
understanding of user requirements.  However, Christensen (1997) points out that no one, 
not market researchers or even users, can predict what the early markets and uses for a 
new technology will be.  Rather, through a process of experimentation with real products, 
customers discover these uses at the same time as producers do.  These assertions, drawn 
from empirical observations, are consistent with processes of learning and the mutual 
adaptation of variation and selection described in the niche hypothesis.  Cowan et al. 
(2004) assert that cooperation among firms and geographic clustering are likely to 
enhance innovation during this phase since the transmission of tacit knowledge often 
requires face-to-face contact. 
                                                 
13 Christensen (1997) distinguishes technologies that disrupt or redefine the performance trajectory from 
those that sustain the trajectory. 
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Next, during the transitional phase of a product’s lifecycle, a dominant design 
emerges as consumers’ needs and product features, design, and components become 
standardized.  Innovation slows and technological change becomes incremental and 
focused on cost reduction and quality enhancements, often through process 
improvements.  Firms compete mainly on product differentiation (Afuah and Utterback, 
1997).  Knowledge is codified and technology is largely embodied in production plants, 
equipment and products.  New knowledge is generated primarily through learning-by-
doing and learning-by-using such that and user and supplier interactions are of primary 
importance (Abernathy and Utterback, 1978; Grübler et al., 1999a).  Malerba (1992) 
finds empirical support for these assertions, but also finds that advances in science and 
technology contribute to firms’ efforts at product differentiation.  Technological advances 
still convey temporary monopolistic advantages, and possibly long-run oligopolistic 
positions, which serve as an incentive for further innovation (Dosi, 1982). 
Afuah and Utterback (1997) name a third specific phase where products 
proliferate around the dominant design and even more emphasis is given to process 
innovation.  Knowledge is embodied in capital equipment (process technology) and 
engineering personnel (Abernathy et al., 1983).  There is little product differentiation – 
the product design becomes increasingly standardized – and the industry is primed for the 
next round of innovation.  A new innovation may render the old technology obsolete, 
pushing it into decline, or senescence.   
Abernathy (1978) and Abernathy et al. (1983) refer to the specific phase as 
industry maturity, but note that the evolutionary process is not “self-contained or 
irreversible”.  A product design can be conceptualized as a combination of functional 
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requirements and the product attributes that fulfill them.  Changes in market preferences 
and technological innovations (both internal and external to the industry) can alter the 
relative importance of the product’s parameters and attributes, possibly adding new 
functional requirements.  Changes in market preferences may be due forces outside the 
industry, including changes in the prices or attributes of complementary or substitute 
products, shifts in cultural values, governmental actions, economic or social crises, etc.  
Such interactions with the environment were discussed in section 2.3.2.3.  Firms must 
develop new design concepts through product innovation in order to remain competitive 
in the new market reality.   
Mature firms that have experienced past success may be at a disadvantage at this 
point.  Concentration on productivity is often associated with a decrease in innovative 
flexibility due to capital investments in highly specialized equipment that makes 
retooling expensive and time consuming (Abernathy, 1978).  Radical product innovation 
is disruptive and competence destroying.  In addition, these firms’ past experience shapes 
their current thinking (see sections 2.3.2.4 and 2.3.2.5).  For both cognitive and strategic 
reasons, incumbent firms’ innovative efforts are shaped by their existing customers, and 
they therefore are often slow to develop innovations that appeal to new customers 
(Christensen, 1997; Klepper and Simons, 1997).  Thus, innovations that result in new 
uses for a product by a new market segment provide opportunities for new entrants.  If 
technical progress is rapid, the performance of the new product in serving existing 
functions may eventually provide an opportunity for these new firms to compete with the 
incumbents, possibly leading to the decline of industry leaders.  
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Gharajedaghi (2006) identifies three hierarchical forces of this nature that can 
transform past success into future failure: inertia, sub-optimization, and change of the 
game.  Inertia and sub-optimization were introduced in section 2.3.2.5.  In the third force, 
change of the game, a firm’s past success essentially solves the major historic 
technological challenge and fundamentally changes the nature of the problem – the 
industry has come to the end of the current trajectory.  Because of its triumphant success, 
the incumbent firm may have difficulty seeing or accepting the new direction of 
development.  The end result is that established firms are likely to attempt ‘retrofitting,’ 
altering secondary or component attributes before pursuing fundamental technological 
changes.  Meanwhile, new entrants have the advantage of starting from scratch with 
completely new product designs and process equipment.  However, there is renewed 
uncertainty and risk in new designs as users’ needs and technological solutions are 
redefined.   
Changes in the functional requirements of a product and the resulting round of 
innovations represent a reversal of the process of maturity, or what Abernathy calls a 
phase of ‘de-maturity’.  De-maturity leads to an increase in the variety of products 
available in the market and possibly an increase in the number of firms in the industry.  
This introduces the idea that a product and industry may experience cycles of maturity 
and reinvention, moving between the specific and transitional phases.   Anderson and 
Tushman (1990) propose a cyclic evolutionary model of technological change in which a 
stochastic technological breakthrough initiates an era of innovative ferment which 
generates a variety of product configurations.  Competition among these variations 
culminates in the selection of a single dominant design. The era of ferment is then 
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followed by a period of incremental technical progress which preserves the standard 
architecture until a new innovation initiates another cycle of variation, selection, and 
retention. 
The final or senescent phase of technological development begins when a new 
innovation begins to dominate and the existing technology experiences declining market 
share.  Eventually, the old technology once again finds application only in niche markets 
where it still holds some performance advantage or where heritage design is required.  As 
markets shrink, supporting industries become economically unviable.  Remaining firms 
in the final product industry must begin manufacturing their own parts and become 
vertically integrated.  Innovation slows or stops, is tailored to the needs of niche users, 
and occurs primarily through learningbyinteracting with these users.  Eventually, even 
the remaining firms are unable to survive and the industry ceases to exist. 
2.5.2 Mechanisms of Learning 
Systems models of innovation assert that technical progress is dependent on 
knowledge and learning.  In this section, I identify four mechanisms of learning, each of 
which has a distinct character and knowledge base.  The boundaries of these 
classifications should be interpreted as being rather ‘fuzzy,’ since entrepreneurial 
activities often fall at the boundary or within more than one class (Clarke et al., 2006).  
While all four sources are expected to contribute to the advance of a given technology at 
any point in time, their relative importance may shift as an industry matures.  Various 
researchers’ theories on the relationship between learning mechanisms and industry phase 
are included in the discussion.  Also, the ability of an entrepreneur to learn via any one 
mechanism is expected to depend on efforts in other mechanisms, the depth of all 
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relevant knowledge bases, and on how tightly the entrepreneur is linked into research, 
production, and use networks. 
2.5.2.1 Internal Research and Development 
The distinguishing characteristic of research and development (R&D) is the 
institutionalized, guided search for new knowledge, generally aimed at solving particular 
problems – what Malerba (1992) calls learning by searching.  The goal may be to expand 
fundamental sciences (so called ‘basic research’), apply existing or new scientific 
findings to a technological problem (so called ‘applied research’), to develop original 
products, or improve existing product design or production.  R&D is generally 
systematic, progressing through problem definition, theory development, data acquisition, 
model construction, and bench testing, with results used iteratively to refine the process. 
R&D is undertaken by private firms, government agencies and labs, universities, 
and non-profit organizations.  I use the term ‘internal R&D’ (IR&D) to refer to research 
investments within a single firm or industry, as distinguished from research in other 
firms, institutions and industries (depending on the unit of analysis), which I classify as 
‘spillovers.’ 
Investments in IR&D expand a firm’s internal knowledge base and directly 
produce technological innovations.  In addition, the research effort enhances a firm’s 
ability to identify, assimilate, and exploit knowledge, new findings, and innovations 
developed outside the firm (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989 and 1990).  In other words, 
IR&D develops the firm’s capacity to access and utilize external knowledge bases 
(spillovers), what Cohen and Levinthal call ‘absorptive capacity’. 
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R&D undertaken by research organizations is likely to play the greatest role 
during the emergent phase of technological development when innovations are more 
radical.  During this phase of development, researchers are forging new frontiers, so 
knowledge is largely tacit, residing primarily in human capital.  However, during this 
phase, manufacturers are focused on determining user’s needs and their relative 
preferences for the various product attributes that can meet these functional requirements.  
New firms therefore are likely to delay establishing R&D units until the emergence of a 
dominant design reduces the market risk.14  In such cases, IR&D is expected to contribute 
to incremental product and process innovations later in the product’s life cycle.  With 
complex products such as automobiles, component subsystems may undergo repeated 
cycles of radical innovation.  However, these innovations may originate from IR&D as 
well as from supplier and external R&D.  Thus, with increasing complexity, learning-by-
interacting with suppliers and the exploitation of inter-industry spillovers become 
increasingly important.  This in turn emphasizes the significance of absorptive capacity. 
2.5.2.2 Learning-by-Doing 
According to Rycroft and Kash (1999), U.S. networks that successfully innovate 
complex technologies have emphasized experience over theory.  The concept of learning-
by-doing evolved out of the long held idea that individual performance improves as a 
worker gains experience with a particular task (Argote and Epple 1990).  As individuals 
become more proficient with a task, it seems likely that a manufacturing team would, on 
average, become more productive.  This concept of organizational learning-by-doing can 
be extended to include experience with product designs, manufacturing processes and 
                                                 
14 In some mature ‘science based’ industries, such as pharmaceuticals and biochemicals, established firms 
engage in continuous new product R&D.  In such cases, industry and product maturity cycles do not align. 
 
92 
machinery (learning-by-using), and material inputs.  Innovations from learning-by-doing 
include changes in any of these factors, as well as changes in plant layout, firm 
organization, inventory control, and supply and distribution networks and methods.  The 
results of these changes include increased labor and equipment productivity, reduced 
material costs, improved plant capacity or uptime, decreased manufacturing defects, 
improved product quality, and reduced time to market. 
In learning-by-doing, process and product knowledge can be codified in texts, 
databases, operating procedures, and organizational structure and can be embodied in 
production plants, equipment, and products.  However, a significant amount of 
knowledge is still tacit, existing in human capital and organizational culture.  Thus, 
employee turnover and corporate reorganization can account for institutional ‘forgetting’ 
(Argote and Epple, 1990).  
While learning-by-doing is often referred to as moving up the ‘learning curve,’ it 
is important to distinguish between the process of learning-by-doing and the studies that 
provide statistical evidence of the process.  Early researchers recognized that learning-by-
doing could have significant implications for manufacturing as direct-labor personnel 
gained experience performing repetitive assembly-line tasks.  Wright (1936) is generally 
credited as the first to publish findings that per unit manufacturing labor hours decreased 
with cumulative production.  Early applications focused on military applications 
(Alchian, 1963; Rapping, 1965), but thousands of studies in diverse industries have 
examined the relationship between labor productivity, per unit costs, or average costs, 
and cumulative production, capital equipment, or some other measure of experience.  
This relationship, variously termed the learning curve, progress function, or experience 
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curve, has proven to be quite robust.   Dutton and Thomas (1984) review 100 studies and 
find statistical evidence that a doubling in cumulative production is associated, on 
average, with a reduction in production costs to 80% of the initial value (a progress ratio 
of 0.80).   
While experience curves provide a methodologically tractable method of 
modeling endogenous technological change, care must be taken in interpreting these 
statistical studies.  The literature on progress rates demonstrates high variation both 
across and within industries, firms, processes and products (Dutton and Thomas, 1984; 
Hirsch, 1952; Hirsch, 1956; Joskow and Rose, 1985).  According to Dutton and Thomas 
(1984) “progress curves are aggregate empirical descriptions of a process, and they mask 
its underlying dynamics.”  Organizational learning is more complex than individual 
workers improving their manual facility.  Improvements in coordination, scheduling, 
plant organization, production processes, and manufacturing technologies can increase 
labor productivity, decrease production costs, decrease time to market, or improve 
product quality.  Therefore, learning-by-doing encompasses experience gained at all 
levels in the organization, including engineers, managers and even sales and marketing 
staff (Hirsch, 1952; Baloff, 1966; Yelle, 1979; Montgomery and Day, 1985; Argote and 
Epple, 1990).  This learning may or may not be represented in the learning curve, 
depending on how progress and experience are measured.   
At the same time, reductions in both direct-labor hours and unit costs may be 
realized through other factors that are correlated with time and therefore with cumulative 
output, such as increasing capacity, cumulative investments in internal R&D, and 
progress in other industries and basic science (Ghemawat, 1985; Day and Montgomery 
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1983).  Therefore, so-called experience curves may conflate learning effects with 
economies of scale and the influx of new knowledge that is both internally and externally 
generated.15  A number of studies that control for these variables find that measures of 
cumulative experience are still statistically significant (Rapping, 1965; Hirsch, 1952; 
Joskow and Rose, 1985; Lieberman, 1984; Zimmerman, 1982).   
Finally, the blanket application of simple experience curves assumes that all firms 
and industries are capable of attaining the average progress rate without any effort; it 
treats progress as a “free good”.  However, the variation in progress rates found in the 
literature supports the idea that firms must expend resources to exploit knowledge from 
the environment.  In a study of progress in the chemical industry, Leiberman (1984) 
found statistical evidence that R&D expenditures steepened the learning curve.  In 
addition, organizational structure and culture can either thwart or facilitate learning.  
Individual learning is not enough; continuous learning must occur across the 
organization; “the ability to integrate individual learning into system-wide learning” is an 
important factor in failure or success (Rycroft and Kash, 1999).   
As I review the history of the automobile, I will attempt to distinguish among 
learning-by-doing, other sources of knowledge and learning, and economies of scale.  
The influence of organizational structure and corporate structure on learning will be 
examined and changes in these factors will be considered as learning-by-doing. 
                                                 
15 In his foundational research, Wright (1936) attributed the reduction in labor costs to “improvement in 
proficiency of a workman with practice” as well as to economies of scale, such as spreading the tooling and 
set up time over larger production volumes, the opportunity for greater tooling, and the “ability to use less 




Learning-by-interacting can be classified in two categories: learning from users 
and learning from suppliers.  Learning-by-interacting represents a fundamental aspect of 
the evolutionary dynamic: outcome of selection processes must feed back into the next 
round of variety generation.  While the idea of ‘selection processes’ is typically 
interpreted narrowly as market mechanisms, here were refer to any framework in which 
manufacturers and suppliers or users interact in order to choose between competing 
patterns of behavior (Metcalfe, 1995).   
Feedback from users is particularly important during the emergent phase of a 
product and industry.  During this phase, such feedback establishes the product’s 
functional requirements as well as users’ preferences for product attributes that fulfill 
them.  Even after the emergence of a dominant design, firms must continuously interact 
with users due to the ever-present potential for shifts in user preferences.  However, 
Hayes and Abernathy (1980) caution that over-reliance on market analysis tends to lower 
the overall level of product innovation and leads to imitative rather than innovative 
product design:  
It may be useful to remember that the initial market estimate for computers in 
1945 projected total worldwide sales of only 10 units.  Similarly, even the most 
carefully researched analysis of consumer preferences for gas-guzzling cars in an 
era of gasoline abundance offers little useful guidance to today’s automobile 
manufacturers in making wise product investment decisions.  Customers may 
know what their needs are, but they often define those needs in terms of existing 
products, processes, markets and prices.  Deferring to a market-driven strategy 
without paying attention to its limitations is, quite possibly, opting for customer 
satisfaction and lower risk in the short run at the expense of superior products in 
the future. 
In the earliest phase of development, entrepreneurs are building one-of-a-kind 
prototypes and are likely manufacturing their own parts and equipment, or modifying off-
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the-shelf parts to fit a new use.  As the product and its market evolve, it becomes 
profitable to purchase supplies, parts, and equipment from specialists who can profit from 
economies of scale and in-depth knowledge and experience.  Therefore, mature 
manufacturing industries typically are mutually supported by a large network of suppliers 
of raw materials, parts, subassemblies, process equipment, and complementary products.  
When these specialists support multiple industries, they serve to diffuse knowledge and 
innovation across sectors.  For this reason, firms that follow a strategy of backward 
integration may isolate themselves from the R&D of independent suppliers who now 
view them as a competitor.  Such a strategy may eliminate supplier power and supply 
chain bottlenecks and therefore reduce costs in the short run.  However, it may also slow 
innovation by diverting the company’s resources from its core business and can lock the 
firm into outdated process technology (Hayes and Abernathy, 1980).  At the same time, 
firms should not leave innovation of supplies and process technologies entirely to their 
manufacturers; rather, the interaction must involve information flows in both directions 
with mutually supporting research programs. 
2.5.2.4 Spillovers  
Spillovers refer to innovations that originate outside the sectoral system – in other 
industries, institutions or other countries.  Spillovers may involve either a transfer of 
knowledge (knowledge spillovers) or economic benefits (rent spillovers).  Rent spillovers 
are realized when an innovation in another (supplier) industry results in decreased costs 
or increased quality or performance of the material inputs or the capital equipment used 
by the subject industry.  If the entire cost saving is not passed on to consumers of the 
final good, the manufacturer of that product realizes some profit from the innovation.  In 
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this research, we are primarily concerned with knowledge spillovers which lead to 
technological progress in the automotive industry.   
However, the distinction becomes somewhat problematic with a complex product 
and production system.  Here, the relationship between manufacturers and suppliers is 
dynamic and more complicated than a simple market transaction.  Suppliers may provide 
entire subsystems which may be jointly designed.  Even ‘simple’ improvements in 
material inputs, like new metal alloys, may require iterative problem-solving by the 
supplier and manufacturer to develop product-unique specifications and appropriate 
product designs, manufacturing processes, and machine tools.  Therefore, rent spillovers, 
knowledge spillovers, and learning-by-interacting with users become difficult to 
differentiate. 
Knowledge spillovers from other manufacturing industries, scientific research 
institutions, and technological research institutions outside the sector require that the 
organization be capable of exploiting knowledge from outside the firm.  While some 
externally generated innovations may be directly used in existing products (direct 
spillovers), others (indirect spillovers) must be adapted and existing product designs may 
require modifications.  Thus, manufacturers must be able to identify and synthesize 
promising innovations.  This capacity is facilitated by an active research department and 
effective linkages with the knowledge base beyond the individual firm (Cohen and 
Levinthal, 1989). 
2.6 Analytical Framework and Approach 
The research questions posed in Chapter 1 follow from the assertions of the QEM 
and MLP theories of technological transitions, mainly those regarding the role of niche 
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markets and the technological nexus.  Section 2.4.4 identified a number of shortcomings 
of these theories which could lead to incomplete or flawed conclusions.  Therefore, in 
this section I integrate the main concepts of the QEM and MLP with concepts from the 
additional research reviewed in section 2.5 to construct an analytical framework that 
accounts for these difficulties.  In this manner, I hope to take advantage of the 
explanatory power of each body of research while compensating for any theoretical and 
practical oversights.  This dissertation does not assert that this framework represents a 
new model of innovation or a complete theory of technological transitions.  Rather, this 
conceptual framework provides the structure and vocabulary to trace the historic 
development of motor vehicle technology and its diffusion to mass markets.  However, 
because of the uniqueness of this approach, the findings of this research have important 
implications for the theory of socio-technical transitions. 
Because of the multidirectional interactions among elements in complex systems 
and between the system and its environment, determining the system boundaries for 
study is a difficult task.  While the QEM and MLP take a technological regime as the unit 
of analysis, it is not entirely clear prior to analysis what actors, organizations, and 
artifacts are relevant.  Because the research questions posed in chapter 1 address the 
coupling between variation and selection identified in QE theory, both agents involved in 
supply (innovators and producers) and demand (users) must be considered.  However, the 
research questions also specifically address the innovative processes involved in 
improving the performance and cost of early motor vehicles.  Thus, the analytic 
framework must adequately account for the behavior of entrepreneurs (agents of change) 
and how they gather, interpret, and respond to information from the selection 
 
99 
environment.  Therefore, I take the perspective of the entrepreneurs and trace their 
actions and interactions through history.  This viewpoint provides the structure to analyze 
both the development of the technological nexus and the learning mechanisms involved 
in transitioning the automobile from niche to wider markets. 
The conceptual framework used here is based on a systems view where 
“technology is best understood in terms of its functional attributes” (Sahal, 1981).  The 
system of interest provides the societal function of personal transport.  To begin 
constructing this framework, I appeal to the sectoral system of innovation and production 
described by Malerba (2002) as “a set of new and established products for specific uses 
and the set of agents carrying out market and non-market interactions for the creation, 
production and sale of those products.  A sectoral system has a knowledge base, 
technologies, inputs and an existing, emergent and potential demand.  The agents 
composing the sectoral system are organizations and individuals (e.g. consumers, 
entrepreneurs, scientists).”  Within the sectoral system, “[a]gents are characterized by 
specific learning processes, competencies, beliefs, objectives, organizational structures 
and behaviors. They interact through processes of communication, exchange, co-
operation, competition and command, and their interactions are shaped by institutions 
(rules and regulations). Over time, a sectoral system undergoes processes of change and 
transformation through the co-evolution of its various elements.” 
Thus, the personal transportation system of innovation and production includes 
agents – individuals, firms, and units within the firms – that are carrying out market and 
non-market interactions for the innovation, design, production, marketing, sales, service 
(maintenance and repair), purchase, and use of new and established products for the 
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provision of personal transport.  This system, then, includes manufacturers of 
automobiles and automobile parts (direct suppliers) and automobile buyers and users.  In 
addition, it includes physical artifacts – factories, equipment, distribution and service 
facilities, product and parts inventories, and stock in use.  The relationship of the agents 
to the physical artifacts and the interaction of agents are shaped by a set of institutions.  
Institutions in this context are defined to include both organizations and rules (cognitive, 
normative, and regulative).  They include any form of social construct or constraint on 
human interactions, including organizational constructs, such as governmental bodies and 
research and industry organizations; formal constraints, such as legislation, economic 
rules, and legal contracts; and tacit constraints, such as shared perceptions, beliefs, social 
conventions, and moral codes.  In general, I will use the term institutions in this manner, 
resorting to the terms ‘rules’ and ‘organizations’ when the distinction is significant to the 
discussion.  Thus, the sectoral system describes all three of the types of elements found in 
complex systems as identified by Geels (2004) – human actors and organizations, 
physical artifacts, and rules. 
Geels (2004) asserts that the sectoral system of innovation inadequately considers 
users and this criticism falls within the broad problem that evolutionary theories generally 
neglect the sociological aspects of systems of production and innovation.  This can be 
remedied by considering that the sectoral system is an integral part of a larger socio-
technical system with a technological and social history, all of which is embedded in the 
natural environment.  In other words, the sectoral system may be considered a subsystem 
of a larger complex system composed of actors, physical artifacts, and rules.  Therefore, 
this analysis examines the innovative behavior of automobile manufacturers, automotive 
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suppliers, and the manufacturers of precursor technologies embedded in a technical, 
institutional, and ecological complex (TIEC) as illustrated in Figure 2-3.   
 
 
Figure 2-3: The Sectoral System of Production and Innovation 
While some elements of the TIEC are analogous to the socio-technical landscape 
in the MLP, there are important conceptual differences.  Geels (2002) defines the socio-
technical landscape as the macro-level which provides an external structure or context 
that is relatively ‘hard,’ which is to say that the landscape is difficult to influence and that 
change occurs slowly.  It contains the material aspect of society, such as cities, factories, 
and highways, and heterogeneous factors such as oil prices, economic growth, wars, 
cultural values, and environmental problems.  In contrast, the TIEC consists of both 
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here are considered as part of the regime’s system of production or as linked systems, 
such as factories and highways respectively.  Meanwhile, the MLP’s landscape does not 
explicitly account for the interaction between the regime under study and other meso-
level systems.  By incorporating overlapping (linked) systems, the TIEC accounts for 
interactions between regimes that are somewhat independent yet inter-related.  In 
addition, meso-level systems that are not directly linked to the system under study may 
still influence it through diffuse associations within the TIEC.  A fuller discussion should 
clarify these important distinctions between the MLP’s landscape and the TIEC.  
Like the socio-technical landscape in the MLP, the TIEC includes regionally or 
nationally established rules and higher level social constructs (e.g. cultural values and 
culturally learned patterns of behavior), among other elements.  Thus, while the 
observable structure and linkages of the system are described by Figure 2-3, the 
institutions determine the interactions that occur through these links, i.e. the processes of 
communication, exchange, co-operation, competition and command.  In dynamic systems 
modeling terminology, the institutions (rules) are analogous to the equations that 
determine the flow of energy, materials, and information.  While a majority of rules are 
imposed by the TIEC, some rules exist that are specific to the sectoral system such as 
perceptions that are unique to the system’s knowledge base and standard operating 
procedures specific to firms or industries. 
Within the TIEC, the sectoral system is directly linked to supporting industries, 
markets, government and private institutions, and the natural systems that provide raw 
materials and absorb material and energy wastes.  These directly linked systems are in 
turn linked to their own network of supporting industries, institutions, and natural 
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systems, providing an indirect link from these ‘apparently unrelated’ institutions to the 
sectoral system of interest.  For example, the sectoral system has a knowledge base that 
resides with the manufacturers, suppliers, universities, government agencies, trade 
associates, etc., and is networked through the TIEC with knowledge bases in other sectors 
and industries.  As a specific example, consider that members of the Society of 
Automotive Engineers (SAE) may also be members of the American Society of 
Mechanical Engineers (ASME), which includes engineers employed in other sectors and 
industry.  And because all planetary ecological systems (water, air, land) are 
interconnected, there is a direct or indirect link between the sectoral system and the entire 
global ecosystem. 
The network of linkages among systems and the TIEC allows for the feedback 
dynamics that are a crucial characteristic of evolutionary change and accounts for the 
two-way linkage between variation and selection identified in the QEM.  Over time, the 
system undergoes processes of change and transformation through the co-evolution of its 
various elements and elements of the TIEC.  For example, the increasing scale of 
automobile use in the U.S. contributed to local air quality problems by the 1970s.  This 
change in a directly linked ecological system (atmospheric processes) led to a social 
change in the TIEC – increased public concern for the health effects of air pollution.  In 
response, the actions of private and government agents led to the creation of new 
institutions for the control of vehicle emissions: the Clean Air Act and the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).  In effect, the success of the automobile had 
radically altered the selection environment, and this change led to new requirements for 
innovation.  Actors within the government served the nexus role of interpreting the new 
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demands of the selection environment and imposing them on the variation that occurred 
within firms.  Actors within firms also participated in the nexus through negotiations and 
collaboration with government agents to establish standards and testing procedures. 
Clearly, the structure of the TIEC and its subsystems is dynamic as new 
institutions and linkages emerge and others disappear.  Meanwhile, the overlap in 
systems is only partial.  For example, while the EPA has responsibility for promulgating 
and enforcing vehicle emissions standards, other divisions within the agency fulfill 
functions unrelated to motor vehicles.  At the same time, the EPA has no jurisdiction over 
establishing new vehicle fleet fuel economy standards, though it is tasked with 
establishing the testing methods manufacturers use to measure the  fuel  economy of new 
models to verify compliance with these standards.16 
Further, some elements of the TIEC can influence the sectoral system with no 
apparent feedback in the reverse direction, while other elements have no identifiable 
connections to the sectoral system.  Although there is no traceable link between these 
systems and the sector of interest, they are connected through associations, often diffuse, 
with the TIEC.  These elements can be considered the sector’s environment and are 
somewhat analogous to the socio-technical landscape described by Geels (2002), though 
they are not necessarily all as ‘hard’ and unchangeable, nor are they necessarily at the 
macro-level.  Dynamics within these systems can effect changes within the TIEC that are 
exogenous to the sectoral system, but which exert influence on it.  This dynamic, in 
effect, changes the boundary conditions for the system under study.  For example, U.S. 
                                                 
16 The National Highway Safety Administration is tasked with reviewing and establishing the Corporate 
Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards.  The fuel economy of each manufacturer’s new vehicles, 




involvement in both World Wars – events with no causal links to the transportation sector 
– required, among other things, the re-allocation of productive resources to the war effort.  
The actions of governmental agents with no prior relationship to the transportation 
industry curtailed the production of automobiles.  In addition, automobile manufacturers 
became involved in the design and production of military supplies such as aircraft 
engines, creating new linkages to a formerly independent industry. 
The actions of the agents and the process of change are studied within a cyclic 
framework, illustrated in Figure 2-4, based on the industry life-cycle model described in 
section 2.5.1 and elements of the cyclic model of innovation described by Anderson and 
Tushman (1990).  The sectoral system (technology, industry, firms and markets) 
progresses through four phases: emergent, transitional, specific, and senescent.  The 
general characteristics of these phases are summarized in Table 2-1.  The specific phase 
is characterized by the emergence of a dominant product design, which represents a 
stable description of the functional requirements of the technology and the product 
attributes used to fulfill them.  In addition, the specific phase entails stable production 
processes and organizational forms, which to some extent are embodied in rules.  
Stability in this case is understood to be dynamic, where technological change occurs 
incrementally without causing discontinuous disruptions to production processes and 
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Figure 2-4 Cyclic Co-evolutionary Framework 
I borrow from Anderson and Tushman (1990) the idea that innovation is cyclic; 
after an industry attains the specific phase, incremental innovation may be punctuated by 
periods of ‘ferment.’  This is represented by movement from the specific phase into a 
new transitional phase.  Anderson and Tushman, however, describe these periods as 
being initiated by stochastic technological breakthroughs (see also Tushman and 
Rosenkopf, 1992).  In the framework presented here, cyclic evolutionary change may be 
triggered by any change in the TIEC – technological, economic, social, institutional, or 
environmental – which may be brought about through co-evolutionary interactions 
between the transportation sector and other elements of the TIEC or by causes entirely 
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exogenous to that sector.  Thus, through the TIEC, the cyclic framework incorporates the 
sociological dimensions of technological change found in the QEM.  Non-technical 
phenomena (social, political, economic) may create instability which presents 
opportunities for innovation or even forms the basis of the innovation of new production 
processes or usage norms.  Changes that trigger innovative ferment may alter the firm’s 
operating environment or result in a redefinition of users’ needs and therefore the 
product’s functional requirements in an evolutionary or discontinuous fashion. 
Entrepreneurs, within or outside the sector’s existing firms, can exploit the change 
in the TIEC to create economic value by modifying existing products and processes or 
developing new ones.  Existing firms in the industry must adapt through changes in their 
products, processes, and organizational structures or face obsolescence and senescence.  
Successful innovation eventually moves the sector toward another specific phase 
awaiting the next round of innovation.  Finally, when an innovation that can fulfill the 
new functional requirements arises outside the existing technological paradigm, the entire 
sector enters a phase of senescence while the success of the innovation gives rise to a new 
sectoral system.  Note that in this framework, the phases of development are a continuum 
with indistinct boundaries and the sector’s characteristics may not align perfectly with 
those listed in Table 2-1.  Further, the system may not attain the characteristics of the 
specific phase as diagramed in Figure 2-4 before another change in the TIEC triggers 
additional innovation and transition. 
In the cyclic model proposed here, changes in the TIEC that trigger a shift to a 
new transitional phase or to the senescent phase can be placed in one of two categories: 
1) new scientific discoveries, technological innovations, or institutional arrangements that 
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arise outside the existing technological paradigm and stimulate the development of 
competing technology; or 2) difficulties advancing along the existing technological 
paradigm due to problems created by its success, its expanding scale and scope, 
theoretical limits, or exogenous factors.  These two classifications are conceptually 
consistent with Geels’ (2005a) ‘technological substitution’ and ‘wider transformation’ 
routes; Gharjedaghi’s (2006) shift of paradigm by design or out of frustration; and Dosi’s 
(1982) theory that radical shifts along new technological directions “emerge either in 
relation to new opportunities opened-up by scientific developments or to the increasing 
difficulty in going forward on a given technological direction” for technological, 
economic, or other reasons.  In both cases, the change in the TIEC may manifest itself in 
one of three ways: 1) through the market via altered consumer preferences for product 
attributes, the price of input materials or waste disposal (i.e. the cost of the factors of 
production), or competition with other technologies; 2) through other institutional 
changes such as taxation or regulation; or 3) through direct environmental effects such as 
the impact of weather patterns on production processes or end use.17 
The cyclic evolutionary model accounts for the increasing complexity of 
products, production systems, and support networks through the cumulative effects of 
innovation through successive cycles.  Also, change may occur at any level – component, 
subsystem, or system – while the other levels remain stable.  For example, with a 
complex technology like the automobile which is produced in a complex industry 
structure, there can be cycles of radical innovation and emerging and senescent markets 
                                                 
17 For the case of the current personal transportation system, most environmental effects are manifested 
through input prices, taxes, and regulation.  If one considers the increasing frequency and severity of 
storms, a case might be made for climate change impacts on end use.  Other sectoral systems, notably 
agriculture and renewable energy systems, obviously have large direct environmental effects which are 
accounted for in the general model. 
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for component technologies, even while the basic architecture of the consumer product 
that supplies personal transport remains unchanged.  However, the functional 
requirements it fulfills and the attributes used to do so may be altered significantly.  
When this is the case, a new dominant design emerges.  Similarly, while the industry 
structure of automobile manufacturers may appear stable over a long period of time, their 
organization, production processes, and interactions may be radically altered, along with 
the network of supporting industries and their relationships with manufacturers.  Thus, 
the network of linkages and the rules guiding these interactions may change while the 
observable structure of the system appears unaltered. 
The phase typology of the cyclic model provides a structure for analyzing the 
emergence of new technologies, the development of a socio-technical regime, and the 
dynamics of niche-regime interactions, while also stressing the central role of stability.  
The QE process of embedding that occurs with movement from the emergent phase to the 
specific phase (and the movement from niche to mass markets) results from the co-
evolution of the technology, the sectoral system, and the TIEC.  As shown in Table 2-1 
and Figure 2-4, this co-evolution results in the emergence of a complex web of 
complimentary and supporting industries, institutions and infrastructure.  Using concepts 
from the MLP, a socio-technical regime is understood to exist when a technology and 
sector have achieved the specific phase and when the stability of that specific phase is 
supported by the alignment of institutions, including rules, and existing physical 
infrastructure with the dominant product design, production processes, and organizational 
forms.  This alignment confers advantages to the existing technology over alternatives.  
Changes in the TIEC result in a misalignment that erodes stability and provides 
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opportunities for an emergent technology to compete with the existing technology, 
possibly pushing it into senescence as described above. 
Alternately, such a misalignment could lead to technological transition within an 
existing regime.  While new functional requirements arising from the misalignment may 
be met by a radically new technology, they may also be met by a new product design that 
emerges within the regime.  What distinguishes transition within the regime from 
transition to a new regime is that internal transition involves a great deal of adaptation 
versus replacement – of firms, industries, knowledge bases, infrastructures and 
institutions.  This is not to say that there is no replacement, as some firms or even entire 
supporting industries may be eliminated by the transition and some new infrastructure 
and institutions may be required, but internal transition is, overall, less disruptive to the 
regime.  The regime and the technology remain identifiable.  Transition to a new regime, 
or ‘regime renewal,’ as described by QE theory, involves the simultaneous and relatively 
abrupt change to both a radically new technology and to a new rule set.  It requires 
considerable change in “the behavior of various actors in relation to various relevant 
technologies,” such as new usage norms and new forms of ownership (Elzen et al., 2003).  
The description of innovation in the cyclic model then allows for the transition to a new 
regime to occur as a gradual unfolding or reconfiguration of the existing regime as 
described by Geels (2002).  In internal transition, a new product design may integrate 
radically new technologies with the existing technology in a manner which allows for 
compatibility with existing rules and infrastructure.  Over a longer time period, this may 
lead to the gradual emergence of a new regime through co-evolutionary adaptations. 
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This analytic framework will be used to review the early history of motor 
vehicles. The analysis will focus on the behavior of entrepreneurs (agents of change) and 
explore the development of the technology, the establishment of the network of agents 
involved in variation (the entrepreneurs) and selection (consumers, policy makers, and 
society at large) and the two-way linkage between the two processes through the 
technological nexus role.  In particular, I will attempt to identify the interactions that 
produced the technological and institutional adaptations that facilitated wider diffusion of 
the automobile.  This includes identifying significant innovations and, using the 
vocabulary introduced in section 2.5.2, exploring the learning processes underlying these 
innovations.  I will also attempt to generally delineate the sector’s phases of development 
based on the emergence of dominant designs, mass markets, and regime stability, 




Technological innovations which may have market application, lie fallow 
until markets can be identified or created. 
-- J.M. Utterback and W.J. Abernathy, 1975 
 
 
Prior to the development of the motor vehicle, personal transportation was 
provided by what may be considered a socio-technical regime based on draft animals, 
primarily horses.  This regime had existed for thousands of years and was characterized 
by a set of rules and aligned industries for the production, ownership, use, and 
maintenance of vehicles (carts, wagons, carriages, etc.) as well as the breeding, housing, 
care, and training of draft and riding animals.  These rules also included the construction, 
maintenance and usage of urban roads.  The regime consisted of two separate but linked 
systems of production and innovation – vehicles and draft animals – that were 
characterized by incremental progress. 
However, the ancient Greeks first conceived of and experimented with alternative 
sources of power as early as the second or first century BC, thus marking the invention of 
the motor vehicle.  It took some two thousand years for this invention to become an 
innovative product with practical application and economic significance.  This chapter 
reviews the history of the technologies involved in this innovation and includes the 
emergent phase of motor vehicles.  Section 3.1 discusses the development of the 
underlying technologies for motor vehicles powered by steam engines, electricity, and 
gasoline internal combustion engines.  Section 3.2 reviews the historical development of 
manufacturing processes for volume production and standardized interchangeable parts, 
two necessary components of mass production.  Section 3.3 relates the history of 
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automobile manufacturing during the emergent phase, which concludes around the 1900.  
Section 3.4 provides the context of developments in the technical, institutional, and 
ecological complex (TIEC).   
Section 3.5 then synthesizes and analyzes this history and context within the 
framework presented in section 2.6.  I identify two initial niche markets for motor 
vehicles – local urban transport and long-distance pleasure touring.  I determine that 
misalignments in multiple regimes combined with several developments in the TIEC 
explain why the motor vehicle industry emerged in these markets when it did.  I find that 
spillovers and learning-by-doing appear as the primary mechanisms of innovation in a 
cumulative and synthetic process during this era.  I also identify four examples of the 
emerging technological nexus role which links variation and selection.   
3.1 Technologies for Motive Power 
3.1.1 Steam Powered Vehicles 
The concept of steam power dates back to ancient Greece, but it was another 1700 
years before the technological possibilities were fully grasped.  During the Renaissance, 
the revival of interest in classical approaches to understanding the physical world led to 
two significant developments:  the scientific method, a process of discovery relying on 
empirical evidence and mathematics; and a new mechanical philosophy which held that 
all natural phenomena can be explained by physical causes.  In 1680, Sir Isaac Newton 
envisaged a steam carriage and predicted that steam power would revolutionize 
transportation.  The earliest patents on practical applications of the principles behind 
steam power were obtained shortly thereafter, and engines for pumping came into 
widespread use in England during the first half of the 18th century.  James Watt’s 
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revolutionary inventions between 1762 and 1782 brought the application of steam power 
to other uses.  Watt described a steam locomotive in a patent in 1784 but never 
constructed one and, in protection of his patents, actually hindered further development 
of steam engines using high-pressure. 
Nicholas Joseph Cugnot of France constructed the first motorized vehicle in 1769, 
a three-wheeled gun tractor powered by a two-cylinder steam engine.  The vehicle was 
inefficient and slow and Cugnot was driven into exile by the French war ministry which 
had funded the project.  Although Napoleon later brought Cugnot back to France to 
continue his work, the project was never completed.  In 1801 and 1802, Oliver Evans and 
Richard Trevithick built high pressure ‘road engines’ to pull heavy loads on tracks in the 
U.S. and England, respectively.  In 1825, the first public railway opened in England and 
successful steamboats applied Watt engines in both countries early in the century (Nevins 
and Hill, 1954). 
By the 1830s, stationary steam engines were being used to power U.S. threshing 
machines, sawmills, and gristmills.  Portable steam engines that were mounted on wheels 
and could be pulled by horses came into use on farms in the 1850s.  They became 
particularly popular for ‘belt work,’ mainly threshing, in the 1870s, though advertising 
was required to overcome some farmers’ well-founded fears of boiler explosions.  The 
machines were more economical than horses, since they required no veterinary care and 
wood for fuel and sperm oil and beef tallow for lubrication were readily available. 
Experimentation with steam-powered plows began in 1856, but these trial and error 
efforts resulted in machines that were far too heavy for practical use.  Wik (1951) blames 
this failure in part on the absence of steel tools and lack of access to schools of 
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agricultural engineering, though overly ambitious design goals also contributed.  The first 
successful self-propelled, or traction, engine was introduced in 1873 when an Ohio 
manufacturer added a gear attachment to a portable engine.18  The traction engine was 
still dependent on horses for steering until the 1882 introduction of a self-steering model.  
Steam power use in agriculture reached a zenith in 1910 at around 3.6 million 
horsepower.  Manufacturing of steam farm engines peaked at 10,000 in 1913 but was 
essentially abandoned by 1925, having been replaced by the gasoline tractor (Wik, 1951). 
Attempts to use steam engines on U.S. roads initially failed because the vehicles 
were too heavy to negotiate the country’s poor roads.  Sylvester Roper was the first 
American to produce lightweight steam cars, some of which weighed no more than 500 
pounds.  Roper built around ten experimental road steamers using coal-fired boilers 
between 1860 and 1895.  Following Roper’s death in 1896, George Eli Whitney, who had 
worked occasionally in Roper’s shop, built his first steam carriage using kerosene to heat 
the boiler.  Whitney founded the Whitney Motor Wagon Company in 1897 and produced 
and sold a few automobiles weighing about 800 pounds for $1500 and up (May, 1990).   
In 1898, the Stanley brothers, Francis and Freelan, built a 600-pound steamer 
using a lightweight engine built by J.W. Perry & Sons and a light, high-pressure boiler of 
their own design.  Frances won a race in the steamer in October, 1898, and Freelan drove 
one over unpaved rocky roads to the summit of Mount Washington the next year, 
marking the first time an automobile had accomplished that feat.  Encouraged by their 
success and the interested it garnered, the brothers formed the Stanley Brothers Motor 
Carriage Company in late 1898 and began production of 100 steamers.  The company and 
                                                 
18 The steam traction engine, or road locomotive, was used to plow, pull heavy loads, or provide power at a 
chosen location.  It was used extensively in agriculture and is the forerunner of the steam tractor.  Though 
powerful and self-propelled, it was heavy, slow, and poorly maneuverable. 
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the Stanleys’ patents were promptly bought out and the firm was renamed Locomobile.  
The patents were later sold back to the brothers who began building an improved version 
of the steamer in 1901.  A specially built Stanley automobile set a speed record of 127.6 
miles per hour (mph) in 1906.  A year later, the racer became airborne at a speed of 197 
mph, seriously injuring the driver, and the brothers abandoned attempts to set speed 
records (May, 1990).  
More than 100 U.S. manufacturers produced steam cars based on the Stanley-
Locomobile design, though most firms were short-lived.  In 1901, Rollin H. White began 
producing a car based on the Stanley but he incorporated a ‘semi-flash’ boiler and a 
condenser.  White also gradually increased the working steam pressure, nearly doubling it 
by 1910.  White sold 9,122 vehicles before abandoning steam power in 1911.  The 
market for steam-powered automobiles began a rapid decline around 1910, but the 
Stanleys continued to make improvements to their automobiles, shifting from gasoline to 
kerosene, adding weight and strength, and, in 1915, adding a condensing system.  The 
brothers’ reputation allowed them to continue selling several hundred cars per year.  
Many analysts have asserted that the Stanleys could have sold many more vehicles if they 
had shifted to mass production techniques and more aggressive advertising.  However, 
the brothers preferred to stick to traditional craft techniques, believing it produced higher-
quality workmanship, and maintained annual production below 650 cars.  The brothers 
sold the company in 1917, but Stanley steamers were produced until 1924, with 
cumulative production exceeding 14,000 vehicles (May, 1990).   
Steam-powered automobiles were designed to operate using gasoline or kerosene, 
which was widely available at rural general stores in the 1890s.  And in an emergency, 
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steam boilers could use nearly any fuel.  Prior to the incorporation of condensers, steam 
cars also required frequent refills with clean, preferably soft, water, which could be 
obtained in many areas at public watering troughs that were made available for horses.  
Steam engines could easily provide adequate and economical power, provided a wider 
range of operation than electric motors, and were less mechanically complex than 
gasoline internal combustion engines (ICE).  They did not stall, permitted smooth 
transmission of power to the wheels, and were easier to manufacture.  However, the 
boiler required sufficient time to heat up, then required frequent attention during 
operation and posed serious risks of explosion.  The development of the flash boiler 
overcame many of these difficulties, but steam car technology reached a plateau in 
development after 1901, just as the gasoline automobile began rapid improvements 
(Flink, 1970, p. 236).   
Although steam-powered automobiles did not ultimately succeed in the market, 
technological developments in this arena made significant contributions to the 
development of gasoline ICE vehicles.  The designers of the steam traction engine had 
developed basic solutions to the problems presented by transmitting power from the 
engine to the wheels, changing speed, and steering.  In addition, the first gasoline ICE 
engines adopted from steam power the concept of a ‘doubling acting’ cylinder: the 
practice of applying expanding gas to one side of the piston to move it in one direction, 
then applying another charge to the other side to return it to the original position (Nevins 
and Hill, 1954). 
 
118 
3.1.2 Electric Powered Vehicles 
Experimentation with electricity traces back at least to the ancient Greeks who 
first observed properties we now call static electricity.  In 1800, Alessandro Volta created 
the first chemical battery, consisting of a pile of discs of copper and zinc separated by 
brine-soaked cardboard.  The first batteries for practical use, developed in the 1830s, used 
a liquid electrolyte which was prone to spillage, making them impractical for portable or 
mobile applications.  Dry cell batteries were invented near the end of the 19th century 
and replaced the liquid electrolyte with a paste.  Both the wet and dry cell batteries were 
permanently drained when the chemical reaction was spent.  In 1859, Gaston Planté 
invented the lead-acid battery, the first battery that could be recharged by reversing the 
current through it.  In 1881, Camille Alphonse Faure developed an improved lead-acid 
battery with better performance that was also easier to produce in quantity.  In the 1880’s, 
massive storage batteries were being used in the first electrical power distribution 
systems to augment  power at peak usage, smooth current output, boost output at remote 
substations, and provide power during outages. 
Public transportation in cities was initially provided by the horse-drawn omnibus 
which was replaced by the horse car.19  These vehicles were limited in their ability to 
negotiate steep grades and contributed to problems with animal wastes, odor, flies and 
disease.  Humans risked infection with tetanus, while close quarters spread infectious 
diseases rapidly among urban horse populations. A major outbreak of an equine 
infectious disease in 1872 proved devastating to most eastern cities.  In the 1880s, 
entrepreneurs experimented with steam-powered cable cars with little success. 
                                                 
19 The horse car looked much like its successor, the cable car, but was pulled by horse. 
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Electrification of urban transport in the U.S. began in 1888 with the installation of 
Frank J. Sprague’s electric streetcar system in Richmond, Virginia.  The system used a 
generator and overhead power distribution, which minimized the energy losses from 
friction that plagued steam-powered cable systems.  Electric streetcar technology diffused 
rapidly, and by 1901, $2 billion had been invested in 15,000 miles of track.  By 1902, 
97% of urban street railway systems were electric.  Because of inherent economies of 
scale, the industry was soon concentrated in the hands of large firms.  These firms were 
often granted long-term or perpetual franchises by local authorities, leading to public 
controversy over control of city streets and government corruption. 
Construction of new lines was terminated abruptly with the Panic of 1907 (see 
section 4.5.1), after which only a few systems were extended.  Though safe and 
comfortable, streetcars required high initial investments and suffered from system 
inflexibility.  While the systems were capable of supporting heavy use, few urban centers 
generated such high traffic.  By 1917, the industry was caught between rising costs and 
rigid fare structures.  Passenger miles reached a peak in 1923 and the industry went into 
decline (Hilton, 1969). 
The earliest U.S. experiments with electric powered personal vehicles were 
undertaken by Andrew L. Riker, who built an electric tricycle in 1884.  He formed the 
Riker Electric Motor Company in 1888 to produce electric motors then established the 
Riker Motor Vehicle Company in 1898 to manufacture electric cars.  William Morrison 
of Des Moines, Iowa built the first successful four-wheeled electric car in the U.S. in 
1891 and drove it on the streets of Chicago the following year (Rae, 1959).  Morrison 
apparently did not pursue commercial production of the vehicle.  The Pope 
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Manufacturing Company, the nation’s largest bicycle manufacturer until 1896, began 
producing both electric and gasoline ICE cars in 1897.  Within two years, Pope had built 
500 electric and 40 gasoline ICE vehicles and was the leading U.S. automobile 
manufacturer. 
In 1894, Henry G. Morris and Pedro G. Salom of Philadelphia produced an 
electric car called the Electrobat consisting of a wooden-wheeled wagon to which masses 
of lead-plate batteries and electric motors were attached.  The two had spent ten years 
developing the vehicle with the support of the Electric Storage Battery Company (ESB).  
In 1895, the Electrobat II was awarded a gold medal for excellence in design by the 
judges of the Chicago Times-Herald race.  However, the Electrobats were not capable of 
the long-range travel required to complete the race.   
Morris and Salom created the Electric Carriage and Wagon Company in 1896 and 
the first experimental vehicles were ready the next year.  However, the two engineers felt 
that untrained drivers were not capable of servicing and maintaining electric vehicles and 
decided instead to operate them as a fleet of public cabs in New York City beginning in 
March, 1897.  By this time, Morris and Salom had relinquished ownership and 
managerial control to executives of the ESB.  Six months later, ESB’s Isaac Rice formed 
the Electric Vehicle Company (EVC) with the intention of expanding the cab service to 
include one hundred vehicles, a monumental task for a nascent industry employing craft 
production methods.  By January, 1899, forty-five electric cabs were in regular service, 
and as many as forty more were leased under long-term contracts (Kirsch, 2000). 
Of the three automobile types, the electric car most closely resembled horse-
drawn vehicles in terms of performance and styling.  It appears that electric vehicle 
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manufacturers conceived of the automobile as a direct replacement for the horse-drawn 
buggy, providing exactly the same functionality but without the disadvantages (feeding 
and stabling requirements, manure production, flies, odor, etc.).  According to Flink 
(1970, p. 238), the Woods Motor Vehicle Company eschewed the production of an 
automobile capable of touring, and instead planned to sell electric cars as “fine carriages 
in all variety of styles” for “gentlemen’s private stables.”   
Battery powered electric vehicles could only travel a short range between 
recharging (initially 20 miles), recharging was time consuming (two to three hours), and 
operation was more expensive than steam and gasoline internal combustion alternatives.  
Batteries yielded poor hill climbing ability and their weight made negotiating mud and 
snow difficult.  In addition, the batteries were unable to withstand the punishment of 
traveling on rough roads and rapidly deteriorated.  However, the electric automobile was 
superior to horse-drawn, steam-driven, and gasoline internal combustion vehicles in 
terms of noise, odor, and ease of operation.  It especially appealed to women who had 
difficulty with shifting gears in the early transmission found in internal combustion cars.  
Around the turn of the century, the general consensus was that electric vehicles were the 
best choice for travel in and around town.  Enthusiasts were optimistic that improvements 
in battery technology and recharging or battery exchange infrastructure would expand 
their use to even enable touring. 
In the summer of 1899, news out of Europe cast a shadow on public optimism 
regarding the electric vehicle.  Electric cab companies in London and Paris announced 
the discontinuation of service, claiming difficulties retaining employees.  Shortly 
afterward, the Automobile Club of France released discouraging initial results from tests 
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of battery endurance.  These reports coincided with efforts in the U.S. by William C. 
Whitney to corner the electric vehicle market.  The financier and transportation magnate 
had cobbled together New York’s Metropolitan Street Railway and had begun 
electrifying the system.  In the process, he had also obtained interest in several of the 
city’s electricity providers.  In 1899, Whitney gained control of both the EVC and its 
parent company, the ESB, through stock purchases on the open market.  Shortly 
afterward, he negotiated the purchase of Pope’s automobile manufacturing enterprises.  
Whitney intended to create an electric vehicle industrial combination that would supply 
electric vehicles to a nationwide organization of regional companies that would in turn 
operate cab fleets and sell electric vehicles to the public.  The new holding company 
formed a manufacturing subsidiary named the Columbia and Electric Vehicle Company 
from the production facilities acquired from Pope and the EVC.  Operating companies 
were established in New York, Atlantic City, Boston, Philadelphia, and Chicago.   
Editorials in a leading trade publication, Horseless Age, scathingly attacked the 
plan, asserting that the formation of a motor vehicle trust was premature and only in the 
interests of the investors.  The magazine attacked both the storage battery and the EVC, 
pointing out the ‘inherent weaknesses’ of the technology and protesting that the cab 
scheme stood in the way of progress.  Other trade publications admonished the editor of 
Horseless Age for misleading its readers with inaccurate information. By January, 1900, 
the magazine’s position on electric vehicles had softened, but public opinion had already 
turned against Whitney’s enterprise which was derisively named the Lead Cab Trust.  
Perhaps most significantly, the EVC in 1899 also purchased and attempted to enforce the 
Selden patent, leading to a number of patent infringement lawsuits against manufacturers 
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of gasoline ICE automobiles that dragged on through 1910 (see section 4.5.2).  According 
to Kirsch (2000, p. 32), the EVC “became synonymous with trust building, stock jobbing, 
financial manipulation, and legal chicanery.” 
Despite the damaging press, the Columbia and Electric Vehicle Company became 
the country’s leading motor vehicle manufacturer, producing around 2,000 electric cabs 
in 1899.  Although this expansion in production was admirable, it fell far short of the 
Lead Cab Trust’s ambitious goal to produce 10,000 electric cabs.  In addition, the 
company failed to unify operations or improve the production process, continuing to rely 
on carriage production techniques.  According to Kirsch (2000), EVC customers were 
reportedly conservative, desiring vehicles that were consistent in appearance with those 
to which they were accustomed – carriages. 
The Lead Cab Trust was plagued by problems regarding finances, production, 
maintenance, and operations.  In December, 1899, an unrelated scheme to monopolize the 
electric vehicle industry led to a speculative bubble that inflated the stock price of the 
EVC then dragged it down when the bubble collapsed.  In addition, the first vehicles put 
on the road apparently had been rushed into service and performed poorly due to design 
defects and improper assembly.  Renters in Boston drove the vehicles carelessly and 
reports of reckless driving were common.  Due to inadequate inspection and 
maintenance, more than half of the vehicles were inoperable after four months of service.  
Operators in Atlantic City experienced similar problems with maintenance, but were also 
plagued by an unreliable electric power grid that led to undercharged batteries.  On some 
occasions, overnight power fluctuations resulted in the batteries discharging into the grid 
to power the town.  Despite high demand for service, the electric cabs failed to show 
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sufficient profits.  When cab drivers in Chicago refused a profit-sharing plan and staged a 
strike in February, 1901, the manager chose to liquidate the company claiming the 
service was unprofitable.  Boston followed suit within weeks and the EVC shut down 
operations in Atlantic City in May.  The EVC was reorganized in December, 1901, 
resulting in the sale of the Philadelphia operation to the ESB.  The New York cab fleet 
became a profitable independent firm and continued offering transportation on a fee-for-
service basis until 1905. 
Following the failure of the EVC, the electric vehicle market grew modestly, the 
technology remaining popular with wealthy urban women and in some commercial 
applications, particularly local delivery trucks.  Meanwhile, the market for gasoline ICE 
automobiles expanded exponentially.  Electric vehicles enjoyed a brief revival beginning 
in 1910, in part due to the efforts of the Electric Vehicle Association of America (EVAA) 
– a national organization of electricity providers, vehicle manufacturers, and the battery 
industry.  To foster the market for electrics, particularly in commercial fleets, the EVAA 
pursued programs in education, advertising, standardization, and cooperation.  A handful 
of central station operators established departments to provide technical support and 
maintenance to electric vehicle owners, subsidize local recharging facilities, and provide 
delivery and service vehicles for their own use.  EVAA efforts resulted in the adoption of 
two standard charging plugs, one for passenger cars and one for commercial vehicles.  
With the increasing reliability of power distribution networks and the adoption of 
standard charging plugs, battery designs coalesced into a general standard by 1912.   
However, efforts at cooperation soon foundered.  Vehicle owners were unwilling 
to share operational cost information and prospective customers became suspicious of the 
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data provided.  The various factions within the EVAA disagreed on responsibilities, 
particularly with regard to promoting vehicle sales.  Amid slow market growth, 
cooperation gave way to finger-pointing, and in 1916 the EVAA ceased to exist as a 
separate entity, having been absorbed by the National Electric Light Association (Kirsch, 
2000). 
3.1.3 Gasoline Internal Combustion Vehicles 
The history of the gasoline internal combustion engine (ICE) automobile begins 
in Europe during the late nineteenth century.  In 1801, French engineer Phillipe Lebon 
patented a two-stroke engine using electric ignition of a compressed illuminating gas 
made from coal.  The engine was ‘double-acting,’ using explosions on both sides of the 
cylinder, a practice used in steam engines.  Unfortunately, Lebon was assassinated in 
1804 and his design was neglected for sixty years before Belgian mechanic Etienne 
Lenoir was inspired by the Lebon engine.  Lenoir added a carburetor for mixing air and a 
liquid hydrocarbon to form a vapor, but he did not compress it.  The design contained no 
new components, but its construction represented a striking advance over previous 
engines.  Lenoir also benefited from the availability of better materials, machining 
techniques, and electrical equipment than Lebon had available sixty years earlier.  In 
1860, Lenoir obtained a French patent for the first commercially successful internal-
combustion engine and around 500 Lenoir engines were sold in France, England, and the 
U.S. over the next five years.  Unfortunately, the engine did not prove to be as 




The same year that Lenoir obtained the patent for his engine, he designed a four-
wheeled carriage to be propelled by it using a sprocket chain to transmit power to the 
wheels, a rod for steering, and a brake.  He built a lighter engine that could run at higher 
speed, but quickly foresaw the desirability of substituting a liquid petroleum fuel and 
began designing a new engine with the addition of a carburetor.  Lenoir built a model 
automobile that ran twenty-four kilometers in three hours, but there is no evidence that he 
continued his automotive pursuits, likely because the carriage was heavy and 
undependable (Nevins and Hill, 1954). 
Nikolaus Otto, a young German store clerk, was inspired by reports of the Lenoir 
engine and began experimenting with engine designs for stationary power.  Otto joined 
forces with Eugen Langen and the two developed an improved engine which used flame 
ignition, a compressed illuminating gas mixture, and a flywheel to regularize the force of 
the working stroke.  The open cylinder design and free piston avoided the overheating 
that plagued the Lenoir, although it resulted in noisy operation.  But the engine was 
dependable, used half the volume of gas as the Lenoir, and actually cost less to operate 
than a small steam engine.  Otto obtained a patent in 1866; demand was slow to develop, 
but by 1872, Langen founded the Deutz Gas-Engine Factory for quantity manufacture.  
Langen hired engineer Gottlieb Daimler as chief engineer and William Maybach as chief 
of production.  The two engineers improved the engine design, making it simpler, more 
efficient, and more reliable.  Although still cumbersome and noisy, the unit was more 
compact and cost effective and was widely used in Europe. 
In 1872, Englishman George Bailey Brayton, who was living in Boston, invented 
and patented a two-stroke continuous-compression-cycle engine that operated on liquid 
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petroleum fuel; it was the first engine to use crude petroleum.  The thermodynamic cycle 
of the Brayton engine is sometimes referred to as the Joules cycle, which vaporizes and 
then compresses the fuel in a separate chamber, feeds it into the cylinder, then burns it in 
a continuous flame rather than exploding it.  The engine was quiet, easy to start, and 
reportedly as efficient as the Otto-Langen engine.  While Europeans preferred the Otto 
engine, Americans showed a preference for the quieter Brayton engine (May, 1990; 
Nevins and Hill, 1954). 
Otto, however, was not satisfied with the performance of his engine, and was 
already working on an entirely new design.  He returned to a concept he had explored 
briefly in 1860 but had abandoned: a four-cycle engine.  By drawing in a larger charge of 
gas, the four-cycle is able to produce an explosion powerful enough to carry through two 
revolutions of the crankshaft.  This allows the piston to compress the next charge of gas 
during the third stroke, an operation that must be performed externally in the two-stroke 
engine, or not at all.  In 1862, French engineer Alphonse Beau de Rochas had also 
proposed a four-cycle engine, discussing it in some detail, but had not attempted to apply 
the principles.  With the help of Daimler and Maybach, Otto was able to make the 
concept operational, receiving a patent in 1877.  Despite requiring a large flywheel to 
regularize the motion of the crankshaft, the ‘silent Otto’ was compact and relatively 
quiet, and was soon licensed for sale in England and France.  By 1882, it was being 
manufactured in the U.S., and the Brayton soon disappeared. 
Otto and Langen showed no interest in applying their invention to transportation, 
and although Brayton experimented with installing his motor in an omnibus, he was not 
fully successful.  The first account of a successful internal-combustion-powered 
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automobile is attributed to German Siegfried Marcus, who reportedly built two 
experimental motor carriages in the early 1870s using a four-stroke engine inspired by 
Beau de Rochas’ work.  However, Marcus saw no commercial use for his carriage and 
discontinued working on it.  Around the same time in the U.S., patent attorney George 
Selden became interested in developing a horseless carriage.  He first considered using 
steam power, but quickly turned to internal combustion.  After witnessing a 
demonstration of the Brayton engine in 1879, he drew up plans for a ‘road-locomotive’ 
consisting of a four-wheeled vehicle powered by a gasoline engine similar to Brayton’s.  
Selden applied for a U.S. patent, but made minor changes to the application annually 
which delayed its formal registration until November, 1895.  Selden sought financial 
backing to manufacture his automobile but was unsuccessful.  His patent, however, 
would figure prominently in the future development of the automotive industry (see 
section 4.5.2). 
In Europe, two Germans working independently built the first crude gasoline-
powered road vehicles.20  In 1882, Daimler left the Deutz Gas-Engine Factory and began 
working on a lighter engine that could be used in a vehicle.  Completed in 1883, 
Daimler’s new four-cycle engine weighed around 80 pounds per horsepower and 
operated at up to 900 revolutions per minute (rpm), compared to the four-cycle Otto’s 
200.  Daimler developed a carburetor that delivered fuel at a suitable ratio of gasoline and 
air and also developed a system that used a heated platinum tube to ignite the fuel when 
compression was complete.  The motor eventually was water-cooled and used oil for 
lubrication.  The light, compact, and highly efficient engine was the first specifically 
                                                 
20 For brevity’s sake, the term gasoline or gasoline-powered vehicle is used from here on to refer to motor 
vehicles powered by gasoline internal combustion engines.  Although gasoline was often used as a fuel for 
the boiler of steam engines, the reference should be clear based on context. 
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designed as an effective power-plant for a motor vehicle.  Daimler immediately began 
experimenting with using the engine in bicycles, four-wheeled carriages, and boats.  He 
received a German patent for a two-speed motorcycle in August, 1885, and for his two-
speed motor carriage in October, 1886. 
Meanwhile, Karl Benz developed a two-stroke engine in the 1870s then began 
work on a four-stroke for automotive applications.  Using knowledge of the Otto, he 
developed a 300 rpm, water-cooled engine with an electric ignition. In July, 1886, he 
successfully applied the engine to power a one-speed tricycle, using a system of belts and 
chains to transmit the power to the wheels.  He later developed a two-speed vehicle and 
obtained a patent for a sun-and-planet transmission in April, 1887. 
The appearance of gasoline-powered road vehicles in Germany was met with a 
mixture of excitement and alarm.  Benz was granted permission to operate his vehicle on 
city streets, but was initially ordered to not exceed 6 kilometers per hour (kph) in the city 
and 12 kph in the country.  Neither Daimler nor Benz vigorously promoted their 
automobiles, though Daimler began manufacturing his engine commercially in 1887.  
Over the next few years, he adapted the engine for motorboats, streetcars, a fire engine, 
and a small locomotive.  In 1889, the French firm Panhard & Levassor began developing 
a motor carriage using Daimler’s engine and began production in 1892.  Benz made an 
alliance with Emil Roger and also began selling vehicles in France, where smooth, well-
paved, level roads were more abundant than in the U.S.  Thus the gasoline-powered 
automobile arrived first in France. 
Many American entrepreneurs were experimenting with gasoline internal 
combustion engines and motor carriages at this time, including Henry Ford, Ransom E. 
 
130 
Olds, Elwood Haynes, Charles and Frank Duryea, Hiram Percy Maxim, and countless 
others.  Henry Ford claimed to have begun building gasoline engines as early as 1891, 
though there is no evidence of experiments with a satisfactory motor until 1893.  His first 
successful test of a motor carriage followed in 1896.  Credit for the first successful U.S. 
gasoline-powered motor vehicle goes to Charles and Frank Duryea, who began 
manufacturing bicycles in the 1880s.  The brothers began experimenting with a gasoline-
powered carriage in 1891 and obtained financing for construction in March, 1892.  
Although Charles developed the initial designs for the vehicle, Frank worked alone over 
much of the following year, solving problems with the two-cycle engine, ignition, and 
transmission.  Frank therefore deserves much of the credit for their success when the 
vehicle completed a public trial run in September, 1893.   
Frank proceeded to redesign the vehicle with wooden-spoked wheels, rubber tires, 
a new water-cooled four-cycle engine mounted in the rear, a cranking device, a clutch 
and gear transmission, and a lever for steering.  The economic crisis beginning in 1893 
postponed introduction of the vehicle for sale, but in September, 1895, the brothers and 
backers from Springfield Massachusetts founded the Duryea Motor Wagon Company, the 
first company organized in the U.S. for the production of automobiles.  The company 
also became the first to produce multiple motor vehicles from a single design when it 
built and sold thirteen automobiles in 1896 (Nevins and Hill, 1954; May, 1990).   
3.2 Volume Production and Standardized Interchangeable Parts 
Early automobiles thrilled the public with their speed and were viewed as luxury 
items for the rich.  Conventional wisdom for high profit was to manufacture a small 
quantity of a highly personalized product (Ford and Crowther, 1922; Rubenstein, 2001).  
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This meant that demand outpaced supply, and manufacturers could sell at a high per-unit 
profit.  But not all early automobile manufacturers subscribed to this doctrine.   With the 
rise of venture capitalism, industries were discovering the profits that could be made with 
large production volumes.   
However, manufacturing technology at the dawn of the automobile industry was 
incapable of producing any quantity of identical vehicles.  The automobile requires parts 
of unprecedented durability, especially gears, and steel parts must therefore be hardened 
to withstand such heavy use.  Because early machine tools could not work hardened steel, 
the parts were heat-treated after fabrication.  This process often caused warping and the 
parts then required reshaping through further machining, grinding, or hand filing.  In 
addition, car builders contracted different craftsmen to manufacture various parts.  
Though highly skilled, these craftsmen did not work to a common gauge.  The resulting 
parts had to be custom filed and fitted for final assembly. 
Innovations in machine tools and production methods around the turn of the 
century allowed a transformation in the automobile industry.  While Henry Ford is 
popularly thought of as the originator of mass production, the Olds Motor Works actually 
became the first company to mass produce a vehicle when it introduced the curved dash 
for $650 in 1900.  Olds produced about 1,400 vehicles in 1900, 2,100 in 1901, 3,300 in 
1902 and about 4,000 in 1903 (Pound, 1934, p. 54; Epstein, 1972, p. 37; Abernathy, 
1978; Rubenstein, 2001).  By 1904, the Olds plant was producing up to 40 vehicles per 
day and the Cadillac Company was soon making 30 to 40 cars per day (Epstein, 1972).  
Henry Ford believed that the desire for vehicle ownership was nearly universal and saw a 
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huge potential market for an inexpensive vehicle, but did not find commercial success 
until after 1903 (see section 3.3 and chapter 4).   
According to Womack et al. (1990, p. 27), the key to mass production was not the 
moving assembly line, but rather “the complete and consistent interchangeability of parts 
and the simplicity of attaching them to each other” (emphasis in original).  This required 
that the vehicle be designed for ease of manufacturing, and that all parts be standardized 
and made to a common gauge.  While this may seem obvious in retrospect, for the 19th 
century manufacturer, it required entirely new ways of thinking about production.  The 
move to mass production techniques with standardized interchangeable parts did not 
occur discontinuously, nor did it occur within the automobile industry.  Rosenberg (1963) 
notes: 
The problems of large-scale automobile production involved the extension to a 
new product of skills and machines not fundamentally different from those which 
had already been developed for such products as bicycles and sewing machines.  
Underlying the discontinuity of product innovation, then, were significant 
continuities with respect to productive processes.  The transition to automobile 
production for the American economy after 1900 was therefore relatively easy, 
because the basic skills and knowledge required to produce the automobile did 
not themselves have to be “produced” but merely transferred from existing uses 
to new ones.  This transfer was readily performed by the machine tool industry. 
Thus, the development of techniques for mass production reviewed in this section 
was a continuous and cumulative process that occurred over decades and within several 
industries that superficially appear to be entirely unrelated. 
3.2.1 Arms Manufacturing 
While the earliest automobile production was a craft industry, large volume 
production using standard parts was not a novel concept.  As early as the end of the 16th 
century, the Venetian Arsenal employed interchangeable pre-manufactured parts, 
specialized labor, and an assembly line for shipbuilding.  In 1765, French General Jean 
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Baptiste Vaquette de Gribeauval proposed that muskets could be manufactured 
economically if they were made from interchangeable parts, with the added benefit of 
being more easily repaired on the battlefield.  However, the ideal of standardized, 
interchangeable parts was not easy to achieve in practice (Hounshell, 1984).  
The U.S. War Department became convinced that a ‘system of uniformity’ was 
necessary for military progress, and invested a great deal of effort over a 40 to 50 year 
period to solve the problem of manufacturing interchangeable parts.  The Department 
established the Springfield and Harper’s Ferry Armories in 1794 and 1798, respectively, 
and also began contracting with private arms-makers for muskets and pistols.  In 1798, 
Eli Whitney proposed that mechanized production would facilitate large volume 
production, but he never produced the quantity of guns he promised, and none had 
interchangeable parts.  Arms contractor Simeon North had greater success.  With his first 
two contracts for a total of 2,000 pistols, he found that the division of labor resulted in 
significant time savings and higher quality workmanship.  North’s third contract specified 
that any component part should be able to fit any of the 20,000 pistols ordered.  To fulfill 
the contract, North developed the revolutionary idea of manufacturing to a standard 
model or gauge rather than a pattern.  In addition, he pursued the design and development 
of special-purpose machinery. 
During this time, the Springfield and Harper’s Ferry Armories began phasing out 
the traditional apprentice system and experimenting with new production and managerial 
procedures, including division of labor and piece-rate wage systems.  By 1819, an 
elaborate gauging system had been devised.  However, it was an array of special-purpose 
machinery developed by Thomas Blanchard that brought the benefits of mechanization 
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and allowed large volume production of interchangeable parts.  Sequentially arranged 
special-purpose machinery was first used in making rope blocks for the British Royal 
Navy around 1807.  But Blanchard was the first to develop machinery for making 
irregularly shaped parts, a technology he applied to barrels and gunstocks for the Harpers 
Ferry and Springfield Armories in 1818-1819.  By 1826, Blanchard, with the support of 
the Springfield Armory, was able to fully mechanize stock manufacturing using fourteen 
sequential machines.  By combining this process with the gauging methods developed by 
North, an intense commitment to making interchangeable parts, and the financial backing 
of U.S. government, John Hall of Harpers Ferry Armory was able to design and 
manufacture a rifle with fully interchangeable parts in 1824.  Hall was convinced that his 
process could be used for production on a large scale that, when combined with “a minute 
subdivision of Labor,” could realize significant economies of scale (Hounshell, 1984, p. 
42).  However, government appropriations never allowed for more than 1,000 rifles per 
year at a single armory, which in 1834 were produced at Harpers Ferry and Simeon 
North’s armories. 
Hall’s methods were transferred to the Springfield Armory, where they were 
applied to the manufacture of muskets in the 1830s.  The government contracted with 
private arms-makers and freely shared parts, workers, and information on production 
technology.  As a result, the Armory served as a “clearing house for technical information 
and a training ground for mechanics,” thus facilitating the diffusion of the innovative 
production methods at the heart of what came to be known as the ‘armory practice’ or the 
‘American System of Manufactures’ (Hounshell, 1984, p. 45).  According to a British 
committee charged in 1854 with studying U.S. manufacturing practices, the American 
 
135 
system was characterized by the “adaptation of special tools to minute purposes,” “the 
ample provision of workshop room,” “systematic arrangement” of manufacturing, “the 
progress of material through the manufactory,” and the “discipline and sobriety of the 
employed” (cited in Hounshell, 1984, p. 64). 
It is significant to note that the U.S. government was not interested in efficiency, 
but only in producing uniform parts such that firearms could be easily repaired.  
Therefore, despite increasing mechanization, the Springfield Armory never decreased the 
cost of its products.  But at the same time that the arms-makers were applying 
mechanization to solve the problem of uniformity, U.S. clockmakers were increasingly 
using special-purpose machines and tools to manufacture large quantities of inexpensive 
clocks.    The market-driven clockmakers never aimed at nor achieved interchangeable 
parts and apparently did not grasp the importance of this innovation for high volume 
production. Though they were turning out hundreds of thousands of clocks annually by 
1850, assembly was slow.  With such high production levels, the clockmakers developed 
novel marketing and financing strategies to maintain demand, including sales on credit 
and the introduction of new models when demand fell (Hounshell, 1984).  Similar 
strategies would be adopted by automakers some 70 years later. 
Beginning around 1840, the increasing requirements of the firearms industry 
spurred the development of the infant machine tool industry, which had originated in the 
1830s with the development of heavy steam-powered machinery for the New England 
textile mills.21  The machine tools required for precision manufacturing of 
                                                 
21 According to Rosenberg (1963), the development of the machine tool industry was hindered by the 
difficulty and expense of transporting heavy equipment.  Machinery production therefore remained general-
purpose and localized until the development of the railroads.  After 1840, a growing number of firms began 
producing increasingly specialized machinery for a narrow range of applications. 
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interchangeable firearms parts were further developed through the 1850s and adapted for 
use in other industries.  Rosenberg (1963) describes the machine tool industry as a 
“reservoir of skills and technical knowledge which are employed throughout the entire 
machine-using sectors of the economy.” As such, it can be viewed as a knowledge base 
that played a central role in the learning processes responsible for U.S. industrialization.  
“This role…is a dual one: (1) new skills and techniques were developed or perfected here 
in response to the demands of specific customers; and (2) once they were acquired, the 
machine tool industry was the main transmission center for the transfer of new skills and 
techniques to the entire machine-using sector of the economy.” 
3.2.2 Sewing Machine Manufacturing 
The requirements of sewing machine production stimulated further machining 
innovations in the latter half of the 19th century, and many of the mechanics hired by the 
nascent sewing machine industry had experience at the Springfield or private armories 
(Rosenberg, 1963).  The Wheeler and Wilson Manufacturing Company adopted 
manufacturing techniques similar to those used at the Colt armory, which utilized 
extensive drop forging prior to machining.  By 1862, Wheeler and Wilson was able to 
produce nearly 30,000 sewing machines annually with uniform parts that the company 
claimed required no filing during assembly.  The company continued to expand with a 
production goal of 100,000 per year at reduced prices that would allow every family to 
own one.  Its production peaked in 1872 at 174,088 machines (Hounshell, 1984). 
In 1858, the Willcox and Gibbs Sewing Machine Company contracted with the 
Brown & Sharpe machine shop of Rhode Island, which was experienced with making 
clocks and watches.  Despite having no experience with the armory practice, Brown & 
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Sharpe approached the task by designing a model, special tools, fixtures, jigs and gauges 
right from the start.  Brown & Sharpe’s success in developing special-purpose tools for 
sewing machine manufacture, a process that took eight months, ultimately led the 
company to begin selling machine tools to the industry as well.  Because the company 
made both process machinery and finished products, it was uniquely positioned to 
understand the needs of the industry and benefited from in-house testing capabilities 
(Hounshell, 1984).  Rosenberg (1963) credits Browne & Sharpe with producing the most 
important innovations in the sewing machine industry, including the universal milling 
machine first sold in 1862. 
Henry Leland, the eventual founder of the Lincoln Motor Company, worked as a 
tool builder at the Springfield and Colt armories and several machine shops, and was 
hired by Browne & Sharpe in 1872 (Hounshell, 1984).  According to Hounshell (1984), 
Leland’s insights and advice were critical in the development of the universal grinding 
machine and a grinder for production work that were capable of producing a fine finish 
on hardened steel parts.  These new technologies overcame the warping caused by 
hardening and helped eliminate the need for hand fitting at assembly.  In addition, they 
improved the precision of gauges, and therefore the precision of manufactured parts 
(Hounshell, 1984).  
In addition to contributing to the development of new machine tools, Leland 
helped institute important organizational changes.  Under the armory system, arms 
manufacturers hired inside contractors who used the company’s shop space, power, tools 
and materials to produce parts at a set piece-rate.  The contractor hired, managed, and 
paid his own workers.  The contract system was a hallmark of New England armory 
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practice and contributed to the diffusion of the armory system and new technologies.  
Leland, however, believed that adopting a strict procedural approach would ensure that 
sequential operations were more closely followed and that materials would flow more 
smoothly.  Leland eliminated the contract system and instituted a piece-work system that 
allowed department supervisors to determine pay rates.  After a year, these changes 
reportedly resulted in a 47% reduction in labor costs and a comparable improvement in 
the quality of work (Hounshell, 1984). 
After leaving Browne and Sharpe, Leland founded the Leland and Faulconer 
Company, which in 1899 designed a machine for production grinding of hardened bevel 
gears for bicycles (Rosenberg, 1963).  The company became Detroit’s most successful 
machine shop and earned a national reputation for machining cylinders and pistons to 
closer tolerance than other companies.  Leland was then hired in 1902 to run the failing 
Henry Ford Company, which was renamed the Cadillac Automobile Company.22  The 
Cadillac and Leland and Faulconer companies largely had the same stockholders, and 
were officially merged in 1905 (Nevins and Hill, 1954).  It is notable that Cadillac was 
the first to manufacture precision-machined interchangeable automobile parts 
(Abernathy, 1978).   
The I.M. Singer & Company initially built sewing machines using predominantly 
European craft manufacturing methods.  Company officials believed that hand finishing 
by skilled workers resulted in the highest product quality. Rather than focusing on 
manufacturing methods, Singer concentrated on a highly successful worldwide marketing 
                                                 
22 Cadillac was purchased by GM in 1909, but Leland retained complete control of management.  When the 
U.S. entered World War I in 1917, Leland left Cadillac and founded the Lincoln Motor Company to 
produce Liberty airplane engines.  The company began producing automobiles in 1920 and was sold to 
Ford in 1923. 
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strategy, which included advertising, demonstrations, financing, and establishment of 
retail stores.  Singer’s sales tripled between 1855 and 1856, due in part to the first Singer 
model intended exclusively for home use, changes in the company’s sales system, and the 
initiation of an installment purchasing plan.  This last innovation, which Singer’s Edward 
Clark credited to the Wheeler and Wilson Company, allowed customers to advance a 
percentage of the purchase price to ‘hire’ the machine then pay monthly installments and 
eventually own it.  Despite growing demand, the company continued to rely on hand 
fitting and assembly was slow and expensive.  Singer’s factories began having trouble 
meeting demand and the company was soon plagued with complaints from customers and 
sales agents about the quality of the sewing machines.  
Around 1863, the now Singer Manufacturing Company began a process of 
increasing mechanization.  Singer hired L.B. Miller, who had two years experience with 
New England armory practice at the Manhattan Firearms Company, to supervise the 
development of special-purpose machinery and tools to facilitate manufacturing with 
interchangeable parts.  The transition was rocky, and company officials and inside 
contractors clashed over the tradeoff between quality and quantity production.  But by 
1882, Singer was producing sewing machines with interchangeable parts that did not 
require hand fitting when soft.  The parts were stamped with a serial number, hardened, 
and then refit by hand using matching serial numbers.  In order to gain more control over 
the production process, Singer subsequently eliminated the inside contract system and 
developed an operations guide that detailed machining instructions and work-flow routes. 
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3.2.3 Bicycle Manufacturing 
Beginning in the late 1880s, the U.S. experienced what contemporaries named the 
‘bicycle craze.’  In 1818, German Karl von Drais invented the first two-wheeled, 
steerable, human-powered vehicle, commonly called a velocipede and nicknamed a 
‘dandy horse’.  Riders propelled the dandy horse by pushing it along with their feet.  The 
velocipede was popular with wealthy Europeans, but was banned on city streets due to 
accidents involving pedestrians.  Over the next 40 years, European inventors 
experimented with velocipedes using 2, 3 and 4 wheels, some using treadles and cranks.  
Around 1863, French inventors developed the first commercially successful bicycle using 
two wheels, rotary cranks and pedals.23  The first bicycles were made in 1867 by 
blacksmith Pierre Michaux who was experienced in making carriage parts.  The bicycle 
consisted of a cast iron frame (later replaced with wrought iron) and wooden wheels 
surrounded with iron ‘tires’.  The velocipede rolled easily on newly paved macadam 
roads in Europe, but the stiff frame delivered a rough ride that earned the nickname 
‘boneshaker’.  The ‘ordinary’ bicycle appeared around 1870, with a large, wire-spoke 
front wheel, ball bearings, solid rubber tires, and a hollow-section steel frame.  The 
design provided a smoother ride and was fast but unsafe for the rider, limiting cycling to 
a sport for adventurous young men.  Bicycles and racing became popular among the 
wealthy, especially in England. 
Albert Pope began selling imported English bicycles in the U.S. around 1876, and 
in 1878 obtained the U.S. patent rights to produce his own version of the ordinary, which 
he named the Columbia.  Although English bicycles were manufactured using European 
                                                 
23 There were conflicting claims for the French patent rights, but Pierre Lallement filed the first and only 
U.S. patent claim for the pedal driven bicycle in 1866.   
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craft techniques, Pope set out to build bicycles with interchangeable parts under contract 
with the Weed Sewing Machine Company.  In 1866, Weed had initially contracted with 
the Sharps Rifle Manufacturing Company to build its sewing machines.  But when Sharps 
changed ownership and moved to new facilities in 1875, Weed began its own production 
in the old plant by hiring some former Sharps employees.   The Weed Company therefore 
had extensive experience in armory practice, and the president of manufacturing 
operations had even been an inside contractor at the Colt armory (Hounshell, 1984). 
According to Hounshell, the production of bicycles required essentially no new special 
purpose machinery or techniques over sewing machine manufacturing, though finishing 
and assembly was considerably more complicated and time consuming. 
Pope aggressively marketed bicycles through cycling journals, cycling clubs, and 
monthly poster contests.  Cycling clubs actively lobbied for road improvements.  With 
Albert Pope’s assistance, the League of American Wheelmen drafted a petition to 
Congress, resulting in the birth in 1893 of the Office of Road Inquiry in the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture.  In 1883, he organized the first bicycle trade show, an 
institution that became an important promotional and sales tool for the bicycle and 
automobile industries.  Pope’s patent royalties allowed him to dominate the market, but 
the Ames Manufacturing Company, under contract to A. H. Overman, posed the first 
competitive threat to Pope in 1885.  Notably, Ames had been involved in arms and 
machine tool production from the early days of the armory practice.   
High-wheeled bicycles were quite successful in the U.S., with sales totaling 
around 250,000 by 1887 when the chain-driven safety bicycle was introduced from 
England (Hounshell, 1984).  The instability and height of the ordinary bicycle meant 
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riding was a daring feat, but the two same-sized wheels of the safety bicycle made it 
stable enough for men, women, and children of all ages.  Demand for bicycles exploded, 
in part due to interest in the healthful benefits of outdoor recreation as a remedy for the 
ills caused by increasing urbanization (Geels, 2005b).  In addition, bicycles conveyed to 
both men and women a level of freedom and mobility they had never before experienced 
(Hugill, 1982).   
As demand grew, an increasing number of arms-makers, sewing machine 
companies, and even clockmakers began manufacturing bicycles in addition to their main 
product.  According to Rosenberg (1963), there were 27 U.S. firms manufacturing 
bicycles and tricycles in 1890; by 1900 there were 312.  Because bicycle production was 
a sideline, most of these companies invested in only a minimum of new equipment, 
purchasing machinery from machine tool companies like Pratt & Whitney and Brown & 
Sharpe.  However, Albert Pope gained control of the Weed Company in 1890, renamed it 
the Pope Manufacturing Company, and ended production of sewing machines.  He then 
pursued a strategy of backward integration by establishing a cold-drawn steel tubing plant 
for building frames – the first of its kind in the U.S. – and by purchasing a rubber factory 
for producing pneumatic tires – an entirely new industry at the time.  Pope also 
established a research department, headed by an MIT graduate, to ensure quality control, 
improve designs, and perform extensive testing of materials, parts, and bicycles (Rae, 
1959; Hounshell, 1984). 
The safety bicycle presented new manufacturing challenges in the need for 
lightness (tubular steel), hardened precision parts (gears and hubs), efficient power 
transmission (chain), and reduced friction (ball bearings and races) (Rosenberg, 1963).  
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Machining techniques and tools were gradually improved, and New England 
manufacturers began departing from the drop-forging methods used in armory practice, 
increasingly opting to machine parts from solid steel bars (Rosenberg, 1963; Hounshell, 
1984).   
In the western states, a separate group of bicycle manufacturers arose from the 
carriage, wagon, toy, and agricultural implement industries.  Having no experience with 
New England armory practice, these firms developed entirely different manufacturing 
processes.  Beginning in the 1890s, these firms reduced machining to a minimum by 
developing techniques for sheet metal stamping to produce frame joints, crank hangers, 
hubs and sprockets.  The electric resistance welder developed around 1888 by Elihu 
Thomson proved essential for these production methods.  The crank hanger, which holds 
the pedal axle and the frame tubing that runs to the seat, rear wheel and steering head, 
was particularly complicated to machine and strength was critical. Stamping techniques 
resulted in a lighter, sufficiently strong part with significantly less waste, and therefore 
lower cost.  Stamped crank hangers were eventually adopted by the entire industry.  In 
another departure from armory practice, the mechanics in the western bicycle companies 
remained seated at their machines, while runners brought materials to them.  Although 
New England bicycle manufacturers insisted that their forged and machined hubs and 
sprockets were far superior to stamped ones, the Western Wheel Works of Chicago 
overtook Pope as the largest U.S. bicycle producer before the market collapsed 




3.3 Automobile Manufacturing 
By providing an unprecedented level of freedom and mobility, the bicycle 
stimulated Americans’ desire for light, personal transport.  It is not surprising, then, that 
many early automobile manufacturers had experience in the bicycle industry and, 
therefore, also in arms and sewing machine production.  In 1892, Hayden Eames, then in 
charge of Pope Manufacturing’s Tube Department, arranged an interview for Hiram 
Percy Maxim, an MIT graduate who had successfully mounted a gasoline engine on a 
Columbia tricycle.  After Pope’s engineering laboratory had inspected the invention, 
Maxim was invited to work for Eames in a newly created Motor Carriage Department. 
Albert Pope, however, was unimpressed by the noisy gasoline contraption. 
Though the company continued experimentation with gasoline vehicles, Pope 
concentrated on developing an electric vehicle which was introduced as the Columbia in 
1897.  For its introduction, Albert Pope invited reporters to a private showing, allowed 
them to operate it, and supplied pictures for publications.  The elaborate press interview 
soon became a standard custom in introducing new vehicles to the public (Flink, 1988).  
Over the next two years, Pope manufactured 500 electric and 40 gasoline vehicles, 
making it the leading motor vehicle manufacturer of the time.  In 1899, the motor vehicle 
venture was separated from the parent company, taking Eames and Maxim with it, and 
sold to the Electric Vehicle Company.  This move raised cash for Pope’s attempt to save 
the bicycle industry through the consolidation of some 45 firms into a ‘bicycle trust.’   
Two of the firms acquired by Pope’s new American Bicycle Company produced electric 
and steam vehicles.  These operations were reorganized as the International Motor 
Company in 1901 and converted to producing gasoline cars.  As the bicycle market 
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continued to collapse, Albert Pope converted more facilities to manufacturing gasoline 
vehicles and consolidated his automotive ventures as the Pope Motor Car Company in 
1903. 
Charles and Frank Duryea began manufacturing bicycles in the 1880s.  Charles 
claimed to have been interested in ‘horseless carriages’ since boyhood, but an 
announcement in 1890 encouraged him to pursue this interest more seriously: an exhibit 
at the World’s Columbian Exposition in Chicago in 1893 would offer rewards for the best 
examples of “vehicles propelled by other than animal power.”  By this time, Charles had 
contracted the Ames Manufacturing Company of Massachusetts to produce his bicycle, 
and Frank was employed as a toolmaker at Ames.  With Charles’ designs and Frank’s 
practical abilities, the two began experimenting with a gasoline-powered carriage (May, 
1990).  In September, 1895, the brothers and backers from Springfield Massachusetts 
founded the Duryea Motor Wagon Company, the first company organized in the U.S. for 
the production of automobiles.  The company also became the first to produce multiple 
copies of a motor vehicle for sale to the public when it built and sold thirteen automobiles 
in 1896 (May, 1990).   
However, Duryea produced only three automobiles in 1897 and failed in 1898.  It 
appears that the Duryeas were unsuccessful at transferring critical elements of armory 
practice from their experience with Ames, including the organization of operations.  May 
(1990, p. 167) describes the Duryea factory as “a hopeless tangle of machinery and 
workmen,” and attributes the company’s failure to the lack of experience in 
manufacturing a complex product.  But availability of startup capital for such a large 
undertaking may also have played a role (Nevins and Hill, 1954).  According to Epstein 
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(1972), people were skeptical about large-scale production of automobiles and few were 
willing to invest in the industry.  Manufacturers who were interested in high volume 
production, such as Olds, Cadillac, and Ford, were forced to start on a small scale, turn 
over capital quickly, and reinvest any profits in expansion.  Since these manufacturers 
largely purchased parts, assembled them into complete vehicles, and sold for cash, the 
industry was basically financed by the parts manufacturers who were largely engaged in 
production of parts for other industries (Epstein, 1972).   
In fact, the majority of automobile manufacturing prior to 1900 was undertaken as 
a sideline business by established firms in New England.  In 1899, three quarters of the 
automobiles produced were built in the Northeast (Jarvis, 1972).  These firms were well 
capitalized and had a ready supply of skilled machinists and facilities.  In addition to 
manufacturing infrastructure, the region benefited from relatively well-developed roads 
and communication systems.  Perhaps because of the availability of soft water for steam 
and electric power for recharging, New England manufacturers specialized in steam or 
electric automobiles of medium to high price.   
A second center of automobile production arose in the Midwest which was the 
center of carriage and wagon manufacturing, due in part to the abundance of hardwood 
forests.  The region was largely rural, lacked electricity, with the population widely 
dispersed and connected by some of the nation’s worst roads.  In addition, the area was 
prominent in the production of gasoline engines used for rural and marine applications 
(Flink, 1970).  Therefore, the Midwestern manufacturers specialized in gasoline-powered 
automobiles.  But the makers of gasoline cars were characterized by a significant factor 
other than geography. According to Jarvis (1972, p. 69), “Established firms went for the 
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electric or the steam auto, whereas the small, underfinanced company headed by a man 
with technical expertise favored the internal combustion engine.”  The individual 
entrepreneur was willing to pursue a more radical innovation than the established 
company.  By 1904, the Midwest and the gasoline automobile dominated the industry. 
Ransom E. Olds was one such Midwestern entrepreneur and the only automotive 
pioneer to have early experience in all three sources of motive power.  Olds had worked 
in his father’s Lansing, Michigan, machine shop, P.F. Olds & Son, eventually taking on a 
leadership role in the enterprise.  Around 1885, Olds developed a steam engine for 
business use that employed a gasoline burner.  The engine was extremely successful and 
the business expanded.  Olds experimented with applying his steam engine to a motor 
carriage, eventually linking two 2-hp engines to power a 1,200 pound, four-wheeled 
vehicle.  Although seriously under-powered, the Olds steamer was featured in Scientific 
American in May, 1892, and Olds sold the vehicle to an English patent medicine firm the 
following year.  In 1893, Olds also observed the large number of European-made 
gasoline internal combustion motor vehicles on display at the Chicago World’s Fair and 
became convinced that gasoline engines were the technology of the future. 
Olds immediately began developing a gasoline engine and applied for a patent on 
a simple and efficient design in 1895.  P.F. Olds & Son began production in 1896 and the 
highly successful engine soon became the company’s main product.24  Olds attached the 
one-cylinder engine beneath a carriage supplied by a local manufacturer and drove it in a 
public demonstration in August of 1896.  In his application for a patent, Olds stated his 
practical objectives to “produce a road vehicle that will meet most of the requirements for 
                                                 
24 In 1897, P.F. Olds & Son was recapitalized and reorganized as the Olds Gasoline Engine Works. 
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the ordinary uses on the road without complicated gear or requiring engine of great power 
and to avoid all necessary weight” (May, 1990, p. 360). 
Although Olds attempted to assemble automobiles in the P.F. Olds & Son shop 
using his engines and purchased components, demand for the engines for farm and 
business use took precedence and he hesitated to divert labor to the new endeavor.  Olds 
obtained outside financial backing to establish the Olds Motor Vehicle Company in 1897 
and the board of directors empowered Olds to “build one carriage in as nearly perfect a 
manner as possible” (Pound, 1934, p. 50).  Unfortunately, the funds were insufficient to 
produce more than a handful of vehicles.  Olds obtained more significant funding from 
banker Samuel L. Smith, but Smith insisted that the engine manufacturing and 
automobile businesses be consolidated.  The Olds Motor Works was established in 1899 
with Smith holding a large majority of the stock, though Olds retained presidency of the 
engine works.25  A new factory for automobile manufacturing was promptly constructed 
in Detroit, but Olds, who was in charge of operations, was unable to select a vehicle 
design.  Though he firmly believed that gasoline internal combustion was the motive 
power of choice, the first vehicle produced was an electric.  In the first year, Olds 
produced a small number of the electrics and some large, expensive gasoline cars.   
Though the company’s initial plans were to build a fairly expensive automobile 
with “up to the minute improvements – pneumatic clutch, cushion tires, and electric 
push-button starter,” Olds became convinced that the machine would be too complicated 
for the still skeptical public.  By summer 1900, Olds finally settled on an inexpensive, 
lightweight, gasoline-powered runabout that could be constructed for $300 and sold for 
                                                 
25 The Olds Motor Works divested of the engine works in 1903. 
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$650 – the Oldsmobile curved dash.  Reminiscing in 1926, Ransom Olds stated that 
“[his] whole idea in building it was to have the operation so simple that anyone could run 
it and the construction such that it could be repaired at any local shop” (cited in Pound, 
1934, p. 52).  The curved dash weighed only 700 pounds, was powered by a 4.5 hp, one-
cylinder engine, with a two-speed planetary type transmission and a chain drive.   
Olds contracted out the supply of wheels, batteries, and bodies.  Demand for the 
Olds engine, which was manufactured in both Lansing and Detroit, remained high, so 
Olds contracted the Dodge Brothers and Leland and Faulconer to manufacture engines 
and transmissions for the curved dash.  By spring of the following year, more than 300 
orders had been received, and Olds directed the Detroit plant superintendent to gear up to 
produce 1,000 vehicles over the coming year.  But just as production got underway, the 
plant burned to the ground in early March, 1901.  Legend has it that a single curved dash 
survived the fire, forcing Olds to concentrate solely on this model.  In truth, the other 
vehicles could still have been produced since their plans survived in the company’s 
vaults.  However, the accident may have prompted Olds to abandon the larger vehicle 
models earlier than initially planned. 
While a new plant was built on the old site, Olds established temporary assembly 
facilities and production of the curved dash resumed in April.  At the same time, Lansing 
officials made the Olds Motor Works an attractive land offer, and the firm began 
constructing a second automobile facility.  In 1901, Samuel Smith served as company 
president and Olds served as vice president and general manager of the Lansing plant, 
while Smith’s son Fred took over operations in Detroit.  To keep up with demand, Olds 
assigned workers a limited number of tasks rather than have them work on assembly of 
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the entire vehicle, and arranged them in a primitive sort of production line.  By 1902, the 
Olds Motor Works was assembling the curved dash at both the Lansing and Detroit 
facilities with production on the order of 2,500, making the company the largest U.S. 
automobile producer.  By 1904, Oldsmobile sales topped 5,500 (Flink, 1988). 
However, a rift began to develop between Ransom Olds and Fred Smith.  
Concerned about the number of complaints from owners, Smith urged Olds to correct 
defects in the fragile curved dash.  At the same time, Smith began pushing Olds to 
develop a larger touring car.  While Olds apparently agreed with the need for a larger 
vehicle, he disagreed on the timing and resented Smith’s intrusion in his domain – the 
production side of operations.  The relationship became untenable in 1903 when Smith, 
without Olds’ knowledge or authorization, established an experimental engineering shop 
at the Detroit plant and soon after applied for a patent on improved springs that would be 
more suited to heavier vehicles.  By summer of 1904, Olds had sold all his stock in the 
Olds Motor Works and resigned from the board.   
Olds went on to establish the Reo Car Company, named for his initials, which 
began production in 1905.  The Reo line included a $650 runabout and a 1,500 pound 
touring car that sold for $1,250.  Meanwhile, Smith continued production of the curved 
dash but also moved forward with the production of a larger touring vehicle as well.  
Apparently because of Olds Motor Works’ reputation as a producer of small cars, the 
new Oldsmobile did not fare well in the market, and Reo soon outsold Olds.  By 1908, 
Olds Motor Works sales fell to only 1,000 cars per year. 
The Dodge brothers’ history parallels the Duryeas’, but with greater success.  
Frank and Horace Dodge were both experienced machinists in 1897 when they began 
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manufacturing bicycles in Windsor, Ontario.  In 1900, they left the bicycle industry to 
open a machine shop in nearby Detroit.  The Dodge Brothers served a wide variety of 
clients, and soon became one of the best machine shops in the Midwest, noted for 
precision machining and for an arrangement of machinery that allowed for ease and 
speed of manufacturing (Nevins and Hill, 1954).  Dodge Brothers began supplying 
automobile components, notably engines and transmissions under contract to Ransom E. 
Olds (Hyde, 2003).  
In 1903, the Dodge Brothers Company took a huge risk and established an 
alliance with the fledgling Ford Motor Company.  Dodge began supplying chassis – 
engines, transmissions, and axles – for the Model A, but the brothers were far more than 
supply contractors.  Prior to production, they made improvements to Henry Ford’s engine 
and axle designs (May, 1990).  Ford was having difficulty raising startup cash, so the 
Dodges accepted 10% of the capital stock in the Ford Motor Company in exchange for 
$7,000 worth of components and a $3,000 bank note.  John F. Dodge was named as one 
of five directors when the company was incorporated (Nevins and Hill, 1954).  Although 
Ford built its own factory in 1904 on Piquette Avenue in Detroit, the company purchased 
most of its parts.  The facility was therefore designed for assembly and housed only 
general purpose machines (Hounshell, 1984).  By 1904, Ford had less than $10,000 
invested in equipment, while Dodge had spent more than $60,000 for machinery 
dedicated to producing Ford automobiles.  While Ford was mainly an assembler of 
components, Dodge was manufacturing nearly a complete automobile except for wheels 
and a body.  By 1905, Dodge was supplying Ford with 400 engines and transmissions per 
month.   
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Dodge continued to be Ford’s largest supplier until 1913, with Dodge 
manufacturing around 60% of the total value of Ford automobiles (Hyde, 2003).  John 
Dodge was named vice president of the Ford Manufacturing Company when it was 
incorporated in 1905 and was named vice president of the Ford Motor Company in 
1906.26  Sometime in 1912, the Dodge Brothers decided to manufacture their own 
automobile, although they knew that, as a result, Henry Ford would not allow them to 
continue participating in management decisions.  While the arrangement between Ford 
and the Dodges had been mutually beneficial and the brothers had prospered, annual 
price negotiations over Dodge parts caused friction.  In August of 1913, John Dodge 
resigned as director and vice president of the Ford Motor Company (Nevins and Hill, 
1954).  The Dodges were able to rely on their extensive experience and reputation, and 
when the first Dodge automobile was produced in November, 1914, it was an immediate 
success. 
The influence of Henry Ford himself was of primary significance after the turn of 
the century.  While a complete discussion of Ford’s history is left for the following 
chapter, a brief overview of his activities prior to 1902 completes the discussion of the 
origins of the automobile industry.  As a child growing up on a farm in rural Michigan, 
Ford showed an interest in and aptitude for all things mechanical.  His formal mechanical 
training began at age 16 when he left the farm for Detroit, where he garnered extensive 
experience repairing engines.  Sometime in the late 1880s, Ford began experimenting 
with steam and gasoline internal combustion engines for a horseless carriage.  While 
working as chief engineer at Edison Illuminating Company in 1896, Ford built a two-
                                                 
26 Henry Ford served as vice president of the Ford Motor Company and banker John Gray served as 




cylinder engine, chassis, and body with the assistance of two fellow Edison employees.  
Built in a garage behind Ford’s rented house, the quadricycle weighed only 500 pounds 
and used bicycle wheels with pneumatic tires.  After completing a successful test run in 
May, 1896, Ford sold it so that he could begin building a new vehicle. 
Ford’s second and improved horseless carriage was completed in the summer of 
1899 with the help of a carriage blacksmith.  Though still lightweight, it was substantially 
stronger than the quadricycle, which had been made almost entirely from wood.  In 
August, Ford resigned from Edison after he and his financial backers had established the 
Detroit Automobile Company.  The company announced ambitious plans for production 
in 1900, but the shop encountered a number of supply problems.  According to Nevins 
and Hill (1954), the company’s car also was probably too expensive and not quite ready 
for production.  Ford apparently wanted to design a better car but was vetoed by the 
stockholders.  Though the Detroit Automobile Company did produce a few vehicles, it 
soon ground to a halt and was dissolved in January, 1901.   
Undaunted, Ford decided to build a racer and use it to gain recognition.  His 
racing successes reinvigorated his investors, who reorganized the old Detroit Automobile 
Company as the Henry Ford Company in November, 1901.  Unfortunately, dissension 
arose over Ford’s preoccupation with racing and his dissatisfaction with the financial 
arrangements of the new company.  The stockholders eventually hired Henry Leland of 
Leland & Faulconer to complete the design of a commercial car and begin production.  In 
March, 1902, Ford left and Henry Leland took over the company, which was renamed the 
Cadillac Automobile Company. 
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Ford then joined forces with a new assistant, C. Harold Wills, who, much like 
Ford, had keen mechanical instincts and preferred to learn by doing.  Wills took charge of 
designing two new racers, one of which set a speed record in October 1902 by averaging 
a mile in one minute and six seconds.  Ford, however, was no longer entirely focused on 
racing.  Despite his prior business failures, he was determined to build and produce a car 
to replace the family horse.  In the summer of 1902 he began planning an inexpensive 
motor vehicle that included a novel, vertical engine design that resulted in less vibration, 
noise and wear.  In August, 1902, Ford established a partnership with a coal merchant, 
Alexander T. Malcomson, to produce a pilot model.  The partnership would become the 
Ford Motor Company in June, 1903, and begin production of the Model A. 
3.4 Technical and Institutional Context 
3.4.1 Industrialism, Individualism, Capitalism, and the Progressive Movement 
By the beginning of the 20th century, increasing industrialism had brought 
prosperity and a rising quality of life to many.  While technological innovations 
facilitated the exploitation of natural resources and a phenomenal growth in productivity, 
these developments rested on fundamental philosophies and the institutional 
arrangements based on them.  The original U.S. settlers had come to America to escape 
religious persecution and were heavily influenced by egalitarian ideals.  These ideals 
shaped the U.S. Constitution and Bill of Rights, which sought to protect individual rights.  
Thus, the idea of individualism, which stresses human independence and the importance 
of individual self-reliance and liberty, was a fundamental American ideology. 
This individualism was also reflected in the development of American economic 
doctrine advocating private ownership of property over collective or state arrangements 
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and individual autonomy in economic decision-making.  In the 19th century, many 
Americans believed in strict adherence to these ideals.  In such strict free-market 
economics, or laissez-faire capitalism, the state has no responsibility to intervene in 
markets to maintain a desired wealth distribution or to protect citizens from poverty.  In 
addition, in the laissez-faire view, the government should not create legal monopolies or 
break up de facto monopolies. 
By the late 19th century, it was clear that not everyone was sharing in the 
prosperity wrought by industrialism and capitalism.  The rise of factory production 
required an unprecedented number of semi- or unskilled workers, which were drawn 
from the countryside and from an influx of immigrants.  Rural farm culture was eroded 
while crowded urban slums arose to house this large population of poorly compensated 
factory workers.  The pollution from factories combined with wastes from the slums to 
create unhealthy living conditions which the wealthy and middle-class soon sought to 
escape.  Although the growing middle-class owed its prosperity to industrialism and 
capitalism, increasing tensions in the large working class threatened the security of their 
new-found socio-economic position.  Meanwhile, a select few were becoming 
phenomenally rich as their business enterprises grew to colossal proportions. 
A growing faction began to view capitalism as unfair and exploitative and felt that 
an increasingly corrupt government failed to serve its citizens.  Activists began pursuing 
a wide range of social, economic, and political reforms to cure American society from the 
problems associated with industrialism.  The ‘progressive’ ideals of these reformers 
diverged from the strictly individualist view and often leaned toward socialism.  Drawn 
from the urban educated middle-class, the Progressives believed that government should 
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play a role in solving social problems, establishing fairness in economic matters, and 
improving the welfare of all citizens.  The movement sought to remove corruption from 
government and give people more participation in and direct control over the political 
process.  The Progressive movement was not coherent and many reformers disagreed on 
issues and approaches, but in general, they sought to regulate business practices, improve 
working conditions, and address health hazards.  Progressive issues included temperance 
(prohibition), child labor and welfare, safe and sanitary food and drugs, the right to 
collective bargaining, conservation of natural resources, immigration control, women’s 
suffrage, and trust regulation. 
Activists worked at the local, state and national levels, and much of the 
movement’s success can be attributed to publicity generated by muckrakers – writers like 
Upton Sinclair who detailed the horrors of poverty, urban slums, factory conditions, and 
child labor.  Local efforts attacked political corruption, addressed child welfare, 
suppressed red-light districts, expanded schools, and constructed playgrounds.  At the 
state level, Progressives promoted minimum wage laws for women, industrial accident 
insurance, child labor restrictions, and factory regulation.  Among the movement’s 
successes at the national level were the Interstate Commerce Act passed in 1887 which 
addressed issues of railroad abuse and price discrimination; the Sherman Anti-trust Act 
passed in 1890 authorizing federal action against the formation of trusts and the restraint 
of trade; the Pure Food and Drug Act passed in 1906 providing for federal meat 
inspection and prohibiting the manufacture, sale, and transportation of adulterated food 
products or poisonous patent medicines; the 18th Amendment ratified in 1919 prohibiting 
the manufacture, sale, and transportation of alcohol; the 19th Amendment ratified in 1920 
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granting women the right to vote; and the development of the National Park system 
beginning in 1902. 
3.4.2 Emerging Markets and Fuel Infrastructure, 1895-1900 
Around the turn of the century, gasoline automobiles were competing with steam 
and electric cars, each of which had niche markets, as well as horse drawn vehicles and 
bicycles which had established markets.  By 1899, around 30 manufacturers had 
produced 2,500 motor vehicles.  Based on their interpretation of the functional 
requirements of the automobile and on the product and production technologies with 
which they were experienced, individual entrepreneurs developed a variety of product 
solutions that could provide personal motorized travel.  Motor vehicles varied in terms of 
motive power, mechanism of power transmission, location of engine, body style, and a 
multitude of design characteristics.  Consider the great variety within just gasoline cars:  
Nothing was certain, all was in process of experiment.  There were offered cars 
with engines of one, two, three, four, or even six cylinders.  The engine could be 
of either the four-cycle or two-cycle type.  The cylinders could be parallel or 
opposed; they could be set in the chassis either horizontally or vertically; they 
could be mounted under the body, under the hood, or at the rear of the car near 
the axle.  The engine might be either air-cooled or water cooled.  Steering could 
be by bar, tiller, or wheel.  The drive might be by shaft, through bevel gears, or 
by chain.  If by chain, it might be either double or single.  The transmission could 
be either planetary or sliding gear; it might have either 2, 3 or 4 speeds forward.  
Finally… the ignition might be by either battery or magneto; if batteries were 
employed, they could be either dry or storage; if magneto, this might be of either 
high or low tension (Epstein, 1972, p. 87-89). 
No doubt the bewildering variety of technical configurations caused many to 
postpone purchasing a motor carriage.  More significant, however, was the fact that 
automobiles were expensive to purchase and maintain.  Parts wore out quickly or broke 
suddenly.  Springs lasted only 1,200-2,000 miles and tires were only warranted for 2,000-
3,000 miles (Epstein, 1972).  Because parts were not standardized among vehicles nor 
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produced in volume, they were extremely expensive.  It is not surprising, then, that the 
wealthy elite were the first to purchase motor vehicles.  Nevins and Hill (1954, p. 197) 
describe the development of a ‘special market’ for automobiles among the social leaders 
of the East, advertised by “lavish activities not unworthy of the Arabian Nights.”  The 
son of a banker initiated the era in 1897 with the purchase of a French car, making it 
“good form” to own an automobile.  By 1900, “nearly everyone at Newport owned ‘a 
machine,’ and some two or three… Naturally the fashion in the East became the fashion 
elsewhere.” 
Among these early owners, some of the men favored gasoline cars while nearly 
all the women used clean quiet electric vehicles which they used for social calls, 
shopping, and riding downtown.  Many of the wealthiest households could afford to own 
more than one type of vehicle – a horse and carriage, an electric vehicle for short trips 
around town for the lady or doctors making late night calls, and a gasoline vehicle for 
touring the countryside.  This created what Kirsch (2000) refers to as the hybrid 
household.  According to Flink (1970, p. 57), Harper’s Weekly estimated in 1906 that 
“there are more than 200 persons in New York who have from five to ten cars apiece… 
The string of vehicles owned by an enthusiast of this class will include two or three 
touring cars, a pair of racers, a couple of broughams, a runabout, a station-car, and a work 
car.” 
Early observers expected the alternative motive powers to share the eventual 
established market.  Horseless Age editor Albert Clough commented in 1903 that 
“experience will furnish the decisive evidence which shall assign each motive power to 
its appropriate sphere” (cited in Kirsch, 2000, p. 217).  Initially, steam and electric 
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vehicles offered distinct advantages over internal combustion engines.  Steam engine 
technology was more mature and more people had experience operating and repairing 
them, while electric vehicles were quiet, clean, easy to operate, and less mechanically 
complex because they did not require a clutch and multi-speed transmission.  As a result 
of these advantages, more steam and electric automobiles were produced in the early 
years of the industry.  In 1900, 57 U.S. manufacturers produced 4,192 motor vehicles of 
which 1,681 were steam, 1,575 were electric, and 936 were gasoline (Flink, 1970; 
Mowery and Rosenberg, 1998).  Locomobile steamers, based on the Stanley patent, 
accounted for around 5,000 of the 22,000 automobiles produced between 1899 and 1902. 
Poor quality intercity roads produced regional isolation and sustained the unique 
characteristics of local markets (Kirsch, 2000).  In 1900 in Chicago, electric vehicles 
accounted for 65% of motorized vehicles; in 1902 in Portland, Maine, 88% of vehicles 
were steam; in Cleveland, 49% of the first 100 vehicles registered were internal 
combustion.  According to Flink (1970), about half of the 100 automobiles in Los 
Angeles in early 1902 were electrics, with the remaining half divided between steam and 
gasoline.  But by 1904 in Cleveland, internal combustion engines accounted for 61% of 
the vehicles. 
Fuel infrastructure played a significant role in the development of these regional 
preferences.  Steam cars were designed to run on kerosene or gasoline and which nearly 
all rural general stores in the 1890s sold for lighting and stationary gasoline engines.  
Prior to the incorporation of condensers beginning in 1901, steam cars also required 
clean, soft water, which in many areas could be obtained at public watering troughs that 
were made available for horses.  Gasoline cars also benefited from the general 
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availability of gasoline, but there were issues of quality, as some retailers diluted the fuel 
with water or heavier petroleum fractions.  In rural areas, gasoline and steam engines also 
benefited from the relative availability of mechanics experienced with repairing engines 
used as stationary power sources.  Meanwhile, electricity was only available in parts of 
some urban centers and output was unreliable.  Furthermore, connecting to the power 
supply was complicated by the lack of a standard plug or operating voltage (Kirsch, 
2000). 
3.4.3 Enthusiast Publications and the Popular Press 
The first publication devoted to the automobile, Horseless Age, appeared in 
November, 1895.   Enthusiast publications were read by motorists and also served 
communication among engineers.  While hundreds of early press articles revealed a 
strong skepticism of motor vehicles, others extolled the virtues of automobiles in glowing 
prose.  Consider the following description found in the inaugural edition of Horseless 
Age (cited in Nevins and Hill, 1954, p. 165): 
A pleasing prospect it is, that rises before us in contemplating this array of 
horseless vehicles!  From the gradual displacement of the horse in business and 
pleasure, will come economy of time and practical money-saving.  In cities and 
towns the noise and clatter of the streets will be reduced, a priceless boon to the 
tired nerves of this overwrought generation…  On sanitary grounds too the 
banishing of horses from our city streets will be a blessing.  Streets will be 
cleaner, jams and blockades less likely to occur, and accidents less frequent, for 
the horse is not so manageable as a mechanical vehicle. 
The general consensus among proponents was that each option for motive power 
had its place in the market.  Established professional publications like Electrical World 
and Electrical Engineer expressed optimism for the future of electric vehicles, citing the 
maturity and innate superiority of the underlying technology.  However, editorials 
published in Horseless Age in 1899 took a stance against attempts by the Electric Vehicle 
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Corporation (EVC) to monopolize the market, saying that trust-building was premature, 
would slow technological and market advance, and would only benefit investors.  The 
magazine also reported discouraging results from European electric cab experiments and 
battery testing and its editorials soon lambasted the technology as well as the EVC.  After 
the EVC plan failed, the editor of Horseless Age took a more balanced position and 
claimed its actions had been in the interests of saving the technology and industry from 
unscrupulous speculators (Krisch, 2000).  
In 1897, Albert Pope pioneered the use of the elaborate press interview for 
introducing new automobile models.  Other manufacturers, including Henry Ford, 
adopted his tactics, making it common industry practice.  The articles produced from 
these interviews were read more like advertisements than balanced journalism.  A 
reporter for the Detroit News-Tribune rode in Ford’s prototype vehicle for the Detroit 
Automobile Company in the fall of 1899.  His vivid account appeared on the front page 
under the headline (cited in Nevins and Hill, 1954, p. 180): 
SWIFTER THAN A RACE-HORSE  
IT FLEW OVER THE ICY STREETS 
Thrilling Trip on the First Detroit-Made Automobile, 
When Mercury Hovered About Zero 
It was also the popular press which initiated races in the United States, beginning 
with the Chicago Times-Herald race in 1895.  Manufacturers also enlisted the press to 
publicize their vehicles’ performance in long distance reliability tests.  Alexander Winton 
was the first to follow this tactic when a reporter accompanied him on his second 800-
mile trip from Cleveland to New York City in 1899. 
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3.4.4 Races, Demonstrations, and Trade Shows 
Speed and reliability races captured the public’s interest and demonstrated the 
performance, endurance, and dependability of competing technologies and models.  The 
earliest automobile races were held in France, where twenty-five horseless carriages 
competed in a race in July, 1894.  Of the fifteen that completed the course, the winner 
was a De Dion steam car which was nearly tied by a gasoline Peugeot; a gasoline 
Panhard & Levassor finished fourth.  In a 727-mile French race held the following year, a 
Panhard & Levassor made the fastest time, but, as a 2-seater, it was ineligible for the 
prize which the Peugeot Brothers took.  Already, the gasoline internal combustion engine 
was gaining on the competition.  Shortly afterward, Scientific American conceded that 
“[u]pon the whole, it was the lightest vehicles that behaved best on the road, and this fact, 
now universally established, proves the superiority of gasoline and naphtha over any 
other motive power at present known” (cited in Nevins and Hill, 1954, p. 139). 
The first U.S. reliability race was sponsored by the Chicago Times-Herald in 
November, 1895.  Since none of the 89 potential entrants was ready by race day, the race 
was postponed three times.  On the third try, only two contestants were ready: a Duryea 
and a Benz, both gasoline-powered.  The organizers allowed a 92-mile consolation run 
that the Benz won after the Duryea ran into a ditch to avoid a farm wagon.  On the fourth 
try, six vehicles started the race, which required the competitors to brave 30-degree 
temperatures and negotiate deep snow that had fallen the day before.  Two electric cars 
and a Benz dropped out after brief runs.  Another Benz lasted eight hours before the 
engine died.  Only two completed the 52.4 mile course: the same Benz and Duryea that 
 
163 
had completed the consolation run.  The Duryea emerged the winner, averaging only 6.66 
mph through the snowy streets of Chicago (Nevins and Hill, 1954; Rubenstein, 2001). 
Despite the encouraging performance of gasoline cars in early reliability races and 
demonstrations, Americans showed a definite initial preference for steam.  Two years 
after the Chicago Times-Herald race, an industry expert asserted that “the vast majority 
of people would prefer a smooth-running, reliable steam engine for use as the propelling 
medium of a pleasure or light business carriage, to the evil-smelling, dangerous, wasteful, 
and at best uncertain and unreliable engine heretofore chiefly employed for that purpose 
in motors of recent construction” (Nevins and Hill, 1954, p. 141). 
The first U.S. track race was held in Rhode Island in 1896 with five Duryeas and 
two electric cars competing.  An electric won, averaging 26.8 mph and eliciting a cry 
from spectators of “get a horse!” (Flink, 1970, p. 42).  But the pace soon picked up and 
gasoline-powered cars quickly demonstrated an advantage over the competing options.  
An early speed race at Grosse Pointe race track near Detroit in October, 1901, held 
separate competitions for steam, electric, and gasoline cars.  The winning cars then 
participated in an exhibition, with the gasoline car completing one mile in 1 minute, 12.4 
seconds compared to 1 minute, 52 seconds for the steam car, and more than 4 minutes for 
the electric (Rubenstein, 2001).  However, in 1906, a Stanley Steamer averaged 127.7 
mph in a one mile race at Ormond Beach, Florida (Flink, 1970). 
Sanctioned races placed primary emphasis on speed and revealed weaknesses and 
strengths in technologies and designs (Flink, 1970).  However, racing tended to reinforce 
the definition of the automobile as an expensive toy for the very wealthy and inhibited 
diffusion into wider markets.  Ford recalled (Ford and Crowther, 1922, p. 36):  
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When it was found that an automobile really could go and several makers started 
to put out cars, the immediate query was as to which would go fastest. It was a 
curious but natural development – that racing idea. I never thought anything of 
racing, but the public refused to consider the automobile in any light other than 
as a fast toy. Therefore later we had to race. The industry was held back by this 
initial racing slant, for the attention of the makers was diverted to making fast 
rather than good cars. It was a business for speculators. 
Meanwhile, long-distance reliability demonstrations proved that the gasoline 
automobile could successfully negotiate the nation’s poor roads, enabling the new sport 
of touring.  In the summer of 1897, Alexander Winton drove one of his company’s cars 
800 miles from Cleveland to New York City in less than seventy-nine hours.  Two years 
later, he repeated the trip in only forty-eight hours, taking with him a newspaper reported 
to publicize the trip en route.  Hoping to prove that his moderately priced, light car was 
reliable for touring, Ransom Olds picked a tester from his factory to drive the new curved 
dash Oldsmobile from the Detroit plant to the New York Automobile Show in 1901.  
Despite extremely muddy roads, the Oldsmobile made the trip in nine days, requiring all 
of the myriad spare parts the driver had taken along (Flink, 1970). 
In the summer of 1903, three separate expeditions completed cross-country trips 
from San Franscisco to New York City.  The first, and perhaps most noteworthy, was 
undertaken by a Vermont physician, Horatio Nelson Jackson, and a hired chauffer in a 
Winton automobile without the sanction or assistance of the manufacturer.  The two took 
shifts driving over rough, rock-strewn dirt roads, through mud and creeks, using a block 
and tackle to dislodge the automobile when it got stuck and frequently patching 
punctured inner tubes.  More than once, the team was stranded for days awaiting 
replacement batteries, tires, and parts, but Jackson proved that private motorists could 
undertake long-distance motor trips.  Jackson completed the trip in sixty-three days.  The 
two other trips, one in a Packard and the second in an Olds curved dash, were undertaken 
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by the manufacturers while Jackson was en route.  According to Flink (1970), Olds’ 
unprecedented sales success in 1902 and 1903 was to a large extent attributable to the 
favorable publicity generated by these accomplishments. Such feats fueled popular 
expectations that the horseless carriage might actually become accessible to the masses 
and eventually displace the horse. 
In addition to races, automobile manufacturers followed the lead of the bicycle 
industry and began using trade shows to publicize their new models.  The first 
automobile show was held in February, 1899, in conjunction with the bicycle exhibit at 
Madison Square Garden.  The first independent automobile show was held in November, 
1900.  American and foreign manufacturers displayed thirty-four models, of which 
nineteen were gasoline-powered, seven were steam-powered, six were electric, and two 
combined gasoline internal combustion engines and electric motors.  One manufacturer 
of gasoline vehicles built a wooden hill and hired a stunt driver to demonstrate the the 
Gasmobile’s hill-climbing, braking, and backing abilities (Nevins and Hill, 1954). 
3.5 Synthesis and Analysis 
This section synthesizes the history of the emergent phase of the automobile 
industry presented in this chapter and analyzes it within the framework presented in 
section 2.6.  Section 3.5.1 describes the changes in the technical, institutional, and 
ecological complex (TIEC) resulting from the success of the bicycle that initiated the era 
of innovative ferment from which the automobile industry emerged.  Section 3.5.2 
identifies the initial markets for automobiles and describes the functions that motor 
vehicles provided in these markets.  These markets emerged due to multiple factors, 
including problems with the existing carriage regime, the combination of functional 
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features which provided advantages over existing options, and the articulation of a new 
functionality.  Product design is then described as arising from multiple regimes and 
benefiting from innovation in multiple industries.  Section 3.5.3 identifies spillovers and 
learning-by-doing as the primary mechanisms of learning and describes innovation as a 
cumulative and synthetic process during this era.  Section 3.5.4 describes the relationship 
between the agents of change and existing regimes and the role of these agents as 
heterogeneous engineers.  I also identify four examples of the emerging technological 
nexus role which links variation and selection.   
Section 3.5.5 then summarizes the findings of this analysis as they relate to the 
research questions posed in Chapter 1.  I find that the role of niches during the emergent 
phase of the motor vehicle industry is consistent with the QE and MLP theories in several 
ways.  However, while the QE and MLP approaches focus on a single existing regime, 
this analysis shows that considering misalignments in multiple regimes along with other 
developments in the TIEC is critical to understanding why the automobile industry 
emerged when it did and in the particular niche markets that it did.  Further, while these 
theories identify learning-by-doing and learning-by-interacting with users as the primary 
mechanisms in learning about user’s needs and improving product performance, I find 
that innovation in this era was highly synthetic and resulted from cumulative progress in 
products and processes over more than a century of development.  Thus, knowledge 
spillovers were a significant, if not the primary, mechanisms underlying the development 
of this new innovation.  Finally, the activities of the agents of change in an emerging 
technological nexus support the assertion that, in order to realize successful designs, 
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entrepreneurs must behave as heterogeneous engineers, solving social, economic, and 
infrastructural as well as technical issues. 
3.5.1 Initiation of an Era of Innovative Ferment 
Evolutionary theories generally assert that innovation is triggered by new 
scientific or technical breakthroughs – a new invention.  The QE and MLP theories focus 
on transitions rather than the initial introduction of radical technologies, though they 
assert that innovations emerge in niches.  However, the MLP identifies tensions or 
misalignments in the existing regime and landscape developments as opportunities for 
niche branching, whereby the technology then breaks into new niches.  The motor vehicle 
was not an innovation based on a recent scientific or radical breakthrough.  Rather, 
innovation was initiated by two factors arising from the bicycle regime: 1) the bicycle 
altered perceptions about personal travel; and 2) the bicycle was reaching technological 
limits.  This finding, discussed further in this section, supports the description of 
innovation in the framework described in section 2.6 where innovative ferment is 
triggered by any change in the TIEC – technical, institutional (economic, social, etc.), or 
ecological – which entrepreneurs can exploit to create value. 
At the dawn of the motor vehicle industry, the underlying technologies for 
generating power from steam, electricity, and gasoline did not represent recent 
inventions.  Most notably, practical steam engines were developed around 1800 and were 
in use in rural America as early as 1830.  Self-propelled traction engines were in use in 
the U.S. beginning around 1873 and Roper was building experimental steam-powered 
vehicles capable of road travel as early as 1860.  Indeed, steam technology was capable 
of fulfilling the functional requirements for basic personal road transport 20-30 years 
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before the first commercially successful automobiles were built.  A handful of 
entrepreneurs experimented with it, perhaps sensing a latent demand, but the market did 
not materialize.27   
In the words of Utterback and Abernathy (1975), “[t]echnological innovations 
which may have market application, lie fallow until markets can be identified or created.”  
One could speculate that the market may have developed earlier if a particularly 
determined product champion with exceptional vision and technical abilities had built a 
functional, light, steam-powered motor carriage and invested in a marketing strategy in 
line with that of the I.M Singer & Company for sewing machines and Albert Pope for 
bicycles.  But that is not how history unfolded.  The automobile industry did eventually 
pattern its marketing strategy in this manner, using journals, demonstrations, races, and 
trade shows, but not until after 1895. 
Given that the development of a practical gasoline engine was nearly 
simultaneous with the commercial development of motor carriages, it is tempting to 
conclude that this innovation served as a critical enabling technology – the technology 
that initiated the ‘technology push.’  But while the gasoline engine quickly became the 
motive power of choice, it was a less mature technology compared to steam and not the 
preferred option at the outset of the industry.  Contemporaries did not attribute the 
development of the automobile to the invention of the gasoline engine.  In his 
reminiscences of 1937, Hiram Percy Maxim (cited in Nevins and Hill, 1954, p. 133) 
recalls, 
                                                 
27 Latent demand generally refers to desires that consumers cannot satisfy due to a lack of money or 
information regarding the product’s availability.  As used here, it refers to desires that consumers cannot 




As I look back, I am amazed that so many of us began work so nearly at the same 
time, and without the slightest notion that others were working on the problem.  
In 1892, when I began my work on a mechanical road vehicle, I suppose there 
were fifty persons in the United States working on the same idea.  Why did so 
many different and widely separated persons have the same thoughts at the same 
time?... 
It has always been my belief that we all began to work on a gasoline-engine-
propelled road vehicle at about the same time because it had become apparent 
that civilization was ready for the mechanical vehicle… It has been the habit to 
give the gasoline-engine all the credit for bringing the automobile… In my 
opinion this is a wrong explanation… 
The reason why we did not build mechanical road vehicles before this [1895], in 
my opinion, was because the bicycle had not yet come in numbers and had not 
directed men’s minds to the possibilities of independent, long-distance travel 
over the ordinary highway.  We thought the railroad was good enough.  The 
bicycle created a new demand which it was beyond the ability of the railroads to 
supply.  Then it came about that the bicycle could not satisfy the demand which it 
had created.  A mechanically propelled vehicle was wanted instead of a foot-
propelled one, and we now know that the automobile was the answer. 
Like Maxim, many historians credit the bicycle with altering Americans thinking 
about the possibilities of transport.  While the railroad had brought rapid long-distance 
transport, passengers had to adjust their schedules and routes to rail schedules and were 
subjected to unfair pricing policies.  The bicycle brought both independence and relative 
speed, which agreed with and reinforced an established and growing cultural focus on the 
individual.  Thus, it was the bicycle craze of the 1880s and 1890s that began to give 
many entrepreneurial and mechanically minded individuals the same vision.  Riders like 
Maxim began to think of adding mechanical power to relieve the hard physical labor 
required to travel distances of any consequence.  According to Abernathy (1978, p.11):  
Emerging consumer needs, not new technological capabilities, triggered the rapid 
development of the U.S automobile industry at the turn of the century.  A 
practical steam-powered car could have been produced twenty years earlier… 
[T]he industry was born from the consumer’s desire for a light personal 
transportation vehicle, a desire stimulated by the bicycle boom of the 1890s.  
Hitherto, the motorpowered vehicle had been envisioned as a product for the 
commercial transportation industry, not the consumer. 
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From the perspective of bicycle’s technological paradigm, the success of the 
bicycle had altered the TIEC in terms of consumer perceptions of personal travel.  
Consumers wanted better performance in terms of speed and distance than the bicycle, 
based on human power, could provide.  Development of the bicycle was reaching 
technological limits.  By stimulating a demand which it could not fulfill, its very success 
would ultimately lead to the industry’s senescence.28  It was this change in the TIEC – the 
developing desire for rapid long-distance personalized transport – that entrepreneurs in 
the late 1880s began to exploit to create economic value out of the invention of motorized 
transport that had occurred to Sir Isaac Newton as early as 1680 and had become 
technologically feasible with the steam engine in 1860.  Serendipitously, entrepreneurs 
now could also exploit the innovation of the practical gasoline engine. 
3.5.2 Initial Niche Markets, Product Definition, and Design 
Two developments that originated with the bicycle regime – the alteration of 
perceptions regarding personal transport and approaching technological limits – explain 
why entrepreneurs began experimenting with motor vehicles when they did.  However, 
these developments do not fully explain why the automobile found commercial success at 
that time and in the markets that it did.  This section identifies four additional factors that 
contributed to the commercial success of the motor vehicle and to the definition of its 
function and initial niche markets: 1) difficulties moving forward with the existing 
carriage regime for providing urban transport; 2) difficulties in the railroad regime: 
abuses of monopoly power and price discrimination;  3) a growing cultural trend known 
                                                 
28 Due to later changes in the TIEC and resultant shifts in consumer preferences, the U.S. bicycle industry 
would eventually be reborn with the functional characteristics of the product redefined strictly for sport 
rather than practical transport. 
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as Progressivism; and 4) new cultural values for sport, recreation, and the healthful 
benefits of escaping urban centers.  Thus, the emergence of the automobile industry can 
only be understood by considering misalignments in multiple regimes along with other 
developments in the TIEC.  This finding provides additional support for the inclusion of 
technical, institutional and ecological factors among the triggers of innovation.  It also 
supports the assertion that a framework for analysis of transitions should include multiple 
regimes as discussed in section 2.4.4 and accounted for in the framework described in 
section 2.6. 
With its unstable design, the first commercially successful bicycle, the ordinary, 
limited cycling to a sport for adventurous young men.  Thus, the bicycle craze began with 
the popularity of racing among the wealthy.  After the introduction of the safety bicycle, 
cycling became accessible to men, women, and children of all physical abilities.  The 
bicycle could be used as a form of clean urban transport for short trips, and while it found 
some use in this function, for the most part it remained functionally defined as providing 
sport and recreation.  The new middle class escaped the increasingly crowded and 
polluted cities to enjoy the healthful benefits of cycling in parks and the countryside.  
However, longer trips and transport of any cargo required too much effort for a ‘human-
powered’ vehicle.  Therefore, the bicycle had established new niche markets but for the 
most part did not compete with horse-drawn vehicles.  Yet the bicycle aroused a desire to 
combine the functionalities of flexibility and speed with long-distance travel.  
Entrepreneurs interpreted this challenge as an opportunity for a radically new technology 
– motorized transport, most commonly in the form of four-wheeled motorized carriages 
and wagons but also as motorized bicycles. 
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Because of the technology’s complexity and the state of industrial production, the 
first motor vehicles were costly to manufacture.  However, the idea of individualism, 
freedom, speed, and the attendant danger appealed to wealthy young men who were 
willing to pay for excitement.  As a result, the earliest applications of motor vehicles 
were racing and cross country touring.  Much as bicycling originally had been conceived 
as a sport for the wealthy and daring, the earliest automobiles were functionally defined 
as entertainment for the rich.  Because of their cost, they also conveyed social prestige, as 
motoring provided a very public demonstration of wealth.  By combining the flexibility 
of bicycles and horse-drawn vehicles with the speed and long distance capabilities of rail, 
touring provided a new function – rapid, cross country, personal transport – that fulfilled 
the desire for entertainment, sport, and thrill.  In this function, motor vehicles did not 
compete with rail transport and carriages because those existing technologies could not 
provide it.  However, demonstrations of the technology fueled expectations that motor 
vehicles might become accessible to the masses, freeing them from the tyranny of the 
railroads and the limitations of the horse.  This niche was served by steam and gasoline-
powered motor vehicles. 
Entrepreneurs were experimenting with a variety of technological approaches and 
another market niche emerged for more practical use on shorter trips in cities where 
animal waste from the use of carriages was creating problems.  This market consisted of 
wealthy businessmen, bankers, their wives, and also doctors.  Electric vehicles were easy 
to operate, quiet and odorless and therefore were best suited to this niche.  In this market, 
electric vehicles competed with carriages, electric rail systems, and bicycles.  However, 
electric vehicles combined the advantageous features of each without the disadvantages.  
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They were as clean like electric rail and bicycles, flexible like carriages and bicycles, and 
did not require the physical exertion of bicycles or the stabling and upkeep of horses.  
Use of electric motor vehicles also did not require investments in costly rail lines.  
Because electric vehicles were also very expensive, they provided both practical transport 
and social prestige and were conceived as a direct replacement for fine carriages in urban 
transport. 
The bicycle craze provided more than the beginnings of demand for personal 
transport and the inspiration for innovation.  The earliest motor vehicle designs borrowed 
heavily from bicycle technology, employing tubular frames and pneumatic tires and 
transmitting power to the wheels using sprockets and chains.  Some designs also followed 
bicycle architecture, such as Benz’s tricycle, Daimler’s motorcycles, and Riker’s electric 
tricycle.  However, early motor vehicle designs also evolved from carriages and steam 
traction engines.  The materials, techniques, and organization of production arose largely 
from experience in the bicycle and carriage manufacturing trades, the former benefiting 
from process innovations developed for the arms and sewing machine industries.   
3.5.3 Mechanisms of Learning and Innovation 
Like most new technologies, the automobile was immature when introduced and 
required significant improvements in performance.  The QE and MLP theories stress the 
importance of learning-by-interacting with users and learning-by-doing in this critical 
process.  However, innovation during the emergent phase of the automobile industry was 
highly synthetic and resulted from cumulative progress in products and processes over 
more than a century of development.  As discussed in this section, entrepreneurs relied on 
learning-by-doing to synthesize existing technologies from a variety of arenas into an 
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innovative new application.  Thus, spillovers were a significant, if not the primary, 
learning mechanism underlying the development of this new innovation.   
Although superficially a radical innovation, the automobile arose from a 
continuous evolution in product and process technologies (Rosenberg, 1963) as well as 
consumer demand.  Spillovers from the stationary engine and bicycle industries appear to 
be the most significant mechanism involved in innovation during the emergence of the 
motor vehicle industry.  The automobile industry relied on the continuous, incremental, 
and cumulative technical progress in production techniques over more than a century in a 
myriad of seemingly unrelated industries: arms manufacturing, sewing machines, 
bicycles, machine tools, and steel working.  As Rosenberg (1963) points out, the machine 
tool industry served a critical role in transmitting these spillovers in technical knowledge 
across industries.  This knowledge was embodied in the machines and manufacturing 
facilities themselves, but also in human capital as vividly illustrated by the careers of 
Henry Leland, Ransom Olds, and the Dodge and Duryea brothers.  This dynamic would 
continue to play out in the first decade of the 20th century. 
Firms that stayed connected to customers and suppliers evolved into new 
applications of expertise previously developed for existing applications.  In this manner, 
the evolution of specific manufacturing firms from the production of arms to sewing 
machines to bicycles to automobiles facilitated the transmission and accumulation of 
knowledge in the form of plants, capital equipment and human capital.  This progression 
is illustrated by the Weed Sewing Machine Company, which contracted with the Sharps 
Rifle Manufacturing Company, acquired some of its facilities and personnel, and evolved 
into the Pope Manufacturing Company, which made bicycles then transitioned to 
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automobiles.  Thus, certain firms exhibited longevity and success in multiple industries 
over time based on the cumulative nature of knowledge and learning as well as the firm’s 
willingness and ability to adapt to change – both technological and social. 
Successful early automobile manufacturers, then, were “less likely to be 
individual inventors starting a completely new business than men who added the 
production of automobiles to an existing operation” (Rae, 1959, p. 8).  New firms like the 
Ford Motor Company that lacked such legacies were largely assemblers of components 
purchased from existing machine shops and firms in the bicycle and carriage industries, 
as will be illustrated further in the next chapter. However, many of them benefited greatly 
from hiring individuals from these industries that brought with them the largely tacit 
knowledge of armory practice.  Unsuccessful firms, like Duryea, were unable to bring 
process technology into the production of technically successful product innovations.   
In general, entrepreneurs were relying on learning-by-doing to synthesize existing 
technologies from a variety of arenas into an innovative new application.  Automotive 
pioneers were working with limited finances and, in many cases, only in their spare time 
while working paid jobs or running another business.  Epstein (1972, p. 28) asserts that 
prior to 1900, road vehicles were not ‘manufactured,’ but were “crude products of home 
or workshop experiment,” built using improvised tools and, wherever possible, 
borrowing parts from steam engines, bicycles, and carriages.  Experimental designs were 
sometimes abandoned because their complexity made commercial fabrication impossible.  
According to Epstein, true commercial manufacturing did not begin until after 1900. 
Contrary to Rycroft and Kash’s (1999) assertion that the creativity in these early 
years were provided by individual entrepreneurs, it is clear that these innovations were 
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produced by multiple agents who collectively synthesized existing artifacts and threads of 
thought from wide ranging industries and disciplines with personal inspiration and insight 
to create a new product or concept.  Even the European inventors of gasoline engines and 
motor carriages generally were inspired by the work of others and worked with an 
assistant or partner.  Etienne Lenoir was inspired by the work of Phillipe Lebon some 60 
years earlier; Nikolaus Otto was inspired by Lenoir and collaborated with Eugen Langen, 
Gottlieb Daimler, and William Maybach.  In the U.S., the Duryea and Dodge brothers 
worked together as a team and Ford relied on a talented team of engineers and metal 
workers, notably including C. Harold Wills.   
Epstein (1972, p. 27-28) describes the American automobile entrepreneurs as 
experimenters that “both through the copying of foreign designs and through a great deal 
of more or less original work… drawing on the mechanical, chemical, and electrical 
developments of decade piled upon decade, succeeded in building practical self-propelled 
road vehicles…”  They worked steadily to improve their designs and construction 
methods through the “synthesis and skillful application of more or less well-known 
principles in order to produce results of an order higher than was known before.”  While 
already evident, teams of entrepreneurs, innovating through synthesis, would become 
even more significant in the early 20th century. 
3.5.4 Agents and Mechanisms of Change 
The QE theory of transitions identifies the technological nexus, where selection 
and variation are linked, as a critical mechanism in the mutual technological and 
institutional adaptations that result in a new technology becoming embedded in the wider 
socio-technical complex.  In this section, I identify the emergence of agents and 
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institutions in the nexus role and trace any connections to existing regimes.  The activities 
these agents of change supports the assertion that, in order to realize successful designs, 
entrepreneurs must behave as heterogeneous engineers, solving social, economic, and 
infrastructural as well as technical issues. 
Automotive entrepreneurs emerged from existing regimes and represented 
stationary engine manufacturers, machine shop mechanics, and bicycle manufacturers.  
Contributions were also made by carriage manufacturers, though entrepreneurs from this 
industry would become more prominent after 1910.  Although these agents of change 
arose from within related existing regimes, they pursued different technical approaches 
based on experience and geography.  A number of established bicycle and sewing 
machine firms, particularly those in the East, began manufacturing automobiles as a 
sideline.  These firms, most notably Pope Manufacturing, generally developed electric 
and steam cars.  Meanwhile, new firms established by Midwestern entrepreneurs with 
expertise in stationary engines or machining, such as Ransom Olds, were more likely to 
pursue less developed and therefore riskier gasoline technology.  These entrepreneurs 
opted to secure outside financing to establish new firms rather than place their existing 
businesses at risk. 
While most innovators began by working in small teams tackling technological 
problems, their roles quickly evolved into that of heterogeneous engineers involved in 
promoting the technology, overcoming public perceptions, altering the use environment, 
and securing financing.  Prior to the turn of the century, we see four examples of agents 
serving the emerging technological nexus role linking variation and selection.  This role 
involves two aspects: interpreting demands from the selection environment into 
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requirements for design, and altering the selection environment, in part by imposing the 
requirements of technology on the selection environment.  Enthusiast publications and 
the popular press were the first institutions to emerge in this intermediary role.  They 
facilitated communication among engineers and as such shaped the shared perceptions of 
designers and entrepreneurs.  They also altered selection by influencing public opinion 
and expectations of motor vehicles, the technological options and specific manufacturers.  
In this role, they were not necessarily a source of unbiased information.  Manufacturers 
also made extensive use of the press beginning with the initiation of the elaborate press 
interview by Albert Pope. 
Albert Pope had a great deal of experience serving in the nexus role for bicycles 
and translated much of that experience to the marketing of motor vehicles.  He was active 
in cycling journals and cycling clubs that lobbied for improved roads, and after 1900 this 
movement shifted to the automobile industry and began to bear fruit (see section 4.5.6).  
This movement represented attempts to impose the requirements of technology on the 
selection environment.  Pope organized the first bicycle trade show to link manufacturers 
and consumers, a practice adopted by the automobile industry, with the first one held in 
conjunction with the bicycle show.  Trade shows advertised new models and provided 
manufacturers with feedback on new designs and innovations.   
Third, Ransom Olds understood that the public was still skeptical of the 
technology and believed motor vehicle design therefore needed to be greatly simplified to 
allow anyone to operate the vehicle and any local shop to repair it.  This interpretation of 
the selection environment resulted in the design of the first mass produced automobile – 
the quite successful Olds curved dash.  Olds also influenced the selection environment 
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through long-distance demonstrations that altered public perceptions that the automobile 
and long-distance touring were privileges for the wealthy. 
Fourth, automakers began using speed and reliability races to influence public 
opinion of automobiles generally and demonstrate the capabilities of their technical 
approaches and products specifically.  However, races reinforced the image of motor 
vehicles as toys for the wealthy.  Races did more than alter public perceptions and 
expectations; they also stimulated the interest of investors and helped swayed their 
opinion in favor of gasoline engine technology, which was most in need of financial 
backing.  By directing resources to particular firms and technologies, racing altered 
variation as well as the selection environment. 
3.5.5 Summary 
In the 1890’s, the motor vehicle emerged as a technological innovation which, 
though radical as a synthetic whole, resulted from cumulative progress in products and 
processes over more than a century of development.  The primary mechanisms of 
innovation in this era were knowledge spillovers and learning-by-doing.  Conceptions of 
motor vehicles and experimentation trace back to at least the 17th century.  Therefore, the 
automobile was not a new invention, but it emerged as an innovation (a commercial 
product) when five developments in the TIEC provided opportunities that entrepreneurs 
were able to exploit:  
1) the success of the bicycle which altered consumer perceptions about personal 
transportation and created a demand for performance characteristics (greater 
speed, distance, and cargo capacity) that the technology was unable to fulfill due 
to technological limits;  
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2) difficulties moving forward with the existing carriage regime for providing urban 
transport;  
3) difficulties in the railroad regime: abuses of monopoly power and price 
discrimination;  
4) a growing cultural trend known as Progressivism; and  
5) new cultural values for sport, recreation, and the healthful benefits of escaping 
urban centers.   
Only the combination of these developments explains both why the automobile 
emerged in the 1890s rather than earlier and why it emerged in two specific niche 
markets.  This supports the issue raised in section 2.4.4 that an appropriate analytic 
framework should account for multiple regimes, i.e. multiple meso-level systems, as well 
as institutional developments. 
Initially, motor vehicles served two niche markets, both consisting of very 
wealthy consumers, serving the functions of: 1) local urban transport and 2) country 
touring.  Because of the specific requirements of these two niches, the technological 
solutions best suited to each differed.  Electric automobiles were used for short trips 
within cities and were the technology of choice for wealthy women.  They provided 
practical urban transport, conveyed social prestige, and, because they offered both 
cleanliness and flexibility, were attractive as a solution to rising problems with the 
existing animal-powered transport regime in this function.  Thus, it was emerging 
misalignments in multiple regimes that provided an opportunity for electric cars to enter 
the urban niche, where they competed with carriages, electric rail cars, and bicycles.   
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Steam-powered and gasoline ICE vehicles were used for touring the countryside.  
This use represented a new function by combining the flexibility of horse-drawn vehicles 
and bicycles with the speed and long-distance capabilities of rail transport.  This function 
– rapid, cross country, personal transport – provided sport and recreation and conveyed 
social prestige.  Motor vehicles in this application did not compete with the existing 
technologies for practical long distance transport (rail and carriage).  However, to some 
extent, they did compete with bicycles as wealthy urbanites began driving electric-, 
steam-, and gasoline-powered motor vehicles in city parks for recreation.   
Thus, the role of niches in the emergence of the motor vehicle industry is 
consistent with the MLP and QE theories in the following ways:  
1) Radical technologies emerge in niches;  
2) Instabilities or misalignments in existing regimes provide opportunities for radical 
technologies to serve as a solution; 
3) The articulation of new functionalities creates new niche markets; 
4) Niches serve to demonstrate technical feasibility relative to niche market needs; 
5) Niche markets serve to demonstrate the relative advantages of alternative 
technological approaches; and 
6) Within niches, firms develop technical capabilities, establish reputations, and 
form networks for financing, manufacturing, and sales. 
However, while the QE and MLP approaches focus on a single regime, this analysis 
shows that considering developments and misalignments in multiple regimes is critical to 
understanding the emergence of the automobile industry.   
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Agents and organizations serving in the emerging technological nexus role began 
to emerge, with noticeable roots in related regimes.  Many of these institutions included 
individuals like Albert Pope that had been active in these related industries and others 
were patterned after institutions established in these industries.  The Good Roads 
movement began with cycling enthusiasts, and trade shows, press interviews, and racing 
evolved from customs in the bicycle regime.  Agents experienced with stationary engines, 
notably Ransom Olds and Henry Ford, emerged as important agents interpreting design 
requirements based on market and infrastructural requirements while also attempting to 
alter perceptions about gasoline-powered vehicles and the function they could serve.  The 
activities of these agents of change support the assertion that, in order to realize 
successful designs, entrepreneurs behave as heterogeneous engineers, solving social, 
economic, and infrastructural as well as technical issues. 
The turn of the century approximately marks the end of the emergent phase, 
which is characterized by a variety of product designs and configurations, and the 
beginning of the transitional phase, where products begin to converge on a standard 
design.  While there is no sharp delineation between the emergent and transitional phase, 
the year 1900 marks the introduction of the first mass produced automobile, the Olds 
curved dash.  The Olds Motor Works produced about 1,400 vehicles that year and was 
producing up to 40 vehicles per day by 1904.  Several manufacturers would soon achieve 




4.0 Transition and Onset of the Specific Phase 
“…the motorcar business is a fusion of three arts – the art of buying 
materials, the art of production, and the art of selling.” 
-- Sorensen, 1956, p. 93 
 
By around 1900, the automobile industry was entering the transitional phase, 
where products begin to converge on a standard design.  This phase is particularly critical 
to understanding technological transitions because it also involves the movement from 
niche to wider markets.  Two developments are critical to diffusion into wider markets: 
defining or refining the product’s functional requirements to appeal to the needs of a 
larger customer base and improving the product’s performance relative to these 
requirements.  The quasi-evolutionary (QE) and multi-level perspective (MLP) theories 
assert that these developments occur within initial markets through learning-by-
interacting with users and learning-by-doing.  Consequently, growth of niche markets, 
niche branching, or niche proliferation allows manufacturers to reduce costs through 
economies of scale.  During this development, the technology begins a process of 
embedding that is characterized by the co-evolution of the technology and the selection 
environment. 
This chapter continues the history of the automobile through approximately 1915 
in order to identify the technological improvements to both products and production 
processes that enabled movement into a wider market.  Most importantly, I seek to 
identify the role of niche markets in this transition and the mechanisms of learning 
involved in these improvements.  I also identify the emergence of rules, other institutions, 
and artifacts which contributed to the onset and stability of the specific phase.  This 
review also traces the continuing development of the technological nexus linking 
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variation and selection, identifies agents serving the nexus role, identifies activities which 
link variation and selection, and describes the institutional adaptations that co-evolve 
with the technology.  Other institutional factors shaping this evolution, including 
exogenous events, also are identified. 
Section 4.1 reviews the history of the Ford Motor Company, beginning with 
Henry Ford’s struggles as a heterogeneous engineer to obtain financial backing. Both 
product and process innovations are discussed. While learning-by-interacting with users 
and learning-by-doing were important aspects of this process, they were not the only or 
even primary mechanisms of learning.  First, Ford’s own experiences and perspectives 
were important in determining users’ needs in the rural market segment.  Second, 
learning-by-interacting with suppliers were critical in the product innovations that 
significantly improved the performance and reliability of Ford’s vehicles.  Third, the 
innovative process was highly synthetic and spillovers played a fundamental role in both 
product and process improvements.  By 1910, Ford’s product was consistent with a new 
functional definition that suited the very large rural market.  The company’s production 
processes were becoming increasingly aligned with broader developments in the 
technical, institutional, and ecological complex (TIEC).  By 1915, Ford had developed a 
revolutionary production system that reinforced these trends and became the industrial 
model for 20th century.  This section concludes with a discussion of the role of 
innovations, institutional factors, and Ford’s experiences and perspectives in the 
company’s move toward vertical integration and centralized control as the industry 
entered the specific phase.  This progression would have important consequences for 
Ford’s innovative capabilities in the following era.   
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Section 4.2 reviews the formation of General Motors, beginning with the Buick 
Motor Company.  Once again, a clear picture emerges of entrepreneurship as a 
heterogeneous endeavor, with William Durant jointly addressing issues of design, 
production, management, marketing, and finance.  The success of the Model 10 in 1908 
testifies to the rising importance of the low-priced market.  While the product design 
during the transitional phase was converging on a dominant design, manufacturers did 
not know what that design would entail, which presented them with substantial risk.  
While Ford attempted to influence the selection environment with his interpretation of the 
automobile and appropriate product attributes, Durant attempted to mitigate the risk 
presented by the converging dominant design by creating GM, an industrial combination 
that diversified his product line in terms of technological approaches and market 
segments.  However, by 1910, only Buick and Cadillac were profitable.  This can be 
attributed to two factors: 1) the emergence of a new functional definition that appealed to 
a wider market and an aligned dominant design which supplanted other technological 
interpretations and configurations; and 2) manufacturing processes at GM subsidiaries 
that were not aligned with the TIEC and market needs for the combination of high 
reliability and low cost.  These problems, combined with an aggressive acquisition and 
expansion strategy, contributed to the transfer of control to a banking syndicate between 
1910 and 1915.  While the bankers did improve production processes and institute a 
research program, they also increased the company’s misalignment with these emerging 
conditions.  Finally, this section provides a detailed description of the development of the 
electric self starter 1911. This review reveals that spillovers and learning-by-interacting 
with suppliers were the most significant mechanisms in this critical innovation. 
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Section 4.3 reviews Durant’s formation of the Chevrolet Motor Company.  The 
firm’s failure with expensive touring vehicles and its contrasting success with small 
inexpensive vehicles again illustrate the increasing importance of the low-price market 
and the changing functional definition of the automobile.  This success also paved the 
way for Durant to re-take control of GM, which is covered in chapter 5.  
Section 4.4 discusses the severe industry shakeout that occurred beginning in 
1909.  A shakeout is typical as industries approach the specific phase, a dominant design 
emerges, and firms begin competing based mainly on cost and quality rather than product 
differentiation.  However, the shakeout for the automobile industry was extreme.  I 
identify eight factors that contributed to this phenomenon, several of which are inter-
related: 1) increasing economies of scale that necessitated high volume production and 
high capital investments; 2) the cumulative burden of manufacturing parts for multiple 
models; 3) process innovations at Ford that were not easy for firms to adopt; 4) the 
cumulative effects of and increasing returns to innovation; 5) the redefinition of the 
automobile for mass markets; 6) an emerging dominant design; 7) the saturation of the 
market niche for very expensive vehicles; and 8) the Panic of 1907 and ensuing 
recession.  Items 5-7 together represent an important feedback mechanism between 
selection and variation.  By contributing to the failure of specific firms, the selection 
environment influenced variation and further reinforced the emerging dominant design. 
Section 4.5 discusses five developments in the TIEC that provide the technical 
and institutional context for this era: the Panic of 1907; the Selden Patent patent dispute; 
the emergence of trade associations and their efforts to standardize parts and materials; 
the expansion and evolution of the autombile market; the activities of motoring clubs; 
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and efforts to improve the condition of the country’s roads.  Finally, section 4.6 
synthesizes this review and summarizes the findings as they relate to the research 
questions presented in chapter 1.     
4.1 Fordism and the Model T 
Despite an early interest in motor vehicles, Henry Ford was not one of the first 
American entrepreneurs to break into the automotive industry.  Ford’s first attempt at 
commercial manufacturing produced fewer than 25 vehicles before being dissolved and 
the second firm succeeded only after Ford’s departure.  Ford’s third attempt found 
commercial success with production of the Model A in 1903.  By the end of that year, the 
Olds Motor Works already had produced an estimated 10,800 motor vehicles.  Over the 
next ten years, the Ford Motor Company revolutionized the manufacture of motor 
vehicles and quickly overtook Olds’ production.  Using a combination of product and 
process innovations, Ford achieved his goal of producing a car that every man could 
afford.  The company’s production system, which came to be known as ‘Fordism,’ was 
so successful at cost reduction that it soon became the industrial model for 20th century 
production. 
This chapter begins in section 4.1.1 with Henry Ford’s background, which shaped 
the perspectives that led him to experiment with motor vehicles and to establish a goal to 
produce an automobile that could replace the family horse.  These perspectives, which 
aligned with evolving higher-level rules within the TIEC regarding capitalism, 
mechanistic reductionism, and increased cultural valuation of efficiency, served as a basis 
for Ford’s highly successful innovations between 1900 and 1915.  Ford also needed 
financial backing, but his conception of the automobile was not aligned with the initial 
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product definition presented in chapter 3.  This section describes his struggles as a 
heterogeneous engineer to obtain funding and sway the opinion of financiers and 
customers regarding the function of the motor vehicle and the attributes necessary to 
fulfill it.  During this process, Ford made use of two institutions described in chapter 3 
that were emerging in the technological nexus: the press and racing. 
Section 4.1.2 then reviews the product innovation and design process at the Ford 
Motor Company beginning with the Model A in 1903 and culminating with the Model T 
in 1908.  Ford targeted the rural market with the company’s least expensive models, most 
notably the A, N and T.  While the QE and MLP theories place primary importance on 
learning-by-interacting with users to determine users’ needs, Ford relied on his own 
childhood experience to understand users’ needs in the rural market segment.  However, 
he did rely on feedback from dealers and buyers to identify defects as he focused on 
product innovations to improve reliability.  Consistent with the QE and MLP theories, 
Ford showed a marked preference for learning-by-doing over guided research, though C. 
Harold Wills did begin metallurgy testing at some point.  However, this review also 
uncovers the critical role of learning-by-interacting with suppliers in the product 
innovations that significantly improved the performance and reliability of Ford’s vehicles 
during the transitional phase. 
In addition, process innovations at Ford discussed in sections 4.1.3 through 4.1.5 
once again highlight the highly synthetic nature of innovation and the fundamental 
importance of spillovers in the product and process innovations that enabled Ford to 
manufacture a product of both high quality and low cost.  While one or the other had 
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been achieved within the industry, it was the combination that allowed Ford to conquer a 
mass market. 
Section 4.1.3 covers the adoption and adaptation of process innovations in plant 
organization from New England armory practice, which was transferred to the Ford 
Motor Company through the ‘acquisition’ of human capital – this knowledge was 
embodied in key personnel with experience in the sewing machine and machine tool 
industry.  Section 4.1.4 discusses a second aspect of Ford’s evolving production process, 
the management of production, specifically the breakdown of manufacturing and 
assembly operations into minute tasks.  This section places these developments within the 
context of a wider movement toward ‘scientific management,’ the formulation of which 
is attributed to Frederick W. Taylor.  The question arises as to how much of the 
innovation at Ford represented original inspiration versus knowledge spillovers 
transmitted either directly from the work of Taylor or indirectly through shared 
perceptions of the knowledge base.  As with the emergence of the automobile itself, 
multiple entrepreneurs were working separately yet concurrently on the same problems 
and were developing a variety of similar solutions.  I find that this era of innovative 
ferment was attributable to pervasive changes in the TIEC and that the role of spillovers 
in Ford’s innovations was of primary significance. 
Section 4.1.5 covers the third and final aspect of Ford’s process innovations, 
continuously moving assembly.  Popular opinion generally regards this innovation as 
Ford’s most significant achievement and attributes its development to Henry Ford alone.   
However, this review reveals first that the development of continuously moving assembly 
at the Ford Motor Company was a highly synthetic process involving the talents and 
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personal inspiration of multiple entrepreneurs and spillovers from multiple industries.  In 
addition, moving assembly was just one component of several which, when combined, 
created a production system that was more efficient than the simple sum of the parts. 
Finally, section 4.1.6 completes the history of the Ford Motor Company through 
1915 and discusses the company’s progression toward centralized control and vertical 
integration.  Throughout the period covered in this chapter, Henry Ford clashed with his 
financial backers over strategy.  This fact, combined with Ford’s predisposition toward 
individualism and autocracy, led Ford to seek complete financial and managerial 
independence.  Ford was assisted in achieving this goal by an unexpected exogenous 
event, the Panic of 1907.  In addition, the price and availability of raw materials was 
always a concern, and supply holdups and bottlenecks became an increasing problem as 
Ford moved toward continuously moving assembly.  Therefore, Ford also began a 
process to bring these supplies under his control.  This movement toward centralized 
control and vertical integration would not be complete until 1918, at which point it had 
significant implications for the company’s innovative capabilities. 
4.1.1 Birth of the Ford Motor Company 
Born in 1863, Henry Ford grew up in rural Michigan where he found the endless 
work on the family farm to be tedious.  He developed an interest in all things mechanical 
at an early age and much preferred to tinker at his tool bench.  Around the age of 12, 
Henry saw a steam traction engine moving along the road under its own power.  
Fascinated by the possibility of an engine being used for a self-propelled vehicle, he 
grilled the operator about the machine.  The man was impressed and allowed Henry to 
operate the machine over the next few summers.   
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With his schoolwork finished at the age of 16, Henry Ford left the farm for 
Detroit.  Between 1879 and 1882 he earned the first-hand mechanical experience he had 
desired all his young life.  His first job as an apprentice at the Michigan Car Company, a 
large Detroit manufacturer of railroad cars, lasted only six days.  Henry was discharged 
after angering the older hands by repairing in half an hour a machine they had spent most 
of the day trying to fix.  Henry then spent nine months as an apprentice in a machine shop 
before moving on to Detroit’s largest shipbuilding firm where he was employed in the 
engine works.  Between 1882 and 1885, Henry worked various jobs, installing and 
repairing engines for the Westinghouse Engine Company and other employers, finding 
occasional work in Detroit factories, and lending a hand at his father’s farm.  He also 
attended business school for practical commercial training. 
In 1887, Henry Ford’s father offered him forty acres of wooded land, which 
Henry accepted so that he might marry Clara Bryant.  He set up a sawmill, which 
provided a source of income and raw materials to build a new home.  Sometime 
afterward, he built a small shop where he did repair work and reportedly began 
experimenting with steam and gasoline engines, aiming to build one to pull a wagon or 
plow.29  Although no record of his work survives, it is clear that he had become interested 
in the idea of a horseless carriage.  As the timber began running out on his property, he 
became restless; he had no desire to become a farmer as his father wished.  Instead, he 
decided that he needed to learn more about electricity in order to build his horseless 
carriage.  In 1891, the Fords moved to Detroit and Henry began working for the Edison 
Illuminating Company, where he was soon promoted to chief engineer.  Shortly after the 
                                                 
29 Except for public demonstrations, the timeline of Ford’s experimentation and achievements is uncertain 
due to discrepancies between his accounts and those of friends and colleagues. 
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move, Ford’s experimentation with horseless carriages began in earnest, and by the end 
of 1893 he reportedly had built a functional one-cylinder gasoline engine.   
In 1896, Ford began working on a two-cylinder engine, chassis, and body with the 
assistance of two fellow Edison employees.  Ford’s quadricycle, as he called it, weighed 
only 500 pounds and used bicycle wheels with pneumatic tires.  The experimental vehicle 
completed a successful test run in May, 1896.  Ford improved the quadricycle then sold it 
so that he could begin building a new vehicle.  After obtaining financial assistance, Ford 
began building a second horseless carriage.  The quadricycle had been built almost 
entirely of wooden parts and Ford hired a carriage blacksmith to fashion metal parts for 
the wheels, seat railings, undercarriage, and steering mechanism.  The new vehicle, 
completed in the summer of 1899, was still lightweight but was substantially stronger and 
capable of carrying both a driver and passenger.   
In August, Ford secured financial backing to establish the Detroit Automobile 
Company and then resigned from Edison to devote himself full-time to the endeavor.  
Ford had a test vehicle ready in January, 1900, and the new company announced 
ambitious plans to produce ten vehicles a month beginning in March.  However, Ford 
wrestled with problems of design while the shop encountered problems with assembly 
and the workmanship of parts supplied under contract.  In addition, the company’s car 
probably was too expensive, not as advanced as some others, and not quite ready for 
production (Nevins and Hill, 1954).  Ford apparently believed the car would not sell and 
wanted to design a better car but was vetoed by the stockholders.  Though it did produce 
a few vehicles, perhaps as many as 25, production at the Detroit Automobile Company 
soon ground to a halt and the company was dissolved in January, 1901. 
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Undaunted, Ford took a new approach.  The public “refused to consider the 
automobile in any light other than a fast toy,” so he decided to build a racer and use it to 
gain recognition (Ford and Crowther, 1922, p. 36). The race car, designed and built with 
the assistance of Oliver Barthel, was ready in time for an October 10 race sponsored by 
the Detroit Automobile Club.  Ford was one of only three competitors that showed for the 
ten-mile race held at the Grosse Pointe track near Detroit.  After one dropped out due to a 
leaking cylinder, only Ford and Alexander Winton remained.  Winton took an early lead, 
but Ford was gaining when Winton developed engine trouble.  Ford won the race with an 
average time just under 1 minute and 21 seconds per mile.  Later that month, Ford made a 
credible challenge of Winton’s newly established one-mile record of 1:09 before losing 
his nerve on the turn.  Inspired by Ford’s racing successes, his investors reorganized the 
old Detroit Automobile Company as the Henry Ford Company in November, 1901.   
Ford hired Barthel full-time, ostensibly to work on the design of a vehicle for 
commercial production, but Ford instead immediately began plans for a new racer.  
While the Henry Ford Company’s financers supported racing as a vital part of publicity, 
dissension arose over his preoccupation with it.  Ford apparently was extremely 
dissatisfied with his share in the profits of the new company and felt he would make 
much more money from racing.  As Ford increasingly neglected his duties as chief 
engineer, the stockholders pressed him to complete design of the commercial car and 
begin production.  Eventually, they brought in the services of Henry Leland of Leland & 
Faulconer who apparently found fault with Ford’s “cut and try” design methods.  In 
March, 1902, Ford left the company.  The stockholders gave him the incomplete plans for 
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the racer and $900 and agreed to discontinue using his name.  Henry Leland took over the 
company which was renamed the Cadillac Automobile Company. 
Ford joined forces with famous cyclist Tom Cooper, who had ridden with him in 
the Grosse Point race the previous October, and a new assistant, C. Harold Wills.  Wills 
had completed a four-year apprenticeship as a toolmaker, worked in a machine shop, and 
studied engineering, chemistry, and metallurgy at night.  Much like Ford, Wills had keen 
mechanical instincts and preferred to learn by doing.  He agreed to work for Ford early in 
the morning and after dinner so that he could keep his full-time job.  Wills took charge of 
drafting and design of two new racers, “The Arrow” and the “999,” the latter named after 
the Empire State Express No. 999, a New York Central train that in 1893 set a world 
speed record of over 112 mph.  The cars were tested in September and the 999 was 
entered in a five-mile race at Grosse Ponte in October.  Apparently both Ford and Cooper 
were intimidated by the vehicle’s power, as neither was willing to drive in the race.  
Cooper found another cyclist who, though he had never driven an automobile, agreed to 
try it. The 999 won, setting a speed record by averaging 1 minute and 6 seconds per mile.  
The relationship between Ford and Cooper, however, had begun to cool.  Cooper 
purchased the 999 and the two parted ways. 
Since leaving the Henry Ford Company, Ford was no longer entirely focused on 
racing.  Despite his prior business failures, he became determined to build a car to replace 
the family horse, and in the summer of 1902 began planning a motor vehicle of moderate 
cost.  His new car included a novel vertical engine design that resulted in less vibration, 
noise and wear than Olds’ horizontal engine.  To obtain funds to produce a pilot model, 
Ford approached successful coal merchant Alexander T. Malcomson, with whom he had 
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become acquainted while working at Edison Illuminating Company.  This time, Ford was 
careful to ensure a profitable stake in the venture.  In August, 1902, Malcomson agreed to 
an equal partnership in developing the pilot model and to establish a corporation to 
replace the partnership and bring Ford’s automobile to market once they had sufficient 
capital for manufacturing.  Ford took charge of engineering and manufacturing, while 
Malcomson was to handle the financial and commercial aspects of the business.  
Malcomson assigned James Couzens, his office manager and business advisor, to handle 
the accounts for the new partnership.   
Following the victory of the 999 in October, the design team turned their full 
attention to developing the new commercial car.  Ford provided general design concepts, 
and Wills helped develop them into specific plans.  With the car, work force, and a rented 
shop on Mack Avenue coming along, Ford and Malcomson made plans for incorporation, 
but had difficulty finding willing investors.  Nonetheless, they began approaching parts 
makers for contracts.  Ford and Malcomson contacted the Dodge Brothers, which was 
one of the best machine shops in the Midwest, to manufacture the new engines.  The 
Dodges had been building engines for Olds, but faith in Ford’s new design and hopes for 
large future profits led them to contract to supply 650 engines, transmissions, and axles.  
The Dodges agreed to invest in machinery, tools, and materials in advance of payment, 
with installments due from Ford beginning in March, 1903.  Ford and Malcomson 
arranged contracts for bodies, wheels, and tires, and were able to show potential investors 
the promising margin for profits from their automobiles.   
Nonetheless, start-up capital remained elusive.  The risks of investing in the 
automobile industry during this still experimental stage were well known, and three-fifths 
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of the companies formed between 1900 and 1908 to produce automobiles would fail.  
Further, Malcomson was over-extended, debt-ridden, and distracted by his other business.  
His reputation as an impulsive ‘plunger’ did little to reassure potential investors.  With 
the first payments to the Dodge Brothers and other suppliers looming, Ford and 
Malcomson were finally able to draw in a few investors.  Among them were 
Malcomson’s cousin, attorneys, friends, and, most significantly his uncle, John S. Gray, a 
banker to whom Malcomson was already heavily in debt.   
The Ford Motor Company was incorporated in June, 1903.  In exchange for a 
$10,500 cash investment, John Gray was named president and granted 10.5% of the 
company stock.  Ford and Malcomson each took 25.5% of the stock in exchange for work 
completed, plans, machinery and patents.  The Dodge brothers were each granted 5% in 
exchange for $7,000 in materials and a $3,000 note.  Couzens invested $1,000 and a 
$1,500 note and was granted 2.5% of the company.  With only $28,000 paid in cash, the 
Ford Motor Company was born on a shoestring.  Gray, Malcomson, Ford, John Dodge, 
and investor John W. Anderson were named as the board of directors.  Henry Ford was 
named vice-president, Malcomson treasurer, and Couzens secretary.  In practice, 
however, Ford served as president, handling all matters of production, and Couzens 
served as both treasurer and secretary, handling all business affairs (Nevins and Hill, 
1954).  Couzens would eventually develop an elaborate but highly efficient business 
organization.  Sorensen (1956, p. 36) designates the first twelve years of the Ford Motor 
Company (1903-1915) as the Couzens period, giving the enterprising and severe 
individualist equal credit for the company’s success:   
True, the company had Henry Ford’s name, its product and production were his.  
There never would have been a Ford car without him.  But the Ford Motor 
Company would not have made Ford cars long without James Couzens.  He 
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controlled expenditures, organized sales, and set the pattern for business 
operation.  He drove Ford and the production side to produce cars to meet the 
public’s demand.  He yelled for plant expansion and drove us from the Piquette 
Avenue Plant into Highland Park.  Everyone in the company, including Henry 
Ford, acknowledged him as the driving force during this period. 
4.1.2 Product Design 
This section reviews the product innovation and design process at the Ford Motor 
Company beginning with the Model A in 1903 and culminating with the Model T in 
1908.  Ford targeted the rural market with the company’s least expensive models and 
relied on his own childhood experience to understand users’ needs in this market 
segment.  Ford focused on improving the reliability of these vehicles, relying on feedback 
from dealers and buyers to identify defects.  This history shows Ford’s marked preference 
for learning-by-doing over guided research, but also uncovers the critical role of learning-
by-interacting with suppliers in the product innovations that significantly improved the 
performance and reliability of Ford’s vehicles. 
In 1903, the Ford Motor Company began producing the Model A in a rented shop 
on Mack Avenue in Detroit.  The Model A design was simple, lightweight (the runabout 
weighed 1250 pounds), and efficient.  The major novelty of the Model A was Ford’s two-
cylinder engine, which could produce eight horsepower and up to 30 mph.  Ford 
contracted the Dodge Brothers for the engines, transmissions, and axles; the C. R. Wilson 
Carriage Company for the wooden body and cushions; the Hartford Rubber Company for 
tires; and the Prudden Company for wheels.  Ford employees assembled four cars at 
once, aiming to finish 15 per day.  The runabout sold for between $750 and $850.   
Although advertised as reliable and rugged, in addition to inexpensive, the first 
Model A’s suffered from many design and manufacturing faults.  The radiators were 
defective, the carburetors were inefficient, and the brakes and engines were often 
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assembled hastily and shoddily by the Dodge Brothers.  Although serious, these problems 
were not a great threat to the longevity of the Ford Motor Company since, in 1903, all 
automobiles were similarly defective, and no one expected them to be dependable.  
Complaints poured in from dealers, one of whom sent a list of recommended changes.  
Ford brought the dealer to Detroit and worked through the problems.   
Ford initially replaced the faulty carburetor with one from a different supplier, but 
the replacement was still unsatisfactory.  Ford then contacted George Holley, who had 
garnered a reputation manufacturing a one-cylinder car, motorcycles, and a simple 
carburetor.  Using principles laid down by Ford and Wills, Holley designed a new 
carburetor that finally solved the problem.  Suppliers also marketed their products to 
improve the vehicle.  For example, Peter Steenstrup of Hyatt Roller Bearing admonished 
Ford that he had failed to honor a promise to use his company’s bearings instead of ball 
bearings and Ford eventually switched.  Within 6 months, the Model A design had been 
reworked (Nevins and Hill, 1954). 
Sales were better than expected and the profits allowed for payment of dividends 
while still financing expansion, all without the need for raising working capital on Wall 
Street.  Since many car-buyers were suspicious of high finance, a Wall Street connection 
likely would have negatively impacted sales.  In 1904, the stockholders approved the 
construction of a new factory on Piquette Avenue.  In the 1904-1905 sales year,30 Ford 
offered three models, all somewhat larger in wheelbase than the Model A.  The Model C, 
which replaced the Model A, weighed 1250 pounds, delivered 10 hp, and sold for $800.  
The new Model F was a touring automobile that weighed 1400 pounds, delivered 12 hp, 
                                                 
30 The sales year began in the fall.  Because early automobiles were open to the elements, Northerners did 
little driving from Thanksgiving through Easter.  Accordingly, few automobiles were sold during this 
period and sales agents were laid off (Nevins and Hill, 1954). 
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and sold for $1000.  Malcomson insisted on tapping the wealthy market and Ford 
introduced the Model B which weighed 1700 pounds, incorporated a four-cylinder engine 
that produced 24 hp, and sold for $2000.  Where the Model A, C and F were all chain-
driven, the Model B had a rotating-shaft or torque drive.  The new models were better 
than the A but still had many defects.  Sales continued to climb and production reached 
25 automobiles per day in 1905 (Nevins and Hill, 1954). 
Shortly after occupying the Piquette plant in late 1904, Ford began planning two 
new models: the moderately priced four-cylinder, 15 hp, Model N, which would improve 
on and replace the C and F, and the six-cylinder, torque-driven Model K, which was 
priced at $2800.  As expected, Malcomson championed the K, bolstered by the industry 
trend toward larger, more expensive cars.    In 1903, 26% of the automobiles produced 
sold for under $875 while 12% were over $2775.  In 1905, the situation was reversed, 
with 10% of vehicles selling for under $875 and 25% for over $2775 (Epstein, 1972).   
The industry and the Ford Motor Company were moving ever farther away from 
Henry Ford’s ideal of manufacturing a single automobile of simple, standardized design 
that could be sold at $500, enabling the masses to replace the family horse.  Malcomson 
seemed justified, however, as many contemporary industry analysts wrote that the 
country was prospering and too many manufacturers were making inexpensive 
automobiles while there were too few expensive models available.  Henry Ford was not 
alone in his battle; Olds Motor Works had been the first to produce in volume a 
lightweight, inexpensive, and highly successful motorcar, yet even Olds’ financial backer 
pushed for higher-priced models.  Unhappy with what he saw as interference with his 
decision-making, Ransom Olds in 1904 resigned from the company that bore his name.  
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Ford, however, remained adamant; he wanted to build a car that workingmen could 
afford. 
Although the Model N was not completed in time for the New York Automobile 
Show in early 1906, Ford showed a specimen without an engine, advertising a price of 
$500.  The response was immediate and overwhelming; Ford’s championship of the “car 
for the ordinary man” was finally vindicated.  The Model N incorporated ideas that had 
been developed for the expensive models B and K, including a torque-drive, yet was 
light, weighing 1050 pounds, and inexpensive.  The engine was located under a front 
hood, lamps were added to the radiator and dash, and mud guards and polished fenders 
were added.   
Ford planned production of the Model N at 100 per month beginning in July of 
1906, with the engines, axles and gears manufactured by the Ford Manufacturing 
Company at the Bellevue plant.31  Such a large production volume was previously 
unheard of and, by this time, Henry Ford was convinced that this feat would require fully 
interchangeable parts and careful plant organization for progressive flow.  Rapid 
expansion of the automobile industry complicated the acquisition of the necessary 
machine tools, but production was in full swing by the fall. 
Dealers and customers were highly enthusiastic, and advance orders for 1907 
production streamed in.  Nevins and Hill (1954, p. 323) declared the new Model N “one 
of the best designed cars yet seen in the United States.”  Nonetheless, the Model N 
suffered from defects and production problems.  The biggest challenge was 
manufacturing interchangeable camshafts of sufficient strength that also provided proper 
                                                 
31 See sections 4.1.3 and 4.1.6 for the history of the Ford Manufacturing Company and the Bellevue plant. 
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timing (Sorensen, 1956).  Sales were brisk, but Ford was already looking ahead.  Late in 
1906, he set up the design room for the next Ford automobile: the Model T. 
Since founding the Ford Motor Company, Henry Ford’s goal had been to produce 
an automobile for mass consumption, and each small car model moved him closer to his 
goal.  The car for everyman would have to be rugged, reliable, and easy to operate, 
maintain, and repair.  To produce it in volume, it needed to be designed for ease of 
manufacturing as well.  The comparative simplicity of Ford’s Model N and T designs 
made them easy to understand and use, and also was well adapted to mechanized, mass 
production techniques.  Ease of repair was facilitated by the availability of standardized, 
precision-machined, yet inexpensive mass-produced parts.  The Ford models’ lightness 
and rugged designs meant that they could negotiate the rough roads and weather 
conditions better than costlier and heavier models and remain structurally sound. 
To correct the faults of previous models and adapt the vehicle design to the 
rugged conditions of American roads, the Model T’s body was lifted high above the road.  
It had stout wheels and springs which negotiated rough terrain and partially relieved the 
body and chassis from the painful wrenching suffered by most cars.  It was offered with 
two carburetors, one of which Holley designed and then manufactured in a Detroit 
factory that Ford purchased for him in exchange for a full order of carburetors.  Dry cells 
for ignition had been replaced by a magneto, and the engine and transmission were 
entirely enclosed.  For the first time, the engine cylinder block and crankcase were made 
in a single casting with a detachable cylinder head, which simplified both design and 
manufacturing once a suitable gasket was developed.  The engine utilized a three-point 
suspension to eliminate the distortion of the motor base from operation on rough roads, 
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and the transmission was an improved planetary type, both of which had been first 
introduced by Northern in 1902 (Abernathy et al., 1983, Appendix D).   
The rugged, easy to operate transmission was key to the mass appeal of the Model 
T.  The soft metal used in previous transmissions meant that gears were easily stripped by 
motorists who had little experience with shifting, and many drivers, especially women, 
had difficulty with the heavy, sticky clutches of previous gasoline-powered automobiles.  
For the first time in automotive manufacturing, the Model T used vanadium steel gears, 
crankshafts, axles, and springs (Nevins and Hill, 1954; Sorensen, 1956).  According to 
Abernathy (1978, p. 96), “The Model T was superior as a car in its era because it 
innovated in the use of a vanadium-steel alloy to achieve a high strength-to-weight ratio 
and could be powered by a moderate-sized … engine.”  Vanadium steel provided more 
than twice the tensile strength of the steel it replaced and yet was easier to machine.   
However, consistent with Rosenberg’s (1963) thesis of technological convergence 
and the reactive forces behind innovation, the use of vanadium steel required 
improvement in the machine tools used to work on it.  According to Sorensen (1956), 
when test parts for the Model N were forged with the new alloy, it was discovered that 
better drills and cutting tools would be needed to machine it. 
The introduction of vanadium steel appears to have inspired Ford to design the 
Model T, and certainly determined its final form.  The origin of this innovation is a bit of 
a mystery, as accounts vary.  According to Nevins and Hill (1954), Ford wrote in his 
reminiscences that, in 1905, he picked up an engine part from a French racecar following 
a wreck at Palm Beach.  Noting that it was very light and tough, he had a company 
mechanic look into its composition and found that it was a French vanadium steel alloy.  
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Ford then sent for metallurgist J. Kent-Smith of England and subsequently arranged for a 
steel mill in Canton, Ohio, to experiment with the new alloy.  In another account, C. 
Harold Wills reports that he saw an exhibit of the steel at an engineering conference in 
1905 and subsequently had it tested.   
The third account by Charles Sorensen32 is the only one where a Ford official is 
not claiming for himself credit for pioneering the use of the high strength steel.  Kent-
Smith had worked extensively with vanadium steel since 1900 and his work was widely 
published in technical journals.  According to Sorensen, Ford executives therefore knew 
about the alloy from their readings (Nevins and Hill, 1954).  Kent-Smith made his first 
U.S. contacts in Canton, Ohio, and then traveled throughout the country with samples of 
the new steel.  When he visited Ford several times in 1905, company officials met him 
with great interest.  Afterward, Henry Ford told Sorensen, “this means entirely new 
design requirements, and we can get a better, lighter, and cheaper car as a result of it” 
(Sorensen, 1956, p. 98).  The lack of self-interest in this final account perhaps lends it 
more credibility than the others, since Henry Ford was known to embellish stories.  
Further, Nevins and Hill (1954, p. 349) conclude that Kent-Smith “seems to have come to 
the Piquette plant on his own initiative.”   However, Sorensen had his own priorities and 
loyalties and as such was not an unbiased source either.  Regardless, in any version of the 
story, supplier interactions were critical in this major innovation. 
Supplier interactions also played a significant role in the development of stamped 
steel parts for the Model T.  Sometime in 1907, William H. Smith of the John R. Keim 
                                                 
32 Charles Sorensen began working at Ford as a pattern-maker in 1905 and within a year was in charge of 
the pattern-making department.  After Walter Flanders and Max Wollering left Ford in 1908, P.E. Martin 
served as plant superintendent and Sorensen served as assistant superintendent, though Ford disdained the 
use of job titles (Sorensen, 1956). 
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mills in Buffalo showed Henry Ford the stamped steel bell housing of a telephone 
receiver and suggested making a full-scale axle housing using the same process.33  Ford 
was reportedly delighted by the idea of using such parts for both the current Model N the 
design of the new Model T and sent Sorensen and Wills to tour the plant (Nevins and 
Hill, 1954).  Sorensen subsequently proposed using a stamped steel cover for the Model 
T crankcase and transmission (Sorensen, 1956).  By 1908, the Keim plant was making 
large quantities of pressed steel parts for Ford cars. 
The design process for the Model T is described in fairly vivid detail in the 
reminiscences of company officials.  Henry Ford was clearly the originator of design 
concepts, which he described to a small engineering team led by Joseph Galamb and 
Harold Wills.  Ford would make rough sketches on a blackboard and Galamb and his 
assistants would draw up graphic sketches and blueprints.  Ford photographed the 
blackboard to document their progress in case of any patent suits.  To facilitate 
visualization of the design concepts, Sorensen built wooden mockups and castings of 
parts, often before blueprints were drawn up.34  These ideas were then presented to a 
group of machinists to work out details and test them.  Meanwhile, Wills took charge of 
testing the new vanadium steel alloys which were fundamental to the lightweight design.  
This process of “cut-and-try” design continued for more than a year before the Model T 
was introduced.  Sorensen, however, asserts that it took more than four years to develop 
                                                 
33 Pressed steel rear-axle housings were first introduced by the Fiat Company around 1907 (Nevins and 
Hill, 1954). 
34 It is well documented that Ford preferred models over blueprints and several contemporaries assert that 
he had difficulty reading blueprints.  Nevins (1954) finds this unlikely since Ford’s machine shop 
apprenticeship would have taught him to draw and use blueprints. 
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the new car since previous models served as experimentation on the road to realizing 
Henry Ford’s dream of a car for everyman (Sorensen, 1956; Nevins and Hill, 1954).   
The Model T was first advertised in the spring of 1908 with prices beginning at 
$825.  The Model T was the synthesis of various product designs and was consistent with 
an emerging dominant design:  a water-cooled, 4-stroke, 4-cylinder gasoline engine 
mounted in front of the driver; left hand drive using a steering wheel; shaft drive; 
magneto; and pneumatic tires.  The Model T’s only major departure from the industry 
standard was the use of a planetary-type transmission.  Ford assumed that his main 
market would be farmers who were experienced in repairing farm equipment.  Therefore, 
the Model T came with a 64-page owner’s manual that explained how to use simple tools 
to repair any of the 140 problems likely to occur (Womack et al., 1990).  At the same 
time, Ford trained dealers how to handle stocks of parts and how to do repair work, and 
also supplied parts lists that included prices.  While the new Model T provided 
unsurpassed simplicity, practicality, dependability and quality at an incredibly low price, 
it was still fraught with problems.  Yet the Model T performed remarkably well in 
contests, negotiating steep grades, rough roads, mud, and water obstacles.  It even 
performed admirably in cross country speed races. Orders for the new Ford flooded in. 
4.1.3 Plant Organization 
In order to manufacture a vehicle that could replace the family horse, Ford needed 
to produce an automobile that was simultaneously high quality and low cost.  Process 
improvements at the Ford Motor Company began with the adoption and adaptation of 
innovations in plant organization that originated with New England armory practice.  
This knowledge was embodied in key personnel with experience in the sewing machine 
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and machine tool industry.  However, its adaptation to automobile manufacturing and 
assembly was accomplished through learning-by-doing on the shop floor. 
Late in 1905, Henry Ford established the Ford Manufacturing Company to begin 
manufacturing parts for the new Model N and as a means to gain control of the Ford 
Motor Company.  Ford rented a factory on Bellevue Avenue for the new company and 
began equipping it to produce engines and small parts for the Model N.  According to 
Nevins and Hill (1954, p. 324), the division of work between the two factories, followed 
by reorganization and expansion of the Piquette facility, enabled Ford “to take the first 
steps, 1906-08, toward a production system that within the next decade became not only 
world famous, but a world force.”   
In 1906, Ford hired Walter E. Flanders, a Yankee machinist who had worked for 
the Singer Manufacturing Company and witnessed quantity manufacture firsthand.  He 
had later built tools for the Landis Tool Company, a pioneer in precision automotive 
grinding.  Although Flanders’ experience with Singer was not true armory practice, he 
conveyed to Ford officials and mechanics that complete interchangeability would be 
absolutely essential for assembly under high volume production.  While the Ford 
Manufacturing Company’s plant superintendent, Max Wollering, claimed the idea was 
not new to him, he conceded that it may have been new to the company.  Whether 
Flanders was responsible for bringing the concept to Ford is unclear.  Nonetheless, in 
1906, the Ford Motor Company began advertising that it was manufacturing in 
unprecedented volume and that every part of each Ford car was made to be exactly alike 
across all 10,000 automobiles produced.  Yet the company’s factory and contractors had 
not yet achieved interchangeability (Nevins and Hill, 1954; Hounshell, 1984).   
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Flanders and Wollering were responsible for rearranging machine tools according 
to sequential operations rather than according to machine type and they introduced Ford 
to the idea that productivity gains could be realized through the use of special- or single-
purpose tools (Hounshell, 1984).  But Flanders brought more than an appreciation of the 
fundamentals of armory practice; he taught Ford officials that “the motorcar business is a 
fusion of three arts – the art of buying materials, the art of production, and the art of 
selling” (Sorensen, 1956, p. 91).  The large demand for the Model N allowed Ford to 
establish monthly delivery contracts with sales agents, which allowed Flanders to plan 
production for steady output.  Late in 1906, when demand began to exceed capacity, he 
set up a 12-month production plan and established long-term contracts with suppliers that 
required them to carry inventories, allowing Ford to reduce theirs to only 10 days.  This 
freed up funds that became critical to design and planning for the Model T (Sorensen, 
1956). 
When Ford gained financial control of the Ford Motor Company in 1907, he 
consolidated the two Ford companies, bringing the Bellevue equipment and Flanders to 
Piquette.  Flanders and Wollering subsequently reorganized the placement of machines 
and flow of materials at Piquette, effectively introducing “the fundamentals of an 
admittedly modern version of New England armory practice to the handful of young 
mechanics Ford had assembled” (Hounshell, 1984).  However, the orderly progression of 
materials and parts was limited by the plant itself, as was total production.  The huge 
volume of advance orders for the Model T in 1908 outstripped the capacity of the 
Piquette plant and Ford began planning for the construction of a third plant at Highland 
Park on the outskirts of Detroit.  This time, progressive operation – logical sequencing of 
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operations and machine layout – was an integral part of the facility’s design.  
Construction began at Highland Park in 1908 and the move to the new plant began in 
January, 1910, when only a quarter of the construction was complete (Nevins and Hill, 
1954).  Prior to occupying the Highland Park plant, Ford production had utilized fairly 
standard machinery.  But in equipping the new plant, Ford began designing special-
purpose tools in earnest (Sorensen, 1956). 
As sales of the Model T increased, shipping fully assembled cars by train became 
wasteful.  To make more efficient use of train space, Ford decided in 1909 to establish 
branch assembly plants and ship knocked-down automobiles.  This innovation resulted in 
lower freight and handling costs and orders were filled more promptly.  In addition, stock 
of automobiles and parts could be held at the branch assembly plants, allowing 
production to continue in Detroit in months when sales were typically slow (Nevins and 
Hill, 1954).  The first branch assembly plant was built in Kansas City, Missouri, and by 
1913, Ford had established branch assembly plants in thirty-one U.S. cities (Flink, 1988).   
4.1.4 Management of Production 
At the turn of the century, American industry was at a crossroads as traditional 
craft production was giving way to modern ideas of high volume production.  Many 
products were being manufactured in factories, including watches, clocks, sewing 
machines, typewriters, and bicycles, but the transition was not yet complete.  Production 
and management systems were not yet aligned with emerging ideas about capitalism and 
high volume production.  Because traditional craft manufacturing practices gave 
craftsmen complete control of the production process, manufacturers engaged in factory 
production continually clashed with suppliers and workers in trying to increase the 
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quantity and reduce the cost of their products.  The shift to mass production presented 
new challenges for product and process management, especially with a complex product 
like the automobile.  New techniques were required to manage quality control, inventory, 
a large labor force, and investments in expensive equipment (Abernathy, 1978).   
This section reviews the second aspect of Ford’s evolving production process, the 
management of production, specifically the breakdown of manufacturing and assembly 
operations into minute tasks.  These developments took place within the context of a 
wider movement toward ‘scientific management,’ the formulation of which is attributed 
to Frederick W. Taylor.  By reviewing both the development of so-called ‘Taylorism’ and 
the management of production at Ford, this section explores the question of how much of 
the innovation at Ford represented original inspiration versus knowledge spillovers 
transmitted either directly from the work of Taylor or indirectly through shared 
perspectives of the knowledge base.   
As with the emergence of the automobile itself, multiple entrepreneurs were 
working separately yet concurrently on the same problems and were developing a variety 
of similar solutions.  Craft production was misaligned with emerging rules within the 
TIEC regarding capitalism, factory production, mechanistic reductionism, and an 
increased cultural valuation of efficiency.  Thus, this era of innovative ferment was 
attributable to pervasive changes in the TIEC.  Scientific management and the Ford 
system improved efficiency by taking control of the production process out of the hands 
of skilled craftsmen, thereby establishing new rules for production that were aligned with 
the evolving higher-level rules within the TIEC.  While the Ford team certainly must be 
credited with a great deal of inspiration and insight, critical members of that team were 
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either educated in scientific management or were tied into the knowledge base where 
these ideas were circulating.  Therefore, the role of knowledge spillovers in Ford’s highly 
synthetic innovations was of primary significance. 
4.1.4.1 Taylorism 
Frederick W. Taylor, the son of a wealthy Philadelphia Quaker family, was an 
educated man who had aspired to law school but dropped out of college when problems 
arose with his eyesight.  The formal education of mechanical engineers was still a new 
idea, and, despite his parents urging, Taylor opted to follow a more traditional path and 
became a patternmaker’s apprentice.  On completion of his apprenticeship in 1878, 
Taylor began working at Midvale Steel Company, where he quickly rose to gang boss 
and then foreman.  In trying to extract more work from the men, Taylor saw his 
camaraderie with them turn to hostility.  He was convinced that the men could be more 
productive, yet they claimed to be working as fast as possible.  Taylor’s observations led 
him to conclude that management was responsible for most worker inefficiencies.  
Believing it would defuse the animosity between workers and supervisors, Taylor 
resolved to study the elements of work and let science impartially determine what 
constituted a fair day’s work (Kanigel, 1996).   
Taylor and his contemporaries were heavily influenced by the scientific paradigm 
of the time based on the ideas of reductionism and mechanism.  Methodological 
reductionism holds that the best way to understand a complex system is to develop an 
understanding of its component parts.  The ideas of reductionism and mechanism were 
introduced by René Descartes in 1637, who argued that the physical world was like a 
machine, its pieces like clockwork mechanisms, and that the machine could be 
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understood by taking its pieces apart, studying them, and then putting them back together 
to see the larger picture.  Descartes, however, was a dualist and did not believe that the 
human mind could be explained in mechanistic terms.  The mechanistic view gained 
favor with the revolutionary successes of Isaac Newton, whose work in mechanics 
seemed to successfully explain the motion of everything in the heavens and on earth. 
Scientists and engineers in the late 19th century applied Newton’s laws of motion 
and the principles of classical thermodynamics to improve the operating efficiency of 
steam-driven machinery.  Taylor had begun studying engineering through a series of 
correspondence courses at the Stevens Institute of Technology and eventually obtained a 
Mechanical Engineering degree in 1883 (Kanigel, 1997).  Familiar with current scientific 
and engineering thinking, Taylor believed that a mechanistic approach could be applied 
to the organization and execution of work in order to improve the efficiency of human 
labor.  By breaking down a job into small, isolated parts, Taylor believed he would be 
better able to understand the individual tasks and thus be able to control them (Freedman, 
1992).  Taylor tackled the problem of managing the human worker as he would have 
approached the design and optimization of a machine. 
Taylor began experimenting with ‘time’ studies around 1880, using a stopwatch 
to measure the component parts of a task to the hundredth of a minute to determine the 
“one best way” to complete the task.  With contributions from Frank Gilbreth, this 
methodology later became known as time-and-motion study.35  Through time studies, 
Taylor determined the amount of work a first-class laborer could complete in a day and 
                                                 
35 While Gilbreth’s and Taylor’s work had similar methodologies, the two differed in philosophies and 
goals.  Taylor was concerned with determining a fair day’s work, primarily as a means to increase profits.  
Gilbreth was concerned with the efficiency of motion and elimination of unnecessary movement 
purportedly for the workers’ welfare (Price, 1990). 
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used this to develop work standards and pay incentive schemes that would reduce 
‘soldiering’ or loafing.  With his approach, which later became known as Taylorism, he 
sought to deliver more goods at lower prices while paying higher wages.   
Through extensive metal cutting experiments, Taylor and his assistants developed 
customized slide rules that could quickly determine the fastest cutting speed that would 
simultaneously satisfy a machine tool’s ability to exert power and a cutting tool’s ability 
to bear it. The customary rules of thumb traditionally used by skilled machinists could be 
replaced with scientifically determined, step-by-step, minute-by-minute instructions.  
Control of the machine shop was taken out of the hands of the workmen and placed 
completely in the hands of management (Kanigel, 1997).  Workers need only be trained 
in the “one best way” and left to execute their instructions mechanically, no thinking 
required.  The planning of work was left to engineers and managers, who were to apply 
Taylor’s scientific management principles to determine the best method for each task.  A 
Taylorist firm was thus hierarchical, with layers of efficiency engineers and managers 
supervising highly specialized workers who operated according to minutely detailed 
instructions.   
Taylor believed that his system of work organization and pay incentives would 
equally divide work between workers and managers, force workers to deal individually 
with managers’ demands, and bring an understanding of the managers’ perspective to the 
worker.  Unfortunately, instead of decreasing hostilities between labor and management, 
Taylorism was demonized by workers and bosses alike.  Labor saw it as exploitative; 
workers had to work harder and faster, while reduced to operating mindlessly like a 
machine.  Meanwhile, bosses resented the higher wages and interference with their 
 
213 
management decisions (Kanigel, 1996).  Nonetheless, Taylorism effectively removed 
control of the production process from skilled craftsmen and placed it in the hands of 
management. 
Taylor left Midvale in 1890 to become a management consultant for varied 
industrial clients.  In 1903, Taylor presented an essay titled Shop Management, the most 
complete statement of his management system to date, to a gathering of 350 mechanical 
engineers in Saratoga, New York.  He served as president of the American Society of 
Mechanical Engineers (ASME) from 1906-1907, where he was asked to reorganize the 
management of the twenty-five year-old society.  
Yet Taylor’s ideas were little known outside industrial engineering circles until 
1910, when lawyer Louis Brandeis used his ideas to argue before the Interstate 
Commerce Commission that a wage increase did not necessitate an increase in railroad 
rates.  The Eastern Rate Case stimulated great interest in worker efficiency and ‘scientific 
management,’ as Brandeis called it.  Taylor published a collection of his articles in 1911 
in a book titled The Principles of Scientific Management and later became known as “The 
Father of Scientific Management.”   The book was re-published as a three part series in 
the American Magazine.  Later that year, Taylor’s disciples, including Frank Gilbreth and 
H.L. Gantt, published a number of books on efficiency.  Kanigel (1997) reports an 
incomplete count of thirty-one articles on scientific management in 1910, fifty-eight in 
1911, and 220 in 1912.   According to Kanigel (1996), Taylor “took strands of thought 
and practice already present in the late 19th century and wound them into a thick, muscled 
cable – Taylorism.” 
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4.1.4.2 Scientific Management in the Automotive Industry 
The emerging field of scientific management defended specialization based on 
scientific observations, but specialization of automobile assembly operations began due 
to happenstance and necessity.  The Olds Motor Works was just turning out the first mass 
produced automobile when its shops were destroyed by fire in 1901.  This disaster led 
Olds to organize a separate final assembly operation, which “demonstrated, perhaps for 
the first time anywhere, that a major production process could be organized as a series of 
separate specialized plants” (Abernathy, 1978).  Departmentalization had become 
common and elaborate in other industries, as illustrated by the organization of Standard 
Oil, and developed along functional lines in the automotive industry.  By 1909, Cadillac, 
Buick, Olds, Studebaker, and other large factories had instituted minute subdivision of 
both business and production sides, with separate departments for purchasing, time-
keeping, cost-accounting, engineering, design, and manufacturing.  Cadillac had forty-
four different manufacturing departments.  This organization required a complex 
management system for inventory tracking, materials handling, and job routing (Nevins 
and Hill, 1954). 
In 1909, the president of Packard invited Taylor, who by then was considered the 
nation’s leading productivity consultant, to Detroit to speak to company executives.  
During a four-hour meeting, Taylor advised that managers should remove all brainwork 
and skilled labor from the shop floor by restructuring every job as dozens of simple 
repetitive tasks.  Packard subsequently instituted a jobs analysis at their factory and had 
‘Taylorized’ the plant by 1913.  However, when Taylor returned to Detroit in 1914 to 
speak to over six hundred superintendents and foreman from various industries, he was 
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informed that “several Detroit manufacturers had anticipated his ideas” on their own 
(Nevins and Hill, 1954, p. 468). 
Nevins and Hill (1954, p. 468) assert that some understanding of Taylor’s theory 
“slowly percolated through industry” and that Ford employees “had doubtless caught 
some of his ideas.”  Taylor had pioneered the idea of breaking down a task into minute 
steps around 1880 and according to Kanigel, by 1908 when Ford was planning the 
Highland Park plant, “this habit of thought was densely part of the American industrial 
air.”  After Taylor published The Principles of Scientific Management in 1911, “you 
could hardly buy a stopwatch in Detroit, so swiftly were they snapped up” (Kanigel, 
1997, p. 497).  The Ford Motor Company established a time study department perhaps as 
early as 1912, and time and motion studies were used to establish wage rates and were 
critical in the design of the chassis assembly line in 1913-1914 (see section 4.1.5). 
Rubenstein (2001) concludes that structural changes that led to deskilling the 
automotive labor force predated Taylorism.  Hounshell (1984) is less conclusive, stating 
that “[t]he Ford Motor Company could have been ‘Taylorized’ without Taylor” 
(emphasis added).  Indeed, the automobile industry had faced substantial management 
challenges early on.  The booming demand for automobiles starting in 1904 made it 
difficult for manufacturers to meet demand and increasing production led to significant 
problems securing sufficient skilled labor in Detroit.  Given his mechanical inclinations 
from an early age, it is likely that Ford would naturally approach the problems posed by 
mass production and labor shortages from a mechanistic and reductionist perspective, just 
as Taylor had.  Further, advances in machine tools and high speed steel (which Taylor 
had helped revolutionize) meant that machines no longer held up production processes; 
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labor was now the limiting factor in productivity.  Nevins and Hill (1954, p. 469) 
conclude that “[t]he machine process, in short, was generating and perfecting its own 
procedures.  Plant engineers and production superintendents, knowing little of theory but 
schooled in machine shop, foundry, and assembly room to a firm grasp of practical needs, 
were creating a system of management to meet them.” 
Charles Sorensen, who began with Ford as a patternmaker and became an 
indispensable member of Ford’s production team, stresses that Ford did not employ a 
formal management system and that no one at Ford was acquainted with Taylor’s 
theories.  He claims that the articulation of the principles and philosophy of Ford’s 
production system followed its achievement, but his ex post description is highly 
suggestive of Taylorism.  According to Sorensen, the Ford system put higher skill into 
planning, management, and tool building, thereby making jobs easier and making it 
possible for unskilled workers to earn higher wages (Sorensen, 1956).   In 1926, Henry 
Ford provided a ghost-written article to the Encyclopaedia Britannica that listed among 
the principles of mass production the “analysis of operations into their constituent parts.”  
He went on to say that successfully planning the orderly progression of materials through 
the shop requires “a careful breaking up of the work into the sequence of its ‘operations’” 
(Encyclopedia Britannica, 1926, p. 822).  When American Machinist editor Fred Colvin 
visited Highland Park in early 1913, he was convinced “that motion study has been 
carefully looked into, whether it is called by that name or not” (cited in Kanigel, 1997, p. 
497).  Ford described the 1913 establishment of new wage rates using strikingly Taylorist 
language:  
And then, too, the wages were not scientifically adjusted to the jobs.  The man in 
job "A" might get one rate and the man in job "B" a higher rate, while as a matter 
of fact job "A" might require more skill or exertion than job "B." A great deal of 
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inequity creeps into wage rates unless both the employer and the employee know 
that the rate paid has been arrived at by something better than a guess. Therefore, 
starting about 1913 we had time studies made of all the thousands of operations 
in the shops. By a time study it is possible theoretically to determine what a 
man's output should be. Then, making large allowances, it is further possible to 
get at a satisfactory standard output for a day, and, taking into consideration the 
skill, to arrive at a rate which will express with fair accuracy the amount of skill 
and exertion that goes into a job--and how much is to be expected from the man 
in the job in return for the wage. Without scientific study the employer does not 
know why he is paying a wage and the worker does not know why he is getting 
it. On the time figures all of the jobs in our factory were standardized and rates 
set (Ford and Crowther, 1922, p. 125-126). 
The highly publicized Eastern Rate Case in 1910 and the publication of The 
Principles of Scientific Management in 1911 marked the height of influence of scientific 
management, and corresponded with the development of Ford’s revolutionary production 
methods.  It therefore is reasonable to theorize that the fundamentals and language of 
Taylorism had permeated the knowledge base, possibly in tacit form.  However, by the 
time Ford was designing the Model T and the Highland Park plant, some of this 
knowledge also would have been codified in operating procedures at a number of 
Detroit’s manufacturing plants.  Indeed, the field of scientific management grew quickly 
after 1911 and widespread interest brought an “efficiency craze that reached into home, 
farm, and office, as well as factory” (Kanigel, 1997, p. 486).  When investigators toured 
Highland Park in 1914, they commented that the Ford had arrived, by trial and error, at 
the practical results detailed in two new theoretical texts: The Business Administrator, by 
E. C. Jones, and Installing Efficiency Methods, by C. E. Knoppel (Nevins and Hill, 1954).   
Further, there is ample evidence that Ford officials were networked in the 
knowledge base.  Ford Motor Company’s chief tool designer, Oscar Charles Bornholdt, is 
listed on the membership roster for the ASME in 1907, while Taylor served as president 
from 1906-1907.  Hounshell (1984, p. 223) names Bornholdt, who worked at Ford from 
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April, 1906, until 1913, among the “backbone of the Ford production team” responsible 
for tooling up for production of the first Model T.   
In 1912, Ford hired Clarence Avery, who had taught Henry Ford’s son, Edsel, in 
high school.  Avery was an educated man, having studied at the Ferris Institute and the 
University of Michigan.  According to Nevins and Hill (1954, p. 474), “[h]e read widely, 
knew the latest European and American advances in engineering, and kept in touch with 
the ideas of men like Frederick W. Taylor.”  As discussed in section 4.1.5, Avery played 
a critical role in developing Ford’s new production system and likely originated some of 
its revolutionary ideas.  Sorensen (1956, p. 130) states that it was Avery who redesigned 
operations and “worked out the timing schedules necessary” to install continuously 
moving conveyer assembly systems and Avery certainly was responsible for instituting 
time-motion studies for chassis assembly. 
Higher labor productivity at Ford came at a price.  The rapid pace of production 
was set by machines and conveyor systems while the work became minutely prescribed 
and monotonous.  Labor became increasingly dissatisfied, and by 1914, Ford was 
required to hire 53,000 employees per year to maintain a staff of 14,000 (Ford and 
Crowther, 1922).  Although the workers now required little skill and could be quickly 
trained, the rising turnover rate would become untenable.  In 1895, Frederick Taylor had 
presented a paper titled “A Piece Rate System” to the Detroit meeting of the American 
Society of Mechanical Engineers which warned that “MEN WILL NOT DO AN 
EXTRAORDINARY DAY’S WORK FOR AN ORDINARY DAY’S PAY” (Taylor, 
1895, emphasis in original).  In conjunction with his management system, Taylor 
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recommended pay increases between 30 and 100% depending on the skill, intelligence, 
and strength required (Taylor, 1911). 
John R. Lee, who came to work for the Ford Motor Company though the purchase 
of the John R. Keim Mill in 1911, took over personnel and began an effort to systematize 
the wages.  The new structure initiated in October, 1913, established wages based on skill 
class and granted a 13% factory-wide raise apportioned according to individual worker 
efficiency.  Lee designed other labor reforms to protect workers from potential 
discriminatory conduct of foremen and to enable steady advancement from an unskilled 
standing to that of first-class workman.  Foremen were required to participate in 
continuous reviews of worker capacity and job assignment to further ensure proper 
advancement.  In addition, safety measures, such as mechanical guards, railings, and 
improved lighting, were put in place to protect workers from “external” causes of 
accidents.  Alarm systems were installed to protect them from accidents caused by 
“internal” or psychological causes like carelessness and boredom (Nevins and Hill, 
1954). 
In 1914, Ford nearly doubled wages to $5 per day – an increase in the upper range 
of Taylor’s recommendation – and reduced the work day from 9 to 8 hours.  Ford 
claimed that the wage hike was simply profit sharing: consumers benefited from low 
prices wrought through high productivity; the company was enjoying huge profits and 
paying dividends and bonuses to executives; it was time for the working man to share in 
the profits too.  When Ford executives were working out the new pay scales, Sorensen 
(1956) claims he envisaged higher productivity and economies that would result from 
more-satisfied willing workers.  In addition, higher wages made economic and business 
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sense because a more prosperous national workforce would expand the market for 
automobiles.  Whatever the motivation, labor management reforms and increased wages 
had a profound and immediate impact on the company’s retention rate.  The following 
year, Ford hired only 6,508 new employees, most of which were required due to growth 
rather than turnover (Ford and Crowther, 1922).  Only one man was discharged in the six 
months prior to April, 1916 (Nevins and Hill, 1954).  As a result of sweeping labor 
changes, Ford’s employees were more experienced and happier and Henry Ford became a 
folk hero. 
However, Fordism diverged from Taylorism on a significant point.  Taylor largely 
took production hardware as a given, stripped away needless elements, and focused on 
maximizing the efficiency of work with that hardware through motion studies 
(Hounshell, 1984; Kanigel, 1997).36  The studies were then used to determine a fair day’s 
work and establish incentive pay schedules.  Meanwhile, Ford engineers redesigned the 
fundamental production hardware to mechanize work processes to the fullest extent 
possible.  While he may have applied time and motion studies to set up the processes, the 
machines then set the pace of work.  Kanigel (1997) describes Taylorism as the universal 
case and Fordism the special case: the application of Taylor’s system to mass production.  
Taylor may have provided the tools and the descriptive language, maybe even the mental 
paradigm, but Ford’s team combined them with principles of armory practice and moving 
assembly and extended all three to develop an entirely new system of continuous 
production. 
                                                 
36 Taylor did, however, design a number of specialized tools to substitute mechanical devices for skilled 




The traditional craft system put control of production in the hands of skilled 
craftsmen and was incompatible high volume, low cost production in factories.  Thus, 
craft production was misaligned with emerging rules within the TIEC regarding 
capitalism, factory production, mechanistic reductionism, and an increased cultural 
valuation of efficiency.  To improve efficiency, managers needed to take control of the 
production process out of the hands of skilled craftsmen.  This problem was not unique to 
the automobile industry and multiple entrepreneurs were working separately yet 
concurrently on the same problems and were developing a variety of similar solutions. 
An era of innovative ferment in the management of production had arisen in response to 
pervasive changes in the TIEC.   
Scientific management and the Ford system improved efficiency by taking control 
of the production process out of the hands of skilled craftsmen, thereby establishing new 
rules for production that were aligned with the evolving higher-level rules within the 
TIEC.  Ford’s production team was uniquely able to synthesize and exploit the 
opportunities provided by this social and institutional context, in part because the 
management was relatively unfamiliar with the rules of production under the craft 
system.  However, critical members of Ford’s production team were either educated in 
scientific management or were tied into the knowledge base where these ideas were 
circulating.  Therefore, while the Ford team certainly must be credited with a great deal 
of inspiration and insight, the role of knowledge spillovers in the company’s highly 
synthetic innovations was of primary significance.  
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4.1.5 Moving Assembly Line, 1908-1915 
The third and final aspect of Ford’s process innovations, continuously moving 
assembly, is popularly regarded as his most significant contribution to modern production 
methods and confers to Henry Ford the status of ‘hero entrepreneur.’  However, the 
development of continuously moving assembly at the Ford Motor Company was a highly 
synthetic process involving the talents and personal inspiration of multiple entrepreneurs 
and spillovers from multiple industries.  In addition, moving assembly was just one 
component of a production system in which synergies yielded higher cost reductions than 
the simple sum of the parts.   
By 1906, Ford had established a highly innovative atmosphere.  After obtaining 
financial control of the Ford Motor Company in 1907, Ford pursued an atypical fiscal 
strategy.  Contemptuous of money-making and profit-seekers, Ford opted to reinvest 
profits in the company instead of paying out large dividends and corporate salaries.  This 
internal funding gave the company extraordinary financial stability.  In addition, though 
Flanders had introduced critical elements of armory practice, Ford and his engineers had 
no rigid ideas about production processes.  Sorensen (1956, p. 55) recalls, “The Ford 
operations and creative work were directed by men who had no previous knowledge of 
the subject.  They did not have a chance to get on really familiar terms with the 
impossible... There was no one around who had had experience, and if one came along 
who had done well in any other business we had more of a problem to get him to drop his 
ideas and fall in with our progressive manufacturing and assembling.”   
According to Hounshell (1984, p. 220), “Ford allowed an extensive amount of 
experimentation to be carried out in the factory and a surprising rate of scrapping 
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processes and machine tools when they did not suit the immediate fancy of his production 
engineers.”  Ford’s young talented engineers “carried out production experiments and 
worked out fresh ideas in gauging, fixture design, machine tool design and placement, 
factory layout, quality control, and materials handling.”  Machinery was organized for 
sequential operation, increasingly specialized tools and equipment were designed and 
installed, and the work was progressively broken down into smaller tasks.  Each worker 
became more specialized, performing only a single task.  In 1908, a single worker’s 
average time before repeating the same operation was 8.56 hours.  By 1913, the task 
cycle had been reduced to 2.3 minutes (Womack et al., 1990).  In 1915, engine assembly 
at Highland Park was performed in a sequence of 84 tasks on three assembly lines 
(Rubenstein, 2001). 
In trying to reduce the cycle time, moving the workers from stand to stand quickly 
became a problem.  The solution, obvious in retrospect, was a major departure from 
standard industry practice: move the cars instead of the workers.  According to 
Rubenstein (2001), Henry Ford and four other Ford Motor Company leaders all claim 
credit for inventing the moving assembly line.  Yet Sorensen (1956, p. 129) claims that 
“Mr. Ford had nothing to do with originating, planning, and carrying out the assembly 
line.  He encouraged the work, his vision to try unorthodox methods was an example to 
us.”  Although Henry Ford took a special interest in magneto assembly, it appears that 
“seminal ideas moved from the bottom to the top” at Ford and that Clarence Avery 
played the largest single role in developing Ford’s new production system (Nevins and 
Hill, 1954, p. 474).  When Avery was hired in 1912, he spent eight months studying 
every production department and then was assigned to assist Sorensen in production 
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planning.  A member of Ford’s experimental staff recalled that Avery was “known as 
pushing the assembly line” and that “it was Avery who put that before the boss” (Nevins 
and Hill, 1954, p. 474).  Others in the Ford experimental staff concur that Avery was the 
first to see the potential for putting the entire plant on the new system and that he served 
as the “guiding light” in working out assembly operations. 
The idea of the mechanized moving assembly line is perhaps a natural progression 
from the practice pioneered by western bicycle manufacturers like the Western Wheel 
Works of Chicago, where machinists remained seated and runners brought materials to 
them.  In addition, the Westinghouse Foundry used a conveyor system to move molds 
and sand as early as 1890.  However, the idea apparently came to Ford officials from 
outside the metalworking industries.  The flour-milling, brewery, meat-packing, and food 
canning industries were using gravity slides and conveyor systems to facilitate the 
smooth flow of materials, and all were well publicized. 
Late in the 18th century, Oliver Evans had synthesized existing technological 
elements into an automatic flour mill and use of such sophisticated materials handling 
technology in the mills in Minnesota were a matter of national and local pride.  Late in 
the 19th century, Edwin Norton developed automatic can-making machinery that 
combined sequential arrangement of machinery with automatic conveyors.  Around the 
time that Ford implemented moving assembly lines, toolmaker Bornholdt compared the 
arrangement of Ford’s machine tools to the layout of canning machinery.  William Klann, 
head of Ford’s engine department, had worked repairing grain elevators and other 
mechanical conveyors in Detroit breweries and his former employer also made conveyors 
for foundries.  But it was the ‘disassembly’ lines of the slaughterhouses, described in 
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detail in Upton Sinclair’s 1906 book The Jungle, that apparently captured the Ford 
officials’ imagination.  After touring a Chicago slaughterhouse, Klann reportedly told the 
factory superintendent P.E. Martin that “[i]f they can kill pigs and cows that way, we can 
build cars that way and motors that way” (Hounshell, 1984, p. 241).   
Experimentation with the moving assembly line was so rapid that the chronology 
of events found in photo documentation, reminiscences of company officials, and 
historical writings conflict (Hounshell, 1984).  It is clear that Ford added the first moving 
assembly line in 1913 and improved the design through trial and error experimentation 
over the next year.  Moving assembly lines were completed for magnetos, motors, and 
transmissions, and by the summer of 1913, the production from these lines threatened to 
swamp final assembly.  It was time to revolutionize this line as well.  Clarence Avery and 
William Klann were responsible for the intricate calculations necessary to develop the 
sequence and timing of steps and the distribution of parts.  They began by timing the men 
as they assembled fifty chassis at fifty different spots in each of two assembly lines.  On 
average, each chassis took 12.5 man-hours to complete.  Next, they pulled a chassis along 
the floor to test their ideas.  “Then after trial and error test to determine speed, optimum 
part placement, and other technical questions, an assembly line pulled by rope and 
windlass was set in operation October 1, 1913” (Nevins and Hill, 1954, p. 473).   
Even in this rough experiment, the average assembly time fell to 5 hours and 50 
minutes.  By December, after careful motion-study, the line was extended to 300 feet and 
assembly time averaged only 2 hours and 38 minutes.  Machine power soon replaced 
hand power on the windlass, an endless chain replaced the rope, and the assembly lines 
were raised to waist level.  With further subdivision of the work, assembly time fell to 1 
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hour and 33 minutes.  Engine assembly time was similarly cut from 600 minutes in the 
fall of 1913 to 226 minutes by the spring of 1914.   
But the moving assembly line can not be credited as the sole source of Ford’s 
unprecedented efficiency.  Ford had invested a great deal in developing the Highland 
Park plant and subsequent moving assembly innovations.  According to Nevins and Hill 
(1956, p. 504): 
A large force was constantly employed in what might be called the creative 
preparations for mass production; that is, in equipping the factory to carry it on.  
This spring of 1914 saw fifty-nine men hunched over desks with triangles, 
compasses, and slide-rules, making drawings for machine tools and fixtures; 
forty men busy with hammer, saw, and chisel making patterns; and nearly five 
hundred men at Highland Park and three hundred in outside machine shops 
forging, casting, and building tools.  A regiment of men, in short, was constantly 
storming the bastions of old-style factory methods. 
The combination of fully interchangeable parts, specially-designed single-purpose 
machinery, sequential placement of men and machines, overhead carriers for materials, 
slides and moving assembly lines, and the minute breakdown of assembly operations 
combined into a production system that was more efficient than the simple sum of the 
parts.  Of this system, continuously moving assembly was the crowning jewel: the key to 
complete coordination and control.  According to Hounshell (1984, p. 187), “Although 
the bicycle industry in the late nineteenth century brought to perfection the American 
system of manufactures it was unable to solve the problem of finishing and assembly of 
parts.  The Ford assembly line… overcame this problem…” 
4.1.6 Centralized Control and Vertical Integration, 1907-1914 
Throughout the period covered in this chapter, Henry Ford clashed with his 
financial backers over strategy.  This fact, combined with Ford’s predisposition toward 
individualism and autocracy, led Ford to seek complete financial and managerial 
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independence.  Ford was assisted in achieving this goal by an unexpected exogenous 
event, the Panic of 1907.  In addition, the price and availability of raw materials was 
always a concern and supply holdups and bottlenecks became an increasing problem as 
Ford moved toward continuously moving assembly.  Therefore, Ford also began a 
process to bring these supplies under his control.  This section relates this progression 
toward centralized control and vertical integration through 1915, though it would not be 
complete until 1918.  Therefore, this trend and its implications for the company’s 
innovative capabilities will be continued in the following chapter. 
Like many early automobile manufacturers, the Ford Motor Company began as an 
assembler of purchased parts, first at a rented facility on Mack Avenue, then at its own 
plant on Piquette Avenue.  In these early days, the financial backers, Malcomson and 
Gray, wielded significant managerial power.  Malcomson owned 25.5% of the voting 
stock and Gray held 10.5% and served as company president.  Ford, who owned 25.5% 
of the company, was designated vice president and had final say on automobile design, 
engineering, and production.  Though Couzens held a small minority (2.5%) of company 
stock, he was completely responsible for all business matters, including bookkeeping, 
correspondence, accounts payable and receivable, supply contracts, advertising, and 
sales.  A determined individualist with a fiery temper, Couzens was not afraid to assert 
his will over Ford or Malcomson when it came to meeting market demand and making 
the company profitable. 
Despite both being hard-nosed individualists, Ford and Couzens worked well 
together, regarding themselves as the insiders and Gray, Malcomson, and the rest of the 
stockholders as the outsiders (Nevins and Hill, 1954).  Ford had clashed with Malcomson 
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over managerial and design issues from the beginning.  The most significant conflict 
involved Ford’s goal to produce a single, inexpensive automobile, while Malcomson 
preferred that the company build expensive cars.  Late in 1905, Henry Ford established 
the Ford Manufacturing Company to begin manufacturing major parts for the new Model 
N, believing that retention and reinvestment of profits from these parts was critical to the 
success of producing an inexpensive car for the masses.  Though Ford, the Dodges, 
Couzens, and three other Ford Motor Company stock holders were allotted shares in the 
new company, Malcomson was conspicuously excluded.  While Ford’s primary goal was 
to begin the in-house manufacture of the most important parts of Ford cars, it appears that 
he also created the new company as a means to free himself of Malcomson’s influence. 
Ford rented a factory on Bellevue Avenue for the new company and equipped it to 
produce engines, gears, and other parts solely for the Model N.  The Dodge Brothers 
continued to manufacture the engines and parts for the more expensive Model B and 
Model K.  In 1907, the new Ford Manufacturing Company enjoyed large profits from 
parts for the highly successful Model N, but Ford Motor Company profits fell due to 
flagging sales of the higher priced models.  The saturating market for expensive vehicles 
and the Panic of 1907 no doubt contributed to the slow sales of the Model K, which 
represented Ford’s first foray into the highest price bracket.  Meanwhile, Malcomson had 
launched his own automobile manufacturing enterprise, the Aerocar Company.  With his 
dividend income dwindling, Malcomson was coerced into selling his now unprofitable 
shares of the Ford Motor Company in order to keep his new venture afloat. 
The bylaws initially adopted for the Ford Motor Company stipulated that no 
stockholder could sell shares to an outsider without approval from the other stockholders 
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and without offering the other stockholders an opportunity to purchase them.  Henry Ford 
purchased all of Malcomson’s stock, and within the next year, three of Malcomson’s 
friends sold their company stock to Ford and Couzens.  The Ford Motor Company 
purchased the Ford Manufacturing Company and, by the fall of 1907, Henry Ford owned 
58.5% of the reunified company and Couzens owned 11% (Nevins and Hill, 1954).  
Shortly after the death of John Gray in 1906, Ford had been named president of the Ford 
Motor Company and John Dodge had been named vice president.  Henry Ford now 
wielded both managerial and financial control of the firm that bore his name. 
With the success of the Model N and the ousting of Malcomson, Ford made his 
strategy for the future clear, saying that “he was going to produce a four-cylinder 
automobile, that once it was produced he was going to stick to that standardized design 
without changing it, that he was going to reach constantly toward a growing volume 
because it would drastically cut his costs, and that he was going to reduce prices steadily” 
(Nevins and Hill, 1954, p. 339).  In the years that followed, production cost reductions 
were realized through a combination of high volume production of a single product, the 
Model T, and a number of process innovations – highly standardized parts, extensive use 
of specially-designed single-purpose machinery, and moving assembly.  The introduction 
of this last innovation required a timely supply of parts, further reinforcing Ford’s desire 
for control over supplies. 
From the birth of the company, the Dodge Brothers had manufactured a major 
portion of the Ford automobiles, including engines, transmissions, axles, drive shaft 
assemblies, and drop forgings.  While this arrangement had worked to the benefit of both 
companies, difficulties arose over annual price negotiations.  With the inclusion of a huge 
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foundry and a machine shop for manufacturing engines, transmissions, and axles, the 
Ford plant at Highland Park brought in-house the production capabilities previously 
provided by the Dodge Brothers.  The move from Piquette Avenue to Highland Park 
began in 1910.  With Ford as their only customer, the Dodge brothers must certainly have 
been concerned about the future of their business.  In August of 1913, John Dodge 
resigned as director and vice president of the Ford Motor Company so that the Dodge 
brothers could pursue manufacturing their own automobile.  Dodge soon ceased 
supplying parts to Ford (Nevins and Hill, 1954).   
Just after the decision on the Selden patent dispute in 1911 (see section 4.5.1), 
Ford purchased the John R. Keim Mills of Buffalo, New York, which supplied stamped- 
and drawn-steel components for Ford cars.37  Following a wildcat strike in 1912, Ford 
moved pressed steel manufacturing from the Keim plant to Highland Park and converted 
the Buffalo facility into a branch assembly plant.  With the purchase of the Keim Mills, 
Ford was capable of manufacturing its own axle housings, crankcase and transmission 
covers, and even bodies.  The intellectual capital that Ford inherited from the Keim Mills 
would also prove invaluable to the development of Ford’s ground-breaking mass 
production techniques:  William Knudsen was instrumental in setting up branch assembly 
plants; William H. Smith, who had first approached Henry Ford with the idea of used 
stamped steel, was a highly capable engineer; and John R. Lee later became Ford’s 
personnel manager and engineered the company’s sweeping labor and wage reforms. 
By the close of 1914, Henry Ford was well on his way to bringing under one roof 
the entire business of automobile manufacturing.  He had realized his dream of producing 
                                                 
37 Ford had underwritten the new tools and dies necessary for this production, and the outlay represented a 
significant risk (Sorensen, 1956). 
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a car to replace the family horse and, without the influence of Malcomson, he was able to 
pursue his goal of steadily decreasing the price of that car so that every working man 
could afford it.  By synthesizing a number of process innovations – the manufacturing of 
fully interchangeable parts, the development and use of special purpose machinery, the 
sequential placement of men and machines, the minute breakdown of production 
operations, and continuously moving assembly – he also was well on the way to 
developing the production system to make that happen.  In 1914, sales of the Model T 
reached nearly a quarter of a million and Henry Ford had plans for expansion on a grand 
scale. 
4.2 The Rise of General Motors 
During the period from 1900-1915, the Ford Motor Company emerged as the 
industry leader with sales in 1915 exceeding half the market for automobiles.  In the same 
time period, another industry giant was forming.  But while Ford had arisen from a single 
firm that, by 1915, was producing a single model, this second giant took a very different 
form and path.  The history of General Motors Corporation (GM) involves numerous 
automobile manufacturers and a multitude of suppliers.  Like Ford, the company’s history 
prior to 1915 is dominated by a single personality whose name, unlike Henry Ford’s, is 
largely forgotten: William C. Durant. 
This chapter begins in section 4.2.1 with the origins of GM in the Buick Motor 
Company and with W.C. Durant, whose experience in the carriage trade did not involve 
engineering or production, but rather management and primarily sales.  Durant’s success 
with Buick supports the notion that entrepreneurs (in this case the team of Durant and his 
partner Josiah Dort) must act as heterogeneous engineers who jointly address issues of 
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technology, management, marketing, and finance.  The Model 10 priced under $1,000 
propelled Buick to the lead market position by 1908 and serves as a testament to the 
rising importance of the low-priced market.  
Section 4.2.2 reviews Durant’s establishment of GM and subsequent loss of 
control.  While the product design during the transitional phase was converging on a 
dominant design, manufacturers did not know what that design would entail, which 
presented them with substantial risk.  Ford attempted to influence the selection 
environment with his interpretation of the automobile and appropriate product attributes, 
while Durant attempted to mitigate his risk through diversification.  However, by 1910, 
only Buick and Cadillac were profitable.  This can be attributed to two factors: 1) the 
emergence of a new functional definition that appealed to a wider market and an aligned 
dominant design which supplanted other technological interpretations and configurations; 
and 2) manufacturing processes at GM subsidiaries that were not aligned with the TIEC 
and market needs for the combination of high reliability and low cost.  This situation is 
illustrative of the difficulties facing much of the industry, as discussed later in sections 
4.4 and 4.5.4.  While most of GMs subsidiaries produced mediocre and outdated products 
using craft production techniques, Buick and Cadillac had high quality models positioned 
for the upper end of the mass market segment and lower end of the wealthy market 
segment. However, GM continued to struggle with aligning production methods to new 
rules in the TIEC.   
These problems, combined with an aggressive expansion strategy and an 
economic slowdown, contributed to the transfer of control to a banking syndicate 
between 1910 and 1915, the era covered in section 4.2.3.  In an effort to restore GM to 
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profitability, the bankers increased the company’s misalignment with both the emerging 
functional definition of the automobile and the rules of manufacturing for the mass 
market this definition served.  By eliminating the Buick Model 10, they eliminated 
participation in the low-price market.  And by maintaining high prices, low volume 
production, and hand-craft techniques, they adhered to outmoded economic rules.  
However, the bankers did improve production processes, bringing GM into alignment 
with the rules of armory practice, and also instituted a research program to replace rules 
of thumb for engineering.  The company was returned to profitability, but a significant 
loss of market share and stock value placed it in jeopardy. 
Finally, section 4.2.4 provides a detailed description of the development of the 
electric self starter 1911, one of the most significant product innovations for GM and the 
industry in this era.  The electric starter overcame one of the largest disadvantages of the 
gasoline car and began a process of ‘electrifying’ the gasoline motor vehicles, making it a 
technological hybrid that combined advantages of electric and gasoline vehicles.  This 
review reveals that spillovers and learning-by-interacting with suppliers were the most 
significant mechanisms in this critical innovation. 
4.2.1 Buick and William C. Durant, 1902-1908 
David Dunbar Buick, an inventor and manufacturer of plumbing supplies, 
founded the Buick Motor Company in 1902.  Buick developed a well-engineered vehicle 
but exhausted the company’s finances doing so.  Buick’s main asset was a patent on a 
valve-in-head engine that obtained a better fuel-air mixture and thus produced more 
power.  The company was sold twice, landing in 1903 in the hands of James H. Whiting 
of Flint, Michigan.  Located at a ford in the Flint River surrounded by abundant pine 
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forests, Flint had been founded on the fur trade then later prospered in the lumber 
industry.  About 90% of the original settlers hailed from New England and New York.  
By the time the forests began disappearing in the 1880s, the city was a manufacturing 
town of flour, paper, wool, and cotton mills.  But its primary business was woodworking 
and the city’s industrial base included an array of woodworking tools and skilled 
workmen.  When the lumber mills closed down, Flint turned to carriage making and 
became the national center of the industry by the turn of the century. 
James Whiting was president of the Flint Wagon Works and looking to enter the 
automobile industry when he purchased Buick and moved it from Detroit to Flint.  
Although David Buick and his engineer, Walter Marr, put together a successful prototype 
of what would be the Buick Model B, they had once again exhausted the company’s 
capital.  Yet they had produced no more than forty cars in 1904.  Whiting had borrowed 
heavily from three Flint banks and the city’s entire financial community was at risk.  
Whiting determined he needed a younger man to reorganize and run the company and 
turned to William C. Durant.   
Durant was a highly energetic businessman and a persuasive salesman.  At the age 
of 43, Durant was already a self-made millionaire and the semi-retired head of the 
country’s largest carriage producer, the Durant-Dort Carriage Company.  His 
achievements and his sincere and persuasive personality had earned the high opinion of 
his neighbors and associates in Flint.  In building his carriage business, he had developed 
a strategy for corporate expansion that he readily transferred to the automotive industry.   
Durant’s sales philosophy is revealed in his advice to other salesmen: “Do not talk 
too much.  Give the customer time to think.  In other words, let the customer sell himself.  
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Look for a self-seller” (Weisberger, 1979, p. 35).  Durant made record sales and new 
friends of prospective customers by giving them a vision of themselves as improved by 
the product.  The trick was finding a deserving product.  Durant had found his first ‘self-
seller’ in 1886, when he purchased the patent rights and manufacturing operations for a 
simple yet elegant two-wheeled road cart with a novel suspension.  His partner, Josiah 
Dallas Dort, agreed to supervise production while Durant handled sales and financing for 
the new Flint Road Cart Company.  Although the business he had purchased could only 
turn out two cars per day, within two weeks Durant had garnered orders for the quick 
delivery of 600 carts.  To meet this demand, he subcontracted a Flint competitor, W. A. 
Paterson, who had excess capacity.  The enterprise manufactured around 4,000 carts in its 
first year (Weisberger, 1979).  In order to meet this volume of production, Paterson had 
to reorganize his plant and operations, thereby introducing the rudiments of mass 
production techniques to the carriage industry (Pound, 1934).  Unfortunately, after the 
first 1,500 carts were delivered, Durant discovered that Paterson was preparing to market 
a cart suspiciously similar to his own but at a lower cost.  Durant and Dort promptly 
established their own production facilities and ended the subcontract arrangement. 
The existing wagon and carriage industry in Flint followed the seasonal pattern of 
agriculture: inventories were built up during the spring and summer then sold to farmers 
in the fall.  Durant, however, sought higher volume production, lower prices, and wider 
markets.  To pursue his goals, he systemized sales, developed advertising, and spread 
production and sales operations over the entire year.  Durant was soon swamped with 
orders and his Flint Road Cart Company became well known.  His dealers suggested he 
begin manufacturing a four-wheeled family buggy for which they saw good prospects.  
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After his staff designed a new buggy, Durant again approached Paterson with a contract 
to supply 200 units.  This time, Paterson obtained the names of his customers and lured 
some away with the promise of a cheaper model direct from the factory (Weisberger, 
1979).  Once again, Durant ended the contract arrangement, this time learning a valuable 
lesson on the virtues of vertical integration that would shape his business strategy for the 
next forty years. 
Paterson’s deceit was not the only impetus for vertical integration.  Dependence 
on suppliers dictated production volumes and costs, which was a worrisome problem in 
an age of horizontal trusts.  In 1900, there were rumors of a trust to control the 
manufacture of steel axles and wagon tires; in 1901, there were rumors of a combination 
to control the price of linseed oil used in paint and varnish (Weisberger, 1979).  Durant 
recalled, “My twenty years’ experience in the carriage business taught me a lesson.  We 
started out as assemblers with no advantage over our competitors.  We paid about the 
same prices for everything we purchased.  We realized that we were making no progress 
and would not unless and until we manufactured practically every important part that we 
used” (Rubenstein, 2001, p. 72).  Durant  proceeded through acquisitions and the 
founding of new enterprises to bring under his control the manufacture of all significant 
components and many smaller parts: 
Our plan was to manufacture practically every important part of a buggy, and 
carrying out this idea, we did not stop until we had controlled or were interested 
in building a full line of bodies, wheels, axles, forgings, stampings, leather, paint, 
trimmings and various other items, even whip sockets; but not until our accessory 
plants were in operation… did we have a product that had no competition in 
value or price in the country.  This gave us control of the business in that line as 
long as carriages were in demand.  (Weisberger, 1979, p. 47) 
In addition, Durant’s acquisitions provided product diversification according to 
both price and styling.  The two principles of Durant’s strategy – vertical integration and 
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product diversification – helped build the country’s largest carriage company in terms of 
production volume.  In 1895, the company was renamed the Durant-Dort Carriage 
Company to better reflect the full range of its products.  In seven of ten years beginning 
in 1892, the company added a major division (Weisberger, 1979).  By 1900, Durant-Dort 
consisted of fourteen branch plants and hundreds of sales agencies with annual sales of 
over 150,000 carriages (Flink, 1988). 
While a more complacent man would have been content with his success, Durant 
was in search of a new challenge when Whiting approached him to run Buick in 1904.  
Durant spent two months testing the Buick automobile and decided he had found his next 
self-seller.  Six weeks later after accepting the reins, he traveled to the Automobile Show 
in New York and obtained 1,108 orders for automobiles – 1,071 more than the company 
had produced in the previous year – but he also effectively raised significant amounts of 
capital.  Durant had insisted on absolute control of Buick and, within ten months, he had 
increased the company’s capitalization to $1.5 million.  Durant recruited new engineering 
talent to work with Buick, Marr, and Arthur Mason, an expert the previous management 
had hired from Cadillac.38  Mason developed a new engine that increased operating speed 
from 1,800 to 4,000 rpm, which led to the development in 1905 of the Model C, a 
powerful two-cylinder, 22-horsepower car (Weisberger, 1979). 
Durant also created a national sales organization, using Durant-Dort carriage 
showrooms and seeking out dealers willing to travel into the countryside in New England 
and the West.  One of his New England dealers, Harry Shiland, was a mechanic who 
personally overhauled each vehicle he sold.  He was not impressed with the early Buicks 
                                                 
38 Though David Buick was highly successful with technical innovations, he apparently was quite inept at 
finances and sank into debt.  In 1906, he resigned from the company that bore his name and disappeared 
into poverty and obscurity. 
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and wrote a letter of complaint to the company.  At Durant’s invitation, Shiland toured 
the plant and provided such accurate criticisms that Durant decided to appoint him 
director of Buick’s service department.  Shiland stressed that cars needed to be foolproof 
in order to market them to doctors and businessmen and he proceeded to build a parts and 
complaint department on this principle. 
When it came to parts delivery, automakers and parts manufacturers were at the 
mercy of railroad freight dispatchers.  Within months after Durant took the helm, Buick 
experienced a production bottleneck due to delayed delivery of axles from the Weston-
Mott Company in Utica, New York.  Durant promptly contacted Charles Mott and invited 
him to relocate or establish a branch plant in Michigan.  In the negotiations that ensued, 
Durant offered to subscribe to 20% of the stock in the new enterprise, donate the site for 
the new plant, and award the new company all of Buick’s axle business (Weisberger, 
1979).  In 1907, Buick became an owner of the Weston-Mott Axle Company which 
moved its machinery and operations to Flint, Michigan.   
Durant was once again following his successful strategy of vertical integration 
and product diversification.  He directed Buick to develop several models of cars in 
different price ranges and was particularly interested in entering the lower priced market.  
In 1908, Buick introduced the Model 10, a lightweight, four-cylinder runabout with 18 
horsepower and a simple planetary transmission.  The Model 10, fondly known as the 
White Streak, was fast, sporty in design, easy to drive and maintain, and sold for under 
$1000.  Buick also sold the luxury Model D for $2,500 and two additional models priced 
between the D and the 10.  In only four years, Durant was able to turn Buick into the 
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country’s leading automobile manufacturer with production of 8,487 units in 1908 
(Pound, 1934; Weisberger, 1979; Flink, 1988).   
4.2.2 The Birth of General Motors, 1908-1910 
Benjamin Briscoe, head of the Maxwell-Briscoe Motor Company, approached 
Durant in 1908 with a plan to unite the major firms in the automobile industry into a 
single company.  Like many other businessmen of the times, Briscoe believed that a large 
industrial ‘combination’ on the order of U.S. Steel Corporation would protect the 
automotive industry from the ‘destabilizing’ effects of unregulated competition.  In 1907, 
manufacturers were competing for an ill-defined and relatively small market for 
automobiles, with the top 25% of firms accounting for around 75% of sales.  Producers 
financed operations with credit from suppliers and cash advances from dealers and 
customers, leaving little cushion against a slump in demand.  A company faced with ruin 
might resort to desperate competitive tactics while other unscrupulous new entrants 
promised quality at prices they could not deliver.  The resulting collapses shook buyer 
and investor confidence, sending ripples through the entire industry (Weisberger, 1979).   
Briscoe and Durant, with the backing of J. P. Morgan & Company, began 
negotiations with Henry Ford, Ransom Olds, who was now making the Reo, and other 
leading automobile producers.  Durant envisioned a holding company that allowed the 
manufacturers to continue to operate under existing management.  Ford and Olds, 
however, insisted on a cash buyout rather than an exchange of stock, and pulled out of the 
negotiations.  Although Morgan initially supported a merger of Briscoe and Durant’s 
enterprises, the bank soon withdrew.  According to Flink (1988), the bankers were 
concerned by Durant’s cavalier attitude, particularly in dealing with Buick’s stockholders 
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and also in an offer he had made to buy the Olds Motor Works without reviewing the 
company’s books.  They became convinced that Durant was unbalanced when he 
prophesied that U.S. automobile sales would soon reach half a million units.39  Durant 
also insisted he be left in control of the new combination’s finances, but the bankers 
insisted on choosing the officers and directors of the new company.  When details of the 
proposed merger were leaked to the press, the plan died (Weisberger, 1979).   
Durant, however, moved forward on his own, founding the General Motors 
Company (GM) in September, 1908, as a holding company that would purchase 
companies by exchanging stock in the old firm for stock in the new one.  GM first 
acquired Buick then within months acquired the Olds Motor Works, which was failing.  
Durant initially left the management in charge at Olds, but replaced them in 1909.  He 
then reportedly brought a Buick White Streak to the Oldsmobile plant, sawed its wooden 
body into quarters, separated the four parts into a wider and longer profile, and directed 
the engineers to duplicate the result to create the basic 1910 Oldsmobile (Weisberger, 
1979).  In 1908, GM also purchased the underfinanced Oakland Motor Car Company 
which would later be renamed Pontiac.  In July, 1909, Durant purchased the Cadillac 
Automobile Company from Henry Leland, who had taken control of the firm in 1902 
when it was the failing Henry Ford Company.  Under Leland’s guidance, Cadillac had 
earned international recognition for high quality engineering and the production of 
precision-machined interchangeable parts.  In 1909, the Cadillac was widely viewed as 
the best high-priced car in the country (Weisberger, 1979).  As agreed during 
negotiations, Durant left Leland in complete control of managing Cadillac.   
                                                 
39 Durant was, of course, proven correct six years later when sales reached 548,000 in 1914. 
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Durant also began purchasing parts manufacturers, believing that “[c]ontrolling 
this enormous volume would make it possible for these accessory plants…to materially 
reduce costs because of the volume of business from GM which they could depend upon 
if motor cars and motor trucks, as I was firmly convinced, was [sic] to become important 
factors in the industrial life of America” (Rubenstein, 2001, p. 73).  Shortly after the 
creation of GM, Durant was approached by Albert Champion, who was manufacturing a 
spark plug of his own design.  Durant was impressed and, as before with the Weston-
Mott Axle Company, promised Champion a market for every plug he could make if he 
moved his operations to Flint.  Durant sold his interest in the Champion Ignition 
Company to GM in 1909, and the firm was later renamed the A.C. Spark Plug Company.  
Within two years of incorporation, GM acquired at least part interest in manufacturers of 
electrical components, transmissions, wheels, brakes, engine castings, springs, body 
panels, and other parts. 
Unsure of the future technological direction of the industry, Durant pursued 
“getting every car in sight, playing it safe all along the line” (Flink, 1988, p. 65).  By 
1910, GM had acquired thirteen motor vehicle manufacturers and ten parts 
manufacturers, employed 14,000 workers, and produced one-fifth of the automobiles 
made in the U.S. (Nevins and Hill, 1954; Weisberger, 1979).  Unfortunately, Durant’s 
policy of broad acquisition and loose managerial control quickly turned disastrous.  
Several of his purchases turned out to be ill-advised, notably the Cartercar Company 
whose friction drive turned out to be poorly designed, the Elmore Manufacturing 
Company for its outdated two-cycle engine, and the Heany Lamp Company whose 
incandescent lamp patent was later revealed to be fraudulent.  Meanwhile, of the 
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automobile manufacturers, only the Cadillac and Buick companies turned profits and 
Buick’s fell as Durant’s energies were increasingly stretched.  GM was a combination of 
twenty-five independent firms which had no unified system of accounting, purchasing, 
marketing or engineering research.  The company had no cash reserves and little working 
cash, so when sales dropped due to an economic slowdown in 1910, GM was unable to 
make the payroll or pay suppliers.  GM’s accounting system was so inadequate that 
Durant was unable to demonstrate the company’s exact needs to potential lenders. 
The fact that only Buick and Cadillac were profitable can be attributed to two 
factors: 1) the emergence of a new functional definition that appealed to a wider market 
and an aligned dominant design which supplanted other technological interpretations and 
configurations; and 2) manufacturing and management systems at GM subsidiaries that 
were not aligned with the TIEC and needs of this wider market for high volume 
production, high reliability, and low cost.  Most of the companies acquired by GM 
(Elmore, Oakland, Rainier, Welsh, and Cartercar) produced fairly low volumes of 
mediocre-quality automobiles using craft production methods and incorporating soon-to-
be outmoded technologies like the two-cycle engine and the friction drive.  However, in 
the Buick Model 10 priced from $900, GM had a product positioned for the upper end of 
the low-priced mass market. Buick sold almost 11,000 Model 10s in 1910 while Ford 
sold 18,700 Model Ts with prices starting at $680.  In the Cadillac Model 30 priced from 
$1,400 to $3,000, GM had a high quality car positioned for the lower end of the wealthy 
market segment.  The Cadillac also incorporated Delco’s new ignition system discussed 
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in section 4.2.4 and offered a closed body style for $2,200.40  Cadillac sold about 8,000 
Model 30s in 1910. 
4.2.3 Banker Control of GM, 1910-1915 
A banking syndicate came to GM’s rescue with a $12.75 million loan that came at 
a very high price – $15 million in 5-year, 6% notes, and $6 million in stock.  GM’s stock 
was placed in a five-year voting trust and, though Durant was appointed a trustee and still 
held a seat on the board, he was outnumbered by bank representatives.  Durant was 
forced to step down from active management of GM.  Banker James Jackson Storrow 
was appointed as interim president of GM.   
Storrow was a Progressive who distrusted one man rule and endorsed 
administrative decentralization.  He appointed managers to track profits and costs for 
each of the GM divisions and gave them a great deal of independence.  In return, he 
expected teamwork: the managers were to fully share information and resources and not 
compete with one another.   
Charles W. Nash, who had worked his way through the ranks at Durant-Dort, was 
appointed president and general manager of Buick in 1910.  Nash slashed inventories, 
squeezed more productivity out of the facilities, and compressed costs.  With Nash 
consumed with administrative details, Storrow hired Walter Chrysler, then a 
superintendent at the American Locomotive Company’s Pittsburgh plant, to supervise 
Buick’s plant operations.  When Chrysler arrived at Buick in January, 1912, he found the 
company’s production methods were still based on labor-intensive handcraft methods 
inherited from the carriage industry.  He also discovered that Buick had no system to 
                                                 
40 Closed-body styles became increasingly significant in the specific and second transitional phases as 
discussed in detail in chapter 5. 
 
244 
determine the costs of production (Hyde, 2003).  Relying on his experience building 
railroad cars, Chrysler instituted changes in management, production processes, and 
material handling that greatly improved scheduling and productivity, cut costs, and 
decreased manufacturing time.  Concurrent with Ford’s experimentation with moving 
assembly lines, Chrysler introduced a system to push unfinished chassis along tracks 
through the assembly area (Hyde, 2003).  In November, 1912, Nash was promoted to the 
presidency of GM and Chrysler remained in charge of Buick operations. 
In order to reduce the number of defects in GM’s automobiles, Storrow decided to 
replace the rule-of-thumb methods used for design with organized research programs.  
Arthur D. Little, Inc., developed a plan for a centralized testing and research laboratory.  
With Storrow’s support, the board voted in early 1911 to fund an engineering laboratory 
for mechanical and electrical testing which was later named the General Motors Research 
Department.  The Department was staffed by nine researchers and their assistants.  The 
first problems they tackled included painting, lubricating, and cutting oil practices at GM 
plants; materials testing for purchasing departments; and the investigation of new parts 
and accessories proposed by outside suppliers (Pound, 1934). 
Between 1910 and 1915, the banker controlled management of GM instituted 
tighter fiscal controls and liquidated most manufacturing units, leaving only Buick, 
Cadillac, GM Truck, Oakland, and Oldsmobile.  At the same time, they increased the GM 
interests in Weston-Mott, A.C. Spark Plug, GM of Canada, and Brown-Lipe-Chapin, 
which supplied gear-trains.  They hired new administrative staff and improved 
communication and coordination among the units within the combination. GM was soon 
restored to solvency, but receipts were devoted to debt retirement rather than dividends or 
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growth.  In addition, the bankers failed to pursue the low-priced market or invest in 
production innovations, the two strategies that propelled Ford to the forefront of the 
industry during this time period.  GM manufacturing units essentially adhered to two 
tenets of traditional manufacturing strategy: 1) that high-priced products yield high per 
unit profits and thus higher overall profits than large volume production of inexpensive 
products; and 2) that craft manufacturing techniques yield superior quality over machine-
intensive mass production techniques.  Thus, in an effort to increase per unit profits, Nash 
ended production of the Buick Model 10 that was competitive with the Model T and 
essentially cut Buick sales in half in 1911.  Meanwhile, Leland refused to adopt 
assembly-line techniques at Cadillac, believing they would compromise mechanical 
precision.  Despite improvements made by Chrysler, GM’s strategies and production 
techniques were incompatible with the new functional definition of the automobile that 
appealed to a wider market and with emerging economic rules.  By 1914, the company’s 
market share had fallen from 21% to 8.5% and its stock price was depressed (Flink, 
1988). 
4.2.4 Development of the Electric Self-Starter, 1911-1912 
Prior to the invention of the electric self-starter, motorists had to adjust the spark 
and turn the engine over by hand, spinning a crank which turned the flywheel.  This feat 
required, according to Pound (1934, p. 271) “the strength of Ajax, the cunning of 
Ulysses, and the speed of Hermes.”  Starting a car in the cold was particularly 
problematic, and the starter problem was one reason that electric vehicles were preferred 
by some motorists, especially women, since “the whole back-breaking operation was 
quite beyond the powers of all women save those of Amazonian proportions.”  From 
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almost the beginning of the industry, gasoline-powered auto-makers had experimented 
unsuccessfully with air, spring, and electric starting devices (Epstein, 1972).  But a 
random accident was perhaps the catalyst that finally stimulated a solution.  In the winter 
of 1910, the founder of Cartercar stopped to help a female motorist whose car had stalled 
near Detroit’s Belle Island Park.  When Byron Carter spun the crank, the engine 
backfired, throwing the crank in reverse, breaking Carter’s arm and jaw.  Two Cadillac 
engineers driving by took Carter to the hospital where he developed pneumonia and died 
a few weeks later.  As legend has it, Henry Leland was horrified and vowed “I won’t 
have Cadillacs hurting people that way” (Cray, 1980, p. 116).41  He called his engineers 
to a special meeting and told them that eliminating the hand crank was a top priority.  
Unfortunately, the working model they developed was far too large to put into an 
automobile.  When the team was unsuccessful at solving the starter problem, Leland 
turned to Charles F. Kettering.42 
While at National Cash Register (NCR) in Dayton, Ohio, Kettering had invented a 
small electric motor to replace the hand crank on cash registers.  All earlier attempts had 
failed, leading experts to the conclusion that it was physically impossible because the 
electric motor would need to be at least as big as the cash register itself.  Kettering, 
however, perceived that the motor needed to provide only a short burst of power, leading 
him to develop a small motor with a mechanical clutch.   
                                                 
41 Other versions of the story claim that Leland was a close fried of Carter’s and that Leland said either “the 
Cadillac car will kill no more men if we can help it,” or “I won’t have Cadillacs hurting any more people 
that way,” both of which imply that the stalled car was a Cadillac (Barach, 2007; Cray, 1980). 
42 Although Cadillac had already purchased electric ignition systems from Kettering’s Dayton Electronics 
Company, Cray (1980) reports that it was Cadillac’s assistant sales manager, Earl Howard, who suggested 
that Leland should contact Kettering.  Howard was employed as secretary to the sales manager at National 




Edward Deeds, general manger at NCR, subsequently asked Kettering to assist in 
building a car from a kit he had purchased.  Kettering developed a high-energy spark 
ignition to replace the weak one supplied with the kit.  At that time, the emerging 
standard ignition system for gasoline-powered cars, including the Cadillac, employed a 
magneto for spark ignition rather than a dry cell or a battery.  Dry cells wore down 
quickly and had to be replaced.  Thanks to development for electric vehicles, batteries 
were becoming more reliable, but as late as 1911, batteries in gasoline-powered vehicles 
still wore down in about 500 miles.  They could be removed from the car and recharged, 
but they rapidly deteriorated due to vibration and shock from the rough roads.  Kettering 
simplified the ignition system by placing the induction coils, one for each spark plug, in 
series in a heat-resistant, armored steel box which reduced the failure rate caused by heat 
and vibration.  He then replaced the vibrators that made and broke the circuit with a 
single master set of contact points connected to a condenser that drew away excess 
current, prolonging the life of the points.  His system was less susceptible to vibration 
and arcing, produced a hotter spark, and used less current, which extended battery and 
component life (Barach, 2007).   
Kettering perfected his ignition system and installed it in his Cadillac Roadster, 
then wrote to Leland about its flawless performance.  In September, 1908, Leland sent his 
chief engineer, Ernest Sweet, to Dayton to test drive Kettering’s Cadillac.43  Sweet was 
impressed, and Leland ordered electrical ignition sets for the entire production run of 
model year 1910 Cadillacs, around 8,000 units.  But Leland also included a standard 
magneto ignition system as a backup, just in case.  With the contract in hand, Kettering 
                                                 
43 Ironically, it reportedly was Sweet and another Cadillac engineer who two years later came upon Byron 
Carter after his fateful accident near Belle Island Park and drove him to the hospital (Barach, 2007). 
 
248 
and Deeds established the Dayton Engineering Laboratory Company, later shortened to 
Delco, in 1909 to produce the ignition devices and to develop electrical components for 
the automotive and other industries. 
When Leland approached Kettering with the self-starter problem, it took him and 
moonlighting engineers from NCR little time to develop a solution based on his small 
motor for the cash register.  In fact, according to Pound (1934), Kettering had already 
been trying to sell his electric self-starter to auto manufacturers who were skeptical of its 
reliance on a battery they believed would be quickly exhausted.  Kettering demonstrated 
a prototype to Leland in December of 1910 and by August, 1911, had been awarded a 
patent.  Kettering’s solution was an integrated starter and ignition system that employed a 
battery, starting motor, and generator equipped with a clutch and reduction gear.  Leland 
had the electrical self-starter installed in the 1912 Cadillac, but still included a magneto 
and hand crank as a backup.  He also installed a variable speed regulator developed by 
Kettering that allowed recharging of the battery without removing it from the car and also 
prevented overcharging, which had plagued earlier attempts at recharging. 
Within two years, nearly all manufacturers offered automatic starters on their 
automobiles (Epstein, 1972). The electric self-starter incorporated one of the most 
attractive features of the electric vehicle – ease of starting – into the internal combustion 
engine vehicle and opened the gasoline-powered car market to women.  Industry 
observers of the day referred to this innovation as the ‘electrified gas car,’ and in truth, it 
represented a weak hybrid gasoline-electric vehicle (Kirsch, 2000).  By 1920, electrical 
components accounted for 5% of the total cost of a gasoline vehicle.  Today, that fraction 
is at least one third.  
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In 1915, Delco was purchased by Durant’s United Motor Company, which was in 
turn acquired by GM in 1918.  In 1919, GM purchased the remaining three companies 
that Kettering had founded, the Delco Light Company, Dayton Metal Products, and the 
Dayton-Wright Airplane Company.  With Kettering and his research operations 
completely enfolded in the corporation, GM commissioned Kettering to set up and direct 
the General Motors Research Laboratories in Dayton.  In 1920, the laboratories were 
incorporated as the General Motors Research Corporation, and in 1925, the research 
activities were moved to Detroit. 
4.3 The Birth of Chevrolet, 1911-1915 
After being forced from active management of GM in 1910, Durant did not sit 
idle.  In 1911, he established three new firms: the Chevrolet Motor Company in Detroit, 
and the Little Motor Company and Mason Motor Company in Flint, Michigan.  He hired 
Louis Chevrolet, a star on his Buick racing team, to design a new vehicle for Chevrolet 
and William Little to head the Little Motor Company.  He hired Arthur Mason, who had 
been the Buick engine superintendent, to run the Mason Motor Company which was to 
produce engines for both the Chevrolet and Little cars.  Durant was incensed by Nash’s 
decision to discontinue the Buick Model 10 in 1911 and therefore aimed for the 
inexpensive market.  Priced at $600, the underpowered Little was moderately successful, 
but the Chevrolet, a ponderous 6-cylinder model with a $2,150 price tag, was a market 
failure.  Louis Chevrolet left the company and Durant consolidated the Chevrolet and 
Little companies as the Chevrolet Company in 1913, discontinuing the Little nameplate.  
The new company retained partial ownership of Mason Motors under the assumption that 
Chevrolet would require only part of Mason’s output.   
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It took Chevrolet’s engineers another year to develop a satisfactory new 
automobile, but in 1914 they introduced two new 4-cylinder models that proved to be 
spectacularly successful: the $875 Baby Grand touring car and the $750 Royal Mail 
roadster.  Weisberger (1979) provides a vivid picture of Durant’s ‘family proposition’ 
and of innovation in the early years at Chevrolet.  During engineering conferences, 
Mason, Little, and engineer Alfred Sturt would discuss shop problems, sometimes 
arguing heatedly.  Durant would then step in to calm them down and they would set to 
work solving the problem.  On one occasion, Buick veteran Charlie Wetherald, an 
incorporator of Mason Motors, heard how the tight-fitting pistons of a new engine 
produced more power but seized up when hot.  Wetherald proceeded to hand file the 
pistons to a slightly elliptical shape that solved the problem.  Another engineer then 
developed a special cam for the grinder to mechanize and standardized the new process.  
“We didn’t even take the trouble to find out if we could apply for a patent” (Weisberger, 
1979, p. 173).  Workers simply developed a solution through trial and error and moved 
on to the next problem. 
In 1914, Chevrolet could sell as many cars as it could produce and Durant 
expanded production and sales operations, establishing new assembly and regional sales 
facilities nationwide and in Canada.  Durant then announced that the 1915 Chevrolet line 
would include a new model called the 490 – named for the price of Ford’s Model T with 
which it was intended to compete.  Arthur Mason was called in to assist in the new design 
and Durant was impressed with his ideas on components other than motors, including 
axles, transmissions, and suspension.  Aware that Mason was personally in debt and that 
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Mason Motors was behind schedule and short of cash, Durant decided that Chevrolet 
should purchase the remaining shares of the company.   
Although the price of the 490 came in above the Model T at $550, Chevrolet was 
flooded with orders.  At over 70,000 units, Chevrolet sales in 1916 exceeded even 
Durant’s optimism (Weisberger, 1979).  This phenomenal success, contrasted with the 
failure of the original, powerful and expensive vehicle designed by Louis Chevrolet 
underscores the growing importance of the low-priced market after 1900.  But while 
Durant had once again found business success, his sights were set higher.  He yearned to 
retake control of GM, which he referred to as ‘my baby.’  His success with Chevrolet, 
combined with the conservative behavior of GM’s banker regime and Durant’s clever 
stock maneuvering, would provide the means for a dramatic return to GM, which is 
covered in chapter 5. 
4.4 Industry Shakeout 
As an industry approaches the specific phase, a dominant design emerges and 
firms begin competing based on cost and quality rather than product differentiation.  At 
this point, it is typical for an industry to experience shakeout, where the number of firms 
peaks and begins to decline.  The shakeout for the automobile industry began in 1909 and 
was extreme.  I identify eight factors that contributed to this phenomenon, several of 
which are inter-related: 1) increasing economies of scale that necessitated high volume 
production and high capital investments; 2) the cumulative burden of manufacturing parts 
for multiple models; 3) process innovations at Ford that were not easy for firms to adopt; 
4) the cumulative effects of and increasing returns to innovation; 5) the redefinition of the 
automobile for the mass market; 6) an emerging dominant design; 7) the saturation of the 
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market niche for very expensive vehicles; and 8) the Panic of 1907 and ensuing 
recession.  Items 5-7 together represent an important feedback mechanism between 
selection and variation.  By contributing to the failure of specific firms, the selection 
environment influenced variation and further reinforced the emerging dominant design. 
Between 1902 and 1910, the number of automobile manufacturers entering the 
market generally rose, with a peak entry of 81 firms in 1907 (Simons, 1995; Klepper and 
Simons, 1997).  Market entry declined between 1911 and 1921 then became negligible.  
The exit rate followed a similar pattern, peaking around 1909.  As shown in Figure 4-1, 
the number of firms in the industry peaked at 274 in 1909 then began a precipitous 
decline, leaving only 30 firms by 1929.44  With the reduction in firms, there was also a 
reduction in product variety.  In 1911, 270 producers manufactured 400 different 
nameplates; by 1942, there were only eight producers manufacturing 17 nameplates 
(Rubenstein, 2001).   
 
Figure 4-1: Number of Automobile Manufacturing Firms, Entry, and Exit 
Reproduced from Simons (1995, p. 100) 
                                                 




Around the turn of the century, new automobile manufacturing ventures were 
launched with very little capital.  For example, Ford was incorporated in 1903 with a 
$150,000 capitalization of which $50,000 was held in company stock.  Machinery was 
assessed at $10,000 and patents at $40,000.  The company initially ran at the verge of 
bankruptcy, owing well more in contracts to suppliers than it could cover until cash 
advances came in from dealers.  Many manufacturers rented modest facilities where they 
largely assembled parts and supplies bought on contract.  By 1911, when Ford was 
implementing revolutionary mass production techniques and Durant was establishing 
Chevrolet, the situation was far different.  Large factories were now required that could 
turn out huge quantities of vehicles using a vast array of expensive, specialized 
equipment.  A manufacturer needed established credit, highly trained executives for both 
production and business offices, and connections in the steel, rubber, nickel and 
upholstery industries.  In 1910, Flanders commented on the difficulty of entry in the 
Detroit Saturday Night (cited in Nevins and Hill, 1954, p. 476): 
The man or concern that would start in the automobile business today must 
begin, not where others began, but where they are now… To equal in quality cars 
now selling at $700 to $900, it is not only necessary to build them in tremendous 
quantities, but to build and equip factories for the economical manufacture of 
every part.  You must begin with an experimental laboratory for analyzing and 
testing metals.  The outlay for this department alone, with its necessary adjunct, 
the machine shop for tool and jig making, would amount to more than the earlier 
makers ever had invested in factories.  Yet the laboratory is an indispensable 
adjunct to the modern automobile factory.  It is the chief means of effecting an 
economy that cuts dollars from the final prices of the car. 
Flanders estimated that, in 1910, it would take an initial investment of at least two million 
dollars to enter the market with a medium-priced car. 
Innovation is among the significant factors influencing firm shakeout, with 
cumulative and self-reinforcing effects strengthening the position of early entrants 
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(Simons, 1995; Klepper and Simons, 1997).  Process innovations, made almost 
exclusively by Ford, conferred significant and growing advantages to the market leaders.  
When innovations are difficult for other firms to adopt, profitable entry becomes 
increasingly difficult.  In 1914, the National Automobile Chamber of Commerce (NACC) 
instituted a cross-licensing agreement among its members.  Though Ford was not a 
member, the company also shared patents with competitors without assessing royalties.  
In addition, Ford’s mass production innovations were well publicized in trade 
publications such as the American Machinist and a book by Arnold and Faurote 
published in 1919.  Henry Ford also extended an open invitation for all to tour his 
Highland Park plant.  As such, these innovations were accessible to other manufacturers, 
but not necessarily easy to adopt, as discussed further below.   
However, it is extremely difficult to differentiate between the advantages 
conferred by innovation and those conferred by simple economies of scale.  In 1909, 
Scientific American (cited in Flink, 1988, p. 71) wrote that “standardization and 
interchangeability of parts will have the effect of giving us a higher grade of motorcar at 
a lower price, but this is dependent in considerable degree upon the production of one 
model in great numbers and the elimination of extensive annual changes in design that 
necessitate the making of costly jigs, gauges, and special machinery.”  The president of 
the Society of Automobile Engineers (SAE) in 1910 expressed a belief that the lack of 
inter-company standardization was “responsible for nine tenths of the production troubles 
and most of the needless expense entailed in the manufacturing of motorcars” (cited in 
Flink, 1988, p. 71).  The mechanical branch of the SAE attempted to level the playing 
field for the small producer by standardizing parts across manufacturers.  Whether 
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wrought through innovation or economies of scale, the falling production costs realized 
by the largest producers put profit margin pressures on smaller firms, leaving no cushion 
for a crisis in production or a drop in demand. 
In such a climate, corporate strategies were key factors in survival.  In 1905, 
Henry Ford staked the future of the company on the Model N.  With its success in 1907, 
he made his strategy for the future clear, saying that “he was going to produce a four-
cylinder automobile, that once it was produced he was going to stick to that standardized 
design without changing it, that he was going to reach constantly toward a growing 
volume because it would drastically cut his costs, and that he was going to reduce prices 
steadily” (Nevins and Hill, 1954, p. 339).  Ford’s strategy was consistent with Scientific 
American’s assessment of the industry published two years later.  In the years that 
followed, reductions in production costs at Ford were realized through a combination of 
high volume production of a single model and a number of synergetic process 
innovations – highly standardized parts, extensive use of specially-designed single-
purpose machinery, minute subdivision of labor, and automated materials and work 
flow.45   
Ford’s complete production system certainly yielded more than simple economies 
of scale and was not necessarily easy for others to adopt, despite Ford’s open door policy 
(Raff, 1991).  While many auto manufacturers adopted some of Ford’s production 
methods such as conveyor systems, most still required skilled fitters as late as World War 
I.  Ford’s system allowed for a high degree of centralized control, which Henry Ford 
demanded.   Raff (1991) argues that Ford’s conveyors and moving assembly lines were a 
                                                 
45 Ford himself described mass production as entailing the application of seven principles: power, accuracy, 
economy, continuity, system, speed, and repetition (Nevins and Hill, 1957). 
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means of coordination and control and that other firms had difficulty imitating these 
methods because they did not fully understand them.  He cites as an example that 
Studebaker conceived of conveyors only as labor-saving devices.  While much was made 
in the press, both then and through history, of the moving assembly line, the key to 
Fordism was the combination of progressive assembly and the production of fully 
interchangeable (standardized) parts – no fitting, and thus no skilled workers, required. 
In addition, Ford’s complete focus on a single model was also a critical part of his 
success, though it would later become a detriment.  According to Nevins and Hill (1954, 
p. 332):  “One factor thrusting numerous early companies into bankruptcy was their 
production of too many chassis.  Just before the First World War one of the largest 
automobile makers said than no company was strong enough to build two chassis every 
year without going broke.”  As early as 1906, auto manufacturers had concluded that the 
annual model change was a curse.  By producing multiple chassis and introducing new 
models every year, manufacturers were saddled with high design and tooling costs and 
were forced to produce a large variety of parts in small volumes at high cost.  The 
manufacturer faced selling these parts below cost or ruining its reputation.  The longer 
the company was in production, the larger the parts burden became.  Ford solved this 
problem by producing large volumes of a single chassis and making only minor styling 
changes from year to year.  Thus, Ford’s production system and strategy placed him in 
unique position early in the 20th century. 
GM later solved the multiple chassis problem differently, building on the SAE’s 
approach, with the introduction of the Pontiac in 1927 which initiated a program to 
standardize parts across its divisions (see chapter 5).  While this strategy would help GM 
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eventually emerge as the dominant firm in the industry, the corporation flirted with 
financial failure throughout its first decade.  This difficulty was due in part to the 
incomplete transition to the new manufacturing techniques and management systems that 
Ford exploited so fully.  Since it was not clear what technological configuration and price 
range would prove most successful, Durant pursued a strategy of diversification.  He 
assembled a large combination of automobile and parts manufacturing companies and 
purchased a wide variety of technologies. This strategy improved GM’s chances of 
owning a product innovation that proved to be a crucial refinement.  Unfortunately, it 
also meant GM was likely to purchase some market failures.  In fact, Durant’s rash 
behavior resulted in some spectacularly disastrous, as well as some brilliant, acquisitions.   
In addition, Durant failed to integrate the management of the companies he 
purchased or rationalize the product lines.  As a result, GM companies competed among 
themselves as much as with other firms.  And because each division produced a number 
of different chassis, GM was not able to fully realize the economies of scale afforded by 
the high volume production of the corporation as a whole.  Meanwhile, the parts 
manufacturing divisions continued to operate as independent companies concerned 
primarily with their own profitability rather than corporate level issues, as witnessed by 
the clash of priorities of the Fisher brothers and the GM board discussed in chapter 5.  As 
of 1918, a few profitable divisions were carrying the entire corporation.  These struggles 
were representative of the industry as a whole during this era. 
By 1916, the situation for market concentration was further reinforced.  
According to Rae (1959, p. 133),  
[N]o independent company founded after 1916 managed to survive for more than 
a few years.  This phenomenon occurred not in spite of the increasing use of 
motor vehicles, but rather because of it.  The day of the small-scale producer in 
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the automobile industry was over.  The successful manufacturer had to be able to 
produce in quantity and sell in a nation-wide market, and the needed investment 
in plant, equipment, and sales organization was prohibitively high for a 
newcomer to raise on the uncertain prospect of being able to break into a highly 
competitive business in the face of the existing well-established companies. 
The one major exception was the Chrysler Corporation, established in 1920.  However, 
the corporation was actually a reorganization of the Maxwell and Chalmers companies, 
and as such can not be considered a new enterprise. 
In summary, economies of scale, a cumulative parts burden, cumulative learning 
effects, positive returns to innovation, and process innovations that were difficult to adopt 
served as selection mechanisms by reducing the number of firms in the industry.  But 
other factors contributed to the failure rate of firms.  The redefinition of the automobile 
for the mass market, an emerging dominant design, and saturation of the market for 
expensive vehicles (see section 4.5.4) also played a significant role in the shakeout 
phenomenon.  Epstein (1972) concludes that “[t]he extraordinary exit figure in 1910, of 
26% of all firms engaged in the field, is probably due, above all, to the absolute falling 
off in the demand for high-priced cars which occurred in that year.”  Firms that were 
unwilling or unable to adapt to production of smaller lightweight vehicles were 
effectively weeded out.  In addition, the Panic of 1907 and ensuing recession (see section 
4.5.1) occurred just prior to the year in which the largest number of firms exited the 
industry and likely played a role in the failure of some of these firms, particularly those 
manufacturing expensive automobiles for the wealthy, who would have been hardest hit 
by the stock market plunge.  Thus, by contributing to the failure of specific firms, a 
random event and the selection environment influenced variation and further reinforced 
the emerging dominant design. 
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4.5 Technical and Institutional Context 
This section discusses five developments in the TIEC that provide the technical 
and institutional context for this era: the Panic of 1907; the Selden Patent patent dispute; 
the emergence of trade associations and their efforts to standardize parts and materials; 
the expansion and evolution of the autombile market; the activities of motoring clubs; 
and efforts to improve the condition of the country’s roads.   
4.5.1 The Panic of 1907 
After a period of economic prosperity, the nation faced an economic slump in 
early 1907.  The economic weakness was due in part to losses from the violent 
earthquake that shook the San Francisco Bay area on April 18, 1906 and the fires that 
ravaged San Francisco for the next four days.  However, in October, 1907, the economic 
downturn, an unusually tight money supply, and a failed attempt by F. A. Heinze to 
corner the stock of United Copper Company combined to trigger one of the most severe 
bank panics the country had experienced to date.  Heinze was both a speculator and a 
banker whose dealings involved “an intricate network of interlocking directorates across 
banks, brokerage houses, and trust companies in New York City.  Contemporary 
observers… believed that the close associations between bankers and brokers heightened 
depositors’ anxiety” (Tallman and Moen, 1990).  As news of Heinze’s financial losses 
and bank connections spread, depositors, fearing insolvency, rushed to withdraw their 
savings from banks where Heinze and his associates held prominent positions.  The bank 
run spread to the third largest trust in New York City, Knickerbocker Trust Company, 
whose president, Charles Barney, was also rumored to have been involved in Heinze’s 
corner attempt.  Because Barney also served on the board of directors of Trust Company 
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of America, the second largest trust in New York, it soon was involved as well.  The bank 
run lasted two weeks, during which Trust Company of America reportedly paid out $47.5 
million of its nearly $60 million total deposits.  
To avert the failure of several large trusts, J. P. Morgan channeled $3 million to 
Trust Company of America on Wednesday, October 23.  J. D. Rockefeller announced his 
support of Morgan and deposited $10 million with another trust.  However, with so many 
of New York’s banks in trouble, the crisis had spread to Wall Street.  On Thursday, 
October 24, no money was available on the New York Stock Exchange floor for the 
purchase of stock equity despite offers of up to 60% interest.  Prices plummeted and the 
stock market was threatened with total collapse. Less than an hour before the closing bell, 
J. P. Morgan organized a group of bankers who made a pool of $25 million available to 
the exchange.  The group provided an additional $10 million pool for call loans the 
following day and other sources provided $2.5 million.  Over a period of ten days, the 
U.S. Treasury deposited a total of $37.6 million in New York national banks and 
provided $36 million to meet bank runs.  In early November, Morgan convinced other 
trust presidents to provide another $25 million in loans to threatened institutions.  The 
panic finally eased when these presidents formed a consortium to support trust companies 
facing runs.  Though the panic had ended, the nation suffered a deep but brief recession 
in 1908 with GDP falling about 11%.  The stock market suffered more severely, with the 
Dow Jones Industrial Average falling about 50% from a peak value in January, 1906, 
before bottoming out in November of 1907. 
Bank runs and economic panics were fairly common in the 19th and early 20th 
century, occurring in 1819, 1837, 1857, 1873 and 1893.  The Panic of 1907 underscored 
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the weaknesses of the U.S. financial system and served as a catalyst for banking reform.  
In May, 1908, Congress passed the Aldrich-Vreeland Act, which eased the credit 
situation in the short-term and established the National Monetary Commission.  In 1912, 
the Commission recommended adoption of a central banking system to be coordinated by 
a board of commercial bankers.  Congress subsequently crafted the Owen-Glass Federal 
Reserve Act, enacted in December, 1913.  The Act established twelve regional Federal 
Reserve Banks to act as central banks for national and other member financial 
institutions.  The Banks were not Federal bodies, but were privately owned by the 
member banks.  However, the Act formed a public body, the Federal Reserve Board, to 
oversee the system rather than leave control in the hands of private bankers. The Act also 
created a new form of currency, the Federal Reserve Note, which was an obligation of the 
U.S. Treasury.46   The tight money supply encountered in 1907 arose in part because 
seasonal increases in economic activity, primarily driven by agriculture, were not 
matched by increases in the money supply. The Federal Reserve Banks were authorized 
to issue Federal Reserve Notes to solve this problem of inelasticity.  The Federal Reserve 
System was also authorized to establish the discount rate – the interest rate the Banks 
charged to its member institutions.  By making loans to commercial banks and issuing 
currency, the Federal Reserve System was intended to avoid the problems that 
contributed to the Panic of 1907. 
4.5.2 The Selden Patent Dispute 
After witnessing a demonstration of the Brayton engine in 1879, patent attorney 
George Selden drew up plans for a “road-locomotive” consisting of a four wheeled 
                                                 
46 The Federal Reserve Note now makes up the nation’s supply of paper money.   
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vehicle powered by a gasoline engine similar to Brayton’s.  Selden applied for a U.S. 
patent, but made minor changes to the application annually to delay its formal registration 
until November, 1895, the same month as the first U.S. reliability race which was held in 
Chicago (Rubenstein, 2001).  Although Selden had not invented any component of his 
design, he claimed it represented an original combination of elements.  The patent design 
was defined in broad terms, covering “the combination with a road locomotive, provided 
with suitable running gear including a propelling wheel and steering mechanism, of a 
liquid hydrocarbon gas-engine of the compression type, comprising one or more power 
cylinders, a suitable liquid-fuel receptacle, a power shaft connected with and arranged to 
run faster than the propelling wheel, an intermediate clutch or disconnecting device and a 
suitable carriage body adapted to the conveyance of person or goods” (U.S. Patent Office, 
2008).   
Selden sought financial backing to manufacture his automobile but ultimately was 
unsuccessful.  Though he never built a single vehicle, he claimed the engine and vehicle 
were operable and that the patent was basic.  Therefore, he asserted, it covered all 
vehicles built after 1879 that used a compression engine, and no automobiles could be 
built during the seventeen years that the patent was valid (1895-1912) without his 
permission.   
Lacking the resources to enforce his patent, Selden in 1899 assigned the rights to 
a group of investors that also bought the Electric Vehicle Company (EVC).  Selden and 
the investors believed that restricting production would maintain high prices and 
royalties.  After the EVC filed several infringement suits between 1900 and 1903, a group 
of automakers agreed to settle the dispute by recognizing the validity of the patent in 
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exchange for exclusive license to manufacture automobiles under its stipulations.  As part 
of the agreement, a new trade organization called the Association of Licensed 
Automobile Manufacturers (ALAM) was formed to enforce the license and prevent 
‘disreputable’ manufacturers from entering the business (May, 1990).  The ALAM leased 
to its members the right to sell a limited number of automobiles.  The ALAM also was 
charged with deciding what companies should be sued for patent infringement 
(Rubenstein, 2001).  However, since the ALAM reserved the right to deny licenses, many 
industry observers opposed the patent claim on ethical grounds (Nevins and Hill, 1954). 
Ford approached the president of the ALAM after forming the Ford Motor 
Company in 1903 but was told the association likely would not rule favorably on an 
application because the company was nothing but an ‘assemblage’ plant rather than a true 
manufacturer.  ALAM officials recommended that Ford delay application until the 
company had its own plant (Nevins and Hill, 1954).  A fierce dispute ensued, with Ford 
publicly challenging the ALAM to take legal action.  The ALAM subsequently filed 
infringement suits against Ford, Ford’s New York sales agent, and a company that had 
purchased a Ford automobile.  The ALAM also sued a foreign auto manufacturer 
(Panhard et Levassor), and in 1904, an automobile importer.   
The five lawsuits were eventually combined into one and litigation dragged out 
over the next five years. The defense prepared arguments based on two interpretations of 
the patent: either the patent was broad, covering all engines of the compression type, or it 
was specific to automobiles utilizing the two-stroke, external compression, Brayton 
engine.  Under the first interpretation, the defense argued, the patent was invalid due to 
“prior art” since patents, devices, and machines that antedated Selden’s application 
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demonstrated that it did not represent a new invention.  Under the second interpretation, 
they denied any infringement because nearly all gasoline automobile engines employed 
the four-stroke internal compression Otto cycle. 
In early 1905, the ALAM gained control of the lease of Madison Square Garden, 
where the annual Automobile Show was held, and announced that only ALAM members 
would be permitted to exhibit at the show.  Less than a month later, twenty independent 
manufacturers formed the American Motor Car Manufacturers Association (AMCMA) 
and leased nearby property to house its own exhibition.  The AMCMA was formed with 
seven objectives which basically served in the same capacity as the ALAM did for its 
members: 1) to arrange for public exhibition of members’ cars; 2) to promote races; 3) to 
promote the sale of members’ cars; 4) to encourage public interest in automobiles; 5) to 
establish agencies; 6) to promote good roads; and 7) to exchange technical information.  
By 1908, the AMCMA consisted of 48 companies. 
As the litigation dragged on, the ALAM sent notices demanding payment of 
royalty fees by owners of imported automobiles and filed an additional seventy suits 
against independent manufacturers (Nevins and Hill, 1954).  The fate of the industry 
depended on resolution of the case against Ford, which finally was decided in September, 
1909, when the judge filed in favor of Selden.  Ford had introduced the Model T a year 
earlier and was liable for royalties running into the millions of dollars on the cars the 
company had sold since being formed in 1903 (Rubenstein, 2001).  Sorensen (1956) 
states that if the decision had been upheld Ford would have faced financial ruin, though 
others dispute this claim. 
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Independent manufacturers rapidly withdrew from the AMCMA and sought 
licenses from the ALAM; on February 9, the AMCMA disbanded.  However, Ford’s 
resolution never faltered, and he promptly appealed the court’s decision.  In January, 
1911, the U.S. Court of Appeals upheld the validity of the Selden patent but ruled that it 
only covered automobiles built with the modified two-stroke Brayton-type engine Selden 
had shown in his application.  The court therefore found that the patent had not been 
infringed.  With only two years remaining on the now worthless patent, the ALAM 
decided not to appeal (Nevins and Hill, 1954; May, 1990).  The ALAM was disbanded in 
1911 and transferred responsibility for promoting and improving the industry to the 
newly organized Automobile Board of Trade, which in 1914 became the National 
Automobile Chamber of Commerce (NACC).47  To prevent a similar costly patent 
dispute in the future, the NACC instituted a cross-licensing agreement among its 
members (Flink, 1988). 
4.5.3 Trade Associations and Parts Standardization, 1905-1910 
In an editorial in 1902, Peter Heldt of The Horseless Age suggested that a 
technical society devoted to automobiles would be best suited to solving technical 
questions requiring cooperation among industry engineers.  Horace Swetland, whose 
editorials in The Automobile had served as the voice of the automobile engineer, also 
promoted the idea.  In 1905, a group of trade journalists founded the Society of 
                                                 
47 The NACC became the Automobile Manufacturers Association in 1932, and then the Motor Vehicle 
Manufacturers Association (MVMA) in 1972 (Flink, 1988).  When foreign manufacturers began 
production in the U.S., they joined the MVMA.  Due to differences in objectives between these foreign 
owned companies and the remaining U.S. companies, the ‘big three’ (Ford, GM, and Chrysler) dissolved 
the MVMA in 1992 and formed the American Automobile Manufacturers Association (AAMA), a U.S. 
only lobbying group.  When Daimler-Benz purchased Chrysler in 1998, the AAMA was dissolved.  Ford 
and GM now participate in the international organization, the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers which 
was created in 1998 (Rubenstein, 2001). 
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Automobile Engineers (SAE)48 to serve this function, primarily through the publication 
of technical articles.  Andrew Riker, an automotive engineer who had built electric cars 
beginning in 1888 and gasoline cars for Locomobile after 1902, served as the first 
president and Henry Ford served as the first vice president.  Beginning with 30 members, 
the society grew over the next ten years, adding full-time staff and the publication of a 
technical journal, the SAE Transactions (SAE, 2007; Flink, 1988). 
Perhaps the most valuable contribution of the SAE came through work begun by 
the Association of Licensed Automobile Manufacturers (ALAM).  Although the ALAM 
was organized to enforce the Selden patent and therefore served as an instrument to wield 
monopolistic market control, in 1905 it established a Mechanical Branch whose aim was 
to promote technical collaboration among manufacturers.  Composed of around 100 
engineers and plant superintendents who met regularly to exchange information, the 
Mechanical Branch initiated a program to standardize automotive parts and materials.  It 
also established a metallurgy lab to test automotive parts and materials. 
During the Panic of 1907, funding for the ALAM’s Mechanical Branch was cut 
and never restored.  Its work and valuable library was transferred to the SAE in 1910.  In 
the process, the SAE’s membership jumped from 310 to 899.  Members previously 
associated with the ALAM who became influential officers in SAE included Coker 
Clarkson, manager of the Mechanical Branch, and Henry Souther, who had been in 
charge of ALAM’s experimental and testing laboratory.  Clarkson, Souther, and SAE 
president Howard Coffin, who was also vice-president of the Hudson Motor Car 
                                                 
48 With Orville Wright’s backing, the SAE incorporated the aeronautical industry in 1916 and changed its 
name to the Society of Automotive Engineers to represent any form of self-powered vehicle. 
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Company, were largely responsible for completing the important work on standardization 
begun by the Mechanical Branch (Barnes, 1921). 
Prior to 1910, automotive manufacturers were using at least 800 different bolts, 
800 different sized lock washers, 1,600 different sizes of steel tubing, and some 230 
different steel alloys (Barnes, 1921; Epstein, 1972).  The ALAM Mechanical Branch and 
the SAE standardized small parts, including spark plugs, screw threads, nuts, bolts, 
tubing, and rods, resulting in 16 standard sizes of washers and 210 types of steel tubing.  
The development of uniform specifications for 50 steel alloys allowed steel makers to 
supply superior grade materials to the industry (Epstein, 1972; May, 1990). 
In general, the SAE represented the interests of small automotive firms whose 
employees constituted most of its membership.  These firms had the most to gain from 
the standardization of parts because it allowed them to purchase small orders of readily 
available, standard, small components at much lower prices, essentially helping them 
realize economies of scale formerly only available to large manufacturers.  
Unfortunately, standardization ultimately failed to keep the small producer competitive 
(Flink, 1988).  Nonetheless, standardization of parts brought order out of chaos and 
eliminated waste. And because of the micro scale of these parts, standardization did not 
stifle innovation in vehicle design (Epstein, 1972). 
4.5.4 Market Expansion 
At the beginning of the century, popular opinion held that the motor vehicle 
would never be more than a toy for the rich.  Ford (Ford and Crowther, 1922, p. 36) 
recalled, “No man of money even thought of it as a commercial possibility… [I]n the 
beginning there was hardly any one who sensed that the automobile could be a large 
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factor in industry. The most optimistic hoped only for a development akin to that of the 
bicycle.”  But the market for automobiles quickly shifted from the very wealthy to the 
lower upper class.  According to Nevins and Hill (1954, p. 241) “…as a group, doctors 
were among the first to make significant use of the automobile.”  Epstein (1972, p. 95-97) 
lists the occupation of the first purchasers of automobiles as capitalists, manufacturers, 
merchants and physicians.  Notably, among the purchasers of the first twenty Waverly 
Electric cars sold in Detroit by 1898 there are six “ladies – wives of the above class, 
including two wives of bankers.”  Purchasers of the relatively inexpensive Olds curved 
dash model between 1900 and 1903 were mostly merchants and physicians, and no 
capitalists or manufacturers are listed.   
Beginning in 1904, the U.S. enjoyed a period of growing prosperity the scale of 
which had never before been seen.  Political reforms and the rise of new industrial 
methods resulted in an increase in production, incomes, and standards of living.  
Technological innovation had brought the telephone, electric lighting, the phonograph, 
modern plumbing, and the bicycle.  Automobile production reached 11,000 units in 1903 
and doubled in 1904. 
The growing popularity of the automobile was accompanied by a shift in the 
functional definition of the product.  According to Epstein (1972), the purposes of the 
motor vehicle can be classified under four headings: transportation service, sport, 
personal possession, and social prestige.  As ‘playthings for the rich,’ the earliest 
automobiles largely fulfilled the desire for sport – the thrill of rapid, cross country transit 
– and social prestige – a public demonstration of wealth.  A writer in the Independent 
declared in 1906, “The man who owns a motorcar gets for himself, besides the joys of 
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touring, the adulation of the walking crowd, and the daring driver of a racing machine 
that bounds and rushes and disappears in the perspective in a thunder of explosions is a 
god to the women” (cited in Flink, 1970, p. 64).  The social prestige conveyed by 
automobile ownership was so alluring that by 1908 many Americans were recklessly 
mortgaging their homes to purchase vehicles they could not afford, leading even to 
foreclosures (Flink, 1970). 
But to the physician who traveled frequently about town, the automobile was 
utilitarian as well, providing more rapid transport and promising more economical service 
than a horse and buggy.  The initial expense of a moderately priced motor car was 
comparable to that of a carriage and, although the monthly maintenance costs of early 
automobiles often turned out to be more than the upkeep of a horse, the automobile could 
do far more work and was likely to last longer than a hard-used horse (Flink, 1970).  The 
automobile was not willful and unpredictable, nor was it susceptible to heat or fatigue. 
By 1905, demand for automobiles outstripped capacity, and cars had gone from a 
fashionable novelty for the very rich to a necessity for well-to-do business and 
professional men (Nevins and Hill, 1954).  Automobile manufacturing was significant 
enough for the U.S. Bureau of the Census to publish separate statistics for industry that 
year.  In the introduction to the report, George E. Oller commented, “As a means of 
amusement, [the automobile’s] popularity may fluctuate or decline, but its practical value 
has been so thoroughly demonstrated that its use will doubtless become more general 
each year, until it is displaced by some vehicle as much its superior as the automobile is 
the superior of the horse and wagon” (cited in Jarvis, 1972, p. 64).  The automobile was 
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rapidly becoming a utilitarian product that fulfilled the necessary service of 
transportation, though with initial and repair costs it was still limited to the well-off. 
At the turn of the century, farmers generally viewed the automobile with 
indifference.  But by 1904, they became noticeably hostile with the rise of touring.  The 
early touring automobiles were purchased by wealthy people “of a sporting and 
adventurous turn of mind who sometimes used them ruthlessly on the highways” (Pound, 
1934, p. 38-39).  Speeding automobiles on dirt roads endangered horses and livestock and 
raised clouds of dust that settled on crops, houses, barns, and wash hung out to dry (Flink, 
1970).  At first, farmers could not foresee owning cars themselves, and felt the 
automobile “flaunted idleness and conspicuous consumption in the faces of hardworking, 
hard-pinched men” (Nevins and Hill, 1954, p. 397).  Some farmers took extreme actions, 
plowing up roads, stringing barbed wire across roads, threatening to boycott businessmen 
who purchased cars, and lobbying for resolutions to ban automobiles from state roads.  
However, most opposition was more balanced, with agricultural publications and 
organizations lobbying for better legislation and enforcement of existing laws regarding 
speed and reckless driving (Flink, 1970). 
The anti-automobile sentiment among farmers was short-lived as prosperous 
farmers became ever more familiar with the vehicles and began to envision owning 
automobiles themselves.  A number of manufacturers in the Midwest produced cheap 
buggy-type cars with a light surrey body, solid rubber tires on carriage wheels, a small 
one- or two-cylinder engine mounted under the seat, and chain or rope drives.  These cars 
were well-suited to navigating poor rural roads and if they did get stuck were light 
enough to easily be pushed out (Flink, 1970).  However, they suffered from inherent 
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mechanical weaknesses and required frequent repairs.  In 1906, Ford introduced the 
rugged and moderately priced Model N that delivered more comfort, reliability, and 
performance for a similar price.  By 1907, farmers’ opposition to the automobile had 
given way to a substantial rural market and dealers in many medium-sized cities were 
selling more cars to farmers than to city inhabitants.  The American Motor Car 
Manufacturers’ Association reported in 1909 that manufacturers were selling to two large 
new segments: the farmer and the middle class (Flink, 1970).   
Americans were relatively wealthy by European standards, the wealth was more 
equally distributed, and social class distinctions were less pronounced.  As a result, the 
U.S. constituted a large market for standardized, homogenous products – the perfect 
conditions for mass production.  In addition, much of the population was highly 
dispersed, creating a large market for a rugged vehicle capable of rapid, long-distance 
travel.  The motor car could bring significant advantages to these rural populations.  Prior 
to the automobile, traveling 20 or 30 miles by horse took a whole day and the farmer was 
dependent on the railroad to transport his products to the market.  With an automobile, 
the farmer’s social radius expanded and he could market directly to a wider area. 
Figure 4-2 shows sales of motor vehicles between 1903 and 1916 stratified by 
three price classes.  Even in 1903, low-priced cars were each outselling the medium- and 
high-price categories.  At that time, most of the vehicles in the least expensive class were 
light, low-horsepower, surrey-styled vehicles, with the Olds curved dash accounting for 
more than half of these sales.49  These vehicles tended to rattle apart quickly on rough 
                                                 
49 Flink (1988, p. 33) refers to the curved dash as “merely a motorized horse buggy.”  Olds reportedly sold 
4,000 vehicles in 1903, while a total of 7,253 vehicles were sold for less that $1,375 (Epstein, 1972). 
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country roads.  By 1910, however, surrey-style design was largely abandoned and the 
reliability of vehicles in this price class was much improved. 
 
Figure 4-2: Sales by Price Class 
Source: Based on data from Epstein (1972, Appendix B) 
This development of a new market for automobiles after 1900 represents the onset 
of wider diffusion of the motor vehicle.  The niche hypothesis asserts that growth in 
initial niche markets yields cost reductions through learning-by-doing and economies of 
scale, and that these reductions facilitate diffusion to wider markets.  However, as the 
automobile was penetrating a new segment, the market for expensive cars was no longer 
growing, it was saturating – buyers in this market were not purchasing their first car, but 
were almost exclusively replacing an older car.  The proportion of the market consisting 











































began a steady decline.  Similarly, expensive cars priced over $2,775 declined after 
reaching 31% of the market in 1907.  The down-turn in demand for expensive motor 
vehicles in 1908 may be attributed at least partially to the Panic of 1907 and the ensuing 
recession (see section 4.5.1).  It is likely that buyers of this class of vehicles were hit 
hardest by the stock market plunge in 1908, but it appears that many of these purchases 
were delayed rather than foregone.  As shown in Figure 4-2, sales of expensive cars 
spiked in 1909 then stabilized in 1910 at an average of 17,400 per year, which is slightly 
lower than Epstein’s (1972) estimate of replacement demand.   
The original niche markets for gasoline automobiles were not only stabilizing, but  
Figure 4-3 shows that the trend within the high-price category between 1903 and 1908 
was, if anything, toward higher price, not lower, since vehicles priced above $3,375 were 
gaining market share over those priced between $2,775 and $3,775.  Instead, innovation 
was improving the performance of these vehicles relative to their functional 
requirements.  According to Epstein (1972), the trend in these cars was toward ever 
higher horsepower and weight.  Thus, while in 1904, the high-priced vehicle was 
represented by a four cylinder vehicle, by 1916, it was more likely a six-cylinder that 
produced 60 hp.  Similarly, the representative low-priced vehicle had progressed from a 
light two-cylinder engine to a four-cylinder that produced 30 hp.  Thus, while vehicles in 
all price classes had improved dramatically in performance, the relative size, 
workmanship, and performance of each class remained comparable over the period. 
While demand for the highest price class had stabilized, demand for medium-
priced vehicles continued to grow, but at an ever decreasing rate.  With a midpoint 
around $2,000, the cost of these vehicles was still high enough that “their consumption 
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was mainly indulged in, up to 1910-1911, by the very wealthy” (Epstein, 1972, p. 94).50  
Thus, the market for cars priced above $1,375 consisted primarily of manufacturers, 








































$2,776-$3,775 $3,776-$4,775 > $4,775
 
Figure 4-3: Market Share within the High-Price Category 
Source: Based on Epstein (1972, Appendix B). 
Meanwhile, sales of inexpensive cars experienced the highest rate of change with 
growth actually accelerating during this period.  In 1903, merchants and physicians 
dominated this market.  As shown in Figure 4-4, the trend within this category after 1907 
was clearly toward lower price as well as improved performance, with sales under $675 
gaining market share on those priced between $675 and $1,375.  By 1915, cars selling for 
                                                 
50 For reference, nominal GDP per capita was only $322 in 1903 and rose to $362 by 1910. 
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under $1,375 constituted nearly 75% of the market, while those priced above $2,775 







































up to $675 $676-$875 876-1375
 
Figure 4-4: Market Share within the Low-Price Category 
Source: Based on Epstein (1972, Appendix B). 
This pattern is not consistent with the assertions of the niche hypothesis.  In fact, 
while some of the largest manufacturers offered models in both the low- and medium- 
priced classes, the market for expensive touring cars was for the most part served by 
different manufacturers than the market for inexpensive cars.  The strategy among 
makers of the most expensive vehicles was not to achieve high volume sales or low price, 
but rather to maintain high quality through hand craftsmanship, increase power, and 
sustain high prices and thus high profits.  Such firms that were unwilling or unable to 
adapt to production of smaller lightweight vehicles faced fierce competition within a 
                                                 
51 Epstein’s (1972) data is not adjusted for purchasing power. 
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stagnating market.  Epstein (1972) asserts that the saturation of the high-priced market 
was the most significant factor behind the extraordinary number of firms that exited the 
industry in 1910 (see section 4.4). 
Henry Leland at the Cadillac Motor Car Company was one of the first 
manufacturers to make progress in reducing costs and maintaining quality in volume 
production.  However, between 1903 and 1908 the company moved toward production of 
moderately priced cars of exceptional quality like the Cadillac Model 30 which sold for 
$1,400 in 1908 (Flink, 1988).  While a few manufacturers like Brush attempted to make 
cars for the lowest price bracket (under $675), their methods of reducing costs often led 
to poor quality vehicles with significant mechanical weaknesses.  In this effort, Ford 
emerged the leader in pursuing ever lower prices and unprecedented volume production 
of reliable, high quality, basic transportation, recognizing the vast market attainable with 
this novel strategy.  By 1915, the Ford Model T was priced starting at $390 and 
accounted for 53% of all automobile sales and roughly 70% of sales under $1,375 
(Epstein, 1972; Cain, 2006; Nevins and Hill, 1954).  While designed with the rural 
market in mind, the low price, high reliability and high quality of Ford’s vehicles also 
served the needs of the urban middle class. 
In 1900, as many as 57 plants were engaged in manufacturing automobiles, 
though some were still in the experimental stages.  Around 4,000 motor vehicles were 
manufactured that year, but designs and technology varied dramatically and steam- and 
electric-powered vehicles accounted for at least 75%.  But by 1910, sales of motor 
vehicles exceeded 180,000 units (Cain, 2006) and the extreme variety of product 
configurations and the accompanying customer confusion had largely disappeared.  A 
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standard design had appeared that served the great majority of the market: a shaft driven, 
magneto equipped, vehicle powered by a water-cooled, four-stroke, four-cylinder, 
gasoline internal combustion engine mounted vertically under a front hood, with a 
steering wheel and a three-speed sliding-gear transmission (Epstein, 1972). 
4.5.5 Motoring Clubs, 1901-1910 
The first automobile club, the American Motor League, was formed on November 
1, 1895, just prior to the Chicago Times-Herald race.  The organization was premature 
and failed, but several local automobile clubs in large cities were active by the turn of the 
century.  The members of these early clubs were almost exclusively very wealthy and 
socially prominent and the clubs emphasized social functions.  However, automobile 
ownership quickly became too widespread to form the basis for an exclusive social club.  
At least twenty-two local organizations existed by early 1901 and almost 100 U.S. clubs 
were active by early 1904 (Flink, 1970).  Motoring was becoming increasingly utilitarian 
by 1905, and the majority of motorists were concerned with local issues of motor vehicle 
legislation, road improvements, and community relations.  Clubs in smaller cities and 
rural areas developed into democratic organizations that charged small dues, drew 
membership from a wide cross section of the population, and set limited practical goals.   
Yet many motorists believed in the need for a national association of local clubs 
to deal with issues beyond local concerns.  Two such affiliations were founded in 1902.  
In February, eight local clubs founded the American Automobile Association (AAA).  In 
March, the American Motor League (AML) was revived by its original organizers and 
representatives from two cycling associations: the League of American Wheelmen and 
the National Cycling Association.  The AML was organized as a national association of 
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individuals and aimed to advance the interests of motorists and add to the value of 
motoring through reports of the mechanical features of automobiles, education, lobbying, 
defense of motoring rights, and promoting better roads.  The AML intended to establish 
branches throughout the states, but its influence never rivaled that of the AAA.   
The AAA was designed as an affiliation of local clubs that would pursue 
legislative issues, protect the interests of motorists, and promote the construction and 
maintenance of good roads and highways.  In mid-1903, the AAA opened its membership 
to individual motorists.  However, legislative issues were largely local and aggressively 
pursued by local clubs.  Therefore, the AAA accomplished little in the first few years.  
Dissention erupted among the organization’s officers and dissatisfied clubs began to 
withdraw, believing the AAA delivered little for their dues.  The AAA accepted a more 
limited role for the national organization, granting more power at the local level, and 
membership began to rise again in 1908.  At the same time, the organization established a 
relationship with the automobile industry by granting three seats on its board of directors 
to the National Association of Automobile Manufacturers (NAAM) in exchange for a 
$5,000 contribution.  By 1909, the AAA consisted of 225 clubs from thirty state 
associations with total membership over 15,000 and was firmly established as the voice 
of the American motorist (Flink, 1970). 
Public safety concerns prompted municipalities and states to consider legislation 
regarding vehicle registration, speed regulation and driver licensing.  Automobile clubs 
actively opposed the first two.  Registrations, initiated in New York in 1901, allowed 
officials to pursue reckless and speeding drivers and to track down owners who evaded 
vehicle property taxes.  Other states followed suit in 1903.  Registrations were either 
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annual or perennial and in some states were initially established at the county level, 
requiring motorist to obtain multiple registrations.  Automobile clubs and the NAAM 
contested the legality of compulsory registration, claiming class discrimination since 
horse-drawn vehicles were not required to register and display identification tags.  
However, motorists’ main objections were based on fear of punishment – arrest, fines, 
imprisonment, and damage claim liabilities – for tax evasion, reckless driving, and 
accidents.  Of course, such illegitimate objections were never voiced in court and the 
constitutionality of small registration fees was repeatedly upheld.   
Automobile associations shifted attention to establishing reasonable state laws to 
avoid multiple and possibly costly fees at the municipal level.  Eventually, these 
associations recognized that registration taxes were often used to improve roads and as 
such were a benefit to their members.  By 1910, thirty-six states had enacted motor 
vehicle registration laws, and all states had done so by 1915 (Flink, 1970). 
4.5.6 Road Improvements, 1880-1916 
At the turn of the century, American roads were in poor condition compared to 
European countries, particularly France where the first automotive industry was born.  
The U.S. federal government was involved in road-building early in the 19th century, but 
abandoned this role in 1837 due to the rapid growth of railroads and an economic 
depression which followed a banking panic.52  Therefore, constructing and marking roads 
was left to counties and municipalities and it was common for road conditions to change 
dramatically at county lines. 
                                                 
52 The Panic of 1837 was preceded by a speculative bubble which burst in May.  An unprecedented number 
of banks failed and unemployment reached record levels during the ensuing five-year depression. 
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Bicycle manufacturers, dealers, and enthusiasts began promoting better roads as 
early as 1880.  At the 1893 World’s Fair in Chicago, the Columbia Exposition, General 
Roy Stone organized the National League for Good Roads which established branches in 
most states.  With Albert Pope’s assistance, the League of American Wheelmen, a 
bicycling organization, drafted a petition to Congress, resulting in the birth in 1893 of the 
Office of Road Inquiry in the U.S. Department of Agriculture. This agency became the 
Office of Public Roads, which conducted a census of American roads in 1904.  The 
census reported that only 7% of U.S. roads were surfaced, most with just gravel.  There 
was only one mile of improved road per 492 inhabitants, and most of this mileage was of 
poor quality unsuitable for steady motor vehicle use (Flink, 1970).  In truth, there still 
were few roads passable by automobile. 
With the demise of the bicycle industry, leadership for the “good roads 
movement” shifted to automobile interests around 1903.  However, the leaders were 
largely the same individuals, as bicycle manufacturers entered the automotive industry 
and bicycle enthusiasts bought automobiles and joined or organized motoring clubs.  For 
example, by 1899, Albert Pope had become one of the country’s leading automobile 
manufacturers with the production of 500 electric and 40 gasoline vehicles (Rae, 1959).   
The influence of motor vehicles and the automobile clubs propelled the need for 
good roads to public consciousness.  Prominent political leaders, including President 
Theodore Roosevelt, attended the National Good Roads Convention in St. Louis in 1903, 
where resolutions were passed endorsing federal support for highway construction and 
state aid to counties and municipalities.  Activists exploited issues of popular appeal, 
including the high cost of transporting farm products to the market, which was due in part 
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to high rates charged by the railroads (Flink, 1970; Geels, 2005b).  The AAA and the 
National Grange, representing motorists and farmers respectively, were the dominant 
influences at the second Good Roads Convention in 1909. 
The federal government gradually increased funding for the Office of Public 
Roads and states increasingly passed legislation designed to improve highways, often 
funding road construction using revenues from registration fees.  By 1910, total mileage 
of improved roads had increased by 48,266 miles, but this represented only a 1.5 
percentage point gain over 1904.  More significantly, gravel was being replaced by 
macadam.  Yet these improvements were easily offset by the rising demands of 
automobile traffic as even macadam broke down rapidly under frequent use.  Concrete, 
first used on a 24-mile stretch of highway to Ford Highland Park plant in Michigan in 
1908, proved to be the most durable and economical solution.  Some 750 miles of 
concrete roads were added nationwide in 1912 and 1913.  California rapidly adopted the 
use of concrete to serve the transportation needs of its agriculture, covering 35% of its 
2,600 miles of improved roads with concrete by 1914 (Nevins and Hill, 1954; Flink, 
1988). 
In 1912, a businessman and automobile enthusiast pitched an idea for a 
continuous, coast-to-coast highway to a group of prominent automotive and supplier 
executives.  Led by automobile interests, the Lincoln Highway Association was 
organized in 1913, having already garnered pledges for four of the estimated $10 million 
required for the project.  Although it was approved by the Conference of Governors that 
year, planning for the project was plagued by a multitude of problems, including 
financing, pressure to change the route, and the inability of states and communities to act 
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harmoniously.  The association downgraded its activities and the road was never 
completed under its original name, the Lincoln Highway.  The federal government 
eventually took over the task in 1923 and used its own system of numbering its routes 
(Nevins and Hill, 1954). 
The breakthrough in road construction began in 1916 when Congress passed the 
Federal Aid Road Act, appropriating $75 million to be distributed to states in matching 
grants over a period of five years.  The main intent of federal involvement was to 
improve postal roads for Rural Free Delivery instituted by the Post Office in 1896.  To 
receive matching grants, states had to have “properly constituted highway departments to 
handle the road-building projects.  The result was the modernization of all state activity, 
as well as a marked increase in it” (Nevins and Hill, 1954, p. 487).   
4.6 Synthesis and Analysis 
This section analyzes the history of the industry between 1900 and 1915 using the 
approach developed in chapter 2.  This era traces the industry’s first transitional phase 
and includes the onset of the first specific phase around 1910.  Because history is 
cumulative, this analysis also builds on the narrative from chapter 3, which covers the 
industry’s emergent phase. 
Section 4.6.1 discusses the emerging dominant design and diffusion of the 
gasoline automobile into wider markets.  The QE and MLP theories assert that, within 
niche markets, product and process improvements achieved through learning-by-doing 
and learning-by-interacting with users allow new technologies to define or conquer new 
niches.  This process of niche proliferation then allows further cost reductions through 
economies of scale, which facilitates diffusion to wider markets.  I find that the history of 
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the diffusion of automobiles was not consistent with the assertions of the QE and MLP 
theories in the following ways.  First, movement from niches to a wider market occurred 
simultaneously with a functional redefinition of the automobile.  The needs of this market 
were not discovered within the niche, nor were product improvements relative to these 
needs achieved in the niche market.  Product improvements and cost reductions from 
both process innovations and economies of scale were all realized within the new market 
for reliable, rugged, inexpensive vehicles.  And because the vast, primarily rural, low-
price market can not be accurately described as a market niche, niche branching, niche 
proliferation, or niche market growth are not accurate descriptions of the diffusion of the 
gasoline motor-vehicle into mass markets. 
Section 4.6.2 discusses the process innovations that allowed motor vehicles to 
conquer the mass market.  I identify four facets of the TIEC that enabled the volume 
production of automobiles.  I find that Ford’s innovative production system resulted from 
a highly synthetic process and relied on knowledge spillovers as well as learning-by-
doing.  However, Ford’s greatest accomplishment was the manufacture of a product of 
both high quality and low cost, a combination that had not yet been achieved in the 
industry.  Ford’s success was accomplished by jointly addressing issues of product design 
and manufacturing processes. Thus, product and process innovations that served the 
needs of wider markets originated concurrently with the development of the large rural 
market and arose from a more complex process than simple learning-by-doing. 
In section 4.6.3 I address the mechanisms of learning and innovation during the 
transitional and early specific phases.  I find that the emphasis on learning-by-interacting 
with users and learning-by-doing found in the QE and MLP literatures is overly 
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simplistic.  While these were important mechanisms of learning during this timeframe, 
spillovers and learning-by-interacting with suppliers were also extremely prominent.  
Consistent with the assertions of the industry life-cycle model, the first attempts at 
systematic research within firms were instituted at the onset of the specific phase. 
Section 4.6.4 explores the continuing development of the technological nexus 
linking variation and selection and the ongoing mutual adaptation of the technology and 
institutions.  I find that the technology itself was a major factor in altering the selection 
environment, first inhibiting then later enhancing diffusion to wider markets.  Several 
new institutions emerged during the transitional phase, including trade organizations that 
served communication among engineers, connected manufacturers to customers, 
established industry standards, and lobbied for road improvements and the rationalization 
of registration laws.  I also identify one set of institutions, the Selden patent and the 
ALAM, that was misaligned with emerging rules in the TIEC, the redefinition of the 
automobile, and the needs of the mass market.  Motoring clubs also emerged in the 
technological nexus and their role changed as the era progressed.  I find that the process 
of embedding was underway and many of the activities responsible for the co-evolution 
of technologies and institutions were consistent with QE theory’s technological nexus 
description.  However, most of these adaptations were simultaneous with or lagged 
behind the diffusion of the automobile into wider markets.  Thus, success wider markets 
did not depend on these processes occurring first.  
In chapter 2, I asserted that a socio-technical regime exists when a technology and 
sector have achieved the specific phase and when the stability of that specific phase is 
supported by the alignment of the technology, institutions, physical infrastructure.  In 
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section 4.6.5, I summarize the role of the alignment in the success of the automobile in 
the mass market.  A number of emerging institutions were increasing the alignment of 
rules and organizations but one set of institutions was misaligned with emerging rules in 
the industry and the TIEC.  I determine that physical infrastructure was not well aligned 
with the mass use of automobiles at the onset of the specific phase.  Thus, while stability 
was increasing during that phase, the automobile regime was still immature and the 
technology was not yet “locked in.” 
Section 4.6.6 summarizes the role of the Panic of 1907 and the ensuing recession 
in the diffusion of the gasoline automobile to wider markets.  By contributing to the 
downturn in sales of the most expensive vehicles in 1908 and to the high failure rate of 
manufacturing firms in 1909, event served as a selection mechanism, reducing variety of 
firms and products.  It also supported Henry Ford’s efforts gain control of the Ford Motor 
Company and pursue production of a single inexpensive model, a strategy that was 
critical to the success of the automobile in the mass market. 
Finally, section 4.6.7 summarizes the events during the time period covered by 
this chapter and the findings of this analysis. 
4.6.1 Emerging Dominant Design and Wider Diffusion 
The MLP and QE theories assert that new technologies emerge within niche 
markets.  Within these niches, manufacturers learn about users’ needs and users learn 
about product performance through learning-by-interacting.  Manufacturers then improve 
the technology in terms of those needs and achieve lower costs through learning-by-
doing.  Consequently, growth of niche markets, or the penetration of new niches allows 
manufacturers to achieve economies of scale and further reduce costs.  Once cost and 
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performance are improved, the technology enters wider markets where it competes with 
existing technologies.  This diffusion to wider markets occurs as the technology moves 
through what I have called the transitional phase to the specific phase.  This transition is 
marked by the emergence of a dominant design.  In the specific phase, products 
proliferate around this design, competing based on price and quality. 
By 1910, a dominant design for gasoline motor vehicles was coalescing and the 
technology had begun conquering what proved to be a mass market consisting of farmers 
and the growing middle class.  The analysis in this section shows that the movement from 
niches to this mass market occurred simultaneously with a functional redefinition of the 
automobile.  Further, cost reductions were realized within the mass market.  Thus, growth 
in niche markets did not provide the economies of scale that reduced the costs of motor 
vehicles and facilitated diffusion to wider markets.  Further, the needs of the new market 
for reliability, ruggedness, high quality and low price were not discovered within the 
niche market, nor were product improvements relative to these needs achieved in the 
niche market.  And because the vast, primarily rural, low-price market can not be 
accurately described as a market niche, niche branching, niche proliferation, or niche 
market growth are not accurate descriptions of the diffusion of the gasoline motor-vehicle 
into wider markets.  In fact, niche branching occurred after diffusion to the mass market.  
The gasoline motor vehicle conquered the urban niche occupied by electric vehicles after 
being vastly improved for use in the mass market.  Therefore, the role of niche markets in 
the transitional phase of the automobile is not consistent with the characterization found 
in the MLP and QE theories of transitions.   
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During the emergent phase discussed in chapter 3, individual entrepreneurs 
borrowed from the product and production technologies with which they were 
experienced, resulting in a bewildering variety of solutions to the basic engineering 
problem of providing motorized travel.  As the industry entered the transitional phase 
around the turn of the century, the original function of the motor vehicle as a novelty that 
provided sport and prestige for the very wealthy began to yield to more practical 
applications.  All of the motorized transport options – powered by electric motors, steam 
engines, or gasoline ICE – could replace existing technology, but each option was best 
suited to a narrow application or niche market.  Thus, while some initial niches were 
defined by geographic preferences and infrastructure as discussed in the previous chapter, 
functional requirements became increasingly important during the transitional phase. 
Electric vehicles were easy to operate, quiet and odorless and therefore were best 
suited to the urban niche market, where they served as a direct replacement for fine 
carriages by providing both clean practical transport and social prestige.  They were 
especially favored by wealthy women.  However, because of their limited range and the 
lack of refueling infrastructure beyond city limits, electric motor vehicles did not provide 
any new functionality.  Steam-powered and gasoline internal-combustion engine motor 
vehicles combined the flexibility of bicycles and horse-drawn vehicles with the speed and 
long distance capabilities of rail to provide a new function – touring – that fulfilled the 
desire for entertainment, sport, and thrill, while also conveying social prestige.  These 
vehicles could also fulfill the need for local travel in cities, but they were odiferous and 
extremely noisy, so were not as well suited to this purpose as the electric vehicle.     
 
288 
Because of its consistency with developments in the TIEC – new perceptions 
about personal travel wrought by the bicycle and rising individualism – flexible, rapid, 
long-distance travel had wide appeal and thus a large potential market.  As early as 1901, 
Motor World reported that with a motor vehicle “you have a method of moving from 
place to place as tireless as a train, one which for short journeys and cross journeys is as 
quick as the train, and yet one which is individualistic and independent, hence its charm” 
(cited in Flink, 1970, p. 102).  An article in Harpers Weekly in 1909 claimed that one of 
the chief attractions of the automobile was “the feeling of independence – the freedom 
from timetables, from fixed and inflexible routes, from the proximity of other human 
beings than one’s own companions; the ability to go where and when one wills, to linger 
and stop where the country is beautiful and the way pleasant, or to rush through 
unattractive surroundings” (cited in Flink, 1970, p. 101).  Such flexibility and speed 
allowed Americans to enrich their social experiences.  Travel by horse limited social 
visits to a 10-12 mile radius, the round trip distance a horse could handle in a day.  
Gasoline- and steam-powered motor vehicles extended that range to 20-30 miles for a 
day trip, and much further for vacations. 
While the state of steam car and electric battery technology stalled in the early 
1900s, rapid improvements in gasoline ICE technology partially overcame the problems 
of noise and ease of operation such that gasoline-powered cars were good enough or 
better at serving all the niche and larger markets – short in-town trips, pleasure touring, 
and long distance travel.  However, while manufacturers of expensive touring vehicles 
continued to increase the quality and performance of their vehicles, they did not seek 
high volume production or low prices. It was the pioneering strategy of two 
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manufacturers to produce simple, lightweight, inexpensive, reliable, and rugged vehicles 
that ultimately tipped the scales in favor of the gasoline vehicle and expanded the market 
for these vehicles beyond the very wealthy.  While the manufacturers of electric and 
steam vehicles continued to use craft production techniques to produce expensive, 
conservatively styled vehicles for the wealthy market, the inexpensive Olds curved dash 
and Ford Model N appealed to a wider market that included the lower-upper class 
consisting of physicians and merchants.  For these relatively affluent buyers, the 
automobile was more a utilitarian product than a toy.   
These inexpensive vehicles also added another important new market and 
function – farmers who needed a practical vehicle to transport products to the market, 
buy supplies in town, and make social visits.  In the words of Utterback and Abernathy 
(1975), during the early phases of a product’s life cycle, “[t]he locus for innovation is in 
the individual or organization that is intimately familiar with needs.”  Based on his own 
experiences, Henry Ford was intimately familiar with the farmers’ needs and he targeted 
them when developing his inexpensive vehicles, particularly the Model T introduced in 
1908.  Following its introduction, Ford’s strategy of progressively reducing the price of 
the Model T combined with rising farm incomes to make the rural market the mainstay of 
the automobile industry (Flink, 1988).  Expansion of the rural market was reinforced by 
positive feedbacks – as the price of motor vehicles came down, more relatively wealthy 
farmers purchased them, and the rural populace became ever more familiar with and 
accepting of the technology.   
By 1910, the bewildering variety in motor vehicle design and the accompanying 
customer confusion had largely disappeared.  Sales of automobiles reached 181,000 units 
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that year53 with 52% of these vehicles selling for under $1,375.  The majority of motor 
vehicles sold were no longer expensive toys for the very rich.  The automobile had been 
functionally redefined as a technology to provide basic, reliable, inexpensive, personal 
transportation that was capable of negotiating rough rural roads and was easy and 
inexpensive to repair.  In 1903, only 14% of vehicles sold had four-cylinder engines, 
while the majority of vehicles were powered by one-cylinder engines.  In 1910, 84% of 
vehicles had four cylinders and nearly 7% had six cylinders.  The four-wheeled 
automobile powered by a water-cooled, four-cylinder, gasoline internal combustion 
engine had emerged as the dominant design.  This design – the functional requirements 
and the technological attributes that met them – was epitomized by the Model T.  By 
1916, sales of cars priced below $1,375 had expanded to nearly 1.3 million units, 
constituted 90% of the total market, and exceeded sales of higher priced vehicles by a 
factor of ten.  The Model T alone accounted for around half of sales.  Clearly, the vast 
and growing scale of the primarily rural low-price market can not be accurately described 
as a market niche. 
The product redefinition that opened the large market for inexpensive automobiles 
directly altered the selection environment, but, combined with the saturation of the 
market for expensive vehicles, it also had a powerful effect on variation by reducing the 
total number of firms.  Firms that were unwilling or unable to adapt to production of 
smaller lightweight vehicles were effectively weeded out.  This further reduced the 
variety of products offered and further reinforced the new functional definition and 
dominant design. 
                                                 
53 See Appendix A. 
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4.6.2 Process Innovations 
The volume production of automobiles, beginning with Olds in 1901 and 
perfected by Ford around 1913, was enabled by four facets of the TIEC: 1) a broad-based 
acceptance of the ideals of individualism as expressed in capitalism; 2) the evolution of 
the American system of manufactures begun in the arms-manufacturing industry and 
perfected through the sewing machine and bicycle industries; 3) the disintegration of 
traditional craft society; and 4) mechanistic scientific approaches based in 
methodological reductionism that led to the development of scientific management.   
The section analyzes the process innovations in this era.  I find that Ford’s 
innovative production system resulted from a highly synthetic process and relied on 
knowledge spillovers as well as learning-by-doing.  However, Ford’s greatest 
accomplishment was the manufacture of a product of both high quality and low cost.  
While one or the other had been achieved within the industry, it was the combination that 
allowed Ford to conquer the mass market.  This combination was achieved by jointly 
addressing issues of product design and manufacturing processes.  Thus, the transition to 
these new production techniques and the resulting cost reductions that enabled market 
expansion did not originate within niche markets, but rather as Ford was developing the 
rural market.  Further, product and process innovations that served the needs of the large 
rural market for ruggedness, reliability, high quality, and low initial and repair cost arose 
from a more complex process than simple learning-by-doing.  
The disintegration of traditional craft society was itself a manifestation of the 
misalignment of old and emerging rules within the TIEC.  Capitalism, factory production, 
and mechanistic reductionism led to an increased cultural valuation of efficiency.  The 
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old rules governing the craft system were incompatible with these evolving economic 
rules and cultural perspectives.  To improve efficiency, managers needed to take control 
of the production process out of the hands of skilled craftsmen.  Scientific management 
and Fordism realized this goal and established new rules for production that were aligned 
with the evolving higher-level rules within the TIEC. 
The companies within GM were struggling with the misalignment of these rules 
as late as 1914, and the continued use of craft techniques contributed to the company’s 
financial difficulties.  However, Ford’s production team was uniquely able to synthesize 
and exploit the opportunities provided by this social and institutional context, in part 
because the management was relatively unfamiliar with the existing rules of production.  
Around 1910, Ford’s production system was evolving rapidly as the team began 
experimenting with the addition of another innovation adapted from of the flour milling, 
canning, brewing, and meat packing industries: mechanical slides and conveyors to move 
materials through the plant.  While the individuals on the team perceived the potential of 
each element in isolation, no one foresaw the synergistic results of their collective efforts. 
Nevins and Hill (1954, p. 366) summarize mass production as the application of 
“simplification of design, standardization of parts, precision machining, carefully timed 
speed, continuous motion, and use of the most ingenious labor-saving mechanism.”  As 
such, it represents an amalgam of process and product innovations.  Ford did not 
originate any of the process innovations: standardized parts all built to common gauge, 
precision manufacturing, high volume production, specialized workers performing 
increasingly minute tasks, control and planning by supervisors and engineers, hierarchical 
management, specialized machine tools, and continuously moving assembly.  And except 
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for continuously moving assembly, Ford was not the first automobile company to apply 
them.  The company was, however, the first to fully integrate them. 
In addition, Ford designed the Model T with the requirements of mass production 
in mind, jointly evolving the product design, machine tools, and production process.  
Abernathy et al. (1983) list four Ford process innovations introduced in 1907, of which 
two (stamped crankcase pans and integrally cast cylinder block and crankcase) require 
component redesign.  Ford introduced five innovations in 1908, three of which (magneto 
integrated into flywheel, detachable cylinder heads, and vanadium steel components) 
involved product redesign for manufacturing.  It appears that Ford was fairly unique in 
jointly addressing issues of process innovation and product design, and much credit 
should be give to the highly innovative atmosphere created at the plant. 
  Rather ironically, the resulting system of production included minutely 
prescribed procedures.  Ford had begun with no rules of production and ended with a 
complex, detailed, and (eventually) inflexible set of rules that were embodied in standard 
operating procedures, routines, and capital equipment. 
4.6.3 Mechanisms of Learning and Innovation 
The QE and MLP theories stress the importance of learning-by-interacting with 
users and learning-by-doing in improving product performance and decreasing 
production costs.  While I find that these were important mechanisms during the 
transitional phase, I also find that spillovers and learning by interacting with suppliers 
were also extremely prominent in the description of product innovations at Ford and GM.  
Process innovations were achieved through a highly synthetic process in which 
knowledge spillovers were critical.  Consistent with the assertions of the industry life-
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cycle model, we also see the first attempts systematic research along the lines of internal 
research and development (IR&D) beginning with the onset of the specific phase. 
As true manufacturing began around 1900, competition among Midwest 
manufacturers of gasoline-powered automobiles was fierce.  The technology still was 
unproven and risky.  Firms operated on slim resources, relying on credit from parts 
suppliers and advance deposits from dealers.  Established firms that sought to expand 
were forced to reinvest profits into improved plant and equipment.  Technology and 
designs changed rapidly, and failure to keep up could mean financial ruin. 
Entrepreneurs focused first on product innovations to improve reliability.  The 
detailed description we have of Ford’s design efforts shows a reliance on feedback from 
dealers and buyers to identify defects.  The role of the producer-supplier relationship is 
also prominent in Ford’s early history.  The Dodge brothers took a great risk in joining 
with the Ford Motor Company, foregoing all other business and essentially financing the 
new venture.  Ford and George Holley collaborated to design a satisfactory carburetor for 
the Model A and Ford later bought a plant for Holley to produce carburetors for the 
Model T.  Suppliers were constantly marketing their parts, materials, and methods to 
manufacturers.  Metallurgist J. Kent-Smith initiated contact with Ford and likely 
provided the motivation to use vanadium steel in the Model T.  Peter Steenstrup of Hyatt 
Roller Bearing pressured Ford to use the company’s bearings in the Model A, and 
William H. Smith of the John R. Keim mills approached Ford about using stamped steel 
axle housings.  Ford was soon using numerous stamped steel parts, and within four years 
had purchased the Keim plant. 
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With cumulative learning effects, each Ford model was an improvement of the 
previous ones.  Ford was also learning from experience on the shop floor, working out 
production improvements through arrangement of men and machines and designing his 
vehicles to facilitate production on an ever increasing scale.  By the time Ford began 
designing the Model T in 1906, he had a clear idea of the functional requirements of 
inexpensive car for the working man and the necessary knowledge to design and build it. 
Weisberger (1979, p. 65) points out that, at the onset of motor vehicle 
manufacturing, no one had the will or the resources for “systematic research – defining a 
problem, accumulating data, testing materials and devices in the laboratory or on the 
bench, building and studying models.  Trial-and-error, which is a costly long-run method 
of learning but requires almost no head-start capital, was what all the pioneers relied on.”  
However, the distinction between learning-by-doing and organized research and 
development is extremely difficult to make.  Systematic corporate research (IR&D) as we 
think of it first appeared at GM in 1911 when James Storrow established an engineering 
laboratory for mechanical and electrical testing.  Charles Kettering, who would later 
refine systematic research at GM, also seems to have progressed systematically from 
problem definition to theory to prototype in developing the electric ignition and the 
electric self-starter between 1908 and 1912.  However, the earliest efforts at systematic 
research were conducted by a trade association, the Mechanical Branch of the ALAM, 
which was formed in 1905 and established a metallurgy lab to test parts and materials.  
The lab ceased operation when funding was cut during the Panic of 1907. 
Ford’s innovative efforts in automobile design and production methods were 
described by contemporaries as “cut-and-try” and definitely fall more along the lines of 
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learning-by-doing.  However, these efforts were aimed at the solution of specific 
problems and did involve construction of mock-ups to assist in working out 
manufacturing issues prior to building a prototype.  In addition, Wills was operating a 
materials testing laboratory that provided strength test data used to design vanadium steel 
parts for the Model T prior to its introduction in 1908.  In 1910, Walter Flanders 
commented that starting an automobile business required the establishment of such a 
laboratory. 
However, Ford’s cut-and-try approach, undertaken by engineers with no 
preconceived notions of what was and was not possible, was highly effective at jointly 
addressing issues of process innovation and product design.  In prior attempts to establish 
a manufacturing firm, Henry Ford had been restricted by investors’ understandable focus 
on near-term profit.  This time, Ford’s lack of interest in personal wealth allowed for the 
reinvestment of profits in innovation, resulting in “an extensive amount of 
experimentation to be carried out in the factory and a surprising rate of scrapping 
processes and machine tools when they did not suit the immediate fancy of his production 
engineers” (Hounshell, 1984, p. 220).   
The synthetic and heterogeneous nature of the rapid innovations after 1900 is 
quite clear and innovation by teams of entrepreneurs became even more prominent than 
during the emergent phase.  David Buick and William Marr put together a technically 
sound motor vehicle, but it took a businessman like William Durant to make it 
commercially successful.  Ford’s product and enterprise would not have succeeded 
without C. Harold Wills, James Couzens, and talented vehicle and tool design teams.  For 
the process innovations during this phase, spillovers remained prominent and were 
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combined in a highly synthetic manner.  The ability of the automobile industry to develop 
and to mass produce high-quality inexpensive motor vehicles relied on continuous, 
incremental, and cumulative technical progress in production techniques from multiple 
industries.  The roots of mass production began prior to the emergence of the automobile 
with the developments for firearms, sewing machines, and bicycles.  Much of the 
necessary innovations – machining technologies, sequential organization of production, 
and application of special purpose machine tools for mass production – had been 
introduced prior to the turn of the century and were extended by the emergent automotive 
industry.  Then, between 1905 and 1914, Ford engineers collectively refined these 
techniques and combined them with innovations in the flour milling, canning, and meat 
packing industries, as well innovations from scientific management, to create a new 
production system that amounted to more than the sum of the constituent parts. 
There are two other examples of the importance of spillovers between 1900 and 
1915.  First, Kettering’s solution to the very significant problem of the automatic starter 
built upon his experience developing an electric motor to replace the hand crank on cash 
registers.  Second, Walter Chrysler drew on his experience building rail cars when 
instituting changes in management, production processes, and materials handling at 
Buick in 1912.  Once again, the movement of key entrepreneurs between industries 
served to facilitate the transfer of knowledge.  This, however, did not represent the only 
mechanism of knowledge transfer, as entrepreneurs were increasingly networked with the 
knowledge base.  
Most, though not all, of the early manufacturers had technical experience or 
training, and Rae (1959, p. 203) points out that “[t]he number of college-trained 
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engineers in this first generation of automotive entrepreneurs is surprisingly large, 
considering that engineering degrees were something of a rarity in the United States until 
the twentieth century.”  According to Raff and Trajtenberg (1997), “the highest rate of 
quality change occurred at the very beginning [of the industry’s history] (1900-1914).  
This is undoubtedly the portion of our period in which the greatest proportion of 
entrepreneurs were engineers or mechanics by training, knowledge spillovers were all-
pervasive, and design bureaucracies were shallowest.” 
Many of these engineers were members of the relatively new American Society of 
Mechanical Engineers (ASME), which was founded in 1880 “to promote the art, science 
and practice of mechanical engineering and the allied arts and sciences” (ASME, 2008)  
Listed among the ASME’s original objectives was the collection and diffusion of 
knowledge.  Prior to the turn of the century, the exchange of information specific to the 
industry was facilitated by several enthusiast publications, including Horseless Age and 
The Automobile.  In 1905, three industry groups were formed to foster collaboration 
among automobile engineers: the SAE, the mechanical branch of the ALAM, and the 
AMCMA, which served the independent manufacturers resisting the Selden patent.  After 
the SAE inherited the ALAM’s library and mechanical work in 1910, the SAE consisted 
of 899 members.  The most significant contribution of these groups was the 
standardization of automobile parts and materials. 
4.6.4 Agents and Mechanisms of Change 
This section explores the continuing development of the technological nexus 
linking variation and selection and the ongoing mutual adaptation of the technology and 
institutions.  I find that the technology itself was a major factor in altering the selection 
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environment, first in a negative way as touring offended the sensibilities of the less 
affluent and aroused the anger of farmers.  Later, the proliferation of motor vehicles that 
conformed to a new utilitarian product definition was a major factor in overcoming these 
hostilities.  I identify several new institutions that emerged during the transitional phase.  
These included trade organizations that served communication among engineers, 
connected manufacturers to customers, established industry standards, and lobbied for 
road improvements and the rationalization of registration laws.  I also identify one set of 
institutions, the Selden patent and the ALAM, that was misaligned with emerging rules in 
the TIEC, the redefinition of the automobile, and the needs of the mass market.  In this 
timeframe, local and national motoring clubs also emerged in the technological nexus and 
their role changed from serving to provide entertainment to one of activism as the era 
progressed.  I find that the process of embedding was underway and many of the 
activities responsible for the co-evolution of technologies and institutions were consistent 
with QE theory’s technological nexus description.  However, most of these adaptations 
were simultaneous with or lagged behind the diffusion of the automobile into the mass 
market.  Thus, success in the mass market did not depend on these processes occurring 
first.  The question of how they contributed to stability and strengthened diffusion will be 
addressed in section 4.6.5 and again in chapter 5. 
As discussed in Chapter 3, races demonstrated the performance, endurance, and 
dependability of competing technologies and models.  At the same time, racing tended to 
reinforce the definition of the automobile as an expensive toy for the very wealthy and 
inhibited diffusion into wider markets.  Though Ford was not interested in building racing 
vehicles, he successfully used racing as a means to build recognition and attract 
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financing.  This use of racing altered the selection environment by directing funding 
toward specific entrepreneurs and projects.  Ford’s efforts to build racers also began 
building a successful team of entrepreneurs and accumulating critical knowledge. 
While races reinforced the public image of motor vehicles as toys for the very 
wealthy, the use of automobiles in this application also inhibited diffusion into wider 
markets.  The very wealthy staged elaborate festivities involving automobiles and 
recklessly toured the countryside, flaunting their conspicuous consumption in the face of 
the hard-working middle and lower class and arousing farmers’ anger.  However, this 
negative opinion was overcome around 1907 by two factors: rising farm income and the 
introduction of inexpensive motor vehicles that rural populations and the middle class 
could afford and in which they found a valuable function.  The first of these were light 
buggy-type vehicles manufactured by Midwestern firms.   
However, Olds and Ford pursued a pioneering strategy when they targeted this 
relatively untapped market by producing a simple, lightweight, reliable, and inexpensive 
vehicle in large quantities. The Olds curved dash and Ford Model N introduced in 1900 
and 1906 respectively were designed specifically for this more utilitarian purpose.  The 
Ford was superior in this respect since it departed from the buggy-style design and its 
inherent weaknesses that were found in the curved dash.  As these vehicles became more 
common and as their performance was demonstrated and improved, the public’s 
interpretation of the motor vehicle and its function shifted.  Ford did not require that these 
users discover and communicate their needs to him; he had lived the life of a farmer and 
already knew what they had yet to discover: if properly designed, the motor vehicle could 
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vastly improve their economic and social well-being.  Ford had interpreted an unmet 
demand and imposed it on the technology. 
Other activities of manufacturers through emerging industry trade organizations 
served the nexus role.  The ALAM and the AMCMA in particular were conceived as 
organizations to connect manufacturers to each other and to customers by arranging for 
public exhibition new vehicles at trade shows; promoting races; promoting the sale of 
members’ cars; encouraging public interest in automobiles; promoting good roads; and 
facilitating the exchange of technical information.  In enforcing the Selden patent, the 
ALAM claimed to be protecting the industry from disreputable manufacturers that would 
have created public distrust and a negative opinion of the automobile.  But by restricting 
licenses and controlling production output, the ALAM also sought to maintain high 
prices, thus affecting variation.  The issue was settled by the legal system, and these 
higher level rules ultimately supported the independent manufacturers of the AMCMA, 
though this group had already disbanded.  After the legal decision in 1911, the ALAM’s 
boundary spanning role was transferred to the Automobile Board of Trade and then, in 
1914, to the National Automobile Chamber of Commerce (NACC).   
The ALAM’s technical work was transferred to another prominent industry 
organization, the Society of Automobile Engineers (SAE), which served as a linkage 
among manufacturers and suppliers.  While the SAE did not connect manufacturers to 
customers, it did influence both variation and selection.  As a technical society, the SAE 
represented the shared knowledge base which served as a cognitive constraint on 
innovation by shaping the perceptions of engineers. But more significantly, the confusion 
caused by the huge number of parts used by the industry constituted an adverse selection 
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environment which the SAE attempted to alleviate through parts standardization.  While 
the organization succeeded at easing the parts burden and improving the quality of 
materials, it was unable to make the selection environment significantly more benign for 
small manufacturers. 
Other than the Selden patent dispute, the automobile industry was fairly free to 
develop without governmental restrictions during the emergent and transitional phase.  
However, formal constraints on automobile use were emerging in the form of local and 
state speed and registration laws.  Initially, these laws were misaligned with the 
capabilities of the automobile and served to limit its usefulness and therefore its 
diffusion.  Through motoring clubs, enthusiasts joined forces with manufacturers to 
remove this element from the selection environment, eventually shifting efforts from 
opposition to coordination.  In this process, the purpose of motoring clubs shifted from 
organizing social activities for the wealthy elite to activism for all motorists.  By 1910, 
registration laws were more coherent and actually served to create a more benign 
selection environment since fees were used for road improvements. 
The poor condition of roads initially had served to limit the usefulness of the 
automobile and was a major design consideration for inexpensive vehicles.  Once again, 
motorists, through local clubs and the AAA, joined forces with manufacturers to promote 
road improvements.  Some of this activism evolved from movements begun by bicycle 
enthusiasts.  This movement tied into dissatisfaction with rail rates, particularly among 
farmers who relied on the railroad to transport agricultural goods to urban and export 
markets, and farmers joined these efforts around 1909 through the National Grange.  The 
Good Roads movement produced modest results, but improvements were overtaken by 
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the increasing demands of motor vehicle use.  Although there was an increase in the 
mileage and condition of surfaced roads between 1900 and 1915, it was not likely a 
significant factor in the process of embedding in this timeframe.  Federal funding for road 
improvements was initiated in 1916, but the major breakthrough occurred after WWI. 
Early in the development of the automobile, critics had warned that the innovation 
would not find market success until the roads were improved.  However, in this 
timeframe, construction of roads passable by motor vehicles lagged well behind the 
development and diffusion of the automobile itself.  The capability to navigate rough 
roads was therefore a main design criterion for those vehicles, like the Model T, that were 
ultimately successful in the first decade of the 20th century.  Road improvements would 
play a significant role in the co-evolution of the automobile regime and the wider TIEC 
between 1915 and 1930.  Similarly, although a pre-existing dispersed fuel infrastructure 
was aligned with the gasoline automobile (see section 3.4.2), a dedicated refueling 
system tailored to the needs of the technology and its widespread use did not begin to 
appear until 1907 and significant growth began around 1915. Therefore, the topic of 
infrastructure will be taken up again in chapter 5.   
By the beginning of the specific phase (1910), mutual adaptation had resulted in a 
dominant design that was aligned with existing physical infrastructure (rough roads and a 
dispersed refueling system) and supporting organizations were actively working to 
improve that infrastructure as well as legislative rules that created an adverse selection 
environment.  Thus, the process of embedding was underway and many of the activities 
responsible for the co-evolution of technologies and institutions were consistent with QE 
theory’s technological nexus description.  However, most of these adaptations occurred 
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during the transitional phase and were simultaneous with or lagged behind the diffusion 
of the automobile into the mass market.  In addition, they continued and were 
reinvigorated with the onset of the second transitional phase covered in chapter 5. 
4.6.5 Alignment and Stability 
In describing the framework for analysis (see chapter 2), I asserted that a socio-
technical regime is understood to exist when a technology and sector have achieved the 
specific phase and when the stability of that specific phase is supported by the alignment 
of institutions (rules and organizations) and existing physical infrastructure with the 
dominant product design, production processes, and organizational forms.  Further, 
changes in the TIEC can result in a misalignment that erodes stability and initiates a new 
transitional phase or provides opportunities for the emergence of a new technology.   
In this section, I summarize the role of alignment in the success of the Ford Motor 
Company and of the automobile in the mass market.  I identify a number of emerging 
institutions that increased the alignment of rules and organizations but also one set of 
institutions that was misaligned with emerging rules in the industry and the TIEC.  
Finally, physical infrastructure was not well aligned with the mass use of automobiles at 
the beginning of the transitional phase but efforts were underway to improve this 
situation.  Thus, while stability was increasing during the first specific phase, the 
automobile regime was still immature. 
The automobile itself was aligned with and reinforced increasing individualism.  
Meanwhile, scientific management and Fordism were aligned with evolving higher-level 
rules within the TIEC regarding capitalism, mechanistic reductionism, and increased 
cultural valuation of efficiency.  In the specific phase, the success of the automobile and 
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Fordism contributed to evolving economy-wide rules on the organization of production 
and further reinforced these trends.  Related alignments supporting the first specific phase 
include the emergence of engineering institutions, including engineering schools and 
associations like the SAE and ASME.  Parts standardization begun by the ALAM and 
completed by the SAE also contributed to the stability of the industry by improving the 
quality of materials and reducing the complexity of the supply environment.  It did not, 
however, have the intended effect of bringing economies of scale to small producers.  
The Selden patent and the ALAM represented institutions that were misaligned with both 
the trend toward high volume production and the 1910 functional definition of the 
automobile.  The patent could potentially have blocked or delayed market growth, but 
this barrier was removed in 1911 with the resolution of lawsuits brought by the ALAM. 
The condition of roads was improving during this era through an increase in the 
mileage of surfaced and the application of new materials with better performance.  
However, this development lagged behind the diffusion of the automobile, and increased 
usage quickly overwhelmed road improvements during the transitional and early specific 
phases.  As of 1916, a mechanism was in place for federal funding of road construction, 
but significant improvements in physical infrastructure did not occur until well into the 
specific phase.  The breakthrough would occur after WWI.  And although gasoline was 
widely available at country stores and other dispersed sources, growth in dedicated 
refueling infrastructure also began a period of significant growth after the emergence of a 
dominant automobile design in 1910 as will be discussed in the chapter 5. 
In conclusion, the stability of the automobile industry was increasing during the 
first specific phase.  However, it still was somewhat fragile and the automobile regime 
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therefore was still immature.  This implies that changing technological trajectory would 
not likely have represented a major disruption at this point; the technology was not yet 
“locked in.” 
4.6.6 Role of Exogenous Events 
This section summarizes the role of the Panic of 1907 and the ensuing recession 
in the diffusion of the gasoline automobile in the mass market.  This event likely 
contributed to the downturn in sales of the most expensive vehicles in 1908 and to the 
high failure rate of manufacturing firms in 1909.  It also supported Henry Ford’s efforts 
gain control of the Ford Motor Company and pursue production of a single inexpensive 
model, a strategy that was critical to the success of the automobile in the mass market. 
The economic downturn and the Panic of 1907, events with no causal link to the 
motor vehicle sector, altered the selection environment in two significant ways.  First, the 
Panic was coincidentally timed with the saturation of the market for expensive 
automobiles.  It is impossible to know whether the recession played a causal role or 
served to hasten the stabilization of demand for these cars, but very wealthy buyers of 
these automobiles would have been among the hardest hit by the 50% drop in the stock 
market between early 1906 and late 1907.  Following on the heels of slowed growth in 
demand for vehicles priced over $2,775 in 1906 and 1907, the downturn in sales in 1908 
would have looked ominous to manufacturers.  Firms in this era were operating with slim 
cash reserves and, for many, a slump in demand spelled financial ruin.  It is significant to 
note that the number of firms exiting the industry peaked in 1909 (Simons, 1995).  The 
Panic of 1907 very likely contributed to the failure of some of the firms that ceased 
production between 1907 and 1909 and would have influenced the strategies of the 
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surviving firms.  In therefore served as a selection mechanism that reduced both the 
variety of firms and the products offered. 
More specifically, the Panic and recession likely contributed to the disappointing 
demand for the Ford Model K in 1907, Ford’s first foray into the highest price bracket, as 
well as the mid-priced Model B.  Serendipitously for Henry Ford, this event occurred as 
he was planning to wrest financial control of the Ford Motor Company from Alexander 
Malcomson.  Malcomson was known as an impulsive ‘plunger’ who took speculative 
risks and was perpetually over-extended.  His Ford Motor Company stock was no longer 
paying dividends and the value of any other of his stock holdings would have plunged 
with the market.  Malcomson’s undoing was the result of multiple factors: his own 
speculation, including the launch of another automobile firm; Henry Ford’s maneuvering 
with the Ford Manufacturing Company; and the economic crisis.  Thus, the Panic of 1907 
was a contributing factor in providing both the justification and the means for Henry Ford 
to pursue his unique strategy of producing a single inexpensive model.  This strategy was 
critical to achieving the cost reductions that made the automobile accessible to nearly 
every American. 
4.6.7 Summary 
The transitional phase of development for the automobile industry began roughly 
in 1900 and, by about 1910, the industry was beginning the specific phase.  The number 
of firms in the industry, the number entering, and the number exiting had peaked by 1909 
and the total number of firms began a precipitous decline in 1910.  By that time, the 
automobile had been functionally redefined as a technology to provide basic, reliable, 
inexpensive, personal transportation that was capable of negotiating rough roads and 
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traveling long distances.  In 1910, just over half of the vehicles sold were priced under 
$1,375 and 84% utilized a four-cylinder gasoline internal combustion engine.  The four-
wheeled automobile powered by a water-cooled, four-cylinder, gasoline ICE emerged as 
the dominant design. 
During the transitional phase, two main factors contributed to the gasoline internal 
combustion engine’s selection over rival technologies and its diffusion to wider markets: 
1) the ability of gasoline ICE technology to fulfill a new function with mass appeal; and 
2) the strategies pursued by the entrepreneurs.  Gasoline vehicles provided a new 
functionality – rapid, flexible, long-distance, personal travel – that ultimately appealed to 
a much larger market than the niche markets served by electric vehicles.  Success in this 
market required a low price and therefore large reductions in production cost.  Chapter 3 
identified five developments in the TIEC that provided opportunities for entrepreneurs to 
begin developing a commercial motor vehicle.  During the transitional phase, the Ford 
production team was able to synthesize four additional facets of the TIEC to develop 
innovations for the production of inexpensive and reliable automobiles:   
1) a broad-based acceptance of the ideals of individualism as expressed in 
capitalism;  
2) the evolution of the American system of manufactures begun in the arms-
manufacturing industry and perfected through the sewing machine and bicycle 
industries; 
3) the disintegration of traditional craft society; and  
4) mechanistic scientific approaches based in methodological reductionism that led 
to the development of scientific management.  
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While process innovations for interchangeable parts originally had been 
developed to facilitate repairing firearms in the field, the Ford’s team perceived that these 
innovations could also reduce assembly time and manufacturing costs; therefore, they 
were critical to high volume production.   
The important mechanisms of learning during this timeframe included inter-
industry spillovers, learning-by-doing, and learning-by-interacting with both users and 
suppliers.  The electric starter was arguably the most significant improvement to gasoline 
ICE technology and was achieved through inter-industry spillovers as well through 
spillovers from electric vehicle technology.  Throughout the period, the role of suppliers 
as innovators and collaborators is particularly striking.  Meanwhile, learning-by-
interacting with users played a significant role in identifying flaws and improving the 
performance of early motor vehicles, but was less significant in communicating users’ 
needs in terms of functionality.  Rather, Olds and Ford relied on their own perceptions 
and experiences with the needs of the rural market and actively targeted this new 
application. 
Thus, I find that the role of niche markets in the diffusion of the automobile to 
wider markets is not consistent with the characterization found in the MLP and QE 
theories of transitions in the following ways: 
1) Niche markets did not provide cost reductions through process improvements and 
economies of scale.  Rather, cost reductions were realized simultaneously with a 




2) The needs of the primarily rural mass market were not revealed within the niche 
market; Ford interpreted these needs from his own experience. 
3) Product improvements relative to these needs were achieved in the mass market, 
not the niche market. 
4) While learning-by-interacting with users and learning-by-doing were important, 
spillovers and learning- by-interacting with suppliers were also critical 
mechanisms of learning. 
5) Because niche markets were saturating and the vast, primarily rural, low-price 
market can not be accurately described as a market niche, niche branching, niche 
proliferation, or niche market growth are not accurate descriptions of the diffusion 
of the gasoline motor-vehicle into mass markets. 
6) The gasoline motor vehicle conquered the urban niche occupied by electric 
vehicles after being vastly improved for use in the mass market.  Therefore, niche 
branching occurred after diffusion to the mass market. 
The very existence of inexpensive and practical motor vehicles did much to alter 
the perceptions of the public, probably more than any other efforts to influence the 
selection environment in this era.  The emergence of a dominant design provided a 
culturally shared definition of the technology – a common image that readily came to 
mind when one heard the term “automobile.”  This image was increasingly symbolic, 
connoting freedom and rugged individualism.  Thus, the automobile and the industry 
were aligned with wider developments in the TIEC and the growth of supporting 
institutions.  Despite these early embedding processes, supporting institutions and 
infrastructure were still in their infancy.  The development of coherent registration laws, 
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roads passable by motor vehicles, and dedicated refueling infrastructure lagged behind 
the growth in markets for automobiles.  This somewhat undermines the argument that the 
alignment of technology, infrastructure and institutions contributed to diffusion into mass 
markets.   Further, while stability was increasing, it was fragile and the automobile 
regime therefore was still immature.  This implies that the technology was not yet 
“locked in” and that changing technological trajectory would not likely have represented 
a major disruption at this point.
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5.0 Stability Yields to New Challenges 
To keep an industry alive, it should be kept in perpetual ferment. 
-- Sorensen (1956, p. 51) 
 
This chapter picks up the history of the industry beginning in 1916, but also 
includes earlier developments that became important to the industry between 1916 and 
the late 1920s.  As discussed in chapter 4, the first specific phase began around 1910 with 
the emergence of a dominant design.  During the first five years of this phase, the 
automobile was being embedded in complex systems for production and use, but the 
stability of this developing regime was still fragile.  However, a mass market was well 
established by 1916, with sales of cars priced under $1,375 approaching 1.3 million units 
and constituting 90% of the market for automobiles.  Cars priced under $675 constituted 
51% of the market. The Model T was the best selling car and Ford’s market share 
reached 50%.  Henry Ford announced his strategy prior to the introduction of the Model 
T and proceeded to follow it to the letter: he produced a four-cylinder automobile, he 
stuck to that standardized design without changing it, he reached constantly toward a 
growing volume in order to cut costs, and he reduced prices steadily (Nevins and Hill, 
1954). 
This strategy meshes perfectly with the product and industry life-cycle model’s 
description of the specific phase – standard product design, mass production, a focus on 
process innovations, and competition based mainly on price and quality.  However, for 
this strategy to be successful, the industry must remain in the specific phase, which 
requires a static environment.  But beginning around 1918, exogenous and co-
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evolutionary forces altered the technical, institutional, and ecological complex (TIEC) in 
which the automobile industry was embedded, requiring that firms adapt. In this chapter, 
I discuss the characteristics of innovation, mechanisms of learning, development of 
institutions, and the two-way interactions between variation and selection during the first 
specific and second transitional phases.  I examine the mutual adaptation of the 
technology, institutions, and physical infrastructure and discuss the role of alignment and 
embedding, as well as unexpected events, in the stability of the developing automobile 
regime.  I identify forces and misalignments that undermined the stability of the first 
specific phase and triggered a second transitional phase beginning around 1918.  By 
1926, the automobile had once again been functionally redefined, a new dominant design 
had emerged, and the industry was beginning a second specific phase.   
Section 5.1 relates the history at the Ford Motor Company between 1915 and 
1927.  Henry Ford continued to follow strategies based on his personal rules, acquiring 
complete ownership and control of the company, pursuing ever deeper vertical 
integration and centralized control, and clinging steadfastly to the product and production 
processes that had been so successful in the prior era.  However, the changes in the TIEC 
that initiated a new transitional phase around 1917 were misaligned with these rules, 
strategies, artifacts and processes.  Adaptation at Ford lagged behind these changes in the 
TIEC and was costly. 
Section 5.2 relates the history of the General Motors Company (GM) between 
1915 and 1927.  Because of William Durant’s haphazard style, GM was plagued with 
uncoordinated management.  But because of the corporation’s acquisition strategy and 
Durant’s past blunders, GM was also lucky to have managerial and technical talent in 
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Pierre du Pont, Alfred Sloan, and Charles Kettering.  In addition, business ties to the E.I. 
Du Pont de Nemours Company gave GM access to that company’s war surplus.  With 
these resources, the corporation was able to respond aggressively to the challenges posed 
by the second transitional phase and turned crisis into entrepreneurial opportunity.  By 
1927, the corporation had products and systems of management and production that were 
aligned with the TIEC and structured to sense and adapt to future change. 
Section 5.3 relates the history of the Chrysler Motor Company, a late entrant in 
the industry.  While many small automobile manufacturing firms were unable to survive 
the post-war recession, Walter Chrysler was able to exploit the opportunity this presented 
by converting the failing Maxwell and Chalmers companies into the third largest 
manufacturer by 1928.  In doing so, he also created an opportunity out of another 
unexpected event: the influenza epidemic of 1920 which took the lives of the John and 
Horace Dodge, leading eventually to the sale of the Dodge Brothers in 1928.  Chrysler’s 
success was due in large part to his strategy to maintain a position of technological 
leadership. 
Sections 5.4 and 5.5 discuss two significant industry innovations, enclosed steel 
bodies and consumer financing, which cannot be attributed to a single manufacturer.  
Inexpensive closed wooden bodies and all-steel bodies were developed by suppliers and 
were key contributors to the shift in consumer preferences that triggered the second 
transitional phase.  Consumer financing was largely a spillover, and represents a 
widespread trend in the TIEC that was strengthened by its use in the automobile industry. 
Section 5.6 discusses five developments in the TIEC that provide the technical 
and institutional context for the period from 1915 to the late 1920s: World War I and the 
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post-war recession; on-going efforts to improve the condition of the country’s roads; 
development of a dedicated refueling infrastructure; market saturation and the developing 
used car problem; and the increasing role of women in automobile purchases.    
Finally, section 5.7 synthesizes this historical review and summarizes the findings 
as they relate to the research questions presented in chapter 1.   
5.1 Ford: Inertia and Sub-optimization 
Henry Ford successfully gained managerial and financial control of the Ford 
Motor Company in 1907.  Without the influence of Alexander Malcomson, who had 
owned an equal share of company stock, Ford was free to pursue his strategy of 
producing a single inexpensive car.  The departure of the Dodge brothers from active 
management in 1913 further empowered Henry.  He had begun to bring the supply of raw 
materials and parts under his control and had plans for massive increases in capacity.  His 
keen engineering instincts and understanding of the rural market were major factors in his 
past business success.  However, Ford’s steadfast adherence to his personal beliefs and 
perceptions and his increasingly autocratic nature became dysfunctional as the industry 
matured.  Henry Ford was not prepared for evolutionary change. 
Section 5.1.1 relates the events culminating with Ford’s acquisition of 100% of 
the Ford Motor Company’s stock.  This move was motivated by Ford’s personal 
predilection for autocracy and was precipitated by friction between Ford and the Dodge 
brothers over expansion plans.  By 1919, Ford had complete financial and managerial 
control, but had lost important human and financial capital along the way.  Thus, Ford’s 
personal beliefs, aspirations, and tactics placed the company in a precarious position just 
as the disruptions of the second transitional phase gripped the industry.  Henry Ford’s 
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response to the initial crisis posed by the post-war recession, which is related in section 
5.1.2, was shaped again by his beliefs and perspectives.  While his personal rules and 
strategies in earlier phases had been aligned with the TIEC and the market, this was not 
the case in the second transitional phase.  By the beginning of 1922, the Ford Motor 
Company was no longer in debt, but had lost critical human capital and was not prepared 
to adapt to the remaining challenges of the transitional phase. 
Section 5.1.3 describes the extent of vertical integration achieved at the River 
Rouge industrial complex, which, by 1923, was a perfectly-timed and efficient industrial 
machine that converted raw materials into cash in 33 hours.  Ford not only controlled the 
manufacture of nearly every vehicle part, he also secured access to raw materials and 
operated rail lines and fleets of cargo ships.  Although the Ford Motor Company 
continued to rely on suppliers for some key materials, the company’s exploitation of 
resources and transportation sent a clear signal to suppliers and shippers considering price 
increases. 
Section 5.1.4 examines the stagnation in product design and innovation at Ford.  
Although improvements were made to the Model T between 1908 and 1926, Ford’s 
incorporation of new technologies lagged behind the rest of the industry.  Product 
innovations and road improvements eliminated many of the requirements that had 
dictated the Model T’s design, turning many of the attributes that had been advantages 
into disadvantages.  As consumer preferences began to shift, they became increasingly 
misaligned with Henry Ford’s personal rules.  Although user feedback was available, 
Ford refused to act on it, imposing his personal rules on the company.   
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By 1927, the Model T was no longer aligned with the rules or physical artifacts of 
the TIEC.  Section 5.1.5 covers Ford’s development of an entirely new four-cylinder car 
beginning in 1926. Henry Ford took charge of the project himself, continuing with “cut-
and-try” methods.  Developing a light, low rpm, high power engine proved to be the most 
significant design problem, which was solved in part by knowledge spillovers when Ford 
brought in an engineer from the company’s aircraft division.  Equipment in Ford’s plants 
were so specialized that a complete retooling was necessary to manufacture the Model A.  
The changeover was costly in terms of lost production, capital outlays and the loss of 
experienced personnel.  In the process, Ford learned that accommodating change required 
advanced planning in both product design and production processes.  More importantly, 
the changeover revealed the importance of shifting from machinery designed for a single 
task to more flexible tools that could accommodate changes in design.  The rules of 
production embodied in Fordism and Ford plants were misaligned with the new 
functional definition of the automobile which required frequent model changes.  New 
rules in the TIEC dictated new rules of production represented by “flexible mass 
production.” 
5.1.1 Ousting the Minority Stockholders, 1915-1919 
In 1912, Ford’s stockholders and directors had agreed to reinvest 15% of the 
annual profits to expansion of productive resources, including facilities at Highland Park 
and branch assembly plants nationwide and beyond. By 1914, all sixty acres of the 
Highland Park tract were covered with Ford Motor Company buildings (Sorensen, 1956) 
and the plant was producing 1,200 automobiles daily (Nevins and Hill, 1954).  Sometime 
around 1907, Ford had initiated experiments to fulfill a boyhood dream to “lift farm 
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drudgery off flesh and blood and lay it on steel and motors” (Nevins and Hill, 1957, p. 
21).  Funded through Henry Ford’s personal accounts, several tractor models were 
constructed in the following years, but the designs were unsatisfactory until 1915.  Ford 
made plans to produce the tractor in temporary facilities in Dearborn, but also had more 
grandiose plans in mind.  Due to space restrictions and the availability of water for the 
steel plant, Highland Park would not be able to accommodate expansion beyond an 
annual capacity of 500,000, yet Ford believed he should plan for a goal of at least 
1,000,000.  Developing a new site would accommodate tractor production and would 
allow Ford to shift some production functions, such as the foundry and power house, 
from Highland Park.  In June, 1915, Ford announced plans for developing an industrial 
complex along the River Rouge to the southwest of Detroit, where he had quietly 
purchased nearly 2,000 acres of farm and woodland. 
The Dodge brothers, who still owned a minority of Ford Motor Company stock, 
supported the expansion even though they were primarily interested in receiving 
generous dividends to help finance their independent automobile manufacturing.  They 
apparently believed that tractor production was its primary purpose and trusted Couzens, 
as treasurer, to keep spending under control.  However, the relationship between Ford and 
Couzens was deteriorating and there had been noticeable friction since 1909.  Ford had 
always been disparaging of the business office, asserting that it was a necessary evil to be 
tolerated.  He was irritated by Couzens’ domineering manner and what he viewed as 
excessive economizing for the sake of money itself.  Now Ford was showing interest in a 
larger executive role just as Couzens was becoming interested in serving in politics.  
Further, Couzens was vigorously pro-Ally and was annoyed by Ford’s public anti-war 
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remarks.  The situation came to a head when Couzens squelched a pacifist editorial and 
article for the Ford Times, the company’s organ for advertising.  In the ensuing 
confrontation, Ford overrode Couzens authority to take such an action.  On October 12, 
1915, Couzens resigned as vice-president and treasurer of the Ford Motor Company. 
According to Nevins and Hill (1954, p. 500), “[Ford and Couzens] had provided 
the inspiration which made [the company] great, and both manifested in growing degree 
the dictatorial and temperamental qualities which would soon mar and eventually impair 
its greatness.  So long as one balanced the other, and John F. Dodge and others exercised 
considerable influence, the possibilities of harm to the company were limited.”  But with 
both John Dodge and Couzens gone from active management, Henry Ford became 
increasingly autocratic, making important decisions as though there were no board of 
directors.  On more than one occasion, funds were disbursed for design and construction 
of facilities before the plans were ratified by or even put before the board (Nevins and 
Hill, 1954). 
In 1916, Ford lowered prices across the board and announced that no special 
dividends would be paid.  He believed this move would increase sales from 500,000 to 
800,000 cars per year, and plans were underway to double production capacity.  The 
Dodge brothers opposed these moves, believing the company had attained its goals.  In 
November, 1916, the Dodge brothers filed a lawsuit to stop the diversion of company 
profits from dividends, thereby delaying expenditures on plant expansion.  Development 
of both Highland Park and the River Rouge was allowed to move ahead in 1917 when 
Ford posted a $10-million bond to protect the minority stockholders.  The courts then 
forced Ford to pay a special dividend of over $19 million plus interest in February, 1919.  
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Although Henry Ford received the bulk of this dividend, he resented the interference of 
the minority stockholders and resolved to rid himself of such constraints.   
In December, 1918, Henry Ford resigned as president of the Ford Motor 
Company, claiming he wanted to devote himself to other organizations, presumably 
Henry Ford & Son which he had established to manufacture tractors.  The board elected 
Henry’s son Edsel to replace him as president.  Then in March, 1919, Henry Ford 
announced he would organize a new firm, owned entirely by the Ford family, to produce 
a better and lower priced car than the Model T.  He claimed the move had been 
necessitated by the settlement of the Dodge suit which, through dividend payments, had 
given him large personal resources that he could not reinvest in the Ford Motor 
Company, which was left without cash reserves for expansion.  The new company would 
allow Ford complete freedom and control.   
Needless to say, the minority stockholders of the Ford Motor Company were 
alarmed.  Apparently at Edsel’s initiation, Henry Ford’s agents began arrangements to 
obtain their stock, representing 41.5% of the company, with the requirement that if the 
entire block could not be purchased then none would be.  Though the stockholders knew 
that the agents were acting for Ford and felt the negotiated stock price was below its 
actual value, they were left with few alternatives.  When the transaction was complete in 
July, 1919, Henry Ford became the first individual to control completely a company the 
size of the Ford Motor Company.  Ford immediately reorganized the company, 
integrating all Ford enterprises, and allocated the new firm’s stock 55.2% to himself, 
41.7% to Edsel, and 3.1% to his wife Clara.  Although Edsel was named company 
president, Henry clearly remained in control (Nevins and Hill, 1957; Flink, 1988). 
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The price of control was high.  Many of Ford’s ablest executives – C. Harold 
Wills, John R. Lee, and Norval Hawkins, head of Ford sales – resigned in the spring of 
1919, apparently as a result of growing tensions and Ford’s desire for absolute authority.  
William Knudsen followed in 1921 and both he and Hawkins found executive positions 
at GM.  Wills and Lee joined forces to develop and produce a new and technologically 
advanced automobile, the Wills-Sainte Claire.  More significantly, Ford, who despised 
reliance on bankers and credit, had to borrow to finance the stock buyout.   
5.1.2 Financial Crisis, 1919-1921 
Payments on the debt, the court ordered dividend, aggressive expansion at the 
River Rouge, and the acquisition of mines and timber tracts left the company in a delicate 
financial position.  It seemed irrelevant in early 1919 when sales were booming, fueled 
by pent-up demand from the war years.  But in the summer of 1920, the post-war 
recession sent sales plummeting (see section 5.6.1).  Ford cut prices, knowing that he 
would take a loss with every car sold, but believing he would make up for it with profits 
from the sale of parts.  By October, nearly half of the industry had followed suit.  Though 
Ford’s sales rallied temporarily, they sank even further by December.  One by one, 
manufacturers began slowing production then shutting down.  By the end of the year, 
Highland Park was closed.  With the plant idle, Ford restructured the company, slashed 
employment, and sold off obsolescent and excess equipment.  Prior to WWI, Ernest 
Kanzler had worked out schedules at the Fordson tractor plant that minimized supply 
inventories.  As a result, parts were managed on a nearly just-in-time basis, arriving only 
hours before being used.  Ford brought Kanzler to Highland Park to assist Edsel in a 
program of ‘waste elimination’ (Nevins and Hill, 1957). 
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But with payment on the debt looming in early 1922, Henry Ford figured his 
obligations at $58 million while the company held only $20 million in cash.  Ford’s 
financial position was precarious enough that company officials began investigating loan 
possibilities, though Henry Ford denied he had ever seriously considered that option.  
Instead, Ford took a calculated gamble and resumed limited production at Highland Park 
in February, insisting that dealers resume taking deliveries despite the fact that they 
already held considerable stocks of unsold vehicles.  The move shifted the burden of 
Ford’s debts to the dealers, most of who were forced to borrow in order to pay for the 
consignments (Nevins and Hill, 1957).  However, company officials worked with the 
dealers to secure the financing required.  Sales figures also showed that the situation was 
improving and that the dealers were generally reducing their inventories. 
By April, sales were rising steadily and Ford had paid off his debts.  His 
reorganization of the plant during the downtime helped streamline production.  But while 
his ruthless restructuring of the business offices considerably reduced the payroll, it was 
essentially an inept hatchet job.  Because of Henry Ford’s disparaging views of the 
‘parasitic’ office force, he “completely missed the opportunity [for an orderly 
reorganization] which General Motors seized and developed under Alfred P. Sloan, Jr.” 
(Nevins and Hill, 1957, p. 167).  By the end of 1921, many of Ford’s most talented 
executives were discharged or had resigned over friction with Henry, who had become 
increasingly autocratic and impatient with independent individualists.  Those who 




5.1.3 The River Rouge 
From 1915 until the post-war recession hit, the price of raw materials for 
automobile manufacturing – steel, malleable iron, leather, and glass – more than doubled 
in price.  Ford had long been interested in bringing the price and availability of these vital 
resources under his control and had begun the process when planning development of the 
Rouge site.  Because of a contract to supply Eagle Boats for the war effort, the U.S. 
government in 1918 granted Ford priority materials for construction of the blast furnace 
which Ford had planned anyway.  Construction forged ahead despite the Dodge suit 
(Nevins and Hill, 1957).  In addition, the government widened and dredged the river and 
constructed a turning basin so that the Eagle Boats could be launched from the plant.  
Further improvements were required to allow passage of deep draft ships but were not 
completed until 1923.   
In 1919, with complete control of the company in Henry’s hands and with the war 
over, Ford began development of the Rouge in earnest.  Body making at the site began in 
August and production reached 800 units per day by November.  By the end of the year, 
the coke plant was in operation.  Early in 1920, a sawmill began preparing wood for body 
making and the first blast furnace went into operation in May.  Shortly afterward, the 
postwar recession hit and most construction was suspended, though work continued on 
setting up tractor manufacturing, which had ended in Dearborn.   
After Ford’s quick recovery from the recession, tractor production began at the 
Rouge in late February, 1921.  Soon after, the foundry and power plant began operation – 
both were the largest of their kind in the world.  By 1922, 10,000 workers manned the 
foundry.  When complete, the power plant was capable of generating 240,000 kilowatts 
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and 500,000 hp.  In 1924, the Rouge complex covered nearly 1,000 acres, contained 
forty-four buildings, employed 42,000 workers, and was still growing.  The blast furnaces 
produced 35-50% of the iron used in Model T’s and tractors and the foundry produced 
nearly all the iron, brass, steel, and bronze castings used by Ford factories.   
The Rouge realized Ford’s objectives to integrate the flow of materials with key 
production units.  A vast array of conveyors moved materials through an apparently 
congested plant.  Traversing the floor was nearly impossible, but each stationary worker 
had sufficient room to perform his operation.  A visitor to the plant in 1922 described the 
factory as a huge machine where he saw “each unit as a carefully designed gear which 
meshes with other gears and operates in synchronism with them, the whole forming one 
huge, perfectly-timed, smoothly operating industrial machine of almost unbelievable 
efficiency” (cited in Nevins and Hill, 1957, p. 288).  The resulting processes also made 
remarkably efficient use of waste materials like gas from the coke ovens and ore dust 
from the blast furnaces.  In its publicity materials, the company claimed that ore arrived 
at 8:00 AM on Monday, and by Tuesday afternoon, it was a finished motor en route by 
conveyor to final assembly: raw materials were converted to cash in about 33 hours. 
Ford’s steel making was expanded, beginning in 1925, to include open hearth 
furnaces, blooming mills, and rolling mills.  Ford had not only become the only 
automobile manufacturer to have its own steel-making facilities, but beginning in 1921, 
was also the only one to make its own glass.  The Rouge eventually manufactured 
coatings, lubricants, artificial leather for tops, solvents, gaskets, upholstery, and carpet.  
Soybean meal was used to manufacture small interior plastic components, including 
window strips, horn buttons, switches, and gear shifter knobs.  Ford eventually 
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manufactured rubber components as well, including tires, mountings, hoses, gaskets, 
mats, running board covers, and insulation (Rubenstein, 2001). 
Ford also secured access to the raw materials for production.  Between 1920 and 
1923, he purchased over 700,000 acres of timberland, an iron mine plus an additional 
2200 acres of iron ore-bearing land, coal mines, and dock facilities.  By 1928, Ford’s coal 
mining operations were large enough to sell one quarter of the output to the public.  
While Ford never produced a significant amount of iron ore and continued to buy from 
contractors about 80% of the lumber required for the company’s automobiles, this 
exploitation of resources sent a clear signal to suppliers considering price increases.  Ford 
later invested in a Brazilian rubber plantation but the venture was never profitable. 
Ford also bought and completely remade the Detroit, Toledo, & Ironton railroad 
in 1920, the use of which cut shipping time and insulated the company from rail strikes.  
Ford purchased a fleet of barges and cargo ships in 1924 and, although costs were higher 
than those of rivals, the operation of the fleet was profitable.  In addition, use of the fleet 
forced other shippers to liberalize their carrying practices and reduce rates. 
5.1.4 End of the Model T 
Though the Ford Motor Company was committed to making only one automobile, 
the Model T first introduced in 1908 was not a static design.  Between 1913 and 1918, 
steady improvements were made in response to complaints by dealers and customers, as 
well as part of constant efforts to accelerate production, reduce costs, and reduce 
requirements for replacement parts.  In 1914, the Model T was modernized to replace the 
bulb horn, acetylene gas headlamps and straight fenders with a hand operated Klaxon 
horn, brass electric headlamps powered by the magneto, and curved fenders.  More style 
 
326 
changes were made in 1917, mainly in response to consumer complaints.  The more 
streamlined appearance and nickel trim was well received.  Cadillac introduced the 
electric self-starter on its 1912 model and most manufacturers had adopted it within two 
years, but Ford held out until 1919, and then only offered it as an option.  Initially, the 
compression ratio of the engine was actually reduced because the quality of gasoline had 
been steadily declining, resulting in problems with engine knock at higher compression.  
However, other improvements in the design and machining processes improved 
compression ratio, acceleration, and strength. 
Model T sales climbed steadily, slowed only temporarily by World War I and the 
post-war recession.  In 1921, sales approached one million.  No longer tempered by 
Couzen’s and the Dodge brothers, Ford’s increasing tendency toward arrogance and 
autocratic behavior began to stifle product innovation.  When the dealers began to press 
for changes, they were brought to Highland Park for a meeting as they had been in the 
previous decade.  They complained that the Model T brakes were noisy and difficult to 
repair; brake shoes wore out quickly; and the planetary transmission was inferior to the 
now popular three-speed selective transmission.  This time, however, their 
recommendations got a chilly reception.  When asked his opinion at the close of the 
discussion, Ford replied, “I think that the only thing we need worry about is the best way 
to make more cars” (Nevins and Hill, 1957, p. 389). 
Meanwhile, Ford’s competitors were slowly closing the price gap.  Manufacturers 
cut prices in all price categories in the summer of 1925 and, the following year, ten firms 
were offering 27 models of four-passenger cars priced below $1,000.  Most notable were 
the price cuts in closed-body cars, with several now available for less than $1,000.  In 
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1924, dealers reported that somewhere between half and all of their sales represented 
exchanges of open- for closed-body cars.  An analysis completed in 1925 revealed that 
four fifths of the used vehicles traded in were open-body cars.  According to Sloan (1964, 
p. 162), “[t]he rise of the closed body made it impossible for Mr. Ford to maintain his 
leading position in the low-price field, for he had frozen his policy in the Model T, and 
the Model T was pre-eminently an open-car design.  With its light chassis, it was 
unsuited to the heavier closed body, and so in less than two years, the closed body made 
the already obsolescing design of the Model T noncompetitive as an engineering design.”  
Although Ford did put closed bodies on the Model T beginning in 1924, they made up 
only 37.5% of Ford’s sales.  By 1927, closed-body cars represented 85% of the 
automobile market, but constituted only 58% of Ford’s sales compared to 82% of 
Chevrolet’s sales.54 
New innovations were also making cars safer and more comfortable.  For the 
1924 model year, four-wheel brakes were offered by 25 firms as standard or optional 
equipment.  Balloon tires that gave a smoother ride were standard on 14 models.  The 
Model T offered neither innovation.  In addition, more powerful six-cylinder engines 
were gaining popularity, growing from less than 20% of the market in 1917 to nearly 
40% by 1926.  Excluding Ford’s sales, six-cylinder engines made up 55% of the market 
in 1926 and a few were offered at under $1,000 (Epstein, 1972).  Though the Model T 
had been restyled in 1923 and was available in a choice of colors beginning in 1925, it 
remained a homely and utilitarian vehicle now competing with more stylish and 
comfortable cars that were also easier to operate. 
                                                 
54 Nearly 80% of overall GM sales were closed-body cars as early as 1925.  But it was the penetration of 
closed cars into the low-price field occupied by Ford and Chevrolet (and Plymouth beginning in 1928) that 
posed a serious challenge for the Model T. 
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During the 1920s, rising prosperity, availability of credit, improved roads, new 
technologies, the increasing market influence of women, and a saturating market fueled a 
shift in preferences from simple utility to style, comfort, and power (see section 5.6).  
Ford could scarcely have been unaware of the trend.  Industry publications and company 
executives alike pointed out the obsolescence of the Model T.  Market saturation around 
1923 posed a particularly difficult problem for the aging Tin Lizzie.  “When first-car 
buyers returned to the market for the second round, with the old car as a first payment on 
the new car, they were selling basic transportation and demanding something more than 
that in the new car.  Middle-income buyers, assisted by the trade-in and installment 
financing, created the demand, not for basic transportation, but for progress in new cars, 
for comfort, convenience, power, and style” (Sloan, 1964, p. 163).  With most buyers 
trading in and up, an increasing number of inexpensive used cars were competing with 
new Model T’s to fill the demand for basic transportation, and many of the used cars had 
more options and advanced features than the Ford. 
Infrastructural changes also contributed directly to the obsolescence of the Ford.  
By the 1920s, many roads had improved dramatically and motorists were driving at ever 
faster speeds.  The high road clearance and stiff suspension of the Model T had been 
designed to navigate rugged rural roads, which it did extremely well, though not 
comfortably.  With improved road surfaces, this functionality became unnecessary and 
the Ford design actually became dysfunctional.  According to Hugill (1982), on smooth 
roads at high speed “the Model T rolled like a ship in a bad storm.”  And when Ford 
finally incorporated four-wheel brakes and balloon tires, innovations that made driving 
safer and more comfortable on most cars, the combination on the Model T “produced a 
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disastrous front-end shimmy when braking at high speeds” (Hugill, 1982).  In addition, 
the Ford’s high center of gravity, necessary on rugged roads, became increasingly unsafe 
at higher speeds. 
In 1924, sales of the Model T reached two million but had stagnated.  Both sales 
and market share were falling by 1926 and a price reduction had no effect.  Although 
Ford could certainly see the trends in the market, he had no tolerance for frills or 
conspicuous consumption and continued to believe that automobiles were and should be 
service vehicles.  Ford vehemently opposed the growing emphasis on style and the trend 
toward annual model changes: 
It is considered good manufacturing practice, and not bad ethics, occasionally to 
change designs so that old models will become obsolete and new ones will have 
to be bought either because repair parts for the old cannot be had, or because the 
new model offers a new sales argument which can be used to persuade a 
consumer to scrap what he has and buy something new. We have been told that 
this is good business, that it is clever business, that the object of business ought 
to be to get people to buy frequently and that it is bad business to try to make 
anything that will last forever, because when once a man is sold he will not buy 
again. 
Our principle of business is precisely to the contrary. We cannot conceive how to 
serve the consumer unless we make for him something that, as far as we can 
provide, will last forever. We want to construct some kind of a machine that will 
last forever. It does not please us to have a buyer's car wear out or become 
obsolete. We want the man who buys one of our products never to have to buy 
another. We never make an improvement that renders any previous model 
obsolete.  (Ford and Crowther, 1922, p. 148-149) 
In December, 1926, Ford was quoted in the New York Times defending the Model 
T’s design. “The Ford car is a tried and proved product that requires no tinkering.  It has 
met all the conditions of transportation the world over” (cited in Hounshell, 1984, p. 
277).  But despite his philosophical objections, there was no escaping the direction of the 
market.  Five months later on May 25, 1927, Ford announced the company would cease 
production of the Model T and build a new car.  The next day, the fifteen millionth 
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Model T rolled off the assembly line.  When production was suspended, Ford had built a 
total of 15,458,781 Model T’s. 
5.1.5 The New Model A 
Although Henry Ford had repeatedly insisted that the Model T required no 
‘tinkering,’ he recognized that eventually it would need to be replaced.  One factor in his 
delay in introducing a new model apparently was the hope that the next Ford automobile 
would be as revolutionary for its day as the Model T had been in 1908 (Nevins and Hill, 
1957).  Since 1920, Ford engineers had experimented intermittently with design concepts 
for a radical “X” car utilizing an engine with eight or twelve cylinders arranged half 
facing upward and half downward in an X pattern.  But by 1926, the car was still a dream 
needing years of development to become reality and Edsel believed it was too radical for 
public acceptance.   
Sometime in mid to late 1926, Ford discontinued work on the X-car and gave the 
order to begin designing a new four-cylinder model.  Ford took charge of developing the 
entirely new car, outlining design objectives of speed, power, and comfort.  Integrity was 
to come first, and Ford wanted to replace stampings and malleable castings with more 
expensive steel forgings.  The body would be somewhat longer than the Chevrolet and, at 
Edsel’s insistence, set lower to the ground than the Model T.  Ford no longer had an 
engineer with the talent of C. Harold Wills, but he had a competent and adaptable team 
willing to subordinate their ideas to Ford’s.   
However, the company had no organized engineering laboratories or research 
facilities and work was carried out in various locations near the production lines where it 
would be applied.  Ford encouraged competition and more than one group of engineers 
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often worked on the same problem.  The resulting research maintained a highly practical 
focus, but lacked careful planning and depth.  According to one employee, “No money 
was being spent… to get highly trained young men out of the universities and 
technological schools.  Expenditures for laboratory equipment and general research 
facilities were made according to Henry Ford’s mood and whim” (Nevins and Hill, 1957, 
p. 443).  And while other manufacturers had sophisticated testing laboratories and 
proving grounds, Ford used public highways to test its experimental cars.  Parts, 
materials, and even entire vehicles were tested on a pass-fail basis, and no data was 
recorded.  Ford was still embracing a cut-and-try approach. 
By the spring of 1927, the first experimental car was ready for road testing; at 
least twenty more would follow.  The biggest problem encountered by the design team 
was the new engine.  Ford insisted it be light, with cylinder bore and stroke only slightly 
larger than the Model T, and kept at relatively low revolutions-per-minute to prolong life, 
yet that it deliver at least 40 hp. The experimental engines produced no more than 22 hp 
until Ford finally brought in Harold Hicks, chief engineer of Ford’s aircraft division.55  
Hicks is credited with solving the basic engine problem, though he gave credit to 
contributions by Edsel and to Henry Ford for his insistence on the combination of 
lightness and power.  The new engine won national acclaim for its quick take-off and 
remarkable acceleration.  Where the Model T produced a top speed of 43 mph, the new 
Ford engine achieved 65 mph. 
                                                 
55 Ford had remained interested in aircraft after producing Liberty engines during the war.  In 1925, he 
purchased the Stout Metal Airplane Company, which was making single-engine monoplanes designed by 
William Stout.  Hicks was initially assigned to assist Stout in the development of a larger three-engine 
aircraft, but replaced him as chief engineer when the tri-motor performed poorly in initial tests. 
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The engine was the last technical issue to be solved.  Edsel had directed the 
design of a new stylish body and distinctive interior.  A selective sliding-gear 
transmission replaced the Model T’s planetary transmission, which had been a major 
source of complaints.  A water pump was added.  For finishing touches, Ford added a 
safety glass windshield and hydraulic shock absorbers.  The safety glass was added after 
Hicks crashed one of the test cars and was hurled through the windshield, badly mangling 
his arm.  The shock absorbers were unheard of in a low-priced vehicle and did more than 
any other feature to provide passenger comfort.  The prototype was complete in August, 
1927.  But Ford faced another daunting task – retooling to produce the new car. 
Every one of the 5,580 parts of the new Ford Model A was entirely new; every 
Ford plant had to be rebuilt from the ground up.  It was the largest and most urgent 
change-over undertaken in U.S. industry to date.  Workers were brought in at Highland 
Park and the Rouge starting in May, and by July, 17,000 were busy with new 
construction, electrical work, tool design, and the complete reconfiguration of the 
factories.  Ford once again developed and purchased extremely specialized machine 
tools.  One notable development was a self-indexing automatic welder used to replace 
bolting on subassemblies; the industry would later adopt this innovation.  Final assembly 
of the Model T had occurred at Highland Park, but for the Model A, it was set up at the 
Rouge. 
The first factory-produced Model A came off the assembly line in late October, 
1927, but Ford used this car for testing and inspection.  Final changes were made in the 
main assembly line, and limited production began November 1.  Finally, in December, 
the public got the first look at the new Ford.  Though the car was not radical, it included 
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up-to-date innovations, superior workmanship and excellent styling; it was available in 
four colors, none of them black.  The anxiously awaited new Ford was an overwhelming 
success.  But as orders came flooding in, Ford had trouble achieving full production.  
There were problems with plant layout, training, and the delivery of machine tools.  
Design refinements were required.  And in the changeover, Charles Sorensen was 
cleaning house, purging the company of “all the Model T son-of-a-bitches” from 
Highland Park.  The loss of seasoned production men, including Clarence Avery and 
William Klann, was crippling (Sorensen, 1956; Nevins and Hill, 1957; Hounshell, 1984).   
Dealers were hard hit by the delays and in March, 1928, Ford established the 
Universal Credit Corporation to finance time-sales of Ford cars and assist authorized 
agents in accumulating stocks.  After six months, only 100,000 Model A’s were in the 
hands of customers, but production was finally up.  The following year proved to be a 
resounding success; production was the largest since 1925 and sales were strong. 
The changeover to the Model A cost roughly $250 million and taught Ford some 
hard lessons in accommodating change (Nevins and Hill, 1957; Hounshell, 1984).  First, 
changeover could not be accomplished smoothly without adequate advanced planning in 
design and production of the automobile.  Although about 25% of the planning for 
retooling was accomplished in the six months before shutting down Model T production, 
this was not nearly sufficient.  Second, Ford learned the value of establishing pilot 
production lines to test new approaches to machine work before tearing out old 
equipment.  Time restrictions had only allowed for one pilot line for the Model A engine 
block, which proved important in identifying and solving production problems.  Third, 
Ford learned the importance of leaving adequate time for error in planning body die 
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work.  It was particularly important for production experts to review new designs since 
body styles proposed by designers could involve curves too deep for drawing.  Fourth, 
Ford personnel learned the hard way the importance of shifting from machinery designed 
for a single task to more flexible tools that could accommodate changes in design.  For 
example, the presses used for the Model T were unable to handle the larger sized 
stampings required by a slight lengthening of the automobile’s design in 1926.  Later, 
specialized multi-spindle drill presses were replaced with ones that could accommodate a 
new arrangement of drills by simply changing the head.  These changes to specialized 
machine tools led to what became known as “flexible mass production.”  Finally, Ford 
was reminded that “a new model in the initial stages of production was a sure target for 
hundreds of proposed changes,” just as the Model T had been in 1908 (Hounshell, 1984, 
p. 294).  
5.2 GM: Planning for Change 
Between 1910 and 1915, the banker controlled management of General Motors 
headed by James Jackson Storrow had cut unproductive units, tightened fiscal controls, 
and restored the firm to solvency.  In the process, Charles Nash had ended production of 
the Buick Model 10, thereby eliminating GM’s share of the growing market for low 
priced vehicles.  By 1915, GM’s market share had slipped to 8.5%.  Meanwhile, William 
Durant had successfully established the new Chevrolet Motor Company in the 
inexpensive market dominated by Ford.  This section reviews the history of GM from 
1915 to 1930.  This era is dominated by four key individuals: William Durant, Pierre du 
Pont, Alfred Sloan, and Charles Kettering.   
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Section 5.2.1 covers the history of GM from 1915 to 1920.  In 1915, William 
Durant used his success with Chevrolet to regain control of GM, bringing Pierre du Pont 
to the board of directors.  GM’s strategy of vertical integration through acquisitions, 
along with Durant’s ultimately destructive actions in the stock market, led to corporate 
associations and the appropriation of critical human capital. The most significant of these 
were associations with the E.I. Du Pont de Nemours and Fisher Body Companies and the 
managerial and technical talents of Pierre du Pont, Alfred Sloan, and Charles Kettering.  
However, Durant’s haphazard management combined with GM’s aggressive acquisitions 
and optimistic expansion left the company in a vulnerable position when the brunt of the 
post-war recession hit the industry in 1920.  That same year, Durant was forced from GM 
after his second disastrous attempt to prop up the value of GM stock.  
Pierre du Pont reluctantly succeeded Durant, serving as president from 1920 to 
1923.  During this period, covered in section 5.2.2, du Pont and Sloan instituted sweeping 
management reforms and restructured the product lines.  Durant’s management had left 
behind an uncoordinated set of rules for the individual subsidiaries that did not serve the 
welfare of the corporation as a whole.  The new system of management began to establish 
a coherent set of rules for GM that was codified in corporate structure and policies.  
Sloan’s reforms represented a synthesis of prior managerial experience, knowledge 
spillovers in financial management from the Du Pont Company, and personal inspiration.  
The restructured product line began a process of aligning the technology with new 
consumer preferences.  However, du Pont’s attempt to compete with Ford using 
innovative technology failed and, as a result, du Pont stepped down as president.   
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Sloan succeeded du Pont, ushering in a new era for GM that is covered in section 
5.2.3.  The failure of du Pont’s pet project, the copper-cooled engine, prompted Sloan to 
adopt new corporate policies that 1) coordinated the functions of and communication 
between the production divisions and the research labs; 2) distinguished programs for 
advanced product engineering from those for long-range research; 3) explicitly avoided 
technological leadership and its inherent risks.  However, the failure, combined with 
Sloan’s market segmentation strategy, also led to one of GM’s most significant 
innovations in the second transitional phase – sharing parts across divisions – which 
allowed GM to offer a greater variety of products while achieving cost reductions 
through economies of scale.  Sloan’s increasing reliance on statistical reporting and 
analysis not only helped with production planning but also provided GM with a wealth of 
market data.  This data may have contributed to GM’s ability to align its products to 
shifting consumer preferences.  By 1930, the corporation had institutionalized designing 
for style and was accommodating annual model changes. 
Section 5.2.4 provides a more detailed history of five significant GM innovations 
between 1915 and 1930: the development of financial controls; the copper air-cooled 
engine; tetra-ethyl lead (TEL) gasoline additive; Duco paint; and institutionalizing style 
and annual model changes.  GM institutionalized research and development in 1919, and 
both the copper-cooled engine and TEL were products of internal research and 
development.  However, this review reveals that knowledge spillovers and learning-by-
doing were also prominent in the development of financial controls, TEL, and Duco 
paint.  Simple luck also played a role in the breakthroughs that led to the development of 
TEL and Duco paint. 
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5.2.1 Durant Returns to GM, 1915-1920 
With the end of the GM five-year voting trust approaching in October, 1915, 
Durant began purchasing GM stock and arranging for voting proxies on stock owned by 
friends and family.  On the scheduled date of the board meeting on September 16, 1915, 
Durant, Storrow, and Nash met privately.  Durant also brought banker Louis Gaveret 
Kaufman, Pierre du Pont, and du Pont’s chief financial assistant, John J. Raskob, to the 
meeting.  Du Pont was one of Kaufman’s directors and held GM stock in his personal 
portfolio.  At the private meeting, it became apparent that neither Durant nor Storrow had 
control of a clear majority of stock.  Rather than resort to an official count, the two 
parties negotiated a compromise.  A new board of seventeen members would be elected, 
with each party selecting seven members.  The remaining three positions would be 
appointed by du Pont and not connected with either party.  Du Pont selected Raskob, his 
brother-in-law, and a du Pont corporate executive.  The executives then joined the official 
board meeting and Storrow announced the details of the agreement.  In November, the 
new GM board of directors elected Pierre du Pont as chairman. 
However, Durant’s plans were not yet complete.  A week after the September GM 
board meeting, he reorganized the Chevrolet Motor Company in Delaware as a holding 
company for Chevrolet operations.  The new company was capitalized to $20 million 
with $6.8 million in stock used to raise funds to triple production.  Ninety day later, the 
directors of Chevrolet recapitalized again at $80 million.  He then offered to trade five of 
his shares in Chevrolet for one in GM, a profitable trade for GM stockholders who 
received no dividends and watched stock prices fall under the banker regime.  By the end 
of 1915, Durant owned around 45% of Chevrolet common stock and 44% of GM.  In a 
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desperate bid to maintain control, the pro-Storrow faction proposed a new three-year 
voting trust, reminding stockholders that the conservative leaders had managed to retire 
the $15 million debt.  The proposal was doomed to failure in the face of the enormous 
profits to be made from Durant’s stock trade.   
In May, 1916, Durant announced that he controlled GM with 54.5% of the 
company’s stock.  Nash, whose name had appeared as a proposed director on the petition 
for a new voting trust, resigned.  Durant took over as GM president in June.  Storrow 
made plans to start his own automobile manufacturing company, intending to install Nash 
and Walter Chrysler in charge of the enterprise. Durant, however, enticed Chrysler to stay 
with GM by promoting him to general manager and president of Buick, raising his salary 
from $50,000 to $500,000, and promising no interference with his authority.56  Durant 
reincorporated the General Motors Company as General Motors Corporation in October, 
and the production facilities were organized as corporate divisions.    
Just months before Durant took control of GM, he formed the United Motors 
Corporation as a holding company for automotive parts manufacturers.  To ensure that he 
retained control of the company, he arranged for only a small minority of stock, owned 
by himself and Kaufman, to have voting rights.  Within months, United Motors owned 
five parts and accessories firms, including Hyatt Roller Bearing, Delco Corporation, and 
the Remy Electric Company.  Hyatt’s Alfred Sloan was named president of the new 
corporation.57   
                                                 
56 Chrysler was promoted to vice president of GM in charge of operations in 1919 (Hyde, 2003).   
57 Delco, originally Dayton Engineering Laboratories Company, had been formed by Charles Kettering and 
Edward Deeds in 1909 to build an electric ignition system under contract to Cadillac.  See section 4.2.4. 
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Unfortunately, fortune would not smile on Durant for long.  In April, 1917, 
America entered World War I.  Henry Leland petitioned Durant to allow Cadillac to 
produce Liberty aircraft engines, but Durant refused.  Leland resigned in June to form the 
Lincoln Motor Company.58  Within a few months, mounting public pressure forced 
Durant to begin token production of Liberty engines at Buick and Cadillac.  Then, despite 
excellent profits, GM stock began an unexplained slump.  Durant proposed to du Pont 
and Raskob that they form a buying syndicate to purchase large amounts of GM stock 
and thereby slow the decline in price.  When they demurred, Durant began purchasing on 
the margin himself.  As prices continued to fall, Durant found himself at the brink of ruin.  
In October, he approached the board and requested a $1 million loan.  His actions had 
been intended to support GM and therefore its stockholders, so he felt his request was 
perfectly reasonable.  Fearing legal liability, the board turned him down.  However, they 
were concerned that public knowledge of Durant’s predicament would harm the company 
and instead voted him an annual $500,000 salary, retroactive to 1916.   
While this solved Durant’s immediate personal financial problems, it did nothing 
for GM’s stock situation.  Raskob later proposed to Pierre du Pont that the Du Pont 
Corporation, which was holding a capital surplus from wartime profits in gunpowder, 
purchase large blocks of GM and Chevrolet stock.  This move would solve GM’s stock 
problem and serve to further diversify Du Pont’s business, a process begun before the 
U.S. entered World War I.  As part of the plan, Durant would have to cede financial 
                                                 
58 The Lincoln Motor Company was initially devoted to building aircraft engines for the war effort.  After 
the war ended, Leland decided to produce a new luxury car line.  Lincoln was still in debt from tooling for 
Liberty engines and retooling for automobile manufacturing when the post-war recession struck.  Due to 
outdated styling, sales of the new car were poor and Lincoln went into receivership.  Ford purchased 
Lincoln in February, 1922, leaving left Henry Leland and his son, Wilfred, in charge.  However, Henry 
Ford insisted that Lincoln be aligned with Ford philosophies and processes.  Friction soon arose, and in 
June, Wilfred was relieved and Henry Leland resigned in protest. 
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control to du Pont and agree to merge GM, United Motors, and Chevrolet – a move he 
had repeatedly refused.  In pitching the plan to the Du Pont board, Raskob pointed out the 
prospect of a large and closed market for Du Pont paints, varnishes, and synthetic fabrics.  
He went on to predict that the Du Pont Company would eventually control the entire GM 
enterprise.   
By the end of January, 1918, a newly created Du Pont American Industries had 
purchased 24% of GM and a sizeable share of Chevrolet for $25 million.  Most of the 
stock was purchased on the open market with $1.2 million purchased from Durant.  Du 
Pont was now the second largest stockholder in GM and controlled GM’s finance 
committee which Pierre du Pont now chaired (Weisberger, 1979).  GM acquired 
Chevrolet in May and the United Motors Corporation in June, 1918.  With the purchase 
of United Motors, Alfred Sloan became a director of GM and vice president in charge of 
its accessories division. 
Du Pont doubled its investment in GM later in 1918.  Over the next two years, 
Pierre du Pont’s control of GM’s finances did nothing to slow the firm’s growth as it 
continued a veritable spree of acquisitions, purchasing all or part interest in 
manufacturers of automobiles, accessories, automotive parts, automobile bodies, tractors, 
aircraft, tires, rubber, and leather, as well as a steel plant and surplus war plants.  Notable 
acquisitions during this timeframe included the Scripps-Booth Company, Samson 
Tractor, and Frigidaire, as well as shares of the Fisher Body Company, Goodyear Tire 
and Rubber, and Dunlop Rubber.  GM secured all of Charles Kettering’s time by 
purchasing three additional firms he had founded, the Delco Light Company, Dayton 
Metal Products, and the Dayton-Wright Airplane Company.  With Kettering and his 
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research operations now completely enfolded in the corporation, GM commissioned 
Kettering to set up and direct the General Motors Research Laboratories, which were 
subsequently incorporated as the General Motors Research Corporation.  GM also 
established the General Motors Acceptance Corporation (GMAC) and the General 
Motors Export Division.  
By the end of 1919, GM’s fixed investments totaled $153.8 million, its payroll 
was 85,890, and it was carrying huge inventories and their attendant storage and control 
costs.  But with the end of World War I, the future looked bright.  Because automobile 
production had been limited during the war, there was now a shortage of automobiles for 
sale.  The market was clamoring for every car the industry could produce and at just 
about any price.  GM was just one of the many manufacturers scrambling to increase 
production to fill a backlog of orders. 
However, the following year brought about abrupt changes at GM, beginning with 
the resignation of Walter Chrysler in March.  He had given Durant the three years he had 
promised, and although he loved the man personally, he was unable to tolerate Durant’s 
interference with his management of Buick (Weisberger, 1979).  Meanwhile, Pierre du 
Pont’s doubts about Durant’s management skills and methods were growing.  With the 
post-war inflation pushing up material and labor costs in late 1919 and early 1920, it also 
became apparent that GM needed more cash to cover operations and the optimistic 
expansion plans initiated in 1919.  A stock offering failed to generate the needed capital, 
so Durant and du Pont formed buying syndicates to acquire and temporarily hold GM 
stock hoping to bid up the price and attract more buyers.  When that proved insufficient, 
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du Pont approached J.P. Morgan.  The bank agreed to invest in GM and distribute stock 
to associated banks, but demanded seats on the board in return.   
Within weeks of the new relationship, the price of GM stock began to slide.  Then 
a block of 100,000 shares was dropped on the market causing a dive.  Durant’s sources 
informed him the sale had come from one of the Morgan partners who now sat on GM’s 
board.  The Federal Reserve Board had raised the discount rate in November, 1919, and 
speculators were liquidating over-inflated stocks.  By summer, the nation was entering a 
recession and the price of GM stock continued its downward spiral.  The 1919 boom in 
automobile demand had been fleeting, based on inflated wartime prices, easy credit, and 
over-blown expectations.  Now the boom had collapsed.  Sales plummeted; trainloads of 
cars stood undelivered.  After Ford cut prices as much as 30%, GM and other 
competitors’ sales dropped even further.  GM’s factory lots were clogged with inventory 
that tied up $210 million (Cray, 1980).  Production was cancelled, factories shut down, 
and workers were laid off to stem the cash outflow.  Yet supplies continued to arrive at 
warehouses that were already full.  The situation was made worse by the lack of accurate 
inventory figures despite the improvements in coordination and management of the GM 
divisions since 1910 (Pound, 1934).   
Amid the great optimism of 1919, Alfred Sloan had become concerned about 
Durant’s management and the lack of any contingency plan for a drop in demand or a 
serious problem in production.  Sloan had built the Hyatt Roller Bearing Company into 
an industry force by keeping pace with the expanding and varied needs of the automobile 
industry.  In the process, he had learned invaluable lessons.  From Cadillac’s Henry 
Leland he had learned about the necessity of absolute precision and accuracy in mass 
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production.  From Ford’s C. Harold Wills, who had insisted on price concessions on large 
volume orders, he had learned that mass production demanded a constant search for 
improved processes and lower costs.  These imperatives required systematic planning, 
research, and accounting (Rae, 1959).  Durant’s “management by crony” was anything 
but systematic (Sloan, 1964, p. 27). 
With du Pont’s encouragement, Sloan had drafted three reports that detailed 
organizational and management reforms, including strict procedures for approval of 
capital expenditures, operating policies, an interdivisional billing system, and a plan for 
centralizing engineering and research functions.  Durant had filed them away 
(Weisberger, 1979; Cray, 1980).  Now Sloan’s worst fears were materializing; it 
appeared that GM could actually collapse under a real market shock and that his life 
savings, tied up in corporate stock, would disappear with it.  Banker and former GM 
president James Storrow had offered him a partnership in the Boston firm of Lee, 
Higginson & Company and Sloan took a month-long vacation to consider it.  He decided 
he should resign and gradually sell his GM stock for whatever he could get.  But he 
apparently cut his vacation short to return to GM, finding the company in the midst of big 
changes and decided to wait.   
The drop in GM’s stock price had put Durant’s personal finances in immediate 
peril once again.  As prices fell, he had continued to buy on the margin.  Brokers 
essentially loaned him 90% of the stock price.  They then borrowed the balance from 
bankers, using the stock as collateral.  When the stock price fell, so did the value of the 
collateral, and the banks asked for either more collateral or repayment.  Durant had dealt 
on such a scale that even he did not know how much he owed.  In early November, 
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Durant was finally forced to admit his predicament to Pierre du Pont.  His assessment of 
his debts reached $38 million, enough to ruin GM, forty-four brokers, and an unknown 
number of banks (Cray, 1980).  With the fate of GM once again in the balance, du Pont 
and J.P. Morgan arranged, partially through borrowing, to buy 60% of Durant’s stock and 
clear his debt (Weisberger, 1979).  The remainder of his stock was purchased by a newly 
created holding company that would hold it until prices recovered.  Though Durant 
owned a minority share in the holding company, he did not directly own any GM stock 
and could not serve as president.  As the news spread that GM control was now 
completely in du Pont and Morgan hands, the stock price began to recover.  On 
December 1, 1920, Durant again left GM; this time he would not return.  
5.2.2 Du Pont Control, 1920-1923 
Pierre du Pont continued as chair of GM’s board of directors and now reluctantly 
succeeded Durant as president.  With the country in a deep recession, it was an 
unfortunate time to begin a career in the automotive industry.  Sales early in 1920 
resulted in a net profit for the industry, but by year end, even Ford had closed the 
Highland Park and River Rouge plants.  Though du Pont would only serve as president 
for two and a half years, the era would see dramatic changes in GM’s finances, 
operations, organizational structure, and product lines. Du Pont attributed much of these 
changes to GM’s new vice president in charge of operations, Alfred Sloan, who had 
forwarded to du Pont copies of his lengthy reports on administrative reforms. 
5.2.2.1 Establishing Coordinated De-centralized Control 
At the end of his first week as president, du Pont reviewed Sloan’s plan for 
organization and in late December put it before the Executive Committee with only 
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minor modifications. The committee unanimously approved it and sent it to the board of 
directors, which also approved it (Sloan, 1964; Cray, 1980).  In essence, Sloan believed 
that GM was too large to operate under Durant’s decentralized, ‘feudal’ system with 
laissez faire doctrines or under Du Pont Company’s rigidly centralized management.  The 
new organizational structure developed by Sloan has been compared to military staff-
and-line division, but with a system of coordination that resembles government 
organizations; local managers retained administrative jurisdiction over and responsibility 
for their divisions (Pound, 1934).  Of the plan’s origins, Sloan recalled in 1964 (p. 47): 
I cannot, of course, say for sure how much of my thought on management came 
from contacts with my associates.  Ideas, I imagine, are seldom, if ever, wholly 
original, but so far as I am aware, this study came out of my experience in Hyatt, 
United Motors, and General Motors.  I had not been much of a book reader, and 
if I had been, I understand that I would not have found much in that line in those 
days to help; and I had no military experience.   
Nonetheless, Sloan’s model would eventually become the gospel for business 
administration students, be copied by nearly every major U.S. corporation, and adapted 
by foreign companies.   
While the central office dictated business policy, division managers were free to 
develop tactics consistent with corporate strategy.  They controlled manufacturing, 
distribution, and sales; hired their own staff; and made their own purchasing decisions.  
But du Pont and Sloan established interdivisional committees, staffed with 
representatives from the manufacturing divisions, to integrate policies regarding 
products, sales, purchasing and advertising.  The committee staff, selected by Sloan, 
controlled the decision-making process by controlling the information passed down.  
Committee recommendations went to du Pont for approval, though Sloan gradually took 
on this responsibility.  Many division managers were unhappy with the reorganization 
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and resigned; others were reassigned.  Sloan and du Pont then promoted men from within 
the corporation to replace them, with Sloan selecting men with engineering backgrounds.   
Many of the committees were temporary in nature, utilized only until problems 
were under control and new organizations and policies were in place.  Of particular note, 
Sloan (1964) felt that the General Purchasing Committee could not be deemed an 
unqualified success for three reasons.  First, many parts were already required in large 
enough quantities by a single division to realize supplier economies of scale and, 
therefore, low prices. Second, some parts were specific to a single engineering concept 
and not applicable to other projects.  Third, vendors that lost a bid sometimes approached 
one of the divisions directly afterward, offering a better price, and thereby causing 
confusion and dissatisfaction with the process.  However, the committee successfully 
demonstrated the feasibility of cooperation among the divisions, proving that 
representatives could work together for the good of their divisions and for the profit of 
the stockholders simultaneously.  Most significantly, though, the committee was 
instrumental in beginning a process of materials and parts standardization across the 
divisions.  By 1926, the evolution of this concept would allow GM to challenge Ford’s 
domination of the market. 
While the committee structure facilitated coordination, the corporation required a 
set of financial controls that could reduce the need to administer operations from the top.  
Forever in search of hard data to support decision-making, Sloan increasingly turned to 
two financial experts, Donaldson Brown and Albert Bradley.  According to Cray (1980, 
p. 200), Brown and Bradley were “among the first of a new generation of financial 
specialists, men who cared little about machines and manufacture and even less about 
 
347 
such intangibles as excitement or the romance of the industry.  Trained as economists and 
accountants, they were hard-eyed, coldly dispassionate champions of financial analysis 
and, through analysis, control.”  Brown had been an assistant to Raskob at Du Pont and 
succeeded him as treasurer when Raskob was transferred to GM.  While serving in this 
post, Brown introduced the then unusual practice of hiring economists and statisticians to 
assist in monitoring divisional efficiency and performance.  At Raskob’s request in 
January, 1921, Brown was hired as GM’s vice president in charge of finance.  Sloan and 
Brown “shared similar views on the value of detailed, disciplined controls in the 
operation of a business” (Sloan, 1964, p. 118).  Brown soon tapped the statistical talents 
of Bradley, a young associate who had joined GM’s financial staff in 1919.  Sloan, 
Brown, and Bradley developed financial instruments to control appropriations, cash, 
inventory, and production.  According to Sloan (1964), Brown and Bradley were largely 
the architects of the specific forms of these controls. 
Prior to 1920, each division had controlled its own finances.  Although the 
financial pressures of that year pushed GM into debt, some divisions had more cash than 
was required.  However, division managers concerned with their own operations were 
unwilling to transfer money, forcing the corporation to borrow.  In fact, the GM 
executives had no way of knowing just how much cash was held by each division at any 
given time.  Further, transferring cash involved an inter-city transfer by mail that required 
time.  In 1922, GM created a consolidated cash-control system using the newly created 
Federal Reserve System (see section 4.5.1).  Local depository accounts with fixed 
minimum and maximum balances were established across the country.  Deposits were 
credited to GM and withdrawals were administered by a central financial staff.  When 
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balances exceeded the preset maximum, funds were transferred to one of several central 
reservoir banks.  If a division required cash, it applied to headquarters using a requisition 
system and funds could then be transferred by telegraph within a few hours. 
GM attacked the worst of its emergency problems – the inventory – by halting 
delivery of materials.  Suppliers were persuaded to delay billing, essentially financing the 
company as they had in the early days of the industry.  To reduce finished product 
inventories, du Pont eventually was forced to follow the lead of Ford and other 
manufacturers and cut prices.  The divisions gradually used up their excess inventories, 
and by June, 1921, Buick, Cadillac, and Oldsmobile were in good shape.  Obviously, 
inventory controls were required to prevent similar problems in the future.  Since supply 
shortages had been common prior to 1920, plant managers placed orders in excess of 
expected needs resulting in an oversupply when business slowed.  New policies restricted 
purchasing materials to monthly budgets prepared by the division managers based on a 
four-month forecast of sales.  These forecasts were later expanded to include plant 
investments, working capital, and outstanding product inventory commitments.  As vice 
president in charge of operations, Sloan reviewed these forecasts to approve or modify 
production schedules.  However, division managers had no mechanism for determining 
the actual inventories held in dealers’ hands and could provide only estimates of retail 
sales and market conditions.  Early in 1923, the R.L. Polk & Company began providing 
the industry with statistics on automobile registrations. 
5.2.2.2 Improving and Rationalizing the Product Lines 
The 1920 market slump also uncovered engineering deficiencies in some GM 
automobile designs.  As long as demand was in excess of supply, cars of reasonable 
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quality sold themselves and manufacturers were free to concentrate on increasing 
production.  As soon as demand slackened, inferior mechanical performance quickly 
affected sales and reputation.  Buick and Cadillac continued to be profitable, but 
Chevrolet, Oldsmobile, and Oakland were in need of overhauling.  In early 1921, du Pont 
appointed Sloan to chair a committee tasked with studying the corporation’s products and 
recommending revisions.  He also hired consultants to provide an independent evaluation 
of GM automobiles.  As part of the assessment, Du Pont insisted that GM must compete 
directly with Ford in the low-priced market. 
The independent review concluded that the Chevrolet products and reputation 
were so poor that the line should be terminated.  Since Oakland and Oldsmobile were not 
much better off, they recommended GM change the names of all three lines.  Sloan 
argued that doing so would not improve the models offered and that starting over with no 
reputation would be harder than improving the current one.  In addition, terminating a 
line would abandon and alienate current owners.  Sloan recommended eliminating two 
newer divisions that had no product recognition nor established dealer organizations: the 
two-year-old Sheridan and unreleased Scripps-Booth.  He further recommended 
rationalizing the remaining product lines which overlapped in some price categories, 
resulting in competition with each other, yet left gaps in the pricing structure.   
Du Pont agreed to postpone a decision on restructuring the GM lines.  However, 
he insisted that Sloan include in his committee report a plan for using a new air-cooled 
engine in a vehicle that would compete with Ford.  Kettering had been working on the 
engine since 1918 and Du Pont believed it was the bold stroke that would lure customers 
away from Ford (Cray, 1980).  The air-cooled engine was not a new innovation; Franklin 
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had introduced it in 1898 (Abernathy et al., 1983) and used it in its expensive 
automobiles for twenty years.  Kettering’s design, the development of which is detailed 
in section 5.2.4.2, employed copper fins to conduct heat away from the cylinders and 
there were many manufacturing problems yet to be solved.  Nonetheless, Sloan was 
forced to incorporate Kettering’s copper-cooled engine in new designs for a four-cylinder 
Chevrolet and a six-cylinder Oakland. 
Sloan’s plan for rationalizing the GM products limited the number of lines to six 
price categories within which the divisions would not overlap in price nor compete with 
one another.  Sloan’s proposed policy would make GM automobiles competitive, not by 
leading in design or innovation, but by being technologically equal to competitors’ best 
models.  Sloan proposed that GM cars should be of slightly higher quality and priced just 
above the competition in each price category.  With this strategy, GM would compete 
with its competitor in a price category based on quality.  But it would also compete with 
its competitor in the next higher bracket based on price, since the GM car would be of 
just slightly lower quality but priced low enough to appear a good value.  Chevrolet 
would fill the lowest price category and compete with Ford.  The remaining divisions in 
order of increasing price would be Oakland, Buick, Oldsmobile, and Cadillac, with Buick 
filling two price categories.   
Two features of Sloan’s strategy are noteworthy.  First, Sloan was advocating that 
GM not compete with Ford head-on in the lowest price category, a move that Sloan 
believed would be “suicidal.”  Ford essentially had a lock on the first-time buyer with 
limited financial means (Rubenstein, 2001).  Rather, “the strategy we devised was to take 
a bite from the top of his position” (Sloan, 1964, p. 69), a strategy that was definitely at 
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odds with du Pont’s mandate.  Though there is no documentation of the origin of Sloan’s 
strategy, an expert industry analysis published in 1913 reported that “at least 15,000 
buyers every year would have preferred a car of more stylistic distinction if they could 
have gotten it for only $100 above the Ford prices” (Parlin and Youker Report, cited in 
Nevins and Hill, 1954, p. 509).  This was particularly important in a market with fewer 
first-time buyers and more consumers who were trading in and up. 
Second, by structuring its product line within classes distinguished by price and 
quality, GM offered a product that was available to members of every social class.  
Further, each nameplate was an immediately recognizable statement of the owner’s social 
status.  Chevrolet was for first-time buyers and the working man.  Oakland (renamed 
Pontiac in 1926) offered more style and flair for a bit more money.  Oldsmobile touted 
superior engineering.  Buick appealed to the upper-middle class – doctors, lawyers, and 
managers.  Cadillac offered luxury and superior craftsmanship for the wealthy owner 
(Rubenstein, 2001).  By trading up from a Chevrolet to an Oakland or Buick, the middle-
class owner demonstrated his progress up the social ladder.  In marketing a “car for every 
purse and purpose,” GM turned a single mass market for low priced vehicles into a group 
of niche markets defined by socio-economic status as well as functional requirements.  
Within each niche, competition was based on price, quality, and options, and GM sought 
to place itself near the top of each niche in all three. 
By 1923, all divisions except for Chevrolet offered new models.  The Chevrolet 
design was seven years old and in need of replacement, but the new design was awaiting 
the development of the copper-cooled engine.  Performance of the new engine in a 
production vehicle was still questionable, and the managers of the other GM divisions 
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had passed on it.  Chevrolet’s division manager protested as well, stressing himself to the 
point of a nervous breakdown.  The job of leading Chevrolet passed to its new vice 
president in charge of operations – William Knudsen.  Knudsen had only been with GM 
one month, having quit the Ford Motor Company in early 1921.  Knudsen assured du 
Pont that he could solve production problems with the copper-cooled engine in time for 
the 1923 season, but by January had turned out only half of the promised volume.  
Around 100 of the new vehicles were sold that spring, but by June it was clear the 
vehicles were faulty and Knudsen recalled the cars.  With the costly failure of his pet 
project, du Pont believed he had become too personally vested in the technology and 
failed to listen to the misgivings of Sloan, the division managers, and the production 
engineers (Cray, 1980).  Du Pont had successfully led the company through its financial 
crisis – GM had cleared its debt by June 30, 1922, and the automobile market had 
rebounded.  In May, 1923, Pierre du Pont resigned as president of GM and recommended 
that Sloan succeed him; the board concurred.  Du Pont retained his position as chairman 
of the board of directors. 
5.2.3 The Sloan Era, 1923-1930 
Soon after succeeding Pierre du Pont as president, Alfred Sloan cancelled all 
production plans using the copper-cooled engine, which prompted Kettering to resign in 
discouragement.  Though the move distressed both Kettering and du Pont, Sloan was 
unwilling to force new innovations on the divisions and to hold back programs while 
awaiting uncertain developments (Sloan, 1964).  Yet Kettering’s work was inestimably 
valuable – he was reportedly close to finding a solution to the problem of engine knock – 
so Sloan negotiated a compromise with Kettering and the Executive Committee.  Sloan 
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believed that the main mistake with the copper-cooled engine project had been the poorly 
coordinated division of responsibilities among the Executive Committee, the operating 
divisions, and the Research Corporation.  Therefore, GM established an independent pilot 
operation, under Kettering’s sole discretion, to develop, manufacture, and market the six-
cylinder copper-cooled engine and automobile.  Chevrolet would continue to work out 
problems with the four-cylinder model.  A reluctant Kettering agreed to stay on.  After 
two additional years of development, the project eventually faded away. 
The failure of the copper-cooled engine, which is discussed in detail in section 
5.2.4.2, was a significant factor in shaping the future strategy and organization of GM.  
According to Flink (1988, p. 233),  
The copper-cooled engine was doomed by a lack of coordination and cooperation 
on the project among GM units.  Production problems were the inevitable result 
of a lack of communication between Kettering’s… laboratory, where the engine 
was designed, and the factories… where the car that the engine powered was to 
be produced.  Design problems arose also, because it had not been foreseen that 
numerous other components would have to be redesigned to accommodate to the 
light weight of the new engine.   
Sloan (1964, p. 70) characterized the problem as “one of conflict between the research 
organization and the producing divisions, and of a parallel conflict between the top 
management of the corporation and the divisional management.”  In 1964 (p.94), he 
recalled that the failure “taught us about the value of organized cooperation and 
coordination in engineering and other matters.  It showed the need to make an effective 
distinction between divisional and corporate functions in engineering, and also between 
advanced product engineering and long-range research.”  At the same time, Sloan 
recognized that long-range research of the type undertaken in Kettering’s lab would only 
be of benefit to the corporation and stockholders if the manufacturing divisions were able 
to exploit the results of that research.  To facilitate coordination and cooperation on 
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engineering matters among the divisions as well as between the divisions and the labs, 
Sloan established a General Technical Committee consisting of chief divisional engineers 
and top research staff in the Research Corporation. 
While the experience with the copper-cooled engine may have catalyzed Sloan to 
clarify functional distinctions and improve relationships and coordination within the firm, 
it also encouraged him to adopt a strategy that tended to inhibit technological innovation.  
As early as 1921, Sloan (1964, p. 64) asserted that “the primary object of the 
corporation… was to make money, not just to make motor cars… The problem was to 
design a product line that would make money.”  Under du Pont, GM had sought to “meet 
Ford more or less head on with a revolutionary car design.”  Sloan instead had proposed 
policies to “produce a line of cars in each price area, from the lowest price up to one for a 
strictly high-grade quantity-production car.”  GM would not produce any vehicles in 
small quantities; the price categories would not leave wide gaps in the product line; and 
there would be no duplication by the divisions in the price categories.  The idea was to 
secure the greatest advantage that quantity production could provide.  Sloan (1964, p. 66, 
emphasis in original) asserted that this policy “was valid if our cars were at least equal in 
design to the best of our competitors in a grade, so that it was not necessary to lead in 
design or to run the risk of untried experiments.  Certainly I preferred this concept to an 
irrevocable commitment to replace the then standard Chevrolet with a revolutionary car.”  
The same concept carried through to production efficiency, advertising, selling, and 
servicing – none need be better than that of GM’s best competitor.  According to Cray 




Under Sloan, GM pushed forward with the redesign of a new Chevrolet model.  A 
booming market in 1923 had resulted in decent sales, but a brief recession in 1924 
underscored the need to redesign Chevrolet’s outdated model.  While U.S. automobile 
sales dropped 12%, GM’s sales fell 28% and represented nearly half of the industry’s 
decline.  Half of GM’s decline was attributed to Chevrolet, where sales dropped 37%.  
Rival Ford’s sales slipped only 4% (Sloan, 1964).  Meanwhile, Dodge, Chrysler, and 
Hudson had increased sales and market shares by introducing new models and affordable 
closed-body designs (Freeland, 2000).  In 1925, Chevrolet introduced the new K Model 
which corrected a number of defects with the previous Chevrolet.  The successful model 
did not include radical changes, but among the improvements boasted a Duco lacquer 
finish that had been introduced on GM’s Oakland the previous year.  The K Model was 
also available in two closed styles, using Fisher bodies, which sold for 40-57% more than 
the roadster.  By 1927, closed bodies constituted 82% of Chevrolet’s production and 85% 
of industry-wide production. 
Consistent with his new product strategy, Sloan also moved to fill a gap in GM’s 
lineup between the low-priced Chevrolet and the more expensive Olds.  The entirely new 
model, which was to incorporate a new six-cylinder engine, was likely to take some sales 
from the four-cylinder Chevrolet as well as the more expensive Olds, but at least those 
sales would stay within the corporation.  In order to minimize the impact on Chevrolet’s 
economies of scale, Sloan decided the new model should use as many Chevrolet body 
and chassis parts as would fit the new design.  As it turned out, the failed copper-cooled 
engine project had given GM some valuable experience with dual-purpose chassis and 
bodies for two different engines.  Although the new GM model would be manufactured 
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and sold by Oakland, Sloan assigned its initial development to Chevrolet due to its use of 
Chevrolet parts.  The introduction of the new Oakland Pontiac in 1926 marked the first 
time that GM physically coordinated the manufacture of vehicles made by different 
divisions; this innovation had sweeping implications for the company.  GM finally had a 
competitive response to Fordism: 
Physical co-ordination in one form or another is, of course, the first principle of 
mass production, but at that time it was widely supposed, from the example of 
the Model T, that mass production on a grand scale required a uniform product.  
The Pontiac, co-ordinated in part with a car in another price class, was to 
demonstrate that mass production of automobiles could be reconciled with 
variety in product… If the cars in the higher-price classes could benefit from the 
volume economies of the lower-price classes, the advantages of mass production 
could be extended to the whole car line. (Sloan, 1964, p. 158) 
While working out improvements to the GM product lines, Sloan also continued 
to integrate and coordinate the operation of the divisions, relying again on financial 
analysts Donaldson Brown and Albert Bradley as discussed in detail in section 5.2.4.  
Sloan was once again forced to address inventory control when a brief recession in mid-
1924 led to an oversupply in dealer stock and forced GM to drastically but belatedly cut 
production.  It was clear that GM needed a more effective way to forecast retail sales and 
to quickly respond to market changes.  A comprehensive study of the total automobile 
market begun by Bradley in 1923 was put toward establishing estimates of consumer 
demand in each price category.  This estimate was then used to set production levels for 
the coming year, allowing for mid-course corrections based on dealers’ reports of sales 
and inventories.  Rather than stay committed to a four-month production schedule 
determined in advance, GM could now respond quickly to market conditions using up-to-
date actual data.  
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The organizational structure put in place by Sloan required decentralization with 
coordinated control.  GM could only leave the execution of operational procedures to the 
divisions if corporate management had a means to monitor and assess the effectiveness of 
these operations.  For Sloan and his analysts, the key was another financial control based 
on rate of return.  Section 5.2.4.1 provides a detailed discussion of these innovations, but 
a brief summary is presented here.  Accounting procedures were first standardized across 
the divisions.  Brown then developed standards for sales and manufacturing expenses 
using past performance adjusted for future plans.  Monthly reports of actual operating 
results, based on uniform return on investment analysis, were used to determine each 
division’s competitive position in the corporation and to troubleshoot when a division’s 
performance deviated from expectations. 
However, comparisons with past performance were complicated by year-to-year 
variations in production volume.  In 1925, Brown developed a new concept called the 
‘standard volume’ based on the average expected production over a number of years and 
a long-term return on investment goal.  Unit costs and prices were developed using the 
standard volume, allowing year-to-year cost comparisons that were unaffected by 
fluctuating volume.  According to Flink (1988, p. 234), GM’s conservative estimate of 
demand used to establish the standard volume ensured “high rates of return in a market 
assumed to be both saturated and technologically mature.” 
With record sales in 1926, GM began to reap the rewards of its reorganization and 
the re-invigoration of its product line.  While Ford clung to the inexpensive, utilitarian 
Model T, GM marketed fifty models of cars and trucks ranging in price from $525 to 
$4,485 – “a car for every purse and purpose.”  In addition, Kettering’s lab had found a 
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solution to the engine knock problem and profits from the growing market for Ethyl 
gasoline, sold in partnership with Du Pont, helped close the gap with Ford (Cray, 1980) 
(see section 5.2.4.3).  However, GM still faced three challenges in the post-war era: 1) 
market saturation; 2) the growing used car problem; and 3) shifting consumer tastes for 
comfort and style.  The corporation’s differentiated product line and consumer financing 
(see section 5.5) helped with these issues, but GM devised one more innovation that 
jointly addressed these challenges and propelled the company to the industry forefront – 
the annual model change.  Again, a brief summary of this innovation is presented here, 
while a more detailed description is given in section 5.2.4.5. 
Since the birth of the industry, style had been forced to adapt to mechanical and 
mass production requirements.  Body and chassis design were largely two separate 
processes, resulting in an awkward fit and appearance.  Closed-body cars were especially 
tall and ungainly and the typical automobile’s high center of gravity was becoming 
increasingly dangerous.  In 1926, Sloan and Lawrence Fisher hired Harley J. Earl, who 
designed custom car bodies for Hollywood celebrities, as a consultant for the design of a 
new GM automobile.  The new La Salle, introduced in 1927, was the first mass produced 
car designed by stylists.  Impressed with the result, Sloan hired Earl to direct a newly 
established Art and Color Section and institutionalized the process of designing for style. 
GM had no policy for regular model changes, which were undertaken as needed 
in response to the market and competition.  Because of the new emphasis on style and the 
need to motivate owners to trade up, GM’s constant upgrading resulted in the 
introduction of annual models beginning in 1923.  By the 1930s, GM had recognized this 
unavoidable fact and was planning for regularized change.  Much of GM’s ability to 
 
359 
accommodate change is attributed to William Knudsen, who was appointed vice 
president of Chevrolet in 1922 and promoted to president and general manager of 
Chevrolet in 1923.  Knudsen built a decentralized organization that could accommodate 
change and expansion.  Although Knudsen arranged machinery and operations for 
sequential production as at Ford, he replaced single-purpose machine tools with standard 
or general-purpose machines that could be adapted to accommodate product design 
changes.  Highland Park had been extremely efficient, but also inflexible; in contrast, 
Chevrolet production had been designed to accommodate change and marked the 
beginning of flexible mass production. 
5.2.4 Significant Innovations 
5.2.4.1 Financial Controls 
Despite the 1921 improvements in inventory control at GM designed by 
Donaldson Brown and Albert Bradley, a demand slump in mid-1924 led to an oversupply 
in dealer stock and forced GM to drastically but belatedly cut production.  It was clear 
that GM and the industry as a whole needed a more effective way to forecast retail sales 
and, more importantly, a way to quickly respond to market changes.  In 1923, Sloan had 
tasked Bradley with a comprehensive study of the total automobile market using the 
available sales data and Bradley’s concept of a “pyramid of demand” (Sloan, 1964, p. 
139).  The intent was to determine the potential market by class, the effect of a price 
reduction on total demand, the competitive relationship of new and used cars, and when 
the market would reach saturation – the point when most new car purchasers were 
replacing their old automobile rather than buying their first car.  This study had, for the 
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first time, demonstrated the relationship between demand and income distribution.59  This 
statistical work was now put toward developing a scientifically based procedure for 
determining production schedules.   
In 1924, GM established official corporate-wide estimates of consumer demand in 
each price category based on actual sales over the previous three years and a general 
business outlook.  This estimate was then used to set production levels for the coming 
year, though mid-course corrections could be made, within tooling constraints, as updated 
information became available.  To improve the reliability of these estimates and facilitate 
corrections, GM had dealers report new and used cars sales and inventories every ten 
days.  Division managers compared the reports to their monthly forecasts and adjusted 
purchases and production as necessary; at the end of the month, the reports were used to 
update forecasts for the following month.  Rather than stay committed to a four-month 
production schedule determined in advance, GM could now respond quickly to market 
conditions using up-to-date actual data.  
Sloan described GM’s fundamental management problem as finding the key to 
decentralization with coordinated control.  With new procedures in place for controlling 
operations, GM could leave the execution of these procedures to the divisions – but only 
if corporate management had a means to monitor and assess the effectiveness of these 
operations.  For Sloan and his analysts, the key was another financial control based on 
rate of return.  Sloan had first applied the principle of return on investment while at 
United Motors, which was his first experience managing multiple divisions that 
                                                 
59 Bradley later correlated automobile sales and overall economic activity, finding that when national 
income was rising, car sales increased at an even faster rate; when national income fell, sales decreased at a 
faster rate.  When better statistics were available, he was able to show a close correlation between sales and 
personal income (Sloan, 1964). 
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separately manufactured diverse products.  “By placing each division on its own profit-
making basis, I gave the general office a common measure of efficiency with which to 
judge the contribution of each division to the whole…  [T]he general principle of rate of 
return as the measure of worth of a business… was fundamental in my thinking about 
management problems” (Sloan, 1964, p. 47-50).  This principle had governed the 
thinking of du Pont’s people and, therefore, GM’s Finance Committee since 1918.   
Brown developed a method for computing return on investment that could be used 
to evaluate investment decisions and the performance of the divisions.  The idea was not 
to maximize the short-term return on capital, but rather to achieve the “highest return 
consistent with attainable volume in the market.  The long-term rate of return was to be 
the highest expectation consistent with a sound growth of the business” (Sloan, 1964, p. 
141).  Brown developed standards of performance for business and manufacturing 
expenses using past performance with adjustments for future plans.  Actual performance 
was then compared to these standards.  To facilitate inter-divisional comparisons, 
accounting practices were standardized throughout the corporation.  Each division 
completed monthly reports of operating results, and was informed of its competitive 
position in the corporation based on uniform return on investment analysis.  These reports 
were used to troubleshoot when a division’s performance deviated from expectations. 
However, production volume varied from year to year, making comparison to past 
performance difficult.  In 1925, Brown developed a new standard for overall performance 
which related a long-term return on investment goal and the average expected production 
or average plant utilization over a number of years – the ‘standard volume.’  Unit costs 
and prices were developed using the standard volume, allowing year-to-year cost 
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comparisons that were unaffected by fluctuating volume.  With prices stabilized in this 
way, when demand and production exceeded the standard volume, GM realized windfall 
profits.  Of course, when sales fell short of the standard volume, profits fell below the 
rate of return goal.  According to Flink (1988, p. 234), GM used a conservative estimate 
of demand to establish the standard volume and reinvested only a conservative portion of 
actual profits in expansion, thereby “guaranteeing the safety of invested capital and 
ensuring high rates of return in a market assumed to be both saturated and technologically 
mature.” 
5.2.4.2 Copper Air-Cooled Engine 
The first air-cooled engine was introduced by Franklin in 1898 (Abernathy et al., 
1980) and offered on the company’s expensive automobiles.  Air-cooling theoretically 
offers several advantages over water cooling: lighter weight and therefore higher fuel 
economy for the same horsepower; simpler design and construction by eliminating the 
radiator, hoses and ducts; and elimination of problems from freezing in winter and 
overheating in summer.  Air-cooled engines of the day utilized fins cast on the exterior of 
the cylinders.  The fins were cooled by air pushed over the engine by the movement of 
the car.  Although this worked fine for small engines, larger ones overheated, resulting in 
‘burned’ valves, sticking pistons, and a loss of power (Leslie, 1979; Flink, 1988).  
Therefore, by 1910, most automobile engines were water-cooled.   
In 1918, Kettering began working on what Flink in 1988 (p. 232) called “the last 
attempt by an American automobile manufacturer to pioneer to the stage of production a 
truly radical engine design.”  In an attempt to solve the overheating problem in air-cooled 
engines, Kettering experimented with using copper, which has superior thermal 
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properties compared to iron.  If successful, the engine would realize a higher compression 
ratio and therefore achieve greater fuel economy and power for the same displacement.  
Since copper was too soft and too expensive for use in constructing the engine cylinders, 
the fins had to be attached to the iron cylinders, a difficult proposition.  Kettering’s team 
at Delco experimented with casting the copper fins directly onto the cylinders, attaching 
the fins with molten zinc, and brazing them on with a torch.  All failed until 1921 when a 
member of the team developed a special electrical furnace that could successfully do the 
brazing.  After working out production methods for the cylinders and fins, Kettering’s 
team constructed a four-cylinder prototype engine and tested it in a Chevrolet chassis 
using a fan to boost the air speed over the fins.  This experiment apparently was only 
marginally successful (Leslie, 1979).   
With the drop in automobile sales in 1920, Pierre du Pont became convinced that 
it was critical for GM to enter the lowest-priced market.  He believed that Kettering’s 
new engine was the key to producing a lightweight, inexpensive vehicle that could 
compete directly with Ford’s Model T.  Ford had cut the price of the Model T in 
September, 1920, and sales had picked up enough for Ford to resume production.  
Meanwhile GM was still working off inventories, hoping that sales would rebound with 
warmer weather in spring.  Just as Kettering began making headway on attaching the 
copper fins to the cylinders in January, 1921, du Pont and GM’s Executive Committee 
announced their intent to develop the air-cooled engine for use in a low-priced car made 
by Chevrolet.  The GM executives also decided to develop a six-cylinder air-cooled 
engine that could be used in a more expensive model produced by Oakland, whose sales 
had faltered.   
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The manufacturing division managers were eager for new designs that would 
boost their sales and initially appeared supportive of plans for the new models.  However, 
when Chevrolet manager K.W. Zimmerschied was informed in February, 1921, that his 
division would begin manufacture of the air-cooled model in August, he objected.  He 
had already made improvements in Chevrolet’s water-cooled engine and had designed a 
new body.  He wanted to postpone production of the air-cooled engine another year. 
By May, Kettering had test cars of both the four- and six-cylinder models in 
operation.  The Executive Committee authorized the creation of a small pilot 
manufacturing section, capable of producing up to twenty-five cars per day, at 
Kettering’s laboratory facility in Dayton.  The research lab thus had been given 
responsibility for the development and the initial production of the new car, but the 
manufacturing divisions were responsible for mass production.  Zimmerschied was 
skeptical about the engineering design and wanted to know who was advisor to whom on 
issues of production.  Meanwhile, Kettering worried that the divisions would alter his 
designs. 
Kettering assembled a fleet of test cars, including several competitors’ cars with 
conventional engines, and set out for a road test in July, 1921.  Although the road 
conditions were grueling and none of the cars survived intact, Kettering was satisfied 
with the performance of his engine (Leslie, 1979).  Because Chevrolet still had inventory 
to work off and because Oakland’s manager, George Hannum, was more receptive than 
Zimmerschied, the Executive Committee decided Oakland would receive the first new 
model and Chevrolet’s four-cylinder model would follow in early 1922.  Production of 
Oakland’s water-cooled car was to cease in December, 1921, and production of the air-
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cooled car would begin in February, 1922.  In November, Oakland received a car for final 
testing – the first tests performed by personnel outside of the research staff.  The results 
surprised the Executive Committee: Hannum informed du Pont that the car was not ready 
for production.  He believed another six months of development was required to make the 
necessary changes to eliminate problems with overheating.  He also informed du Pont 
that Oakland would bring out a new water-cooled line in December to bridge the time 
until the air-cooled model was ready.  The Executive Committee remained committed to 
the new engine, but decided to delay production of the air-cooled Oakland until at least 
June, 1923. 
Kettering believed that the division managers were resisting his innovation for 
other than technical reasons, perhaps feeling the technology had been forced on them 
because of Kettering’s close relationship with du Pont.  Nonetheless, he resolved to 
address the issues revealed by the Oakland tests.  His team focused as much on problems 
with the frame, axle, and transmission as those with the engine itself (Leslie, 1979).  The 
pressure was now on developing the four-cylinder model for Chevrolet.  Meanwhile, 
Alfred Sloan decided to prepare a second line of defense by establishing a parallel effort 
in the Chevrolet division to improve the existing water-cooled design.  The team 
responsible for manufacturing both cars was now in direct competition with Kettering’s 
research team. 
In March, 1922, du Pont replaced Zimmerschied as general manager of Chevrolet 
and assigned Knudsen as vice president of operations at Chevrolet.  Knudsen 
recommended that GM immediately put the air-cooled engine into small level production 
for technical and commercial testing.  Production of the Chevrolet four-cylinder was 
 
366 
scheduled for September.  The next trial in May, 1922, was encouraging and Kettering 
pushed for immediate production.  But sales of traditional water-cooled cars finally were 
on the rise and division managers openly questioned the wisdom of deploying a new 
technology under such conditions.  Kettering confided to du Pont that he believed the 
divisions were trying to thwart his innovation.  Sloan argued for caution in deploying a 
new innovation during a time of peak sales.  September came, but production was not 
underway.  The executive management remained committed to the new engine but 
decided that production of the water-cooled Chevrolet should continue and that the new 
air-cooled model would be sold as an option.  The new model was to be unveiled at the 
New York automobile show in January, 1923. 
Knudsen reassured du Pont that he would have 500 of the new engines ready for 
the start of production in 1923, but he was able to produce only 250 in time for the New 
York automobile show where the new model was “the sensation of the show” (Sloan, 
1964, p. 85).  Spring sales were booming, but production of the new vehicle soon 
encountered problems of technical malfunctions and miscommunication.  Chevrolet 
produced 759 of the automobiles, but 239 were scrapped by the production team.  Of the 
500 delivered to the sales organization, only 100 were sold to retail customers with the 
remainder either driven by factory representatives or held in inventory.  Complaints 
poured in from field representatives, dealers, and customers.  The engine overheated and 
lost power, even in cool weather.  The design was partly at fault: the air entered the 
engine housing from the bottom and was expelled at the top.  But as it moved over the 
engine, it warmed before ever reaching the cylinders which were the hottest part of the 
 
367 
engine.  Customers also complained about excess noise, clutch problems, wear on 
cylinders, carburetor malfunctions, axle break downs, and fan-belt trouble (Leslie, 1979). 
In addition to design flaws, many of the problems were the result of 
miscommunication, poor coordination, and shoddy manufacturing or assembly, though 
the division engineers complained that it was impossible to “produce the car within the 
limits set by Dayton, and rightly or wrongly demonstrated by their sample car” (Leslie, 
1979).  While Kettering remained convinced that there was organized resistance against 
his work, the divisions felt that Kettering’s actions were the result of an over-inflated ego 
and not in the best interests of the corporation.  Leslie (1979) places much of the blame 
on Kettering, claiming that his insistence that only research engineers were capable of 
solving technical problems had alienated the production engineers.  In addition, his team 
“grossly underestimated the difficulty of converting a prototype into a reliable, mass-
produced article ready for sale to the public.” 
Once the extent of the problem became clear, Knudsen moved quickly, recalling 
all of the automobiles.  Du Pont apparently took responsibility for the failure, believing 
he had become too personally vested in the engine’s development.  Although du Pont had 
successfully led the corporation through the post-war recession, it was time to step aside.  
He passed the presidency to Sloan who had consistently advised caution in putting the 
new engine in production cars.  Sloan cancelled development of the six-cylinder copper-
cooled engine for Oakland and Olds and Knudsen at Chevrolet soon cancelled production 
of the four-cylinder model.  Without a clear market demand for the new engine and du 
Pont’s championship of the project, the fate of the copper-cooled engine was sealed. 
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Disappointed in the abrupt termination of production, Kettering announced his 
resignation, prompting Sloan to seek a solution that would retain the inventor at GM.60  
Sloan proposed creating a new pilot operation under Kettering to develop, manufacture, 
and market the air-cooled automobiles.  Pierre du Pont, still serving as chairman of the 
board, insisted the four-cylinder model had to be sold through Chevrolet.  The Executive 
Committee negotiated a compromise, giving Knudsen and Chevrolet responsibility for 
development and engineering of the four-cylinder model.  Kettering’s team in Dayton 
was given complete responsibility for redesigning the six-cylinder copper cooled engine 
for the existing Oldsmobile chassis.  If successful, a new division would be created for 
small scale production and sale prior to going into high volume production (Chandler and 
Salsbury, 1971).  Kettering accepted the compromise, but not without complaint.  
“Accounting always kills research,” he complained (Cray, 1980, p. 218).   
Disappointing tests of both copper-cooled models in the spring of 1924 showed 
neither was ready for production.  With some $3.5 million in direct costs invested in the 
project, du Pont and the Executive Committee were reluctant to terminate the project.  A 
year later, the six-cylinder version still was not ready, but Chevrolet reported all major 
problems had been solved with the four-cylinder model.  But by this time, the successful 
new water-cooled Chevrolet K Model was competing well with the Ford Model T.  The 
Executive Committee did not even discuss Chevrolet’s report and the copper-cooled 
engine project quietly faded away.61 
                                                 
60 Leslie (1979) claims it is doubtful that Kettering would have followed through with his resignation.  He 
had a large financial investment in GM and his research team was making headway on projects of great 
interest to him, especially the engine knock problem they would eventually solve using tetra-ethyl lead.  In 
addition, Kettering had a history of lashing out verbally but not fulfilling his angry threats. 
61 Because of their inherent simplicity and light weight, air-cooled engines are particularly well-suited for 
and frequently used in motorcycles.  They are also used in most aviation piston engines where weight is a 
 
369 
Sloan believed the failure of the copper-cooled project was in large part due to 
confusion of responsibilities and poor coordination.  In September, 1923, he established a 
General Technical Committee consisting of chief divisional engineers and top research 
staff to coordinate the activities of the divisions and the Research Corporation.  
According to Sloan (1964, p. 109), the General Technical Committee “had a remarkable 
effect in stimulating interest and action everywhere in the corporation in matters of 
product appeal and product improvement, and produced a free exchange of new and 
progressive ideas and experience among division engineers.”   
The Committee was highly independent and had the authority to undertake 
technical studies using the facilities of the Research Corporation, the operating divisions, 
or outside sources.  Over the course of time, the Committee studied numerous short-range 
engineering problems that concerned brakes, fuel consumption, lubrication, rust and oil 
sludge caused by the condensation of the products of combustion, and changes in steering 
mechanisms required for four-wheel brakes and balloon tires.  The Committee even gave 
attention to educating dealers and sales staff on the value of engineering developments.  
Kettering’s staff reported to the Committee on long-range studies concerning cylinder-
wall temperatures, cylinder heads, sleeve-valve engines, intake manifolds, tetraethyl lead 
as a gasoline additive, and transmissions. 
In summary, the copper-cooled engine was developed through IR&D.  The 
project was begun by Kettering largely because of his belief that more efficient engines 
were important to conserving fuel and avoiding shortages or depletion.  GM’s executive 
                                                                                                                                                 
premium and the much higher airspeed facilitates cooling.  In the 1930s, German engineer Ferdinand 
Porsche developed a simple air-cooled engine for the first Volkswagon.  It was used in the VW Type 1 
(Beetle) and related models, including the Porsche 911.  GM abandoned the air-cooled engine until 1960 
when it introduced the Chevrolet Corvair.  However, none of these engine designs use copper fins. 
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support of the project, however, was stimulated by an external economic condition – the 
post-war recession – and by intra-industry market dynamics – competition with Ford’s 
Model T in the low priced field.  During development of the vehicle, economic 
conditions and demand for automobiles improved.  In addition, market tastes were 
shifting – buyers were becoming interested in more style and comfort than the Model T 
offered.  The new technology was no longer ‘demanded’ by the market and therefore no 
longer ‘needed’ as part of GM’s market strategy.  
Also, though the research lab’s findings show that the technology was ready for 
production, it appears the product was rushed to market before design and manufacturing 
issues were fully worked out.  Where Ford had found great success by jointly addressing 
issues of product design and manufacturing processes for the Model T, GM had failed by 
separating the two for the copper-cooled engine vehicle.  Had the few cars that were sold 
to retail customers performed successfully, the market outcome may have been different.  
But with no apparent need for the new technology and no product champion at the 
executive level, GM chose to minimize its risk and table the project.  However, the 
experience with the copper-cooled engine was responsible for changes in corporate 
policy and organization that significantly shaped the innovative trajectory of the company 
for the next fifty years. 
5.2.4.3 Tetra-Ethyl Lead Gasoline 
In 1913, Cadillac engineers discovered a violent banging in the cylinders which 
they blamed on Kettering’s new electric self-starter and battery system.  At Delco, 
Kettering quickly dismissed the problem after determining that it was not caused by 
faulty firing of the spark plugs.   Kettering later became involved in a broad range of 
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innovative efforts for three companies he founded: Delco Light Company, Dayton Metal 
Products, and the Dayton-Wright Airplane Company.  While working on a farm lighting 
system that used a small internal combustion engine to generate electricity, Kettering 
once again encountered engine knock and found that it occurred even more violently 
when using kerosene.  Kettering assigned the problem to his assistant, Thomas Midgely, 
in 1916 (Cray, 1980).   
Kettering’s focus shifted to aviation fuels when he began working on aircraft 
engines around the beginning of World War I.  He began experimenting with alternatives 
to gasoline altogether, finding that some fuels could be used in high compression engines 
while others produced a significant amount of knock.  Kettering and Midgely also 
experimented with a number of “high-percentage” fuel blends using up to 50% of an 
alternative fuel that produced no knocking, such as benzene from coal or olefins.  Most of 
the additives had technical issues to overcome such as a relatively high freezing point or 
the tendency to ‘gum.’  With the end of World War I, Kettering’s focus returned to the 
automotive industry. 
As demand grew for more powerful automobiles, the industry began using higher 
compression engines and engineers found that the knock problem increased.  Engine 
knock reduced the energy efficiency and therefore the power of the engine and also could 
crack the piston.  While loss of engine power certainly bothered engineers and 
consumers, the efficiency issue was a more pressing concern.  Fears of oil shortages are 
nearly as old as the automobile industry, and in 1919, geologists estimated that only 20 or 
30 years-worth of oil were left in the U.S.  After World War I, demand for gasoline grew 
so rapidly that suppliers had trouble keeping up with demand and the quality of fuel 
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declined (Kovarik, 1994).  Lower quality fuels increased the prevalence of knock and 
further reduced engine efficiency. 
Many industry experts advocated alternative fuels, especially ethanol, as a 
solution to the supply problem.  Ethanol had the added benefit of not producing engine 
knock even at high compression.  However, the lower energy density of ethanol required 
vehicles to carry more fuel and thus more weight, which was particularly problematic for 
aircraft.  In addition, experts concluded that there was insufficient farmland to produce 
both food and fuel.  Although experiments were underway to convert cellulose from trees 
and agricultural wastes into ethanol, the conversion process was too inefficient.  
Prohibition also complicated the development of an ethanol fuel infrastructure and even 
hindered experimentation.  Nonetheless, Kettering apparently was an advocate of ethanol 
as a long-term solution to fuel supply concerns.  He believed more efficient gasoline 
engines would extend the life of oil supplies and could be converted later to use ethanol 
after the fuel production technology was more mature.  Increased efficiency would then 
help compensate for the lower energy density of ethanol.  This approach required high 
compression engines and a solution to the knock problem (Kovarik, 1994). 
 The prevailing view in the industry was that engine knock was caused by 
premature ignition of the fuel when the spark was too far advanced.  However, Kettering 
and Midgely had proven that pre-ignition and knocking were two separate problems and 
they believed that engine knock was due to properties of the fuel itself.  In addition to 
high percentage fuel blends, they also experimented with low concentrations of additives 
or so-called doping compounds.  One of Kettering and Midgely’s early theories was that 
knocking arose from the heat absorption properties of the fuel.  Perhaps the lower 
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volatility of kerosene caused it to remain in droplets in the cylinder then vaporize very 
suddenly after combustion had begun, leading to increased knocking.  They decided to 
try darkening the fuel to enhance heat absorption.62  Unable to locate any oil-soluble dye, 
Midgely tried adding a few drops of iodine to the carburetor and found that knock was 
diminished.  When he later used a number of dyes, there was no effect, yet a colorless 
iodine compound was effective.  Midgely concluded that the effectiveness of the iodine 
was related to its chemical properties.  Since iodine was corrosive and expensive, 
Midgely tried similar elements: bromine, tellurium, tin and selenium.  The results pointed 
toward heavier elements.  In December, 1921, after trying perhaps thousands of 
compounds, he finally used tetraethyl lead (TEL) in the test engine and the knocking was 
silenced.  In 1923, Midgely was awarded the William H. Nichols Medal from the New 
York section of the American Chemical Society for his discovery of the anti-knock 
properties of TEL. 
Although TEL was the most efficient additive Midgely had tried, it was difficult 
to make and broke down quickly in sunlight.  Adding it to gasoline resulted in lead 
deposits on the engine valves and spark plugs, while lead particles corroded the valve 
seats and exhaust system.  Additional experimentation solved these problems and the 
additive was ready for commercialization in 1923.  GM expected to capture 20% of the 
fuel market and estimated production and distribution costs at only one cent per gallon of 
treated gasoline.  With a price differential of three cents per gallon, GM stood to realize 
an annual profit of around $24 million based on the existing fuel market.  
                                                 
62 The literature provides two conflicting stories of the source of this inspiration.  According to Pound 
(1936), Delco chemists noticed that ordinary combustion produced a bluish flame while the flame for 
combustion with knocking was yellow or orange.  Kovarik (1994) reports that Kettering recalled that the 
trailing arbutus sometimes bloomed in the snow and theorized that the flower’s red color might help it 
absorb more heat. 
 
374 
But by 1923, Midgely and three other lab employees were suffering from lead 
poisoning.  Despite his illness and the warnings of several of the world’s leading health 
experts at MIT, Harvard, and Yale, Midgely insisted that there was no risk to the public 
and that there would not be enough lead in automobile exhaust to cause any problems 
(Kovarik, 1994).  Amid a growing controversy over the safety of the additive, GM and 
Standard Oil of New Jersey jointly founded the Ethyl Gasoline Corporation in 1924 to 
market gasoline doped with TEL, which they gave the brand name Ethyl.  Kettering was 
named president and Midgely vice president.   
In 1923 and 1924, three separate operations were set up to produce the lead 
solution.  A pilot plant set up in Dayton manufactured TEL and shipped it in liter bottles 
to prospective customers who mixed it into gasoline at their service stations.  The Dayton 
plant was shut down in April, 1924, after two workers on the packing line died.  Midgely 
claimed that the workers had failed to follow safety precautions and that the liquid was 
safe when handled properly.  The Du Pont Company was contracted to manufacture the 
lead solution beginning in August, 1923, and by January, 1925, Du Pont was 
manufacturing 1,700 gallons per day.  Eight workers died at the Du Pont facility between 
the time it opened and the winter of 1925.  However, demand for Ethyl was booming, and 
GM had been pushing Du Pont to speed up production.  Standard Oil claimed to have a 
less expensive process than Du Pont’s and, with Sloan’s approval, set up a small plant in 
New Jersey in September, 1924.  In late October, five workers went violently insane and 
within eight days had died; at least thirty others were treated for acute lead poisoning and 
some suffered permanent brain damage (Kovarik, 1994). 
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It is not entirely clear whether the New Jersey incident was solely the result of an 
industrial accident or explosion, as typically recounted in automotive histories, or due at 
least in part to the fact that Standard’s production process was inherently more hazardous 
than Du Pont’s, which had already claimed five lives before the new plant opened.  
Concerned over those losses, Du Pont was developing a closed system that would limit 
workers’ exposure to the chemicals and fumes.  Meanwhile, Standard’s process involved 
higher temperatures and pressures and workers were directly exposed to concentrated 
fumes and process wastes.  On touring the facility in September, Du Pont engineers were 
reportedly shocked by the dangers posed by Standard’s equipment and methods as well 
as the inadequacy of safety precautions.  When Kettering and Midgely urged Du Pont to 
adopt Standard’s process, Du Pont’s technical director refused (Kovarik, 1994).   
After the October incident, Standard Oil’s production plant was shut down, but 
the courts found the company innocent of criminal negligence in February, 1925.  
However, media coverage of the incident led to a public panic over acute poisoning from 
the use of ‘loony gas’ and several states moved to ban its use.  GM continued to stress 
that, while manufacturing pure TEL was indeed dangerous, there was no risk to the 
public because the additive was diluted to one part in 1,300 in gasoline.  In a presentation 
to the American Chemical Society, Midgely also asserted that no alternatives to Ethyl 
existed – a claim that was contrary to Midgely’s own research.  Meanwhile, health 
experts continued to weigh in on the danger of chronic exposure to lead in automobile 
exhaust.  As the controversy grew, Kettering and Midgely were secretly removed as 
president and vice president of the Ethyl Gasoline Corporation (Kovarik, 1994).  
 
376 
In May, 1925, a conference on the safety of TEL was held by the federal Public 
Health Service (PHS).  While the PHS had no authority to regulate chemicals, it had 
taken an aggressive stance against TEL.  As a result of the conference, which lasted only 
one day, the Surgeon General was tasked with forming an expert panel to investigate the 
dangers of leaded gasoline.  The Ethyl Corporation suspended sales of the additive 
pending the outcome of the investigation.  The study examined the health of 252 men, 
comparing drivers and mechanics exposed to leaded gasoline to those who had not, as 
well as to workers in lead industries.  Despite finding that the exposed workers’ blood 
and stools contained high levels of lead, the panel’s report in January, 1926, was 
inconclusive, citing the incompleteness of data regarding the effect of longer exposures 
on human health. 
Vindicated by the report, Ethyl Corporation resumed sales of leaded gasoline in 
the spring of 1926 after agreeing to put warning labels on it.  In 1927, Chrysler 
introduced the first moderately-priced automobile with a high-compression engine, made 
possible by higher octane fuels like Ethyl that reduced knock.  By 1940, TEL was used in 
90% of the gasoline in the U.S (Kovarik, 1994).  The Ethyl Corporation recorded profits 
of $1 billion between 1924 and 1947, when its patents expired.  GM’s share of the profits 
totaled $82.6 million, while patent royalties netted $43.3 million.  Du Pont realized 
profits of $86 million (Cray, 1980). 
5.2.4.4 Duco Paint 
Finishing methods for automobile bodies were inherited from the carriage 
industry.  As many as three dozen coats of paint and varnish were required, with sanding 
and drying in between.  Body finishing was a major production bottleneck since the total 
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process took from two to eight weeks, depending on a number of conditions, including 
temperature and humidity.  Dark pigments tended to dry faster, leading to the use of very 
dark greens and blues, and of course, black (Nieuwenhuis and Wells, 2007).  The all-steel 
Budd bodies used on Dodge cars beginning in 1914 could be oven-baked, facilitating a 
shift to black enamel.   
In 1921, GM appointed a Paint and Enamel committee to consider the problem of 
finishing car bodies.  In GM’s assessment of the problem, the industry absolutely needed 
a product that would reduce finishing time from days to hours without requiring the use 
of high temperatures beyond what wood could stand.  The product needed to be 
inexpensive, capable of producing a wide range of colors, and able to last the life of the 
vehicle.  In short, the industry needed a finish that would provide all the advantages of 
both varnish and enamel with none of the disadvantages of either (Pound, 1934).  On the 
other end of the spectrum from paints and varnishes, the toy industry was using cellulose 
nitrate lacquers, but they dried too fast.  The paint and varnish industry claimed the task 
was impossible.   
The answer to the auto industry’s finish problem came about largely by accident 
in a Du Pont laboratory, but traces logically from the firm’s origins.  In the 1830s, French 
chemists discovered that nitric acid mixed with starch or wood fibers produced a 
lightweight combustible explosive material broadly called nitrocellulose.  Unfortunately, 
the material was unstable and therefore not practical as an explosive.  Some ten years 
later, a German-Swiss chemist cleaned up a nitric acid spill with a cotton apron which he 
then hung on the stove door to dry.  But once dry, the apron exploded; the chemist had 
serendipitously discovered what came to be known as guncotton, which was also 
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discovered by another German chemist in the same year.  Refinements in the 
manufacturing process improved the stability of guncotton, which was used as a 
propellant and a low-order explosive. 
Guncotton was briefly used in artillery, but was too powerful and unstable for use 
in firearms.  In 1884, Frenchman Paul Vieille invented a smokeless gunpowder by 
dissolving guncotton in ether or alcohol.  The gelatinous solution was formed into thin 
sheets and cut into small flakes to produce a less volatile propellant that only exploded 
when compressed.  The powder was more powerful than black powder, producing a 
higher muzzle velocity and therefore more accurate long-range firing with no pall of 
black smoke.  Du Pont developed its own smokeless gunpowder in the 1890s and became 
a leading manufacturer the explosive for U.S. military use. 
Other experiments discovered that films made of nitrocellulose combined with 
ether or alcohol would harden into a film, leading to the development of plastics, lacquers 
and photographic film.63  The Du Pont management began a program of diversification 
beginning in 1902 and was particularly interested in alternative uses for nitrocellulose.  In 
1904, Du Pont purchased the International Smokeless Powder and Chemical Company 
which produced nitrocellulose lacquers.  In 1910, they purchased the Fabrikoid 
Company, which produced artificial leather made from fabric covered with a 
nitrocellulose film.  Du Pont improved the product and successfully marketed it to the 
automobile industry for tops for open cars.  In 1915, Du Pont purchased the Arlington 
Company which manufactured pyroxylin (nitrocellulose) plastics used in combs, collars, 
cuffs, and automobile side curtains. 
                                                 
63 Though not explosive, this film was still highly flammable. 
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In 1920, a Du Pont chemist working with nitrocellulose film noted an accidental 
chemical reaction that led to the creation of a thick, quick-drying lacquer capable of 
holding more pigment than before.  Du Pont initially marketed the lacquer under the 
name Viscolac in 1921, but subsequently worked with General Motors Research 
Corporation to refine the product for the automotive industry (Du Pont, 2007).  With 
promising progress in the labs, Pierre du Pont petitioned the Du Pont board to give GM 
an exclusive license to the new product, but the request was denied.  The new lacquer 
was renamed Duco and was first used on the “True Blue” Oakland for model year 1924.  
Du Pont made the new finish available to the entire automobile market in 1925. 
The introduction of Duco was a major step forward and was soon used by all 
major auto manufacturers.  The quick-drying, inexpensive lacquer relieved a major 
bottleneck in mass producing cars.  Even inexpensive cars were now available in a wide 
variety of rich, deep colors, opening a new era in automotive styling.  The finish did not 
fade in sunlight or weather, nor was it damaged by the heat of the engine.  And dents 
could be repaired and the metal repainted with matching color.  However, there still were 
issues to be resolved with the lacquer.  Duco did not produce a lustrous finish, so owners 
had to wax the car frequently to maintain a glossy shine.  But the most significant 
problem was that the lacquer was not sufficiently adhesive and would sometimes strip 
away from metal in large sheets.  The Du Pont and GM research laboratories continued to 
collaborate on undercoats to improve adhesion.  In addition, the development of synthetic 
chemicals later eliminated the reliance on natural resins that were limited in quantity and 
varied in quality (Sloan, 1964). 
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5.2.4.5 Style, Annual Models, and Planning for Change 
The post-war era presented the automobile industry with three challenges: 1) 
market saturation; 2) the growing used car problem; and 3) shifting consumer preferences 
for comfort and style.  To stimulate sales, manufacturers relied on consumer credit and 
began focusing on dealer organizations, marketing, and national advertising.  The issue of 
comfort was being partially met by the production of more closed-body cars, which rose 
from 17% of the market in 1920 to 72% by 1926 (Epstein, 1972).  Style, however, had 
always been subordinate to engineering.  Market saturation meant that most customers 
were now purchasing their second vehicle.  If automakers wanted to maintain industry 
growth, owners would have to be enticed to trade up rather than wait until the end of the 
useful life of their current automobile.  Manufacturers needed to engender consumer 
dissatisfaction. 
Since the birth of the industry, performance and economics had dominated the 
design process and both style and comfort had been a secondary issue – style had been 
forced to adapt to mechanical and mass production requirements.  After thirty years of 
development, the product and production technologies were no longer limiting factors in 
styling, which allowed for a new emphasis on aesthetics.  At this point, body and chassis 
design were largely two separate processes, resulting in an awkward fit and appearance.  
The chassis design included the fenders, running boards, and hood, and was still based on 
open body styling.  The separately designed closed body fit on top of the frame and was 
therefore narrower than the chassis and quite tall, resulting in an ungainly appearance.  
To make matters worse, road and engine improvements led to faster driving, and the 
typical automobile’s high center of gravity was becoming increasingly dangerous. 
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GM’s Alfred Sloan had long believed that a lower body was visually more 
appealing and, in 1926, he decided to approach automobile styling more systematically.  
Lawrence Fisher of the Fisher Body Company, now serving as general manager of 
Cadillac, shared Sloan’s sensibilities on styling.  Fisher visited dealers around the country 
and was impressed by the styling of custom bodies being produced by California dealer 
Don Lee for Hollywood stars.  Fisher toured Lee’s custom body shop where he met the 
shop’s young director and chief designer, Harley J. Earl.  Earl, who had studied at 
Stanford and trained in his father’s carriage shop, was using novel approaches to body 
design.  Instead of making models of various automobile components using wood and 
hammered metal, he designed the complete automobile as an integral whole using 
modeling clay.  As a result, the long, low custom bodies that Earl designed blended 
together the elements of the body, hood, fenders, headlights, and running boards. 
In 1926, Sloan and Fisher hired Earl as a consultant for the design of a new GM 
automobile to be sold by the Cadillac Division but at a lower price than the current 
Cadillac model.  The new La Salle, introduced in 1927, was the first mass produced car 
designed by stylists.  Sloan (1964, p. 269) recalled, “The La Salle looked longer and 
lower; the ‘Flying Wing’ fenders were drawn deeper than their predecessors; side 
windows had been reproportioned; the belt line had a new type of molding; sharp corners 
had been rounded off, and other design details were added giving it the unified 
appearance that we were looking for.”  Since there was no time to redesign the existing 
Cadillac model that year, Earl suggested using color to dress it up.  Where the Cadillac 
had previously been offered in three colors, the 1927 model was announced with five 
hundred color and upholstery combinations.   
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Impressed with the results at Cadillac, Sloan hired Earl to direct a newly 
established Art and Color Section funded through the Fisher Body Division.  To facilitate 
the operating divisions’ acceptance of the new section, Sloan and Fisher leant their 
personal support to Earl.  The first automobile completely redesigned by the Art and 
Color Section was the 1928 Buick.  The new model was a commercial failure, in part due 
to style changes made for production reasons, but also because the public saw it as too 
radical a departure from conventional styling.  Afterward, the group instituted successive 
style changes that allowed for an evolution along a projected line of development.  The 
new group gradually gained acceptance as the market proved that appearance sold cars. 
As of the mid-1920s, the annual model change was not a stated policy of GM or 
any automaker.  Manufacturers had always sought to make some improvements in quality 
or performance every year.  Major design and style changes generally were instituted as 
needed in response to the market and competition.  Sloan and the GM division sales 
managers debated the idea of annual models versus continual improvements in a 1925 
sales committee meeting.  While no one in the industry wanted annual models, GM was 
finding it necessary to make more frequent changes.  These changes were not regularized 
and the timing of them was becoming problematic from both production and marketing 
standpoints.  In truth, because of the need to motivate owners to trade up and the new 
emphasis on style, GM’s constant upgrading resulted in the introduction of annual 
models beginning in 1923.  By the 1930s, GM had recognized this unavoidable fact and 
was planning for regularized change.  The annual model change entailed a major style 
redesign every three years, a cycle that meshed with die life to minimizing retooling 
costs.  Minor annual cosmetic changes were made in between.  Although Sloan and Earl 
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did not invent planned obsolescence, they were the first to institutionalize it (Sloan, 1964; 
Cray, 1980; Flink, 1988). 
Much of GM’s ability to accommodate annual model changes is attributed to 
William Knudsen.  Knudsen was a Keim Mills employee when Ford purchased the 
company in 1911 and brought him to Highland Park.  Later in the decade, Knudsen 
repeatedly tried to impress upon Henry Ford that the tired Model T had run its course 
(Cray, 1980).  Tensions rose between the two individualists as Ford became increasingly 
autocratic and rigid in regard to the Model T’s design.  Knudsen could accept Ford’s 
interference with his decisions, but he resented Ford’s methods of countermanding his 
orders or telling employees to ignore them.  In 1921, Knudsen resigned to avoid further 
confrontation with Ford, saying “I can’t avoid it if I stay, and I can’t stay and keep my 
self-respect” (Nevins and Hill, 1957, p. 168).   
GM hired Knudsen in 1922 with no particular role in mind for him.  Amidst 
problems with Kettering’s new copper-cooled engine, Pierre du Pont named Knudsen 
vice president in charge of operations at Chevrolet.  Du Pont planned for the new 
Chevrolet model to compete directly with Ford in the low-price car market.  In 1924, 
Knudsen was promoted to president and general manager of the Chevrolet Division.  
Although the copper-cooled engine failed in the market, Knudsen, under Alfred Sloan’s 
management, was able to turn Chevrolet around.  The division lost nearly $9 million in 
1921, but by 1932, Chevrolet’s profits were largely responsible for keeping the 
corporation out of the red. 
Rather than imitate the production system at Ford, Knudsen built a decentralized 
organization that could accommodate change and expansion.  In 1924, Chevrolet 
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produced 280,000 cars; Chevrolet models were re-styled each year and by 1928, 
production exceeded 1 million and forced an end to the Model T.  Although Knudsen 
arranged machinery and operations for sequential production as at Ford, he replaced 
single-purpose machine tools with standard or general-purpose machines.  He expanded 
production facilities and added new assembly plants, each run independently by a local 
manager.  A Fisher Body plant was then attached to each assembly facility so that body 
production was closely coordinated with the daily output of each assembly plant.  
Highland Park had been extremely efficient, but also inflexible, because “every machine 
tool and fixture was fitted for the production of a single product whose every part had 
been standardized to the minutest detail” (Hounshell, 1984, p. 288).  In contrast, 
Chevrolet production had been designed to accommodate change and marked the 
beginning of what Hounshell calls flexible mass production.  With the addition of 
automated factory equipment in the 1950s, flexible mass production would also allow for 
variety within a product run – body style, color, trim, and powertrain options.   
5.3 Birth of Chrysler, 1920-1930 
Walter Chrysler left GM in 1920, unable to tolerate Durant’s “erratic decision 
making and arbitrary interference in Buick’s operations” (Flink, 1988, p. 68).  Later that 
year, Chrysler was hired as executive vice-president of the Willys-Overland Company in 
an attempt to save its holding company, the Willys Corporation, which suffered from the 
post-World War I recession.  While at Willys, Chrysler hired three talented engineers 
away from Studebaker – Fred Zeder, Owen Skelton, and Carl Breer – who brought with 
them twenty-eight men from Studebaker’s engineering department.  The three ‘wizards’ 
designed an entirely new and far superior car featuring a six-cylinder in-line engine, an 
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updraft carburetor, and semi-elliptic front and rear springs (Hyde, 2003).  Chrysler 
planned to give the car his name and manufacture it under the Chrysler Motor Company, 
a newly incorporated division of the Willys Corporation.  However, the parent 
corporation went into receivership in November, 1920, before the vehicle went into 
production.  The Willys plant and the plans for the new car were auctioned off, purchased 
by the new Durant Motors, which built and sold the car as the Flint. 
Chrysler then moved on to supervise the reorganization of the failing Maxwell 
and Chalmers Motor Companies which were in merger negotiations.  Maxwell had bailed 
out Chalmers, a low-volume high-price producer, by leasing its plants and keeping its 
automobiles in production.  Chrysler restored the Maxwell Company’s reputation and 
returned the company to profitability by improving the faulty Maxwell automobile 
design, introducing a new axle in 1921 and aluminum pistons in 1922.  Chrysler then 
hired the Zeder-Skelton-Breer team, which had opened a consulting firm named ZSB 
Engineering, to design a new six-cylinder car to be named the Chrysler Six.   
The settlement of a lawsuit against Chalmers in late 1922 placed the company in 
receivership, allowing the Maxwell Motor Corporation to purchase the Chalmers 
property outright.  Maxwell continued production of the Chalmers car through 1923 then 
retooled the plant to produce the Chrysler Six.  In 1923, Chrysler signed a four-year 
contract to serve as president of the Maxwell Motor Corporation – the only way he could 
obtain the support of the board of directors for his new car.  The following year, Maxwell 
introduced the Chrysler Six at the New York Automobile Show.  The fast, powerful, and 
stylish automobile was an instant success at the show and in the market.  Advertisements 
for the Chrysler focused on its technological superiority and emphasized the use of Fisher 
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bodies as proof of its overall quality.  The speed and power of the stock automobile were 
proven by a number of racing successes in 1924 and 1925. 
Though not radical in design, the moderately priced automobile offered a host of 
advanced technological features as standard equipment, including a high-compression 
engine (4.7:1 versus the typical 4:1), hydraulic four-wheel brakes, and balloon tires.  The 
Chrysler Six was the first moderately-priced car to offer a high compression engine, a 
technology that was enabled by the 1923 introduction of Ethyl (leaded) gasoline and 
improved crankshaft balancing.  Low-pressure balloon tires were developed by Firestone 
in 1923 (Abernathy et al. 1983) and offered a smoother ride than older style tires.64  They 
were included as standard equipment on fourteen of the models displayed at the 1924 
show (Hyde, 2003).  Duesenberg first introduced four-wheel mechanical brakes, a 
European import, in 1922 by adding standard drum brakes to the front wheels.  Malcom 
Loughheed (later changed to Lockheed) developed a four-wheel hydraulic braking 
system that Duesenberg adopted on its Model A in 1923.  In October of 1923, Maxwell 
offered hydraulic brakes as an option on its Chalmers models.  However, the ZSB team 
found that the Lockheed brakes leaked hydraulic fluid under heavy use.  Working with 
the Manhattan Rubber Company, ZSB designed a rubber cup to replace the rawhide one 
employed by Lockheed to seal in the fluid when braking.  ZSB allowed Lockheed to 
incorporate the change into his design in exchange for free licensing of the Lockheed 
brake system.  The 1924 Chrysler catalog referred to the system as the ‘Chrysler 
Lockheed hydraulic four-wheel brake’ (Hyde, 2003, p. 32).  
                                                 
64 Abernathy et al. (1983), indicate that Firestone’s new low pressure balloon tires were first introduced on 
Ford automobiles in 1923.  Although Firestone supplied Ford, Nevins and Hill (1957) state that Ford was 
late in adopting this innovation. 
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In mid-1925, the company began selling a modified Maxwell Model 25 as the 
Chrysler Four and discontinued the Maxwell line.  That same year, Chrysler reorganized 
the firm as the Chrysler Corporation.  Chrysler offered “new and improved” models 
approximately every twelve months and expanded the variety of cars it offered to include 
four distinct lines, with each line offering four to nine body styles.  Sales tripled from 
31,429 in 1924 to 106,857 in 1925 and reached 192,083 in 1927.  By the late 1920s, the 
Chrysler Corporation had established itself as a leader in technological excellence and 
innovation and according to Nevins and Hill (1957, p. 444), “boasted of an engineering 
laboratory that would have done credit to Yale or Cornell.” 
The biggest challenge for the company during this time was expanding production 
fast enough to keep pace with demand, a difficult proposition since building new 
facilities was both costly and time consuming.  Chrysler relied on the Fisher Body 
Company to supply most of its car bodies, but purchased a large body plant directly 
across from one of its Detroit facilities in 1925.  After Fisher Body became wholly owned 
by GM in 1926, most Chrysler bodies were supplied by the Briggs Manufacturing 
Company, the Edward G. Budd Manufacturing Company, and the Murray Corporation.  
The company expanded its existing manufacturing facilities in 1928. 
However, the biggest increase in plant capacity came when Chrysler purchased 
Dodge Brothers in 1928.  The Dodge brothers had launched their automobile 
manufacturing business in 1913 after ten years of manufacturing parts worth up to 60% 
of the value of Ford automobiles.  Because of their reputation, when the first Dodge car 
was introduced in November, 1914, it was an instant success.  Perhaps the most 
significant feature of the new four-cylinder Dodge was the use of an open all-steel body 
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produced by Edward G. Budd (see section 5.4.2).  The steel body gave the car superior 
strength and allowed the use of an oven-baked enamel finish which reduced finishing 
time to five days. 
During the first year, Dodge only offered one model in two body styles.  In 1915, 
it added a third ‘Winter Model’ which was merely the standard touring or roadster Dodge 
with a detachable steel top and removable glass windows.  The Dodge brothers followed 
a strategy similar to Ford’s, eschewing annual model changes and instead making minor 
improvements to the existing design.  In 1917, the wheelbase of the Dodge automobiles 
was increased and a coupe and a sedan were added to the line.  Two delivery trucks were 
introduced in 1918, and a four-door sedan, the first of its type in the industry, was added 
in 1920.  However, there were few styling changes to the Dodge models from 1914-1920 
(Hyde, 2003).   
While at the New York Automobile Show in January, 1920, both of the Dodge 
brothers contracted influenza.  The disease took the life of John Dodge on January 14.  
Weakened by his illness and devastated by his brother’s death, Horace spent much of the 
year in Florida and died on December 10.  The company continued to operate 
successfully under the leadership of Frederick J. Haynes, whom the brothers had hired in 
1912 to oversee production.  Following the Dodge brothers’ policies, Haynes pursued 
engineering improvements and cost reductions rather than cosmetic changes.  In the fall 
of 1921, the share of closed car bodies in the Dodge lineup jumped to 35%.  For the 1923 
model year, Haynes and Budd jointly designed two all-steel closed-body models that 
were introduced in the summer and fall of 1922, another industry first.  Since these 
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models used a steel frame and steel panels, they allowed Dodge to use a baked enamel 
finish on its closed-body cars. 
In 1925, the Dodge widows sold the company to a banking house whose 
executives had no experience manufacturing or selling cars.  The new management 
introduced an entirely new line of automobiles in 1927, all more expensive than the old 
four-cylinder Dodge models.  Though solid and comfortable, they had few innovative 
features and failed in the market; Dodge sales and profits plummeted.65  Though the 
management correctly perceived a market shift to larger engines and more luxurious cars, 
in going ‘up-market,’ Dodge had abandoned its long-time customers and entered a 
market segment where it had no reputation (Hyde, 2003).  The company had spent nearly 
$15 million retooling plants to produce the new automobiles and now could not sell them.  
In a year when the price of automobile stock generally increased 50%, the price of Dodge 
Brothers stock fell, prompting the bankers to sell. 
As luck would have it, Chrysler desperately needed to increase his production 
capacity and was as anxious to buy Dodge as the bankers were to sell it.  The Chrysler 
line was popular and profitable and the company already had plans to introduce two new 
models.  The new low-priced Plymouth was intended to compete with Ford and 
Chevrolet, while the mid-priced DeSoto was to compete with Dodge.  However, 
competing with Ford and Chevrolet in the low-priced car market would have been 
extremely difficult without a large established dealer network.  The acquisition of Dodge 
doubled Chrysler’s sales outlets with the addition of a distribution and dealer network 
                                                 
65 Factory sales of automobiles fell 1% (42,800) in 1926 and 20% (755,800) in 1927, then rebounded by 
28% in 1928 to exceed 1925 sales.  In 1926, Ford sales alone dropped nearly 450,000 from a high of nearly 
2 million units.  In May of 1927, Ford shut down the Rouge plant to retool for the new Model A and 
production ceased for almost a year.  This shutdown left the low-priced field wide open for Chevrolet and 
the new Chrysler Plymouth. 
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that was generally considered one of the best in the industry (Hyde, 2003).  Chrysler was 
also especially interested in adding casting and forging capabilities and the Dodge 
Brothers plants had large, modern, and efficient facilities. 
According to Hyde (2003), the purchase of Dodge was not just intended to 
increase production capacity and capabilities, but was a strategic move to ensure the 
long-term survival of the company.  Since Chrysler and Dodge models overlapped in 
terms of price categories, the purchase reduced competition in those segments while 
increasing Chrysler’s market share within them.  Most significantly, the merger would 
allow Chrysler to operate more like, and therefore compete with, the dominant force in 
the industry – General Motors.  A larger size and sales volume enabled the operation of 
finance and export companies; greater production of parts; and economies in research, 
engineering, and purchasing.  When the merger was complete on July, 1928, Dodge 
became a division of Chrysler, making it the third largest U.S. automaker behind GM and 
Ford.  An editorial in the Automotive Daily News noted that the industry was now 
dominated by a ‘big three’ that accounted for nearly 75% of passenger car manufacturing 
(Hyde, 2003). 
5.4 Enclosed Steel Bodies 
The earliest automobile bodies were styled and built similarly to carriages, and 
even the names were borrowed from this tradition: stanhope, surrey, brougham, phaeton, 
tonneau, cabriolet, landaulet, and wagonette.  The techniques for shaping wooden bodies 
– steaming and bending – resulted in simple curves with little distinguishing style 
characteristics from one make to another.  The use of sheet metal and aluminum, 
beginning around 1900, allowed for greater styling differences.  Columbia Electric 
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produced the first enclosed body, constructed of a wood frame and steel panels, in 1898.  
Marmon introduced the first all metal (open) body using cast aluminum in 1902 
(Abernathy et al., 1983).  However, closed wooden bodies were expensive, costing 30-
50% more than open bodies (Epstein, 1972), and did not hold up well to the vibration and 
shock of rough roads.  The use of metal was also expensive and therefore was found only 
in high-priced automobiles and limousines.  In 1916, 98% of new cars bodies were open 
(Epstein, 1972) and as late as 1920, 85% of car bodies were constructed of wood 
(Abernathy, 1978).66  Motorists could protect themselves from the elements by 
purchasing canopy tops from automobile or accessory manufacturers.  In 1905, Peerless 
introduced a folding top which became standard equipment by 1916 (Epstein, 1972).   
Beginning in 1916, the percentage of automobiles manufactured with closed 
bodies rose from a mere 1.5% to 17% by 1920 and reached 72% by 1926.  Epstein (1972) 
credits the increasing popularity of closed bodies in part to road improvements which 
reduced the vibrations and shocks that damaged automobile bodies.  In addition, quantity 
production brought costs and prices down and extended the market for closed bodies 
beyond the wealthy.  The difference in price between open and closed bodies fell to 
around $100 by 1926, costing about the same as optional folding canopy tops offered 
prior to 1916 (Epstein, 1972).  The Hudson Motor Company was among the first 
manufacturers to produce closed-body cars in volume, introducing the affordable Essex 
coach at $1495 in 1921.  By 1925, the price of the four-cylinder Hudson coach had 
                                                 
66 The wood or wood and steel automobile body and chassis were attached to a frame consisting of two 
long bars.  Initially the frame was constructed of wood, which produced a quiet ride.  In 1903, A.O. Smith 
introduced a pressed steel frame (Abernathy et al., 1983).  As manufacturers began instituting mass 
production techniques, they found suppliers could not produce wood frames quickly enough to meet the 
speed of moving assembly lines.  As the industry shifted to pressed steel frames, A.O. Smith soon became 
the leader in frame production, a position it held for most of the twentieth century (Rubenstein, 2001). 
 
392 
dropped to $895, placing it within the low-price field (Sloan, 1964).  One firm, the Fisher 
Body Company, is largely responsible for the development of inexpensive closed bodies. 
Meanwhile, the use of all-steel bodies was also rising thanks to innovations 
pioneered by the Edward G. Budd Company that significantly reduced production time 
and costs.  Manufacturing wooden bodies entailed a large amount of hand crafting that 
simply could not be replaced with Fordist production techniques.  The adoption of all-
steel bodies banished the last foothold of the craft system from automobile 
manufacturing.  Steel also improved the strength and flexibility of bodies, making them 
quieter and more comfortable.  At the same time, it allowed greater variety in body 
styling.  By 1925, Budd’s all-steel technology was used in 50% of U.S. body production. 
5.4.1 The Fisher Body Company 
The industry shift to closed bodies is attributable to Fred J. and Charles T. Fisher 
who formed the Fisher Body Company in Detroit in July, 1908.  The brothers were third 
generation vehicle craftsmen with experience in carriage building and in motor vehicle 
body manufacturing for the C.R. Wilson Body Company, then the largest U.S. 
automobile body firm.  The Fisher’s younger brothers, six in total, joined them in the 
business later.  While many automobile body builders, particularly older ones, employed 
machinery and styling inherited from the carriage business, the Fishers understood the 
specific needs of the automobile for strength and resilience and were therefore more 
progressive.  Most notably, for two years they actively solicited orders for closed bodies, 
believing it would extend the driving season and expand the market for motor 
automobiles especially by appealing to women.  In 1910, Cadillac ordered the first ‘large’ 
volume of closed bodies, 150 units, prompting the Fishers to organize the Fisher Closed 
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Body Company (Pound, 1934).  The Fishers quickly gained a reputation for building high 
quality bodies.  By 1916, after merging all their interests into a single company, the 
Fisher Body Company was a leader in the industry, manufacturing 370,000 car bodies a 
year. 
As Fisher production expanded, so did concerns about capital and future demand.  
If the brothers issued additional stock to new holders, their control of the company could 
become weakened.  In addition, the automobile industry was becoming increasingly 
concentrated and their customers could switch to a new supplier or begin manufacturing 
their own bodies.  The Fishers’ best options were to either begin producing their own 
automobiles or merge with an existing manufacturer.  As they made tentative plans for 
the former option, two manufacturers initiated negotiations for mergers.  William Durant 
had tried unsuccessfully to employ four of the Fisher brothers at GM and was alarmed by 
the potential loss of a source for closed bodies, which he believed might be of strategic 
importance.  In 1919, GM outbid the competitors, purchasing 60% of the Fisher Body 
Company.  GM signed a ten year contract to purchase, at cost plus 17.6%, as many closed 
car bodies from Fisher as it could supply, though Fisher was free to produce bodies for 
other customers.  Under the terms of the merger, Fisher Body and GM each selected half 
the members of the board of directors for the reorganized Fisher Body.  The firm’s stock 
was placed in a five year voting trust with each side assigning two trustees.  Fisher 
retained a majority control in a newly appointed operating committee, but GM secured 
majority control of the finance committee.  For the next five years, Fisher essentially 
would be allowed to continue operating as an independent firm.  However, the brothers 
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were contractually obligated to remain with the company for those five years (Coase, 
2000; Freeland, 2000).   
At $26.7 million, GM’s purchase price of the 60% share of Fisher Body was 
exceptional even in a year of frenzied acquisitions.  But according to Pound (1934, p. 
182), the significance of this event went far beyond the value of the physical assets 
obtained: 
The importance of this alliance, which was later extended to the point of 
complete merger, can hardly be overestimated.  It gave General Motors first call 
on the production of the largest and best equipped body-building plants in the 
world.  With the steady trend toward closed cars, the Fisher brothers… had 
pushed forward until they occupied a foremost position in their line both as to 
quantity and quality.  The Fisher name had become known far and wide, and the 
presence of a Fisher body on any car recommended it to the consuming public.  
By this one decisive step the General Motors Corporation wrote off future body 
difficulties by placing that business in the hands of outstanding specialists in the 
field of body manufacture.  With advancing complexities in design and 
manufacture, the wisdom of this alliance has become increasingly manifest. 
Apparently, the Fisher brothers should not have been concerned about losing their 
customers, because they possessed a scarce resource – knowledge.  Freeland (2000) 
argues that GM’s purchase of a majority share in Fisher Body was motivated by “the 
desire to acquire and retain the specialized knowledge and services of the Fisher brothers.  
Unified ownership was thus driven much more extensively by the attempt to capture 
scarce knowledge than has been recognized.” 
While the work provided by Fisher Body continued to be efficient and of high 
quality, GM officials felt that the Fisher brothers were not sufficiently aware of or 
concerned with GM’s needs, particularly in terms of expanding body production by 
locating new plants near GM assembly facilities.  Concerned first with the bottom line for 
their own company, the Fishers preferred to expand existing facilities instead of building 
entirely new plants.  In order to improve coordination between the two companies, Pierre 
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du Pont placed Fred Fisher on GM’s board of directors in 1921 then appointed him a 
member of the executive committee in 1922.  These positions involved him in making 
broad decisions regarding GM’s production, product design, and pricing (Chandler and 
Salsbury, 1971).   
As the end of the five year employment contract neared in October, 1924, closed-
body cars were increasingly popular and GM became concerned about retaining the 
Fishers.  The possibility of a merger was discussed as early as 1922, but the brothers had 
no desire to become GM employees and were reluctant to see the family business 
disappear.  In addition, they wished to continue receiving financial incentives comparable 
to the lucrative profit-sharing terms of the original contract, while GM was concerned 
that such an arrangement would limit Fisher Body’s ability to expand with GM.  A new 
agreement was brokered that compensated the brothers through GM’s stock incentive 
plan rather than from Fisher’s profits.  To receive the full benefit, the brothers would 
have to stay with the company until 1929.  Fred Fisher was also appointed to GM’s 
finance committee while Lawrence Fisher joined the GM board of directors and the 
executive committee.  This agreement retained the knowledge and skills of the brothers 
and had the added benefit of further aligning the interests of the two companies.  From 
this time, it apparently was understood that the GM-Fisher relationship was permanent 
and the two firms would eventually merge (Coase, 2000; Freeland, 2000).   
Despite the improvements in communication and coordination between the firms, 
availability of bodies continued to limit automobile production as late as 1925.  The 
wooden frames in Fisher bodies limited the use of heat to speed drying and therefore 
created a production bottle neck.  According to a GM publication, in 1923, Fisher 
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“pioneered the use of lacquer in place of paint and varnish for bodies.  This was a vital 
step in attaining volume production, thereby helping to bring the closed car within the 
reach of the average buyer” (cited by Nieuwenhuis and Wells, 2007).  However, this 
innovation originated at Du Pont (see section 5.2.4.4) and its early adoption at Fisher was 
facilitated by GM’s close relationship with both firms.  In fact, according to Cray (1980), 
the Fisher’s were reluctant to adopt the new finish because of its dull finish and 
difficulties getting the paint to adhere.  Though GM sought an exclusive license for the 
new Duco lacquer, Du Pont made the paint available to the entire motor industry in 1925 
(Cray, 1980; Sloan, 1964).  The shift to lacquer reduced the time required to paint and 
trim a body from four weeks to six hours.  And, as GM (cited by Nieuwenhuis and Wells, 
2007) later pointed out, it “ushered in a new era of color in automotive styling.” 
In 1925, the entire GM line was redesigned with an increasing emphasis on color 
and style and a growing number of closed bodies.  Sales were booming and GM needed 
to expand production, which meant Fisher Body needed to expand as well.  The Fisher’s 
were still reluctant to move to new facilities close to GM assembly plants, in part because 
they still provided bodies to other manufacturers.  Closed-body styling was a primary 
means of product differentiation and the Executive Committee was concerned that 
control of a strategic asset would be compromised if the remaining 40% of Fisher Body’s 
stock were sold to outside interests, such as a speculator like Durant.  Only a year after 
GM reached a new employment contract with the Fishers, Pierre du Pont once again 
suggested the companies merge.  Du Pont and Fred Fisher negotiated an exchange of 1.5 
shares of GM stock for each remaining share of Fisher stock, half of which was owned by 
the brothers.  Fisher Body became a fully owned GM division.  Charles Fisher joined the 
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Executive Committee and Sloan appointed Lawrence Fisher head of Cadillac.  All but 
one of the six Fisher brothers eventually served as senior executives at GM.  GM’s 
complete ownership of Fisher Body cut off competitor’s access to the most important 
supplier of closed bodies and helped propel GM to the top position in the industry 
(Freeland, 2000).  In 1934, Fisher would be responsible for the innovation that removed 
the last vestige of fabric from auto bodies: the turret top. 
5.4.2 Edward G. Budd Manufacturing Co. of Philadelphia  
After graduating from high school, Edward G. Budd apprenticed as a machinist in 
a Smyrna, Delaware, iron works firm.  Around 1890, Budd moved to Philadelphia where 
he worked for a foundry and a manufacturer of machine tools and metal presses.  The art 
of pressing steel sheets was a relatively new idea, dating back to around 1860.  In 1911, 
The Horseless Age (cited in Grayson, 1978) wrote “by the term pressed steel, engineers 
generally understand that the material has been worked into shape from plate or tube by 
means of stamping and drawing processes performed either while the material is hot or, 
in some cases, cold.  The process is therefore one which usually changes the form of 
rather than the thickness of the material operated upon…” 
Budd became acquainted with a Connecticut mechanic who had designed a pulley 
made of sheet steel which was lighter and cheaper to produce than traditional cast iron.  
When his friend received financing to produce the new pulley, Budd joined him as a 
draftsman and engineer at the American Pulley Company.  The pulleys proved to be 
strong and flexible and were a market success.  As the business expanded, American 
began producing stamped steel parts for Hale & Kilburn, a furniture manufacturer that 
specialized in seating for railways, subways and trolleys.  Most Hale & Kilburn’s parts 
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were produced using cast iron, and in 1902, the company hired Budd away from 
American to develop lighter, cheaper pressed steel parts.  Budd and co-worker Morris 
Lachman accomplished these goals using new techniques in oxy-acetylene welding 
enabled by the work of Frenchmen Henry Le Chatelier, Edmond Fouche and Charles 
Picard and Americans Thomas Wilson, Major J. Turner Morehead, and Eugene 
Bournonville.   
Budd and Lachman also experimented with resistance and arc welding.  The 
electric resistance welder was developed around 1888 by Elihu Thomson, an Englishman 
working in the U.S.  In 1892, C.L. Coffin of Detroit received a U.S. patent for an arc 
welding process using a metal electrode whereby the metal from the electrode was used 
to fill the joint.  With this new expertise in welding and pressed steel fabrication, Budd 
designed all-steel passenger rail cars that Hale & Kilburn produced for the Pullman 
Company in the early 1900s.   
Budd soon began experimenting with shallow-draw sheet metal stamping, and 
produced a small number of sheet metal panels for the King and Paige Co.’s automobile 
bodies.  In 1909, Budd was contacted by Emil Nelson, the chief engineer of the Hupp 
Motor Car Co., for help developing an all-metal body.  Although advances in sheet metal 
manufacture made possible larger stampings of uniform thickness, the compound curves 
demanded by automobile bodies still required multiple stampings connected by hand 
welding and no Detroit firm was willing to contract to build an all metal body.  Budd 
already believed that car bodies should not have a piece of wood “as big as a toothpick,” 
and eagerly embraced the project (Grayson, 1978).   
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Since they lacked the equipment and experience necessary to draw complex 
shapes from a single piece of metal, Budd and Nelson designed the cowl and tonneau 
from formed and welded panels, and devised a system to support the parts during 
welding.  Hale & Kilburn began supplying Hupp with pressed steel body panels and 
Budd began development of an all-steel body.  In 1911, Budd developed and Hale & 
Kilburn built for Hupp the first automobile body that used steel-reinforced wood frames, 
called armored wood, to which sheet steel was attached.  In 1912, Hupp introduced the 
Model 32, the first car with an all-steel body produced by Hale & Kilburn (Grayson, 
1978).  At this time, the painting of bodies was a production bottleneck.  Because of the 
wood frames, the bodies could not be baked to speed drying because this could result in 
fires.  Gluing, sanding, staining, and varnishing took weeks.  By adapting stove 
enameling on the Model 32, Hubmobile reduced the process to one day (Grayson, 1978; 
Nieuwenhuis and Wells 2007). 
In 1911, Hale & Kilburn was sold to J.P. Morgan and the management was 
replaced.  The new management had no understanding of the stamped metal business and 
Budd had difficulty tolerating the stream of senseless orders.  In the same year, Robert C. 
Hupp left the Hupp Motor Car Company.  In 1912, Budd resigned from Hale & Kilburn 
and Nelson resigned from Hupp.  Although the Hupp Company continued to manufacture 
the Model 32, it incorporated a traditional wood and steel body. 
In June, 1912, Budd formed the Edward G. Budd Manufacturing Co. and hired a 
handful of coworkers from Hale & Kilburn.67  Budd’s son later claimed “[i]t is probably 
true that this small group of people represented the greatest aggregate knowledge that 
                                                 
67 One of these, Joseph Ledwinka, would later be responsible for numerous lucrative patents and would be 
a significant factor in Budd’s success. 
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existed in the Country at that time, of the art of making dies and using presses for the 
formation of light gauge steel parts” (Grayson, 1978).  Budd believed that steel was the 
material best suited for manufacturing both automobile bodies and interior frames.  Steel 
“gave the elasticity that was desirable so that some flexibility of the chassis was absorbed 
by the flexibility in the body.  It gave greater strength at less weight.  Our art reduced to 
the minimum the number of joints in the body and so kept the body water tight, wind 
tight, and quiet” (Grayson, 1978). 
Budd continued to perfect the techniques required to manufacture all-steel bodies, 
eventually developing jigs and fixtures that prevented the stamped steel parts from 
deforming during the welding process.  Soon after being appointed president of GM in 
1912, Charles Nash ordered a sample metal body for Buick then ordered 2,000 metal 
touring (open) bodies for GM’s Oakland division.  Willys-Overland also ordered 2,500 
metal touring bodies that year for its recently purchased Garford Truck Company.  Budd 
purchased a facility in Detroit to paint and upholster bodies shipped from Philadelphia.  
Unfortunately, Garford filed for bankruptcy soon afterward and Oakland demand 
dropped.  Budd was forced to sell the Detroit facility, but was able to keep the company 
afloat by manufacturing truck bodies, automobile fenders, and stamped panels and trim 
for railway cars. 
The breakthrough came for Budd when the Dodge Brothers ordered 5,000 all-
steel bodies for their new automobile in 1914.  With its instant success, Dodge ordered 
50,000 all-steel bodies in 1915.  In June of 1915, Budd was granted a patent on the design 
of a welded all-steel touring car body.  Demand for the new Dodge exceeded Budd’s 
production capabilities, so the C.R. Wilson Body Co. supplied Dodge with bodies using 
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wooden frames (Grayson, 1978; Nieuwenhuis and Wells, 2007).  In addition to complete 
bodies, Budd supplied stamped parts for Buick, Reo, Willys-Overland, and later, 
Chevrolet. 
In 1916, Budd introduced a hard-top with optional side curtains that could be 
attached to the Dodge chassis during inclement weather and removed during fair weather, 
thus creating the Dodge ‘Winter Model’.  In 1917, Budd developed an all-steel sedan for 
Dodge, but dedication of Budd facilities to the war effort delayed production.  In 1922, 
Budd and Dodge’s Frederick Haynes developed an all-steel coupe body for Dodge that 
was introduced in the 1923 model year.  It was the industry’s first all-steel closed-body 
car.  Due to limitations in sheet metal width and concerns over noise problems, the roof 
section still used a wood and wire frame over which fabric was stretched.   
As closed bodies gained in popularity during the 1920s, Budd expanded 
production rapidly.  Significant economies of scale realized from high production 
volumes combined with improved welding and engraving machinery allowed Budd to cut 
the average body price by 40% in 1922.  By 1925, Budd’s all-steel technology was used 
in 50% of U.S. body production (Nieuwenhuis and Wells, 2007).  Ledwinka continued to 
improve manufacturing techniques, developing a huge welding machine capable of 
producing steel sheets 140 inches long – longer than those rolled by steel mills.  This 
allowed Budd to stamp entire side panels from a single sheet (Grayson, 1978).   
Although Budd did not invent the steel body or any of the core technologies used 
– production of sheet steel, forming by hydraulic presses, resistance welding, and the use 
of jigs and fixtures to prevent distortion – he was the first to see the possibilities for these 
processes to revolutionize body manufacturing.  His synthesis and adaptation of existing 
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tools and processes eliminated the remaining need for craft techniques in body 
production, beginning with the elimination of handcrafted wood components and ending 
with the replacement of hand bolting of steel panels by automated welding in 1925 
(Abernathy et al., 1983).  Nieuwenhuis and Wells (2007) assert that researchers have 
under-valued Budd’s contributions to the displacement of craft manufacturing by mass 
production. “[T]he early Fordist revolution in mass manufacturing of cars was 
incomplete, and required the introduction of Budd’s all-steel body technology to resolve 
key bottlenecks in the manufacture and painting of vehicle bodies and thereby enable a 
transformation of the industry.”  Without a doubt, the closed steel body marked a major 
change in the functional specifications and design attributes of the automobile.  
According to Abernathy (1978, p. 18), “The very concept of the automobile was changed 
for the consumer by an early technological advance in body design.  The introduction of 
closed steel bodies during the 1920s raised a whole new set of criteria for automotive 
design – passenger comfort, room, heating and ventilation, and quietness of ride.” 
5.5 Time Sales and Financing 
Even before 1910, consumers had become willing to forego savings and 
investments or go into debt to own an automobile.  Banks generally disapproved of 
financing the purchase of luxury items like “pleasure cars,” a perspective which persisted 
until sometime in the 1920s (Sloan, 1964).  As a result, Americans began mortgaging 
their homes to obtain the necessary cash, leading sometimes to foreclosure (Flink, 1970).  
However, the automobile became more utilitarian and more affordable just as the wealthy 
market became saturated.  Dealers soon found that some promising sales prospects 
required extension of credit.  In 1911, the Studebaker Corporation announced it would 
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accept dealer-endorsed notes from farmers and other responsible buyers (Smith, 1968; 
Flink, 1988).  In the following years, dealers began arranging for customers of financial 
standing in the community to make a down payment of 66-75% with the balance due in 
one or two payments within one to three months (Epstein, 1972).    
Success with these arrangements emboldened some dealers to develop installment 
plans under which they held title to the car until it was completely paid for.  This 
technique required that dealers make arrangements with local banks and finance 
companies.  While banks still were not willing to handle large quantities of loans for 
automobiles, they were willing to lend money to specialty finance companies.  
Experience soon showed that these installment plans were a good low-risk investment 
when the automobile was well insured and the payment plan took into account the 
depreciation of the car, which was used as security against the loan.  By assessing 
relatively high fees for these low-risk loans, the finance companies prospered (Pound, 
1934). 
As the scale of the automobile business grew, dealers shouldered ever-increasing 
costs of new car inventories and the facilities required to display and stock them.  In 
addition, they needed to provide service facilities and space for stocking and selling used 
cars.  As a result, the specialty finance companies began financing dealer stock as well as 
consumer purchases (Pound, 1934).  Under increasing pressure from their dealers, 
manufacturers of moderately priced cars began to view credit sales as an alternative to 
Ford’s strategy of progressively lowering prices (Flink, 1988).  In 1915, John Willys 
created the industry’s first captive lending agency to finance time sales of Overland and 
Willys-Knight cars (Sloan, 1964; Cray, 1980).  In 1916, the company was reorganized to 
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finance twenty-one makes of cars, including all GM makes, Dodge, Ford, Hudson, 
Maxwell, Reo and Studebaker (Flink, 1988).   
GM became the first manufacturer to directly finance consumer purchases of new 
and used cars when Durant and Raskob created the General Motors Acceptance 
Corporation (GMAC), a GM owned subsidiary, in 1919.  GMAC also financed wholesale 
purchases by GM dealers.  According to Sloan (1964, p. 306), GMAC was established to 
prove the validity of consumer financing of automobiles and to “crusade for reasonable 
rates.”  Over the next few years, GMAC formulated and refined policies regarding loan 
terms and structure in order to minimize the risks associated with default.  GM also 
commissioned a multi-year study by economist E. R. A. Seligman who reported that 
installment credit strengthened consumers’ willingness and ability to save, increased 
purchasing power, and stabilized and increased production.   Published in 1927, the study 
“had a strong influence… in bringing about an acceptance of installment selling among 
bankers, businessmen, and the public” (Sloan, 1964, p. 306). 
The use of installment sales became an important strategy in reducing swollen 
inventories during the recession that followed World War I, particularly the stock of used 
cars traded in as a down payment on a new automobile.  As the automobile market 
saturated in the 1920s and manufacturers began pursuing annual model changes to 
stimulate new car sales, disposing of used cars became a major issue and consumer credit 
became essential to the industry.  Because an inexpensive used vehicle offered more 
options and conferred more status than a new Model T, the sale of these cars on easy 
credit also cut into Ford’s market.  This effect was reinforced by the fact that Henry Ford 
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refused to engage the Ford Motor Company in consumer lending and did not endorse 
installment sales by Ford dealers.   
By early 1921, there were over 110 automobile finance companies in existence 
and by 1925, 75% of new and used automobile sales were made on time-payment plans 
(Flink, 1988; Epstein, 1972).  Prior to the 1920s, merchants arranged time-payment 
purchasing for furniture, sewing machines and pianos, and mortgages were commonplace 
for buying homes.  But now the concept was increasingly applied to all durable consumer 
goods and was rapidly becoming a mainstay of the U.S. economy (Rae, 1965; Flink, 
1988).  One dealer in 1928 went so far as to assert that it was practically a patriotic duty 
to buy and sell on credit, since keeping Americans wanting more than the bare necessities 
kept Americans working and thus kept the economy growing (Cray, 1980). Eventually, 
even the Ford Motor Company was forced to followed suit.  Ford established a credit 
corporation to fund Ford dealers and customers in 1928, concurrent with the changeover 
from the Model T to the Model A.  Hounshell (1984, p. 293) deemed the new Universal 
Credit Corporation “perhaps the most revolutionary change (considering Ford’s 
detestation of credit buying) wrought by the changeover.” 
5.6 Technical and Institutional Context 
5.6.1 World War I, Recession, and Economic Recovery 
From the beginning of World War I, the European automobile industry played a 
key role in what would be the world’s first mechanized war.  Rapid conversion to the war 
effort led to a phenomenal expansion of capacity and employment, mainly for the 
production of trucks, tractors, and tanks, but also for diversification into munitions, 
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aircraft engines, airframes, and other items useful to the military.  The war effort also led 
to the modernization of French, British, and Italian factories. 
With the possibility of U.S. involvement in the war looming, the U.S. government 
called on the domestic automotive industry to help with American preparedness.  Hudson 
vice-president Howard Coffin was tapped to serve on the Navy Department Advisory 
Committee in August, 1915, then was appointed chair of the Committee on Industrial 
Relations, an agency of the Council of National Defense, in 1916. 
Even after the nation entered the war on April 6, 1917, U.S. automobile 
production continued unabated until well into 1918, making 1917 a banner year for the 
industry.  Hundreds of automobile industry executives volunteered for the war effort, 
though most of the industry’s support came from the smaller manufacturers whose 
market position had been deteriorating despite the boom conditions.  Because of their 
smaller investments in specialized plants and equipment, these firms were able to convert 
to wartime production more easily and at lower cost than Ford and GM.  In addition, the 
luxury automobile chassis of Locomobile, Packard, Peerless, and White were easily 
adapted to support two- and three-ton truck bodies for the military.  By 1916, Packard 
was already making more trucks than cars.  White had received orders to supply trucks to 
the Allies at the onset of hostilities and had found truck production so profitable that it 
discontinued making cars in 1917.  The Nash Motor Company, formed in 1916 from the 
ashes of the Thomas B. Jefferey Company, grew to be the leading truck manufacturer by 
the end of the war (Rae, 1959; Flink, 1988). 
Henry Ford had taken a pacifist stance against the war in late 1915, but revised his 
position and vowed to stand behind the president when diplomatic ties with Germany 
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were severed in early 1917.  Ford Motor Company engineers were responsible for 
process innovations that allowed inexpensive mass production of Liberty engine 
cylinders, resulting in a contract for Ford to produce all the cylinders for Liberty engines 
produced in the U.S. and a contract to make 5,000 complete engines.  Ford produced a 
wide variety of other items for the war effort, including armor plate, caissons, shells, steel 
helmets, submarine detectors, and torpedo tubes.  Ford also built 60 Eagle Boats and 
completed two tank prototypes too late to be used in the conflict.68  The company’s most 
significant contribution, however, was 39,000 Model T cars, ambulances, and trucks 
which supplied both American and Allied forces (Nevins and Hill, 1957). 
William Durant of GM had also opposed war production, refusing Henry Leland’s 
request to covert Cadillac facilities to the production of Liberty engines.  Leland and his 
son immediately resigned and formed the Lincoln Motor Company to manufacture the 
engines.  Shortly thereafter, under the mounting pressure of public opinion, Durant began 
token production of Liberty engines at both Cadillac and Buick (Flink, 1988).  The 
Liberty engine itself had been designed for mass production by Packard engineers as a 
replacement for the Allied engine designs which required hand machining (Rae, 1965).   
Supervision of the automobile industry had been assigned to the Automobile 
Products Section of the Council of National Defense and the War Industries Board.  To 
coordinate government requirements and industry facilities, automobile manufacturers 
established a committee with representatives of the National Automobile Chamber of 
Commerce, the Ford Motor Company, and the parts makers.  In reality, the committee 
largely functioned to prevent government interference with industry operations.  In 
                                                 
68 Eagle Boats were small (200-foot) steel submarine chasers intended for use in the battle against German 
U-boats. Only seven were delivered before the signing of the Armistice and none saw service in WWI. 
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response to an apparent steel shortage in late 1917, the War Industries Board proposed 
curtailing the industry’s supply of alloy steel for manufacturing passenger cars.  Though 
spokesmen for the industry denied the existence of an actual shortage, the industry was 
divided on the matter.  While large manufacturers lobbied for the leeway to 
independently solve the supply issue, small producers whose markets were already 
disappearing preferred to suspend all passenger car production and relinquish their 
facilities to the government for the duration of the war.  The debate continued until the 
reality of the shortage became unavoidable by mid-1918.  The War Industries Board cut 
the steel allocation to the industry to allow for passenger car production in the last six 
months of the year at a level of only half of that achieved in the last six months of 1917.  
In truth, the diversion of plant facilities to war production had already substantially 
reduced production for civilian use such that total production for 1918 was only 53% of 
the previous year’s (Rae, 1959). 
U.S. automakers generally believed that the diversion of plant facilities to the war 
would lead to unfulfilled demand and a booming market after the conflict ended.  With 
the advent of peace on November 11, 1918, manufacturers rode a wave of optimism, 
scrambling to reconvert facilities and expand capacity to meet the backlog in demand that 
by mid-1919 had reached an estimated one million vehicles.  Worried about speculation 
on the stock market and the growing use of installment sales plans for new cars, the 
Federal Reserve Board had raised the discount rate in November, 1919, and speculators 
began liquidating over-inflated stock.  Meanwhile, rising commodity prices had increased 
the cost of living.  With the decrease in purchasing power, consumer spending slowed.  
Veterans returning from the war began swelling the unemployment ranks and the 
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oversupply of labor pulled down wages, leading to labor unrest.  Although automotive 
employees generally were not involved, strikes in the coal and steel industries affected 
supply lines.  By the summer of 1920, the country was slipping into an economic 
recession.  To make matters worse, foreign markets for farm commodities collapsed and 
the American farmer – the foundation of the automobile market – returned to hard times.  
The 1919 boom in automobile demand had been fleeting, based on inflated wartime 
prices, easy credit, and over-blown expectations.  Now the boom had collapsed. 
Automobile sales plummeted and trainloads of cars stood undelivered.   
Although the recession would prove to be brief – just an economic readjustment 
to peace-time production and prices – it hit the automobile industry hard.  Many 
manufacturers, especially the largest ones, were in the midst of optimistic expansions and 
were over-extended.  Henry Ford was developing the huge River Rouge complex and 
deeply in debt from his buyout of the minority stockholders.  GM’s expansion plans and 
Durant’s loose management, not to mention his questionable financial dealings, left GM 
in an equally precarious position. 
Ford was the first to respond to the slumping demand for cars, cutting prices in 
September, 1920, as much as 30%, thereby cutting further into its competitors’ sales.  
Soon, twenty-three manufacturers followed suit; GM was not among them.  Price cuts 
failed to sufficiently stimulate industry sales, and by December, production was shut 
down at Buick, Dodge, Ford, Maxwell-Chalmers, Nash, Packard, Reo, Studebaker, and 
Willys-Overland.  Pierre du Pont had taken over leadership at GM and continued to resist 
price cuts but was forced to slow production.  Nonetheless, the industry recorded profits 
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for the year, largely based on sales in the first half of the year (Rae, 1959; Rae, 1965; 
Flink, 1988). 
Ford’s sales began to pick up in early 1921 and production was gradually 
resumed.  Sales of other manufacturer’s cars remained slow, and the last remaining 
holdouts began to cut prices.  Pierre du Pont finally entered the price war in May and two 
rounds of price cuts eventually left a gap of $110 between the Chevrolet and the Model 
T.  However, the more expensive Chevrolet came with features that were only offered at 
additional cost on the Model T and Ford cut the price one last time.  Both vehicles were 
losing money at the final prices, but the cuts enabled Ford to win 62% of the passenger 
car market in 1921.  Sales of all GM cars only amounted to 14% of the market that year, 
yet the corporation was able to survive the recession (Cray, 1980).   
Automobile sales rebounded in 1922 and reached a new high of 3.6 million in 
1923.  GM emerged from the recession a stronger corporation, having undergone a major 
reorganization and begun a complete redesign of its vehicles.  Other companies were 
unable to meet their obligations and went into receivership.  Among these less fortunate 
firms were Maxwell-Chalmers and the Willys Corporation, the remains of which would 
eventually give birth to the Chrysler Corporation.  Meanwhile, firms that had refrained 
from ambitious expansion plans were better positioned to weather the downturn.  These 
companies emerged relatively unscathed and included Dodge, Hudson, Nash, Packard 
and Studebaker (Rae, 1959).  After a brief economic slowdown in 1924, the country 
entered a period of rising prosperity that brought steady growth in automobile sales. 
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5.6.2 Road Improvements, 1917-1930 
With the U.S. turning out motor vehicles and supplies for the war effort, the rail 
lines to eastern ports became clogged in 1917.  Highway Transport Committee Chairman 
Roy Chapin, who was also president of the Hudson Motor Car Company, was tasked with 
identifying road routes for trucks to be driven from assembly plants in the Midwest to the 
docks in the east.  Loaded with other freight, these caravans demonstrated the viability of 
long-distance trucking as an alternative to shipping freight by rail and simultaneously 
drew attention to the need for an interconnected highway system.  In addition, Chapin 
arranged for local authorities to keep the truck routes open in winter, demonstrating the 
feasibility of year-round use of major highways (Rae, 1959; Rae, 1965; Flink, 1988). 
Between 1916 and 1921, Congress had distributed a total of $75 million to states 
to improve postal roads.  Federal support for building roads was substantially increased 
with the passage of the Federal Highway Act of 1921, which appropriated $75 million for 
matching grants in 1922 alone.  Initially, state expenditures were funded through 
licensing fees and property taxes or general funds.  However, sparsely populated states 
found these revenues insufficient.  To pay for highway construction, Oregon, New 
Mexico, and Colorado instituted the first gasoline taxes in 1919.  State and federal 
revenues from registration fees and taxes on gasoline, vehicles, and parts reached nearly 
$189 million in 1923.  Public highway expenditures that year totaled $1.5 billion, while 
the amount spent on investment in and upkeep of automobiles and highways combined 
reached $6 billion.  By 1929, all states had instituted gasoline taxes, raising $432 million 
that year and entirely replacing the use of property taxes and general funds for main roads 
(Nevins and Hill, 1954; Cray, 1980; Flink, 1988). 
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A 1933 report by the President’s Research Committee on Social Trends 
concluded that the automobile was the largest single contributor to the expansion of local 
taxes between 1913 and 1930.  Highway expenditures, funded largely by use taxes, were 
only part of this burden.  The automobile had also required expenditures to solve traffic 
congestion, increased crime, and traffic control.  In addition, increasing suburbanization, 
aided by automobility, required the provision of facilities and public services for 
suburban communities (Flink, 1988).  However, it is important to note that the desire for 
suburbanization predated the automobile.  The rise of factory production late in the 19th 
century, combined with swelling immigration, led to polluted conditions and an 
increasing urban concentration of poorly paid workers and their families.  The 
automobile enabled the growing middle class to fulfill a pre-existing desire to escape the 
city while simultaneously strengthening this demand This led eventually to socio-
economic and racial segregation and the impoverishment of urban centers.  Thus, while 
the automobile and improved roads got “rural America out of the mud,” it also caused a 
host of problems for urban planning.69 
Early in the development of the automobile, critics had warned that the innovation 
would not find market success until the roads were improved.  However, construction of 
roads passable by motor vehicles lagged well behind the development and diffusion of 
the automobile itself.  The capability to navigate rough roads was therefore a main design 
criterion for those vehicles, like the Model T, that were ultimately successful in the first 
                                                 
69 Although the motor vehicle conferred great initial economic and social benefits to rural communities, the 
shift from horses to tractors had unexpected negative feedbacks.  High equipment costs made it more 
profitable to farm larger tracts and often forced farmers to take out mortgages.  Operating costs were 
further increased by the need to replace manure with chemical fertilizers.  As farm productivity rose, prices 
fell.  This shift ultimately led to the displacement of farm laborers, over-production of staple crops, and the 
erosion of agricultural profits.  Thus, impoverished rural populations began migrating to the cities in the 
1920s (Cray, 1980; Flink, 1988). 
 
413 
decade of the 20th century.  This resulted in cars with high road clearance and rugged 
suspension, as well as a preference for open bodies since the structural integrity of closed 
wooden bodies rapidly deteriorated from vibration and shock.  With road improvements 
by the 1920s, these design attributes were unnecessary.  They were also undesirable and 
unsafe, since they resulted in a rough, uncomfortable ride and a high, precarious center of 
gravity.  Thus, road improvements were a factor in the shift in market preferences toward 
comfort and luxury in the mid-1920s. 
5.6.3 Refueling Infrastructure 
Around the turn of the century, gasoline was widely available at country stores for 
use in lighting and stationary engines.  At that time, kerosene dominated the petroleum 
product markets and gasoline was a by-product for which supply outstripped demand.  
Around 1905, the largest demand for gasoline was for use as a solvent or in chemical and 
industrial plants; motor vehicles consumed only 600,000 of about 7 million barrels 
produced annually.  However, in 1916, automobiles consumed approximately 1.2 billion 
gallons of gasoline, or more than 28 million barrels (Melaina, 2007).   
Gasoline was distributed using the system established for kerosene consisting of 
around 100 refineries and a large network of small, dispersed, bulk storage facilities.  
Fuel was transported from the refinery to bulk stations in barrels or tank wagons and then 
distributed to retailers by horse-drawn wagons.  A variety of dispersed methods were 
used to deliver gasoline to consumers.  Retailers stocked cans of gasoline, up to five 
gallons each, on store shelves.  General stores and garages that sold or used a higher 
volume of fuel stored gasoline in barrels.  The gasoline was ladled it into a pitcher, 
carried to the vehicle, and poured through a chamois-lined funnel into the tank.  
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Consumers could also purchase home refueling tanks and pumps, which were popular 
with wealthy motorists.  Many wealthy urban motorists used their vehicles for country 
touring on weekends and stored them in downtown parking facilities, many of which 
dispensed gasoline from handcarts with tanks and pumps.  These handcarts were also 
used as mobile refueling centers, as were dispensing tank wagons.   
Curb pumps, the precursor to modern gas stations, were introduced in 1907 and 
consisted of an underground storage tank, a gasoline pump located at the curb, a flow 
meter, and a dispensing hose.  Curb pumps were refilled by tank wagons and were the 
dominant form of refueling in the late 1910s and early 1920s.  Most were operated as a 
sideline and were owned by and located in front of businesses that either catered to 
motorists or wished to attract more customers to their primary business.  Curb pumps 
were a common street-side fixture and were installed in an estimated 140,000 locations 
by 1927.  In fact, they were so prevalent that lines of waiting vehicles became an urban 
nuisance and 14 major cities had banned their installation by 1923. 
Dedicated gasoline stations also appeared around 1907 and were distinguished 
from dispersed methods by the use of land and buildings dedicated to refueling and 
related services.  They also sold larger volumes of fuel and had higher capital and 
operating costs.  The dedicated station rose in popularity after 1915 as motorists became 
increasingly dissatisfied with long waiting lines at curb pumps and on-the-spot price 
increases and unreliable fuel quality experienced with many dispersed refueling methods.  
Dedicated stations were often owned by oil companies, which projected an image of 
reliability and legitimacy.  In addition, these stations began emphasizing service and 
amenities and “the service mentality was firmly established across the gasoline marketing 
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industry” by the end of the 1920s (Melaina, 2007).  These services included free air and 
water; tires, batteries, and accessories; oil and battery checks; free maps; clean restrooms; 
and helpful attendants.  Early records on the number of refueling stations are inconsistent 
but suggest that there were around 15,000 in 1920.  The first reliable statistics became 
available with the 1924 census which reported 46,904 dedicated refueling stations70; by 
1929 the number had risen to 121,513 (Melaina, 2007).  Melaina (2007) concludes that 
“the takeoff period for gasoline stations occurred between 1915 and 1925… so the rise of 
gasoline filling stations followed rather than preceded the rise of gasoline vehicles.” 
5.6.4 Market Saturation and the Used Car Problem 
Before 1920, the typical new car customer was buying his first automobile.  But 
by 1923, the market for new cars was reaching saturation.  Although the total number of 
personal vehicles in use was still rising, sales of new cars had leveled off as shown in 
Figure 5-1.  According to Sloan (1964, p. 163), after 1923 “the role of the new car was to 
cover scrappage and growth in car ownership.”  To a large extent, market saturation was 
an inevitable result of the phenomenal success of the industry’s efforts to decrease 
production costs.  According to Hounshell (1984, p. 186), “Ford pursued specialization in 
production to its logical conclusion – gross overproduction…  Until, Ford, complete 
saturation of the world market by a single product had remained only a theoretical 
concept.” 
                                                 


















































Figure 5-1: Automobile Sales and Registrations 
Source: Cain (2006), see Appendix A. 
As replacement sales came to represent a larger fraction of the market, the used 
car was increasingly traded in as a down payment on a new car.  Initially, manufacturers 
considered the disposal of these used cars to be solely the dealers’ responsibility.  Though 
there are no reliable statistics on trade-ins, the used car market first became an issue for 
manufacturers during the post-war recession beginning in the fall of 1920.  According to 
Cray (1980, p. 187) “[f]or the first time, dealers found themselves unable to deal off the 
used cars taken as down payments on new-car sales.  Used car prices fell 25 percent, and 
still the vehicles sat there.  A ‘used-car problem,’ as it would become known, had 
surfaced.”  After the economy recovered, new car sales in 1923 reached a new record 
when consumers purchased 3.6 million new automobiles but they also traded in 2.8 
million used cars (Cray, 1980). 
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For the first 25 years of the industry, manufacturers had focused on expanding 
production quickly enough to satisfy market demand.  Suddenly, they were competing 
with each other for fewer and fewer first time-buyers.  Saturation presented two new 
challenges for the industry: disposing of used cars and stimulating demand for new cars.  
The industry already had a mechanism in place for assisting with the first challenge: 
installment sales.  But the availability of used cars on easy credit meant even more 
competition for the manufacturers of inexpensive cars.  The automakers needed to 
convince consumers that new vehicles offered something their current cars and used cars 
did not.  To meet this need, manufacturers pursued two strategies: national advertising 
and the annual model change. 
Industry emphasis shifted from production to marketing and sales.  Between 1914 
and 1924, GM’s advertising budget per vehicle increased tenfold.  The industry became 
one of the largest users of magazine advertising, with expenditures rising from $3.5 
million in 1921 to $6.2 million in 1923 and to 9.3 million in 1927 (Cray, 1980; Flink, 
1988).  But the automakers were not alone in their increasing use of national advertising.  
Because of improved transportation, distribution of manufactured products was no longer 
confined to a local sales territory around the factory.  By the 1920s, national advertising 
of brand-name products like Pepsodent toothpaste, Coca-Cola, Welch’s grape juice, 
Listerine, Campbell’s soup, RCA radios, and now automobiles, was common (Cray, 
1980).  Automobile advertisements emphasized utility and the freedom to travel.  In 
addition, automakers began to target women in their advertising, emphasizing style, 
comfort, refinement, social status, and even safety. 
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By 1910, automakers were well aware of the disadvantages of frequent model 
changes and most opted to make continual improvements to existing models.  New 
models were introduced as needed in response to perceived market conditions.  Although 
no manufacturers had policies regularizing change, they continually tracked and 
responded to market trends, introducing new or completely restyled models when they 
perceived it to be necessary.  But by the 1920s, many found they were making 
increasingly frequent style changes in an attempt to entice buyers to trade up and to win 
market share from competitors through product differentiation.  While GM managers 
argued against annual model changes, the corporation in effect introduced a new model 
every year beginning in 1923.  Despite manufacturers’ resistance, the annual model 
change was emerging from evolutionary forces as an unavoidable feature of the industry. 
GM incorporated style as a major consideration in automobile design with the 
establishment of the Art and Color Section in 1927 and in that same year introduced the 
first mass produced stylists’ car, the La Salle.  In 1930, the corporation acknowledged 
that the annual model change had in fact already arrived and led the industry in planning 
for regularized change. 
5.6.5 Role of Women 
A number of exogenous factors increased women’s influence in automobile 
purchases.  Educational opportunities for women had been steadily improving.  Women 
were empowered with the achievement of universal suffrage in 1920 and the widespread 
dissemination of birth-control information.  Labor-saving devices freed more of the 
home-maker’s time, but women were increasingly likely to work outside the home as 
well.  Their participation in the workforce during World War I began to alter public 
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views on women’s role in society.  Prior to the war, when a woman worked outside the 
home it was regarded with shame, but during the war, it became a patriotic and heroic 
act.  Although most of these women left the fields and factories after the war, their 
expectations were permanently effected.  In addition to gaining experience in the 
workforce, married women whose husbands served in the war also found themselves 
making decisions as heads of household.  While war widows were forced to maintain 
these responsibilities, others gladly relinquished them to their returning husbands.  But 
many found their old subordinate roles in the family less satisfying. 
Changing economic conditions were also creating new employment opportunities 
for women.  With the rise of industrialism and scientific management, men were 
promoted to an entirely new class of jobs in middle management and clerical jobs became 
available to women.  A new consumer culture gave rise to chain department stores and 
new opportunities as clerks.  While the percentage of women in the labor force did not 
grow appreciably during the 1920s, between 1920 and 1930, the fraction of employed 
women who were married grew from 19% to 25% in professional jobs, and from 18% to 
32% in clerical jobs (Nottingham, 1947).  With the possibility of paid employment, 
women began to view marriage as less a requirement for financial stability and more a 
partnership and source of personal gratification. 
The young generation was particularly influenced by World War I and the age of 
prosperity that followed.  A large number of young men did not return from the war; 
most servicemen did return, but their outlook was permanently altered.  Facing a high 
probability of death in the trenches, these young men adopted a live-for-the-moment 
attitude, looking for and finding extreme experiences.  They had broken with society’s 
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structure, and returning to their prior lifestyle proved difficult.  Meanwhile, young ladies 
had also broken with that structure in supporting the war effort at home.  These women 
adopted a similar, live-for-fun attitude and experimented with new sexual freedoms.  The 
‘New Woman’ cut her hair short, smoked, drank, and wore makeup.  She shortened her 
skirts and loosened her clothing so that she could dance to jazz music.  The automobile 
suited the flapper’s gregarious lifestyle perfectly, affording freedom and thrill. 
The safety bicycle and the automobile also played a role in emancipating women, 
giving them new freedom of mobility.  Wealthy urban women had first adopted electric 
cars, but with electric self-starters and improved transmissions, gasoline cars became 
accessible to women.  With the availability of closed-body cars which protected them 
from wind, weather, mud, and engine grease, rural and urban women alike took to the 
automobile.  Women wanted cars that were lower to the ground because they were easier 
to board.  They wanted roomier, comfortable interiors with plenty of headroom for hats.  
For women, the mechanical reliability of the automobile was presupposed and high 
priority was given to elegance of style, imaginative use of color, luxurious comfort, and 
ease of operation.  Married women may have left decisions about purchasing a horse and 
carriage to their husbands, but they asserted their preferences when it came to 
automobiles.  Meanwhile, prosperous single women were also becoming a factor in the 
market. 
5.7 Analysis 
 The narrative history presented in this chapter begins in 1916, well into the first 
specific phase.  This phase lasted until approximately 1918, after which the industry 
entered a second transitional phase.  By 1926, a new dominant design had emerged and 
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the industry entered a second specific phase.  In this section, I use the framework 
presented in section 2.6 to analyze the characteristics of innovation and continued 
development of institutions during the first specific and second transitional phase.  I 
examine the mutual adaptation of the technology, institutions, and physical infrastructure 
and discuss the role of alignment and embedding, as well as unexpected events, in the 
stability of the developing automobile regime.  Many of the issues discussed here have 
roots in events that occurred prior to 1916, but come to fruition between 1916 and the late 
1920s.  Therefore, this analysis also builds on the narrative in chapter 4. 
Section 5.7.1 analyzes the industry trend toward vertical integration and its impact 
on innovation during the second transitional phase.  I identify three factors that 
contributed to vertical integration in the automobile industry: 1) a trend in the TIEC 
toward large industrial combinations that could influence the price and supply of raw 
materials; 2) process innovations that required continuous plant operation and carefully 
timed delivery of parts; and 3) tacit knowledge that existed only in human capital.  I 
conclude that the influence of vertical integration on innovation depended on the specific 
strategies pursued and the resulting rules and capabilities that were embodied in corporate 
structure, operating procedures, facilities, and human capital. 
Section 5.7.2 identifies five factors that triggered a second transitional phase: 1) 
World War I and the post war recession; 2) market saturation; 3) the availability of 
inexpensive all-steel closed bodies; 4) and improved roads; and 5) the increasing market 
influence of women.  These changes in the TIEC resulted from exogenous events, 
innovations, and issues associated with the very success of the technology and the 
development of supporting infrastructure.  While the transitional phase did not present 
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serious challenges for the industry until the middle of 1920, the stage had been set by the 
middle of 1918.  Therefore, I mark the beginning of this phase in 1918. 
Section 5.7.3 summarizes firm strategies in responding to the changing 
environment of the transitional phase.  I find that firm histories, the personal beliefs and 
perspectives of firm leaders, and corporate structures and culture – i.e., firm-specific rules 
– shaped individual firm strategies for innovation and their adaptive capabilities.  In 
addition, I find that unexpected events presented insurmountable difficulties for some 
firms, while other entrepreneurs were able to exploit the opportunities presented by those 
firms’ failures.   
Section 5.7.4 reviews the emergence of a new dominant product design that arose 
from co-evolutionary forces.  I find that production processes and management systems, 
i.e. corporate rules, must also be aligned to rules in the TIEC and to the technology.  
Therefore, I conclude that the specific phase also is characterized by a particular 
dominant business model that is aligned with the TIEC of that era. Thus, a transitional 
phase may involve adaptations and innovations in the business model as much as (or 
rather than) the product design and the dominant business model of a specific phase may 
represent a recent innovation for that time. 
Section 5.7.5 reviews the characteristics of innovation during the first specific 
phase and the second transitional phase.  Contrary to the description of the industry life-
cycle model, I conclude that there was no clear industry-wide trend toward process 
innovations and away from product innovations during the first specific phase, nor was 
there a reverse trend during the second transitional phase.  I also find no clear trend in the 
shifting importance of the mechanisms of learning: learning-by-interacting with suppliers 
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remained the most prominent mechanism of innovation during both phases.  Innovation 
also remained synthetic, involving collaborations by teams of entrepreneurs and between 
manufacturers and suppliers.  Finally, I find that innovations in business operations 
played a critical role and should not be over-looked in studies of technological progress 
and transitions. 
Section 5.7.6 discusses the process of embedding, alignment and stability during 
the first specific phase and second transitional phase.  I find that the development of 
‘hard’ supporting infrastructure lagged behind the expansion of markets for the 
automobile and did not become a significant factor in stability until the second 
transitional phase.  Beginning in the latter part of the first specific phase, manufacturers 
also began using consumer financing to alter the selection environment, an institution 
which aligned with and reinforced trends in the TIEC.  The stability of the first specific 
phase was undermined by the post-war recession and evolving consumer preferences that 
became misaligned with the existing dominant product design. This development was 
marked by feedbacks and co-evolutionary effects. The emergence of a new dominant 
product design brought the product and rules (consumer preferences) into realignment.  
Finally, the introduction of TEL was challenged by emerging trends in the TIEC, but the 
innovation was successful due to the immaturity of institutions governing public health 
and GM’s activities to shape the selection environment. 
Finally, section 5.7.7 summarizes the events during the time period covered by 
this chapter and the findings of this analysis. 
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5.7.1 Vertical Integration 
An industry trend toward vertical integration began even prior to the onset of the 
first specific phase.  Henry Ford began this process in 1905 when he established the Ford 
Manufacturing Company to manufacture parts for the Model N (see section 4.1.6).  
William Durant pursued vertical integration beginning in 1907 at Buick with the 
acquisition of the Weston-Mott Axle Company and continuing in 1908 at GM with an 
aggressive acquisition strategy that resulted in partial or complete ownership of a 
multitude of suppliers (see sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2).  This process continued throughout 
the specific phase and, by the onset of the second transitional phase in 1918, both Ford 
and GM were large, vertically integrated companies.  In chapter 4, I identified learning-
by-interacting with suppliers as a critical mechanism of innovation in the transitional and 
early specific phases.  Therefore, vertical integration and the resulting corporate structure 
had significant implications for the ability of these industry leaders to innovate and adapt 
during the second transitional phase. 
This section examines the factors contributing to the trend toward vertical 
integration and discusses the impact of vertical integration on the innovative capabilities 
of Ford and GM.  I find that three factors contributed to vertical integration in the 
automobile industry: 1) a trend in the TIEC toward large industrial combinations that 
could influence the price and supply of raw materials; 2) process innovations that 
required continuous plant operation and carefully timed delivery of parts; and 3) tacit 
knowledge that existed only in human capital.  I also conclude that vertical integration in 
itself did not necessarily stifle innovation, but that the influence of integration on 
innovation depended on the specific strategies pursued and the resulting rules and 
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capabilities that were embodied in corporate structure, operating procedures, facilities, 
and human capital.  
The traditional explanation of the trend toward vertical integration asserts that it 
was more economical for manufacturers to make their own parts.  According to Smith 
(1968, p. 110), by 1929 “it was still possible to become an automobile manufacturer by 
buying components and assembling them, but it was impossible to cut much of a figure 
this way or to survive in competition… With competition at fever heat, the manufacturer 
could ill afford to share any profits with suppliers.  Companies were growing more 
vertical as well as horizontal.  The rich were getting richer; the poor were getting poorer.”  
However, parts suppliers generally could achieve the same low costs that manufacturers 
could through economies of scale, especially if guaranteed volume sales through long 
term contracts.  Meanwhile, purchasing parts obviated the need for investments in plants 
and equipment, an important consideration in a rapidly growing industry.  On the other 
hand, the price of raw materials – coal, iron ore, and steel – was a concern since suppliers 
were large industrial combinations whose control of a large portion of the market allowed 
for price fixing.  Thus, the wide-spread trend toward combinations and price fixing was 
an important contextual factor for the industry.  But availability was a bigger concern 
since supplies were restricted several times due to labor strikes in the railroad and mining 
industries. 
According to Epstein (1972), vertical integration in the early automotive industry 
became attractive because it ensured an adequate and timely supply of materials and 
parts, and therefore facilitated continuous plant operation.  By the early 1900s, demand 
for automobiles was so great that manufacturers were not concerned with market share, 
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but rather with adequate production volume and prompt delivery of parts. Olds, the first 
mass producer of automobiles, built 3,299 cars in 1902, but could have sold 4,000 if 
suppliers had been able to fill his orders.  A few years later, Buick found that “[t]he 
public would take Buicks as fast as they could be turned out; delay in delivery of even a 
minor part might cost a tremendous sum” (Pound, 1934, p. 87).  Suppliers of parts and 
raw materials were often the cause of plant downtime at Ford, and this became more 
problematic once continuously moving assembly lines were fully implemented and 
timing became crucial.  As late as 1934, Pound (p. 87) reported that “in this industry utter 
dependence on certain forms of goods was so essential that practically all the survivors in 
the stern battle for existence waged during the past thirty years are those who have been 
working toward self-determination, seeking positions where their operations could not be 
shut off by shrinkage of those essential supplies.” 
Another factor in the move toward vertical integration was the appropriation of 
knowledge.  Suppliers of key components possessed singular expertise that, for the most 
part, resided in human capital.  Through partial ownership in the Ford Motor Company, 
Ford established a relationship with the Dodge brothers to provide nearly complete 
vehicles, excluding only bodies, wheels, and tires.  This move was critical in Ford’s early 
success.  The Dodge brothers brought necessary start-up capital, but as manufacturers of 
engines for the only mass produced vehicle to date, they also brought scarce knowledge.  
After Henry Ford made clear his intention to bring this expertise in-house, the Dodges 
successfully launched their own manufacturing firm.  Similarly, GM’s partial, and later 
complete, ownership of the Fisher Body Company was a strategic move to secure 
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exclusive access to the Fisher brothers’ unique skill and knowledge in closed body 
production. 
Ford and General Motors pursued significantly different strategies for vertical 
integration, resulting in different corporate structures and different emphases for 
innovation.  Henry Ford brought nearly all production, including processing of raw 
materials, in-house at the Rouge complex.  He established complete, centralized, 
financial and managerial control.  Without the tempering effects of a board of directors or 
executive committee, strategic decisions were made entirely according to Ford’s personal 
goals, beliefs, values, and perceptions.  The rules governing interactions at Ford included 
those established for Fordist production that were embodied in standard operating 
procedures, routines, and capital equipment, and one additional overarching rule:  defer 
to Henry Ford.  Employees unable to comply were forced out or left in frustration.  As a 
result, innovation at Ford had stagnated by the late 1910s, just as a new transitional phase 
was beginning. 
Meanwhile, GM purchased all or part ownership of suppliers and initially allowed 
them to continue operating as independent firms.  During this time, innovation continued 
on whatever level set by individual company policies.  There was no single identifiable 
set of rules for the corporation as a whole, except perhaps for the understanding that, 
during the years of his tenure, William Durant could interfere at will.  GM’s strategy of 
acquisition, along with Durant’s ultimately destructive actions in the stock market, led to 
corporate associations and the appropriation of human capital that defined GM’s 
innovation capabilities and strategies for the next fifty years.  The most significant of 
these associations were those with the E.I. Du Pont de Nemours and Fisher Body 
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Companies and with Pierre du Pont, Alfred Sloan, and Charles Kettering.  Collectively, 
the decisions of Durant, du Pont, and Sloan were of critical importance in shaping GM’s 
strategies and success in the second transitional phase. 
The financial and managerial reforms achieved between 1920 and 1925 finally 
established a coherent set of rules for GM that was embodied in corporate structure and 
policies regarding operations, communication, and financial reporting.  After du Pont and 
Sloan began coordinating divisional operations through corporate policy, their 
establishment of decentralized control allowed for a greater level of innovation than what 
was realized at Ford.  This innovation was largely realized through IR&D and was 
institutionalized within the Research Corporation.  However, the establishment of 
financial controls to coordinate management of the divisions, the separation of R&D 
from operations, and the establishment of corporate policy on product development likely 
inhibited the rate of innovation realized in production automobiles.  Dodge, and later 
Chrysler, would emerge as industry leaders in incorporating product innovations.  Neither 
firm pursued vertical integration to the extent that Ford and GM did. 
5.7.2 Initiation of a Second Era of Ferment 
Beginning with the onset of conflict in Europe, four factors created misalignments 
that undermined the stability of the specific phase.  These factors resulted in a shift in 
consumer preferences that triggered a new transitional phase: 1) World War I and the 
post war recession; 2) market saturation; 3) the availability of inexpensive all-steel closed 
bodies; 4) improved roads; and 5) the increasing market influence of women.  These 
factors include exogenous events, innovations, and issues associated with the very 
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success of the technology and the development of supporting infrastructure.  These 
initiating events were marked by pervasive co-evolutionary effects.   
In general, the industry first felt the challenges of the transitional phase in the 
middle of 1920 when the post-war recession sent sales plummeting.  However, the stage 
had been set by the middle of 1918 when diversion of facilities to the war and a steel 
shortage limited production to 53% of the level achieved in 1917.  In fact, despite banner 
sales in 1920, average sales for the years 1918-1920 were still lower than total sales in 
1915.  Therefore, I will mark the beginning of the transitional phase in 1918. 
While the war and ensuing recession were exogenous events, the response of the 
industry during and after the war created feedbacks that magnified their impact on the 
industry.  First, using trucks to deliver war supplies to the ports demonstrated the 
feasibility of long-haul trucking and year-round driving.  This provided the impetus for 
increased federal funding for improved roads, a process already underway.  Second, the 
industry (correctly) perceived that decreased production during the war had resulted in 
pent up demand for automobiles.  When the post-war recession hit, companies that had 
invested in aggressive expansion plans had an especially difficult time coping with the 
sudden drop in sales.  Many firms did not survive the crisis. 
Meanwhile, market saturation was a result of the industry’s past success.  The 
industry had to either scale down production to serve a stagnant market consisting of 
replacement sales or find an innovation that would stimulate accelerated replacement or 
create demand in a new market.  In choosing to innovate, a firm would be taking on the 
nexus role, actively using variation to alter the selection environment in terms of 
consumer preferences, and thereby altering the functional requirements of the 
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automobile.  However, consumer demands were already shifting due to other factors.  
Improved roads and affordable closed bodies were increasing the feasibility of year-
round driving, and all-steel closed bodies were more durable and comfortable.  Women 
were driving more and influencing more sales thanks to closed bodies, electric self-
starters, and shifting cultural patterns that were accelerated by the war.  The industry’s 
response to these shifts – an increasing emphasis on style and comfort and frequent style 
change – would be self-reinforcing.   
5.7.3 Firm Strategies for Adaptation 
This section summarizes firm strategies in responding to the changing 
environment of the transitional phase.  The resources available to firms depended on 
institutional linkages, corporate policy, and access to human as well as financial capital.  
Therefore, I find that firm histories, the personal beliefs and perspectives of firm leaders, 
and corporate structures and culture – i.e., firm-specific rules – shaped individual firm 
strategies for innovation and their adaptive capabilities.  Because of industry 
concentration, firm-specific rules had a large and rapid impact on the development of the 
technology and the industry as a whole.  This supports the use of a behavioral approach 
with a micro-focus in the analysis of innovation and socio-technical change.  In addition, 
I find that unexpected events presented insurmountable difficulties for some firms, while 
other entrepreneurs were able to exploit the opportunities presented by those firms’ 
failures. 
GM was one of the firms caught in midst of aggressive expansion when the 
recession struck.  Durant’s market activities only made matters worse.  But because of 
GM’s prior acquisition strategy and Durant’s past blunders, the corporation was also 
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lucky to have managerial and technical talent in Alfred Sloan, Pierre du Pont, and Charles 
Kettering.  These activities also resulted in ties to the E.I. Du Pont de Nemours Company 
that gave GM access to that company’s war surplus.  With these resources, the 
corporation was able to respond aggressively to the challenges before it.  Durant was 
ousted, the corporation was reorganized, and the new management instituted financial 
controls.  With the financial crisis partially under control, GM began to address market 
saturation, which meant fierce competition with other manufacturers in a market of 
relatively fixed size.  GM rationalized the product line and attempted to penetrate the 
low-price market through product innovation (the copper-cooled engine).   
When the new technology failed, the economy was already recovering, so GM 
instead redesigned the conventional Chevrolet.  GM was successful in challenging Ford, 
not because of a new innovation, but because of the company’s understanding of the 
importance of an existing one in a new era.  According to Sloan (1964, p. 160), “The last 
decisive element in this competition, I believe, was the closed body, which itself was by 
far the largest single leap forward in the history of the automobile since the basic car had 
been made mechanically reliable.” 
This understanding of changing conditions, enabled in part by systematic study of 
the market, led to GM’s next three-part strategy: pursuing national advertising, 
emphasizing style, and making frequent model changes.  Although the corporation did 
not formulate style and model change policies during the transitional period, the 
management structure that Sloan instituted was inherently responsive to market 
conditions.  Thus, by the time designing for style and planning for regular change were 
institutionalized, the annual model change was already a de facto policy. 
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GM’s final and arguably most significant strategic move during the transition was 
born from the effort to rationalize the product line and fill an existing gap.  First, by 
offering “a car for every purse and purpose,” GM essentially re-introduced product 
differentiation and turned a single mass market, where competition was based on price, 
quality, and options, into a group of niche markets defined by socio-economic status as 
well as functional requirements.  Within each niche, competition was based on price and 
quality, and GM sought to place itself near the top in both. Then, when adding the 
Pontiac in 1926, GM decided to share chassis and body parts across divisions and price 
categories to provide product variety while preserving economies of scale.  GM now had 
a competitive alternative to Fordism. 
GM had turned the crises of the post-war period into entrepreneurial opportunity.  
In 1927, Moody’s Investors Service praised the results: GM had “reorganized its system 
of buying raw materials, harmonized its factories, reformed its sales methods, improved it 
advertising, organized a department to study public demand, and developed the greatest 
automobile research organization in the world.  In so doing it had approximately doubled 
its rate of profit” (Nevins and Hill, 1957, p. 403). 
When the recession hit, Ford faced the added challenge of being in debt from the 
stock buyout and court ordered dividend.  Ford suspended production at Highland Park 
and the Rouge.  During the shutdown, Ford streamlined the company’s organization and 
improved coordination of supplies, but he also ruthlessly slashed the payroll.  While GM 
was departing from past practice and building an effective management structure, Ford 
was holding the line and eliminating vital business functions.  Ford responded to the post-
war crisis by clinging to the Model T, continuing to reduce prices, and pursuing ever 
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deeper vertical integration.  His pursuit of vertical integration was in part due to price 
fluctuations encountered leading up to and during the war, though such fluctuations had 
always been a feature of the industry.  But by staying with previously successful 
strategies and taking them to an even greater extreme, Ford illustrated the folly of what 
Gharjedaghi (2006) calls inertia and sub-optimization.  The strategy did nothing to 
address saturation, shifting preferences, or other manufacturers’ introduction of 
frequently restyled closed-body cars. 
While Flink (1988, p. 240) asserts that “[t]he annual model change and diversity 
of product were incompatible with Fordist production methods,” the problem went far 
deeper.  The annual model change and diversity of product were incompatible with Henry 
Ford’s values.  In 1907, he had been able to perceive the market potential for the Model T 
because he not only knew the farmer’s needs, but because the farmer’s values were part 
of his psyche: hard work, thrift, and resourcefulness.  Ford had always known that the 
Model T would someday need to be replaced and he was aware of market trends.  But the 
market shift in the 1920s was near anathema.  Ford’s beliefs and perspectives, his 
personal rules, had served him well in the emergent and specific phase, but now were 
misaligned with changes in the definition of the technology and other developments in 
the TIEC.  Because of his intolerance for frills and conspicuous consumption, he 
continued to believe that automobiles were and should be service vehicles.  Unlike GM’s 
Sloan, Ford was unwilling to accept that the functional definition of the automobile had 
been altered from a technology for basic personal transportation to one that provided 
transportation service, demonstrated social status, and provided satisfaction from 
personal ownership.     
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However, the misalignment of Ford’s strategies with the trend toward market 
saturation is harder to explain.  Ford’s stated intention was to build a car that, for all 
practical purposes, would last forever (Ford and Crowther, 1922).  Such a strategy would 
lead inevitably to a saturated market and stabilized sales.  Ford could only have hoped to 
maintain market share and therefore stable production levels.  However, the industry 
response of the annual model change, led by GM, not only accelerated replacement sales 
to maintain market growth, but also eroded Ford’s market position.  
The reality of the market shift was inescapable, especially after other 
manufacturers began to feed demand for style with frequent model changes.  In order to 
accommodate a complete product change to the Model A, Ford had to institute a 
complete shutdown, scrap most of the company’s specialized machine tools, and develop 
and purchase new process equipment.  Inertia and suboptimization cost Ford dearly in 
terms of lost production, capital outlays, and the loss of critical human capital that could 
have increased the firm’s adaptability. 
While many smaller firms were unable to survive the financial crisis of the post-
war recession, Walter Chrysler was able to exploit the opportunity this presented.  
Chrysler was able to convert the Maxwell and Chalmers companies from failing 
enterprises in 1920 into the third largest manufacturer by 1928.  In doing so, he also 
created an opportunity out of unexpected events that were disastrous for the Dodge 
brothers.  The influenza epidemic in 1920 took the lives of the company’s founders, 
leading eventually to the sale of the Dodge Brothers in 1928.  In buying Dodge, Chrysler 




Walter Chrysler was successful mainly because of his strategy to maintain a 
position of technological leadership, an approach that also had served Dodge Brothers 
well.71  Though Chrysler did not necessarily originate many major innovations, the 
company was the first to incorporate a number of advanced technologies in a moderately-
priced car.  Much like GM, Chrysler collaborated with suppliers to improve technologies, 
established a well-funded research laboratory, offered improved models annually, 
developed several distinct lines of vehicles, and established dealer and consumer 
financing. 
5.7.4 Dominant Design and Business Model 
This section reviews the emergence of a new dominant product design that arose 
from co-evolutionary forces.  However, I find that production processes and management 
system, i.e. corporate rules, must also be aligned to rules in the TIEC and to the 
technology.  Therefore, I conclude that the specific phase also is characterized by a 
particular dominant business model that is aligned with the TIEC of that era. Thus, a 
transitional phase may involve adaptations and innovations in the business model as 
much as (or rather than) the product design and the dominant business model of a specific 
phase may represent a recent innovation for that time.   
The “dominant design” is not a static concept, but rather a temporarily stable 
description of the majority of the market.  Even during a specific phase, it co-evolves 
with TIEC in a gradual, continuous fashion.  During a stable specific phase of sufficient 
duration, a product’s functional description and attributes may evolve considerably, 
                                                 
71 Interestingly, after leaving Ford, C. Harold Wills attempted this same strategy in designing the Wills-
Saint Claire introduced in 1921.  The car was an excellent work of engineering, but was years ahead of its 
time.  The engine was so complicated that no ordinary mechanic could repair it and the vehicle was a 
market failure.  C.H. Wills & Company went into receivership in 1922 (Sorensen, 1956; Rae, 1959). 
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appearing radically changed after decades without any disruptive changes in the TIEC or 
the industry.  During the first specific phase, from roughly 1910 to 1918, the functional 
definition of the automobile was stable but the product characteristics used to fulfill them 
evolved.  The most significant change was in engine technology.  In 1912, 91% of new 
automobiles sold included four-cylinder engines while only 8% were six-cylinders; by 
1920, the fractions were 73% and 25% and the trend toward six-cylinders continued 
through the next decade. 
As discussed in section 5.7.2, a new transitional phase was initiated around 1918 
by WWI and other changes in the TIEC.  It is difficult to pinpoint exactly when a new 
dominant design emerged and marked the onset of a new specific phase.  However, it is 
clear that before Ford discontinued the Model T in 1927 the automobile had been 
functionally redefined.  I therefore place the emergence of a dominant design around 
1926.  By that time, providing basic reliable transportation to the masses was no longer 
enough.  In the earlier days, when the expense of motor vehicles restricted ownership to 
the wealthy, owning any automobile conveyed social prestige.  But with ownership 
attainable by the masses, it now mattered which vehicle a person drove.  To all who saw 
it, the automobile suggested that its owner had attained a certain level of income and 
social status.    And much like a work of art, the automobile designed for style had an 
aesthetic value that yielded personal satisfaction.  According to Epstein (1972, p. 58), 
“[l]ike a handsome piece of furniture, a picture, or an artistic piece of jewelry, it not only 
is used but it reaches a deep-seated sense of ownership.”  
The automobile in 1926 was functionally defined as a technology to provide year-
round, comfortable, rapid, personal transportation while displaying social status and 
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imparting the pleasure of personal ownership.  The product attributes that fulfilled the 
requirements of this definition were an all-steel, closed-body car, powered by a four- or 
six-cylinder gasoline internal combustion engine.  However, the trend toward larger 
engines continued in the second specific phase with eight-cylinder engines eventually 
becoming dominant. 
The product strategy that GM adopted in 1923, “a car for every purse and 
purpose,” was the ultimate expression of this new definition.  When a buyer traded in a 
Chevrolet for an Oakland (later Pontiac), he was climbing the economic and social 
ladder.  Owning a Cadillac said that you had ‘arrived.’  The institutionalization in 1927 of 
designing for style completed GM’s transition to the new era.  While Ford and others 
criticized GM for artificially creating demand through planned obsolescence, they 
overlooked the fact that GM did not invent the idea of the car as a style product.  No 
manufacturer’s actions caused the market change; consumer preferences and automobiles 
co-evolved with the TIEC. 
The onset of a second transitional phase taught the industry hard lessons in 
planning for and accommodating change.  Not only did the new definition of the 
automobile dictate continual change, but in a co-evolutionary system, change is the rule 
and adaptation is necessary for survival.  According to Hounshell (1984, p. 264), “The 
Ford Model T dictum of maximum production at minimum cost gave way to planning for 
change.”  This new dictum meant new product strategies, new business organization, and 
new systems of production.  ‘Rigid’ mass production gave way to ‘flexible’ mass 
production.   
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Thus, a second but related distinguishing characteristic of the specific phase 
becomes apparent from this research: the existence of a dominant business model.  
Rycroft and Kash (1999) assert that as industries mature, production processes evolve 
from craft to mass to synthetic production.  However, this research indicates that what I 
have called a specific phase is characterized by a particular business model that includes 
the production process and organizational structure.  Thus, a transitional phase may 
involve adaptations and innovations in the business model as much as (or rather than) the 
product design.  The production methods seen during the specific phases reviewed in this 
research each were new innovations at the time, as was the organizational structure 
originated at GM in the 1920s.  During the first specific phase, the dominant business 
model entailed “Fordist production” (volume production; standardized fully-
interchangeable parts; special or single purpose machinery; and continuously moving 
assembly), and centralized control.  The dominant business model of the second specific 
phase entailed flexible mass production, staff and line organization, and coordinated de-
centralized control using financial controls.  There is good reason to expect that in other 
eras, specific phases will entail yet other business models with production systems and 
organizational structures that are recent innovations for their time, for example lean 
production and the Toyota Production System. 
5.7.5 Characteristics of Innovation 
This section reviews the characteristics of innovation during the first specific 
phase and the second transitional phase.  Contrary to the description of the industry life-
cycle model, I conclude that there was no clear industry-wide trend toward process 
innovations and away from product innovations during the first specific phase, nor was 
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there a reverse trend during the second transitional phase.  I also find no clear trend in the 
shifting importance of the mechanisms of learning.  Learning-by-interacting with 
suppliers was the most prominent mechanism of innovation during both phases, while 
spillovers were and learning-by doing were also important and R&D became a major 
factor for the first time during the transitional phase.  Innovation remained synthetic, 
involving collaborations by teams of entrepreneurs and between manufacturers and 
suppliers.  Finally, I find that innovations in business operations deserves mention and 
should not be over-looked in studies of technological progress and transitions. 
The product and industry life-cycle model predicts that innovation during the 
specific phase, which for the automobile first occurred between roughly 1910 and 1918, 
will shift emphasis from products to processes.  This was certainly true at Ford, which 
constituted only 10% of the market in 1910 but roughly 50% between 1914 and 1919.  It 
should be recalled, however, that Ford’s major process innovations, which actually began 
prior to the onset of the specific phase, involved a great deal of concurrent product 
innovations.  Further, a trend toward process innovation was not characteristic of the 
industry as a whole and a number of significant product innovations were introduced 
during this timeframe, including the large volume production of closed body cars (1910), 
the all-steel body (1912), the electric self-starter (1911), and mass production of the all-
steel body (1914). 
This conclusion is supported by Klepper and Simons (1997) who analyze the list 
of automotive innovations from Abernathy, et al. (1983).  Using a five year moving  
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Figure 5-2 Automotive Product and Process Innovation 
Source: Reproduced from Klepper and Simons (1997) with phase 
depiction by author. 
1893 through 1940, both in terms of the number of innovations and their transilience 
index – a subjective measure of the innovation’s impact on production systems and 
market linkages.72  However, the authors do find a generally increasing trend in the 
                                                 
72 Abernathy et al. (1983) define transilience as a measure of the overall competitive impact of an 
innovation, including disruption to production systems and market linkages.  The authors use a seven point 
scale to assign transilience scores, based on their judgment, to each innovation in an extensive list covering 
the period from 1893 to 1981.  A value of 7 represents innovations that were “very disruptive for products 
or processes.” See Abernathy et al (1983) p. 109-110 and p. 153.  Klepper and Simons (1997) calculate the 
sum of the squared transilience scores for all product or process innovations in each year then graph the 
five-year moving average to smooth out year-to-year variations. 
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number and transilience index of process innovations during that timeframe.  
Interestingly, product innovations generally occurred more frequently (averaging 
between 2-9 per year versus 0-2.5) and were more disruptive to production (transilience 
roughly 16-80 versus 0-40).A few points are worth noting on examination of Figure 5-2, 
which shows the phases identified in this research overlaid on Klepper and Simons’ 
graph.  First, midway through the first specific phase (1914), product innovation was 
indeed waning and was then reinvigorated by the end of the post-war recession (1921).  
This is consistent with the life-cycle model and the dates I have drawn to delineate the 
phases, but the specific phase lasted only another four years, which provides very few 
data points from which to draw conclusions.  If the specific phase had lasted longer 
before being interrupted by the war, the decline might have proved to be merely a brief 
slump.   
In addition, WWI  diverted productive and innovative resources as automobile 
manufacturers were involved in both the development and manufacturing of military 
equipment.  For example, Packard engineers were largely responsible for the design of 
Liberty aircraft engines and Ford developed innovative manufacturing processes for the 
engine cylinders.  This diversion of resources would have delayed the introduction of 
new automotive innovations even if events and changes in the TIEC had not triggered a 
new transitional phase.  Thus, the war in itself could explain the pattern of product 
innovations shown in Figure 5-2 between 1917 and 1919.  If, for these reasons, the years 
during the war and the ensuing recession (1918-1921) are excluded, the transilience index 
of process innovations between the first specific and second transitional phases is roughly 
constant, though there is an overall increase in their number.  Therefore, while the work 
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of Klepper and Simon supports the assertion that product innovation stagnates during the 
specific phase and is re-invigorated with a new transitional phase, it is not conclusive.  
Further, it fails to provide evidence of a trend toward greater emphasis on process 
innovation during the specific phase. 
As we have seen, Ford’s focus on process innovations after 1908 was the result of 
Henry Ford’s personal rules (goals, values and perceptions) and not necessarily an 
inherent feature of industry or firm maturity.  Ford pursued both vertical integration and 
centralized control and after 1913, product innovation was stifled in preference for 
control of supply lines and a singular focus on production costs.  Meanwhile, innovation 
was institutionalized at the corporate level in GM and later strengthened considerably 
with the purchase of Kettering’s enterprises in 1918. 
Much of the significant product innovation during the specific phase between 
1910 and 1918 originated with suppliers, including: large-scale production of closed 
bodies by Fisher for Cadillac, the all-steel body by Hale & Kilburn for Hupmobile, and 
the electric starter by Delco for Cadillac.  Dodge Brothers was incorporated during this 
timeframe and quickly established itself as an innovative leader by incorporating Budd’s 
all-steel body.  Budd also contributed a significant process innovation – electric spot 
welding – that served as an enabling technology for all-steel bodies.  Thus, interactions 
with suppliers continued to play a critical role in development, as did spillovers.  Budd’s 
innovations were highly synthetic, representing the culmination of years of teamwork 
beginning at Hale & Kilburn and in collaboration with Emil Nelson, the chief engineer of 
the Hupp Motor Car Co. 
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During the second transitional phase (1918-1926), most of the significant product 
innovations – four-wheel hydraulic brakes, balloon tires, and all-steel closed bodies – 
again originated with suppliers.  Duco lacquer, primarily a process innovation for the 
automobile industry, also originated with a supplier and, though it was a product of a 
guided research, the particular application largely resulted from serendipity. Another 
significant innovation during the second transitional phase was the development of 
leaded gasoline (TEL) at GM’s Research Corporation.  Although part of a guided 
research program, the breakthrough was largely one of trial and error.  While it did not 
represent an innovation in automobile technology, it solved a major industry problem and 
enabled the use of engines with higher compression ratios.  It is also the first instance 
where environmental factors became an issue for the industry. 
Perhaps most interesting during this phase is the importance of innovations in 
business operations which are generally overlooked in studies of technological progress.  
GM’s “car for every purse and purpose” market segmentation was a brilliant solution to 
market saturation and an emerging functional definition (see section 5.7.4).  The 
corporation’s later decision to standardize parts across divisions, an innovation in both 
product and process, enabled this market segmentation and was equally revolutionary for 
the industry and market.  Other significant business innovations include planning for 
annual model changes, design for style, and the use of time sales.73  While planning for 
change may be considered an innovation in business operations, it also required 
important changes to production processes, specifically in capital equipment, which can 
be attributed to William Knudsen. 
                                                 
73 Time sales were introduced during the first specific phase but became a dominant feature of the industry 
in the second transitional phase. 
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Market segmentation and annual model changes designed for style were 
innovations based on a fundamental understanding of emerging user preferences, which 
GM tracked with rather sophisticated data analysis.  At the same time, the appearance of 
stylish new vehicles every year, marketed as symbols of status, reinforced and fed these 
trends in preferences.  These innovations, along with the use of consumer financing can 
be considered as efforts to alter the selection environment by accelerating replacement 
sales and extending the market to more consumers.  Thus, the new functional definition 
of the automobile, the new design attributes that fulfilled them, consumer preferences, 
and financing institutions arose in a co-evolutionary fashion. 
Finally and perhaps most significantly, GM’s innovations in corporate structure 
and operations established a new standard business model for industry in general (see 
section 5.7.4).  These innovations resulted from the collective and synthetic efforts of 
Pierre du Pont, Alfred Sloan, Donaldson Brown and Albert Bradley.  While many of 
these innovations resulted from in-house efforts, largely learning-by-doing, the 
entrepreneurs themselves were associated with GM due to past supplier relationships and 
financial difficulties and brought with them experience gained in other industries. 
5.7.6 Alignment and Stability 
Chapter 4 discussed how the automobile, scientific management and Fordism 
were aligned with evolving higher-level rules within the TIEC.  This section summarizes 
the the process of embedding which continued through the first specific phase and 
became more pronounced during the second transitional phase.  I find that the 
development of ‘hard’ supporting infrastructure lagged behind the expansion of a mass 
market for the automobile and did not become a significant factor in stability until the 
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second transitional phase.  Beginning in the latter part of the first specific phase, 
manufacturers also began using consumer financing to alter the selection environment, an 
institution which aligned with and reinforced trends in the TIEC.  The stability of the first 
specific phase was undermined by the post-war recession and evolving consumer 
preferences that became misaligned with the existing dominant product design.  This 
misalignment was due to: 1) an exogenous factor – the increasing influence of women in 
the automobile market; 2) two factors related to the technology’s success – market 
saturation and road improvements; and 3) an innovation – the all-steel closed body.  
Changing preferences were also reinforced by the industry’s response to them as well as 
to the war and the challenge posed by market saturation.  The emergence of a new 
dominant product design and business model brought the product and rules (consumer 
preferences) into realignment.  Finally, the introduction of TEL was challenged by 
emerging trends in the TIEC, but the innovation was successful due to the immaturity of 
institutions governing public health and GM’s activities to shape the selection 
environment. 
Physical infrastructures for roads and refueling began periods of significant 
growth late in the first specific phase.  Federal funding for roads began in 1916 and was 
significantly increased in 1921.  This development was supported by the initiation of 
gasoline taxes in 1919, which became the dominant source of state funding for main 
roads by 1929.  The availability of gasoline from dispersed and non-dedicated sources 
prior to the turn of the century was a factor in the success of gasoline-powered vehicles in 
early markets.  A physical infrastructure for refueling gasoline motor vehicles began 
development with the introduction of curb pumps and dedicated stations in 1907.  
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Between 1915 and the early 1920s, the curb pump was the dominant form of refueling, 
but growth in dedicated stations began around this time.  By 1930, dedicated service 
stations were overtaking the curb pump both in terms of number and sales volume.  Thus, 
the development of roads and filling stations, the ‘hard’ infrastructure that still exists 
today, lagged behind the expansion of a mass market for the automobile.  In fact, both 
entered a period of substantial growth just as the automobile industry was entering the 
second transitional phase.  Therefore, physical infrastructure did not become a significant 
factor in stability until the second transitional phase. 
In 1910, bankers disapproved of loans for automobiles, which they still 
considered a luxury.  Beginning in 1916, captive lending agencies began financing time 
sales of automobiles and this became an important strategy in adapting to the challenges 
presented by the second transitional phase.  The implementation of consumer financing 
by dealers and manufacturers can be considered efforts to alter the selection environment 
by extending the market for new vehicles to more consumers and by improving the 
desirability of used cars relative to inexpensive new cars, particularly the Model T.  Such 
financing had been limited to furniture, sewing machines, pianos, and homes, but the 
concept became a mainstay of the U.S. economy in the late 1920s.  Thus, the use of time 
sales for automobiles aligned with and reinforced trends in the TIEC. 
The stability of the first specific phase was undermined by an exogenous event – 
the post-war recession – and by evolving consumer preferences that became misaligned 
with the existing dominant product design.  The increasing influence of women in the 
automobile market represented an exogenous factor in this misalignment.  Two other 
factors were due to the technology’s success – market saturation and road improvements.  
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The fourth factor was an innovation – the all-steel enclosed body.  While continuing road 
improvements during the transitional phase should have served to support the industry, 
they were destabilizing as long as the dominant design remained consistent with the poor 
roads of the earlier era.  The Model T design in particular lagged behind the evolution the 
supporting infrastructure.  Road improvements and the trend toward year-round use, both 
of which were reinforced by events during the war, along with saturation and the 
increasing role of women dictated new design requirements.  Once the automobile had 
been redefined and a new dominant design had emerged, the product and rules (consumer 
preferences) became realigned. 
During the transitional phase, one additional misalignment arose. The 
introduction of tetra-ethyl lead (TEL) represents the first time that the environmental 
health effects of automobile use became a prominent issue.  However, in 1925, 
institutions to protect public and worker health were still in their infancy despite the work 
of Progressives (see section 3.4.1), whose influence waned in the post-war era.  While 
university experts and the federal Public Health Service (PHS) raised the TEL issue to 
national attention, the federal government had no authority to regulate chemicals.  
Meanwhile, Thomas Midgely and GM actively worked to refute the claims of health 
experts and calm the public, despite suffering from lead poisoning himself.  Thus, while 
the use of TEL was misaligned with a rising national consciousness about worker and 
public health, no formal legislative rules were in place to block the use of the additive.  
The PHS study was unable to make conclusive statements regarding the health effects of 
long-term exposure, and the courts found Standard Oil innocent of criminal negligence in 
the TEL plant accident.  Therefore, GM’s efforts at altering the selection environment 
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were successful as the controversy faded.  However, the movement in the TIEC toward 
greater concern with public and worker environmental health would later create more 
serious misalignments with automobile and fuel use. 
5.7.7 Summary 
The first specific phase of the automobile industry extended from roughly 1910 to 
1918.  Though product attributes evolved slowly, the functional definition of the 
automobile remained stable during this phase and was aligned with rules within the 
TIEC.  The specific phase was characterized by a dominant business model that was also 
aligned with the TIEC.  Firms whose operations or products were less aligned struggled 
financially.  Although this alignment supported the stability of the specific phase, 
physical infrastructure lagged behind the expansion of the market and became more of a 
factor during the second transitional phase. 
The stability of the first specific phase was undermined by factors that can be 
placed in three categories: 
1) exogenous factors: WWI, the post-war recession, and the increasing influence of 
women in the automobile market;  
2) the technology’s success: market saturation and road improvements; and  
3) innovations: the inexpensive all-steel closed body. 
These factors influenced the industry through the actions of government agents, 
economics (the price and availability of raw materials, capital, and labor), and changing 
consumer preferences.  As a result, the functional definition and attributes of the 




Up through the onset of the second transitional phase, three factors contributed to 
increasing vertical integration in the automobile industry:  
1) a trend in the TIEC toward large industrial combinations that could influence the 
price and supply of raw materials;  
2) process innovations that required continuous plant operation and carefully timed 
delivery of parts; and  
3) tacit knowledge that existed only in human capital.   
Vertical integration had a great influence on each company’s innovative focus and 
capabilities, but this influence depended on the specific strategies pursued to achieve 
integration and the resulting rules and capabilities that were embodied in corporate 
structure, operating procedures, facilities, and human capital.  Therefore, during the 
second transitional phase, I find that firm histories, the personal beliefs and perspectives 
of firm leaders, and corporate structures and culture – i.e., firm-specific rules – shaped 
individual firm strategies for innovation and their adaptive capabilities.  In addition, I 
find that unexpected events presented insurmountable difficulties for some firms, while 
other entrepreneurs were able to exploit the opportunities presented by those firms’ 
failures. 
There was no clear industry trend toward process innovation versus product 
innovation during the specific phase, and no reversal of that trend during the transitional 
phase that began in 1918.  Rather, individual firms pursued specific strategies for 
innovation.  For example, Ford focused on reducing costs and controlling supplies, 
consistent with company strategy and the dictates of Fordism.  I also find no clear trend 
in the shifting importance of the mechanisms of learning.  product innovation occurred 
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largely through interaction with suppliers who generally initiated these novelties.  GM’s 
partial ownership of its suppliers created a partner relationship and fostered a higher rate 
of product innovation than was found at Ford.  However, newcomer Dodge Brothers 
quickly assumed the role of industry leader in product innovation with the incorporation 
of all-steel bodies.  This role was taken on by Chrysler in the late 1920s.  Innovation also 
remained synthetic, involving collaborations by teams of entrepreneurs and between 
manufacturers and suppliers.  In addition, innovations in business operations played a 
critical role in the second transitional phase and should not be over-looked in studies of 
technological progress and transitions. 
The new dominant product design of 1926 arose from co-evolutionary forces, 
with industry responses to the challenges of the transition and new product offerings 
reinforcing trends in consumer preferences.  The new product definition that emerged by 
1926 was misaligned with Fordism and dictated a new dominant business model – 
“Sloanism” and flexible mass production.  Thus, the specific phase is characterized by a 
particular dominant business model that is aligned with the TIEC of that era and a 
transitional phase may involve adaptations and innovations in the business model as 
much as (or rather than) the product.   
By the late 1920s, the technology and dominant business model were aligned 
consumer preferences.  With increasingly aligned institutions and the addition of a 




6.0 Results and Conclusions 
…the car is not one invention but a mechanical creation composed of 
hundreds, if not thousands, of inventions.  In truth, we are still inventing 
the car, for the car is an ever-changing assembly of ideas, systems and 
parts. 
-- J. Barach, 2007 
6.1 Introduction 
As discussed in chapter 2, the quasi-evolutionary (QE) and multi-level 
perspective (MLP) theories assert that niches play a fundamental role in socio-
technological transitions.  Niches are understood to be distinct application domains, small 
in scale and scope, that are characterized by specific functional requirements.  Because of 
the special functional requirements of the niche, users are willing to accept higher cost or 
lower performance on other non-essential functionalities compared to those attained with 
existing products available in mass markets.  Thus, products tailored to niches are not 
competitive in other niches or mass markets because the functional requirements are not 
comparable across markets.  For a product to compete in a mass market, which is large in 
scale, it must provide a functionality with wide appeal and compete with alternative 
products based on price, quality, and performance, which can be objectively compared. 
The QE and MLP theories describe transitions as a process of niche accumulation, 
niche branching, or niche proliferation.  The development or penetration of new niches 
allows a technology to expand the overall scale of its markets. Eventually, the technology 
achieves cost reductions through economies of scale and learning effects that allow it to 
conquer a mass market.  This phenomenon relies on learning processes, primarily 
learning-by-doing and learning-by-interacting with users, within niche markets that alter 
the technology and the systems in which it is produced and used.  As a result, a novel 
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technology becomes embedded in a new rule set through the mutual adaptation of the 
technology and institutions, where institutions are understood to include organizations 
and rules.  Rules may be cognitive, normative, or legislative, and are defined as the 
complex set of constraints that shape interactions among agents and between agents and 
the physical elements in the system.  The co-evolutionary process of embedding results in 
the alignment of the technology, institutions, and the physical artifacts of the system, 
forming a stable system or regime.  The embedding process arises from the interaction of 
agents through institutional linkages in what QE theory calls the technological nexus.  
Agents in the nexus role link selection and variation by translating information from both 
realms; shaping interactions; and harmonizing social and market needs with the results of 
scientific and technological research. 
Chapter 1 posed a set of research questions related to the assumptions underlying 
this niche hypothesis; the role of the technological nexus in niche dynamics and the 
diffusion to wider markets; and regime dynamics and stability.  For reference, these 
questions are repeated in section 6.2.  The following sections directly address each 
research question and discuss related findings of this research.   
Section 6.3 summarizes the role of niche markets in both the emergence of the 
motor vehicle and its diffusion to mass markets.  I find that niche markets did indeed play 
an important role in the transition to motor vehicles but that this role was not entirely 
consistent with the assertions of the niche hypothesis.  I also find that the mechanisms of 
learning involved in the improvement of motor vehicle performance and reductions in 
cost were more complex than the descriptions found in QE and MLP theory.  Section 6.4 
reviews the activities aimed at altering variation and selection, as well as other forces that 
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produced mutual adaptations in the technology and institutions. I find that the 
technological nexus concept is useful in understanding the process of embedding.  
However, I find that this process occurred simultaneously with or lagged behind the 
diffusion of the automobile into the mass market rather than within the context of niche 
markets.  I also find that the technological nexus concept is not sufficient for 
understanding all the important forces behind the co-evolution of technologies and 
institutions.  Section 6.5 discusses other factors related to niche-regime interaction that 
were important in facilitating the transition to motor vehicles, including the role of 
compatibility with existing regimes, the stability of existing and emerging regimes, and 
the role of exogenous events.  I find that the diffusion of the motor vehicle is more 
consistent with a description of gradual unfolding and adaptation similar to the concept of 
‘hybridization’ (Geels, 2002) than with the description of niche proliferation and rapid 
regime renewal.  Section 6.6 summarizes these findings and discusses the implications 
for theory and policy.  Last, section 6.7 presents an agenda for future research. 
6.2 Research Questions 
• Is the role of niche markets as described in the literature historically accurate for the 
transition from horse-drawn to motorized vehicles? 
▫ Were learning-by-interacting with users and learning-by-doing the primary 
processes involved in improving the performance and cost of early motor 
vehicles? 
▫ Did growth in niche markets facilitate economies of scale? 
▫ Is niche branching, niche proliferation or niche market growth an accurate 
description of the diffusion of the gasoline motor-vehicle into mass markets? 
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• Is the linkage between selection and variation described by the technological nexus an 
accurate account of the interactions that produced the technological and institutional 
adaptations that facilitated wider diffusion of the automobile? 
▫ Who were the agents involved and from what regimes were they drawn? 
▫ How did elements of the existing regime(s) influence their identities and roles?  
How were these identities and roles altered? 
▫ What formal institutions were developed and what contributed to their stability 
and longevity? 
▫ How were the variation and selection environments altered?  Did this co-
evolution occur within the context of niches? 
▫ Was the selection-variation linkage the most significant network contributing to 
technological and institutional adaptations? 
• Were other factors related to niche-regime interaction important in facilitating the 
transition to motor vehicles? 
▫ In what ways were early motor vehicles compatible with the existing regime(s)?  
How did this compatibility evolve and eventually diverge? 
▫ Did regime instability contribute to the transition?  If so, what were the causes of 
this instability? 
▫ What role did unexpected exogenous events play in existing and emerging regime 
instability and the adaptation of institutions? 
6.3 Role of Niche Markets 
This research shows that niche markets did indeed play an important role in the 
transition to motor vehicles.  However, that role is not entirely consistent with the 
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assertions of the niche hypothesis.  This section summarizes the role of niche markets in 
both the emergence of the technology and its diffusion to mass markets.  I draw out 
several consistencies and discrepancies between the history and the assertions of MLP 
and QE theories.  These findings are also summarized in section 6.6. 
6.3.1 Emergent Phase, Through 1900 
The first experiments with motorized transport, which occurred in the late 18th 
and early 19th centuries, applied steam engine technology to transporting heavy 
equipment for military applications and rail freight.  By the late 19th century, motorized 
rail transport had become the primary mode of commercial long-distance transportation 
for freight and passengers in the U.S.  Although steam-powered cable systems initially 
served urban passenger transportation, electric rail cars, introduced in 1888, became the 
dominant technology for this application by 1902.  Meanwhile, the bicycle emerged in 
the 1880s as a form of personal transportation.  This technology first found application in 
a niche market providing sport and entertainment for daring young men.  By the late 
1880s, technological improvements had expanded the bicycle market to include men, 
women, and children of all physical abilities.  The bicycle provided exercise and 
recreation as well as practical, short-distance, personal travel. 
Thus, by the time motor power vehicles found application in personal transport, 
motorized rail systems had developed into two regimes for commercial transport.  
Practical personal travel was served by an existing regime based on draft animals while 
personal transport for sport and recreation was served by an emerging bicycle regime.  
Although the rail and draft animal regimes were fairly stable, problems had appeared by 
the turn of the century.  The railroads had come under scrutiny for abuses of monopoly 
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power and price discrimination.  Thus, business practices were becoming misaligned with 
a growing cultural trend known as Progressivism.  Horse-drawn public transport in urban 
areas had difficulty negotiating steep inclines and was contributing to problems with 
wastes, odor, flies, and illness.  The success and growth of this regime was causing 
difficulties with continuing on the current trajectory.  Meanwhile, success of the bicycle 
was altering consumer perceptions and creating a demand for performance characteristics 
(greater speed and distance) that the technology was unable to fulfill.  The emerging 
bicycle regime was facing technological limits. 
During the emergent phase, personal motor vehicles first found commercial 
success in two niche markets serving very wealthy consumers.  These niches were 
defined by the function they served.  Electric automobiles were used for short trips within 
cities and were the technology of choice for wealthy women.  They provided practical 
urban transport, conveyed social prestige, and were attractive as a solution to rising 
problems with the existing animal-powered transport regime in this function.  Steam-
powered and gasoline internal combustion vehicles were used for touring the countryside.  
They provided sport and recreation and also conveyed social prestige. 
Based on the niche hypothesis, we might consider that the application of steam 
and electric power to personal vehicles was representative of niche branching – the use of 
a radical innovation in subsequent application domains or market niches – where the 
original application was in rail transport.  However, engines used in commercial transport 
were too heavy and bulky for personal transport and developing a small engine or electric 
motor and battery with sufficient performance represented a significant innovative 
challenge. Therefore, the technologies for steam and gasoline power used in early motor 
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vehicles derived more from engines for stationary uses than from other motorized 
transport applications.  Meanwhile, electric vehicle technology relied on battery 
technology and not primary electricity generation and transmission technologies used for 
electric rail systems.  The inspiration to apply motor power to personal vehicles did not 
arise from rail transport either.  Instead, it arose from the bicycle regime.  Therefore, 
niche branching from the rail regime is not an accurate description of the emergence of 
niche markets for motor vehicles.  Nonetheless, much of the knowledge base relevant to 
motor vehicles was shared with rail transport.74   
The MLP asserts that problems in an unstable regime present opportunities for a 
new technology to serve as a solution, effectively creating new niches (Geels, 2004).  
Thus, one could argue that the early success of electric automobiles in the urban market 
niche was facilitated by problems using horse-drawn vehicles in cities.  However, electric 
rail systems were already established as an effective solution and bicycles also could 
provide clean individualized transportation in town.  Again, electric motor vehicles were 
conceived as a technology for urban applications only after the bicycle altered 
perceptions about personal transport.  This change provided the inspiration for motor 
power to replace horse or human power for personal, rather than commercial, transport.  
Electric vehicles could provide a combination of the advantages of electric rail systems 
(cleanliness) and personal carriages (individual flexibility) without the disadvantages of 
the bicycle (physical exertion and limited cargo capacity).  Thus, it was emerging 
misalignments in multiple regimes that provided an opportunity for electric cars to enter 
the urban niche, where they competed with carriages, electric rail cars, and bicycles.   
                                                 
74 We do see a number of automobile entrepreneurs with experience manufacturing rail cars, notably Walter 
Chrysler and Edward Budd.  Henry For also worked for a manufacturer of rail cars, but only for six days.  
His main experience was with stationary engines. 
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The MLP also asserts that the articulation of new functionalities plays a role in 
niche development.  In a stable regime, a new functionality creates niche applications and 
allows a radical technology to develop relatively unnoticed by the existing regime.  In an 
unstable regime, entrepreneurs may promote the new functionality of their innovation as 
a solution to regime problems.  No new functions were articulated for electric vehicles in 
urban transport – they provided practical transport and social prestige and in this manner 
served as a direct replacement for fine carriages for the wealthy.  They also provided 
clean intra-city transport, which was a direct replacement for electric rail cars or bicycles.  
However, they were able to provide these functions simultaneously, which represents a 
form of hybridization, as discussed below.  The use of steam- and gasoline-powered 
motor vehicles for touring did represent a new function by combining the flexibility of 
horse-drawn vehicles and bicycles with the speed and long-distance capabilities of rail 
transport.  This function – rapid, cross country, personal transport – provided 
entertainment, sport, and thrill, as well as social prestige.  As the MLP predicts, motor 
vehicles in this application did not compete with the existing technologies for practical 
long distance transport (rail and carriage).  However, to some extent, it did compete with 
bicycles as wealthy urbanites began driving motor vehicles in city parks for recreation. 
In both of the niche markets for automobiles, the combination of functional 
features from multiple regimes represents a sort of hybridization.  Hybridization here is 
interpreted as the merging of functions, performance features, and technologies, both old 
and new, from multiple regimes to solve particular problems or provide new functionality 
through symbiosis.  The MLP describes hybridization as a mechanism in niche 
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proliferation, but identifies only the combination of new and existing technologies to 
solve particular problems while causing a minimum of regime disruption. 
At this point, the automobile case history supports the assertion that radical 
technologies emerge in niche markets.  The history is also generally consistent with the 
pathways of niche development described by the MLP.  However, it suggests two areas 
where the MLP lacks sufficient description.  First, the emergence of the motor vehicle in 
early niche markets can only be understood through consideration of multiple regimes.  
In MLP language, the analysis must include more than one meso-level system.  This 
deficiency was raised by Raven (2005) and accounted for in the framework developed in 
section 2.6 by considering direct linkages to other industries as well as indirect linkages 
through the technical, institutional, and ecological complex (TIEC).  This is also 
consistent with the assertion of Kemp et al. (1998) that “[t]he success of niche formation 
is… linked to structural problems, shifts and changes within the existing regime(s).  The 
ultimate fate of processes of niche formation depends as much on successful processes 
within the niche as on changes outside the niche: it is the coincidence of both 
developments that gives rise to niche development patterns.”  However, this research 
suggests that much more emphasis should be given to this underdeveloped aspect of 
niche formation.  
Second, a more complete conception of hybridization would include the merging 
of functionality and performance features in addition to technological artifacts.  Further, 
this combination can yield synergies that result in new functions or applications in 
addition to novel solutions. 
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6.3.2 Transitional Phase I, 1900-1910 
We now turn to consideration of the transitional phase where the technology 
moves from niche to wider markets.  This phase began around 1900 for the automobile.  
Did processes within the niche facilitate this diffusion, and if so, what were these 
processes?  The MLP and QE theories assert that, within the niche, manufacturers learn 
about users’ needs and users learn about product performance through learning-by-
interacting.  Manufacturers then improve the technology in terms of those needs and 
achieve lower costs through learning-by-doing.  Consequently, growth of niche markets, 
niche branching, or niche proliferation allows manufacturers to reduce costs through 
economies of scale. 
Only the gasoline-powered motor vehicle was able to break out of its niche 
market and conquer wider markets.  The early niche for gasoline vehicles was the 
relatively small, wealthy touring market.  While other uses for the automobile and 
geographic features likely defined many other niche markets, as of the turn of the 
century, the automobile was widely regarded as a toy for the rich.  But the market for 
automobiles quickly shifted from the very wealthy to the lower upper class, primarily 
merchants and physicians, for whom the automobile provided utility as well as sport.  
The Olds curved dash, which sold for $650, accounted for one third of the 4,100 motor 
vehicles sold in 1900, the year it was first introduced.  Many small Midwestern 
manufacturers were also selling light, inexpensive surrey-type vehicles like the curved 
dash that appealed to wealthy farmers.  Although these vehicles were well suited to 
navigating rural roads, they tended to rattle apart quickly on them.  The key to 
penetrating the rural market was producing an inexpensive vehicle that could navigate 
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rough roads yet was rugged and reliable.  With this goal in mind, Ford introduced three 
successive inexpensive models during the transitional phase: the Model A in 1903 with 
prices starting at $750, the Model N in 1906 starting at $500, and the Model T in 1908 
starting at $825. 
Geels (2005b) asserts that growth in the touring niche in the first years of the 20th 
century was responsible for gasoline cars gaining a lead over electric- and steam-powered 
automobiles.  However, this growth had stagnated by 1905 as the market for expensive 
vehicles saturated fairly early.  As shown in Figure 4-2, the market for inexpensive 
vehicles was already well established in 1903 and sales had already surpassed that of both 
the medium- and the high-price category.  By 1910, the market for new automobiles 
priced above $2,775 had stabilized and represented only 10% of the market.  Demand for 
moderately priced vehicles continued to grow, but at an ever decreasing rate.  With a 
midpoint around $2,000, the cost of these vehicles still constrained this market to wealthy 
manufacturers and capitalists.    Meanwhile, the least expensive vehicles appealed to two 
new market segments: the upper-lower class for whom the automobile fulfilled utilitarian 
purposes as well as conveying social prestige and a larger market consisting of affluent 
farmers for whom the automobile was primarily utilitarian. 
It is difficult to argue that processes within the early niche market were 
responsible for a reduction in price that allowed motor vehicles to branch into the 
inexpensive market.  As discussed in section 4.5.4, the trend within the high-price 
category between 1903 and 1908 was, if anything, toward higher price, not lower.  And 
while the performance of these vehicles was being steadily improved, it was being 
improved relative to the functional requirements of the niche market: speed, power, size, 
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and weight were all increasing.  While niche branching was likely occurring between 
1900 and 1910 within the slowly growing medium-price class of vehicles, these markets 
still consisted of a limited number of very wealthy consumers.  The trend within this 
category was toward every higher quality but not necessarily lower price.  Performance 
and reliability in both categories increased as well, but the remaining core requirements 
for the mass market were not being addressed: affordability, ruggedness, ability to 
navigate rough roads, and ease and affordability of repair. 
Meanwhile, the lowest price category steadily gained market share after 1907, and 
the trend within that category was clearly toward ever lower price.  The decrease in 
production costs and price for inexpensive vehicles was not the result of a widening of 
the touring market, but rather of Henry Ford’s business strategy to consciously target the 
rural market and continuously reduce prices.  Cost reductions were realized from 
learning-by-doing and scale economies, among other mechanisms, but they were realized 
simultaneously with a product redefinition that moved the automobile out of the wealthy 
niches into the mass market.  Product improvements for the mass market were also 
accomplished in the mass market. The functional requirements of the mass market were 
decidedly different from those of the wealthy touring market: practicality, ruggedness, 
and affordability of ownership replaced speed, power, and display of wealth.  This 
difference in functional requirements resulted in a product design with decidedly 
different attributes.  The Model T was distinctly a “no frills” utilitarian vehicle. 
6.3.3 Specific Phase I, 1910-1918 
Much of the downward trend in prices within the lowest price category after 1907 
was due to sales of the Model T, which by 1915 was priced from $390 and constituted 
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around 70% of sales of vehicles priced under $1,375.  As the industry approached the 
specific phase, Ford actively sought to drive down the cost of manufacturing motor 
vehicles specifically to make them affordable to the masses.  In this pursuit, he was fairly 
unique.  However, Ford’s greatest accomplishment was the manufacture of a product of 
both high quality and low cost.  While one or the other had been achieved within the 
industry, it was the combination that allowed Ford to conquer the large rural market.  
This combination was achieved by jointly addressing issues of product design and 
manufacturing processes.  Ford designed the Model T with the requirements of mass 
production in mind, jointly evolving the product design, machine tools, and production 
process. 
The volume production of automobiles, perfected by Ford around 1913, was 
enabled by four facets of the TIEC: 1) a broad-based acceptance of the ideals of 
individualism as expressed in capitalism; 2) the evolution of the American system of 
manufactures begun in the arms-manufacturing industry and perfected through the 
sewing machine and bicycle industries; 3) the disintegration of traditional craft society; 
and 4) mechanistic scientific approaches based in methodological reductionism that led to 
the development of scientific management.   
Ford’s production team was uniquely able to synthesize and exploit the 
opportunities provided by this social and institutional context.  The key aspects of mass 
production were simplification of design, standardization of parts, precision machining, 
continuous motion, carefully timed speed, and the use of labor-saving mechanisms.  Ford 
did not originate any of the component process innovations involved in this system: 
standardized parts all built to common gauge, precision manufacturing, high volume 
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production, specialized workers performing increasingly minute tasks, control and 
planning by supervisors and engineers, hierarchical management, specialized machine 
tools, and continuously moving assembly. Ford was not even the first to apply any one of 
them, but was the first company to fully integrate them.  In doing so, the Ford team relied 
on knowledge spillovers, learning-by-doing, and a great deal of inspiration.  Clearly, for 
the automobile, the QE and MLP theories’ singular focus on learning-by-doing is 
inconsistent with this development. 
As manufacturing costs were reduced, Ford continuously lowered prices, despite 
the fact that the market during the first specific phase was still clamoring for more 
production than the industry could provide.  Ford therefore set the stage for competition 
based on price for a given level of quality.  For example, Durant explicitly aimed to 
compete with Ford in developing the 1915 Chevrolet Model 490, named for the price of 
the 1914 Model T.  The automobile had clearly conquered a mass market by 1916: total 
sales reached over 1.5 million units and 91% sold for under $1,375; 51% of sales were 
priced under $675 and the Model T had captured half of the total market. 
6.3.4 Mechanisms of Innovation 
While learning-by-interacting with users and learning-by-doing were important 
mechanisms in the innovations that improved the ability of motor vehicle to meet 
consumers’ needs and reduce costs, they were not the only significant processes.    Table 
6-1 summarizes the significant innovations discussed in chapters 3 through 6 and places 
them within the industry phase structure.  This section discusses the role of each 
mechanism of learning in turn then provides a summary of conclusions. 
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Clearly, knowledge spillovers were of primary importance in the emergent and 
first transitional phase, ending around 1910.  This knowledge resided in human capital 
and initially was embodied in plants and equipment in the bicycle, carriage, and machine 
tool industries.  In general, firms in these industries became suppliers or evolved into 
automobile manufacturing firms.  Suppliers thus served as the link for transmitting inter-
industry and international knowledge spillovers.  Spillovers continued to be extremely 
important during the first specific phase from 1910 to 1918 as the performance of motor 
vehicles continued to be substantially improved and costs were further reduced.  
Spillovers figured prominently in four of the most significant innovations of this phase: 
Budd’s all-steel body (begun while Budd was at Hale & Kilburn), Delco’s electric self-
starter, the incorporation of the moving assembly line in Ford’s production system, and 
sales on credit.   
What is not reflected in Table 6-1, but is apparent from the historical narrative, is 
that user interactions were important in both product refinements and in firms’ decisions 
to adopt technologies already in the market.  Although Ford did not need to interact with 
users to discover the needs of the rural market, he did rely on feedback from dealers and 
buyers to identify defects as he focused on product innovations to improve reliability.  
Meanwhile, supplier interactions provided the technological means to improve the 
product.   
In fact, learning-by-interacting with suppliers figured prominently in all phases.  
These interactions often included collaborations to solve problems with the existing 
component or to design entirely new ones.  For example, Ford and Holley collaborated on 
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early carburetor development during the first transitional phase.75  During the first 
specific phase, Hupp and Edward Budd collaborated to develop all-steel bodies while 
Budd was employed at Hale & Kilburn.  During the second transitional phase, Chrysler 
and Lockheed worked together to improve four-wheel hydraulic brakes.  Suppliers often 
initiated contact with manufacturers and petitioned for the adoption of their technologies. 
This relationship is demonstrated in Ford’s use of stamped steel and vanadium steel, 
Cadillac’s incorporation of the self-starter developed by Kettering at Delco, and GM’s 
adoption of closed bodies developed by Fisher. The unique relationship between GM and 
supplier Du Pont played a significant role in the collaborative development of Duco 
pyroxylin lacquer and the commercialization of tetra-ethyl lead (TEL).  At Ford, where 
extensive vertical integration was realized through in-house production of nearly all parts 
and components, supplier interactions were not significant after about 1916.   
The role of R&D within automotive manufacturing firms in the timeframe of this 
analysis is decidedly less than would be expected from contemporary industry.  This is to 
some extent a reflection of the fact that the idea of corporate research laboratories was 
still relatively new.76  In addition, at least through 1910, firms were operating on slim 
cash reserves and were primarily interested in re-investing profits in capacity expansion.  
However, by 1910, automobile manufacturers were using materials testing laboratories to 
improve product design.  This is consistent with the assertions of the industry-phase 
model.  However, R&D did not appear to be a significant factor until the second 
transitional phase.  By 1920, a broad range of R&D was institutionalized at GM with the 
                                                 
75 This collaboration is not reflected in Table 6-1 because it did not represent a new innovation.  It does, 
however, illustrate the importance of supplier interactions in improving early product performance. 
76 Thomas Edison built the first U.S. industrial research laboratory in Menlo Park in 1876. 
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General Motors Research laboratories by incorporating the knowledge and talents of 
Charles Kettering and his staff at Delco.  Through vertical integration, GM had brought 
the innovative efforts of the corporation’s suppliers in-house.  Kettering’s and Delco’s 
innovative efforts were then subject to the constraints imposed by GM’s market 
strategies.  This was demonstrated by the termination of the copper-cooled engine 
program and the selection of TEL over fuel blends in addressing the problem of engine 
knock.  By late 1920, Chrysler had a research laboratory worthy of comparison to those 
of Ivy League universities. 
Perhaps most interesting is the emergence during the second transitional phase of 
innovations in business operations.  GM’s market segmentation and decision to 
standardize parts across divisions, an innovation in both product and process, combined 
to enable both variety in product and economies of scale.  Other significant business 
innovations include planning for annual model changes, design for style, and the use of 
time sales.  Time sales were introduced during the first specific phase but became a 
dominant feature of the industry in the second transitional phase.  While planning for 
change may be considered an innovation in business operations, it also required 
important changes to production processes, specifically in capital equipment.  Market 
segmentation and annual model changes designed for style were innovations based on a 
fundamental understanding of emerging user preferences, which GM tracked with rather 
sophisticated data analysis.  Finally and perhaps most significantly, GM’s innovations in 
corporate structure and operations established a new standard business model for industry 
in the second specific phase. While these innovations resulted from in-house efforts, 
largely learning-by-doing, the entrepreneurs themselves relied on experience gained in 
 
468 
other industries and were associated with GM due to past supplier relationships and 
financial difficulties. 
In conclusion, while learning from users and learning-by-doing were important 
mechanisms in improving the performance and cost of early motor vehicles, they were 
not the only significant ones.  Table 6-1 shows a striking contribution from spillovers and 
learning-by-interacting with suppliers during all phases.  In addition, this table and the 
analysis provided in section 5.7.5 show that, contrary to the description of the industry 
life-cycle model, there was no clear industry-wide trend toward process innovations and 
away from product innovations during the first specific phase, nor was there a reverse 
trend during the second transitional phase.  I also find no clear trend in the shifting 
importance of the mechanisms of learning as the industry progressed.  Finally, I find that 
innovations in business operations deserves mention and should not be over-looked in 
studies of technological progress and transitions.
 
 
Table 6-1 Sources of Selected Innovations and Industry Phase 
Source  
Technology/Innovation Learning by Interactinga 
  
 






Doing Users Suppliers 
 Changes in TIEC: problems with expanding scale of current technology (stabling space and cost, waste, odor, and flies); 
demand for rapid personal transport stimulated but not met by bicycle; advances in machine tool technology; changing 
perceptions of efficiency and human labor 
< 1900 Emergent Motive power (batteries, 
steam and gasoline engines) 
1 X     
  Product configuration 1 X 
carriages, 
bicycles 
    
1900-
1910 
Transitional Manufacturing techniques 
(standard parts, volume 






 X  X 




   X 
1907  Integrally cast cylinder block 
and crankcase (Ford) 
1,2c   X   
1908  Vanadium steel (Ford) 1d X 
Europe 
X X  X 
                                                 
a The distinction of user versus supplier interaction is taken from the perspective of the automobile manufacturer.  An innovation that originates with the supplier 
at its initiative is considered to come to the manufacturer through interactions with suppliers. 
b Type denotes (1) product, (2) process, (3) marketing or (4) other innovation. 
c Abernathy et al. (1983) classify these as process innovations.  I give a joint classification to product design changes made for incorporation of innovative 
manufacturing techniques. 
d Abernathy et al. (1983) classify this (and material changes in general) as a process change.  Given our discussion of the impact of the use of vanadium steel on 
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Doing Users Suppliers 
1908  Detachable cylinder head 
(Ford) 
1,2b   X   
1908  Magneto integrated in 
flywheel (Ford) 
1,2b   X   
1909  Branch assembly (Ford) 2   X   
1910-
1920 
Specific Functional definition: basic, reliable, inexpensive, personal transportation capable of traveling long 
distances and negotiating rough roads 
Dominant design: water-cooled, four-stroke, four-cylinder, gasoline internal combustion engine mounted 
vertically under a front hood; shaft drive; magneto; steering wheel 
Dominant business model: capitally intensive volume production using standard parts (Fordist production) 
1910  Closed body (Fisher on 
Cadillac)e 
1    X X 
1912  Electric spot welding (Hale & 




   X 
1912  All-steel body (Hale & Kilburn 
on Hupmobile)f  
1   X  X 





   X 
                                                 
e This marks the first mass production (150 units) of closed bodies.  The first closed body, made of a wood frame and steel panels, was introduced in 1898 by 
Columbia Electric. 
f The first all-metal body automobile was a 1902 Marmon with a cast aluminum body.  The all-steel Hupmobile body was developed by Edward G. Budd at Hale 
& Kilburn, and was only available for one year.  The first mass produced (5,000 units) all-steel bodies were built for Dodge by the Edward G. Budd 
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Doing Users Suppliers 




 X   
1914  Large-scale production V-8 
engine (Cadillac) 
1  X    
1914  Mass production of all-steel 
body (Budd on Dodge) 
1     X 




  X 
dealers 
 
1918 Economic shock: post-war recession, overcapacity, and market saturation; precipitates high failure rate and further firm 
consolidation, and thus ever-increasing market concentration 
 Changes in TIEC: new consumer preferences for comfort, style, and performance, due to improved roads, inexpensive 
closed bodies, market saturation, increasing prosperity, increasing role of women in purchases 
1918-
1926 
Transitional        
1921  Market segmentation by 
economic class (GM) 
1,3   X X  




    
1922  Four-wheel hydraulic brakes 
(Lockheed on Duesenberg) 
1  X X  X 
1923  Balloon tires (Firestone) 2  X X  X 
1923  All-steel closed body (Budd 
on Dodge) 
1  X   X 
1923  Tetra-ethyl lead gasoline 
additive (GM) 
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Doing Users Suppliers 




 X X  





X   X 
1926  Standardization of parts 
across product line (GM 
Oakland Pontiac) 
1,2   X   
1926-? Specific Functional definition: stylish, comfortable, personal transportation that conveys social prestige and the 
pleasure of personal ownership. 
Dominant design: electric starter, closed body, competition based on styling, increasing body and engine 
sizes culminating in V-8 engine 
Dominant business model: Large, vertically integrated corporation; “flexible mass production”; staff and line 







Growth in niche markets did not provide the economies of scale that reduced the 
costs of motor vehicles and facilitated diffusion to mass markets.  Further, the needs of 
the mass market were not discovered within the niche market, nor were product 
improvements relative to these needs achieved in the niche market.  And because the vast 
rural market can not be accurately described as a market niche, niche branching, niche 
proliferation, or niche market growth are not accurate descriptions of the diffusion of the 
gasoline motor-vehicle into mass markets.  In fact, niche branching occurred after 
diffusion to the mass market.  The gasoline motor vehicle conquered the urban niche 
occupied by electric vehicles after being vastly improved for use in the mass market.   
Therefore, the role of niche markets in the transitional phase and early specific 
phase of the automobile is not consistent with the characterization found in the MLP and 
QE theories of transitions.  This, however, is not to say that niche markets were not 
important or possibly even critical.  Competing technological configurations first found 
applications in niche markets which served to demonstrate technical feasibility relative to 
niche market needs.  These markets also demonstrated the relative advantages, as well as 
the limitations, of each alternative.  Within the niches, firms developed technical 
capabilities, established reputations, and formed networks for financing, manufacturing, 
and sales.  Racing was extremely important in working out technological issues and 
demonstrating to the public the capabilities and the performance of automobiles generally 
and of technological options and manufacturers specifically.  This role will be discussed 
further in section 6.3.5.   
 
474 
Finally, while learning from users and learning-by-doing were important 
mechanisms in improving the performance and cost of early motor vehicles, they were 
not the only significant ones.  Table 6-1 shows a striking contribution from spillovers and 
learning by interacting with suppliers.  This finding supports the assertion that the MLP 
and QE theories would benefit from a more complete description of the learning 
mechanisms involved in the co-evolutionary technological and institutional adaptations 
that facilitate diffusion.  It also has implications for the definition of the technological 
nexus, as discussed in section 6.4. 
6.4 Mutual Adaptations and the Technological Nexus 
In QE theory, variation and selection are coupled through institutional linkages 
that constitute the ‘technological nexus.’  Actors serving in the nexus role translate the 
requirements of the selection environment into objectives for technological development 
and also alter the selection environment, in part by imposing the requirements of 
technology on the selection environment.  These activities produce co-evolutionary 
technological and institutional adaptations that facilitate wider diffusion and result in the 
new technology becoming embedded in the wider socio-technical complex.83 
This section reviews the activities aimed at altering variation and selection, as 
well as other forces that produce mutual adaptations in the technology and institutions. I 
find that the technological nexus concept is useful in understanding the process of 
                                                 
83 Recall that in the framework presented in section 2.6 institutions are defined to include both 
organizations and rules (cognitive, normative, and regulative).  They include any form of social construct 
or constraint on human interactions, including organizational constructs, such as governmental bodies and 
research and industry organizations; formal constraints, such as legislation, economic rules, and legal 
contracts; and tacit constraints, such as shared perceptions, beliefs, social customs, and moral codes.  For 
example, races are a social custom with shared cultural meaning and expectations and therefore are an 
institution that shapes interactions. 
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embedding.  However, I find that this process occurred simultaneously with or lagged 
behind the diffusion of the automobile into the mass market rather than within the context 
of niche markets.  I also find that the technological nexus concept is not sufficient for 
understanding all the important forces behind the co-evolution of technologies and 
institutions.  I identify four deficiencies in the nexus description and suggest some ideas 
that would complement the nexus concept.   
Enthusiast publications and the popular press were the first institutions to emerge 
in the nexus role.  They facilitated communication among engineers and altered selection 
by influencing public opinion and expectations of motor vehicles, the technological 
options and specific manufacturers.  In this role, they were not necessarily a source of 
unbiased information.  Manufacturers also made extensive use of the press, beginning 
with Pope’s initiation of the press interview as a means to introduce new models.  
Through the Association of Licensed Automobile Manufacturers (ALAM) and its 
counterpart, the American Motor Car Manufacturers Association (AMCMA), 
manufacturers used the press extensively to sway public opinion and reassure consumers 
during the Selden patent dispute.   
The press initiated another institution, racing, that shaped both variation and 
selection.  Racing was established first in Europe and evolved from the custom for 
bicycles.  Speed and reliability races demonstrated the capabilities of the technical 
options and specific models, thus shaping public perceptions and also stimulating the 
interest of investors.  Thus, by directing funding to particular technologies and 
manufacturers, races and demonstrations influenced the direction of variation. 
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However, Ford argued that races also limited the industry’s early development 
(Ford and Crowther, 1922).  The technology itself – its very existence, its specific design, 
and its use – alters the selection environment.  The first functional definition of the 
automobile and its use in that function initially served to inhibit diffusion into wider 
markets.  As conspicuous spectacles, races reinforced public opinion that motor vehicles 
were no more than toys for the very wealthy.  In addition, the use of automobiles by 
wealthy motorists in elaborate festivities and reckless touring aroused indignation and 
anger in those with lower financial status.  However, this negative opinion faded after the 
introduction of inexpensive motor vehicles that provided a valuable and affordable 
function for these populations.  Ransom Olds served in the nexus role by interpreting 
initial public skepticism into design requirements for the curved dash – simplicity of use 
and repair.  Experience with using this vehicle then served to overcome the skepticism 
that necessitated its design specifications, thereby easing the ‘harsh’ selection 
environment.  Ford’s interpretation of market requirements and the resulting vehicle 
designs continued this mutual adaptation. 
Other activities of manufacturers through emerging industry trade organizations 
served the nexus role.  The ALAM and the AMCMA in particular were conceived as 
organizations to connect manufacturers to each other and to customers by arranging for 
public exhibition new vehicles (trade shows); promoting races; promoting the sale of 
members’ cars; encouraging public interest in automobiles; promoting good roads; and 
through the exchange of technical information.  In enforcing the Selden patent, the 
ALAM claimed to be protecting the industry from disreputable manufacturers that would 
have created public distrust and a negative opinion of the automobile.  By restricting 
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licenses and controlling production output, the ALAM also sought to maintain high 
prices, thus affecting variation.  The issue was settled by the legal system, and these 
higher level rules ultimately supported the independent manufacturers of the AMCMA, 
though this group had already disbanded.  After the legal decision in 1911, the ALAM’s 
boundary spanning role was transferred to the Automobile Board of Trade and then, in 
1914, to the National Automobile Chamber of Commerce (NACC).  The ALAM’s 
technical work was transferred to another prominent industry organization, the Society of 
Automobile Engineers (SAE), which served as a linkage among manufacturers and 
suppliers.  While the SAE did not connect manufacturers to customers, it did influence 
both variation and selection.  As a technical society, the SAE represented the shared 
knowledge base which served as a cognitive constraint on innovation by shaping the 
perceptions of engineers. But more significantly, the confusion caused by the huge 
number of parts used by the industry constituted an adverse selection environment which 
the SAE attempted to alleviate through parts standardization.  While the organization 
succeeded at easing the parts burden and improving the quality of materials, it was unable 
to make the selection environment significantly more benign for small manufacturers. 
Other than the Selden patent dispute, the automobile industry was fairly free to 
develop without governmental restrictions during the emergent and first transitional 
phase.  However, formal constraints on automobile use were emerging in the form of 
local and state speed and registration laws.  Initially, these laws were misaligned with the 
capabilities of the automobile and served to limit its usefulness and therefore its 
diffusion.  Through motoring clubs, enthusiasts joined forces with manufacturers to 
remove this element from the selection environment, eventually shifting efforts from 
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opposition to coordination.  In this process, the purpose of motoring clubs shifted from 
organizing social activities for the wealthy elite to activism for all motorists.  By 1910, 
registration laws were more coherent and actually served to create a more benign 
selection environment, since fees were used for road improvements. 
The first instance of government action related to the environmental health effects 
of automobile use arose during the second transitional phase after the introduction of 
tetra-ethyl lead (TEL).  An industrial incident and the statements of university experts 
and the federal Public Health Service (PHS) raised the TEL issue to national attention.  
However, institutions to protect public and worker health were still in their infancy and 
the federal government had no authority to regulate chemicals in 1925.  Thus, although 
the use of TEL was misaligned with a rising national consciousness about worker and 
public health, no formal legislative rules were in place to block its use.  GM actively 
worked to refute the claims of these experts and the PHS was unable to make conclusive 
statements regarding the health effects of long-term exposure.  In addition, the courts 
found Standard Oil innocent of criminal negligence in the illness and deaths related to the 
TEL plant accident.  Therefore, GM’s efforts at altering the selection environment were 
successful and the controversy faded. 
The poor condition of roads initially had served to limit the usefulness of the 
automobile and was a major design consideration for inexpensive vehicles.  Once again, 
motorists, through clubs, joined forces with manufacturers to promote road 
improvements.  Many of these agents were continuing efforts they had undertaken as 
bicycle enthusiasts and manufacturers.  Because motor vehicles offered an alternative to 
railroads for transporting agricultural goods, farmers joined these efforts around 1909 
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through the National Grange.  Farmers were motivated by economics and by the 
perceived abuses of monopoly power and price discrimination by the railroad, an issue 
brought to national attention by Progressives. The Good Roads movement produced 
modest results, but improvements were overtaken by the increasing demands of motor 
vehicle use until the appropriation of federal funding for road improvements beginning in 
1916.  But the major breakthrough in road construction resulted from the industry’s 
response to events that occurred during WWI which demonstrated the feasibility of both 
long-distance trucking to transport freight and the year-round use of highways. 
While motorists’ and manufacturers’ efforts to coordinate registration laws and 
improve roads did alter the selection environment, they did not simultaneously influence 
technology development.  Therefore, they cannot be designated as nexus activities as 
described by QE theory.  However, these actions indirectly influenced the technology and 
resulted in mutual adaptations.  This feedback came through consumer expectations as 
roads were dramatically improved after the war and the idea of year-round use became 
common.   This change was one of several factors that initiated a second transitional 
phase, or era of innovative ferment, between 1918 and 1926.  As a result, the 
automobile’s functional requirements and attributes were significantly altered to align 
with the much improved condition of roads.  Two other related factors contributed to the 
second transitional phase: market saturation and the used car problem.  Manufacturers’ 
innovative responses to these challenges – time sales and annual model changes – were 
designed to alter the selection environment. 
By the beginning of the specific phase (1910), mutual adaptation had resulted in a 
dominant design that was aligned with existing physical infrastructure (roads and a 
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dispersed refueling system) and supporting organizations were actively working to 
improve that infrastructure as well as legislative rules that created an adverse selection 
environment.  Thus, the process of embedding was well underway and many of the 
activities responsible for the co-evolution of technologies and institutions were consistent 
with QE theory’s technological nexus description.  However, most of these adaptations 
occurred during the transitional phase and were simultaneous with or lagged behind the 
diffusion of the automobile into the mass market.  In addition, they continued and were 
reinvigorated with the onset of the second transitional phase. 
As an agent associated with niche markets, the ALAM worked to protect these 
niches and restrict market diffusion.84  Motoring clubs also represented a niche market 
(wealthy touring) but changed roles during the process to represent the needs of the mass 
market.  One prominent nexus agent, Albert Pope, was drawn from a competing regime 
(bicycles) and was initially associated with a niche market (electric vehicles).  Pope 
apparently viewed motor vehicles as an opportunity – a solution to falling bicycle sales – 
rather than a threat and adapted his role to support rather than stifle the emerging 
industry.  He also eventually adapted from manufacturing electric vehicles to gasoline 
vehicles.  Pope’s activities demonstrate the potential significance of existing networks 
and agents to emerging industries. 
This research provides evidence that the technological nexus concept is useful in 
understanding the process of embedding but suggests that it is not sufficient.  I identify 
four deficiencies in the nexus description of the interactions that produce technological 
and institutional adaptations.  In general, these deficiencies stem from the singular focus 
                                                 
84 The ALAM attempted to maintain the motor vehicle’s standing as an expensive product for the wealthy.  




on agent activities that directly link variation and selection and result in simultaneous 
adaptations. 
First, some of the important linkages between variation and selection are not 
mediated by agents, but arise from system properties.  For example, saturation of the 
wealthy touring market prior to 1910 served to down-select specific firms and thus 
influenced variation.  Similarly, activities that alter the selection environment may not 
directly alter variation (or vice versa), but the system structure and properties may create 
indirect feedbacks that do.  This is illustrated by the chain from activities of motoring 
clubs to improved funding for roads to altered consumer preferences to the re-
specification of vehicle design.   
Third, the technological nexus does not account for all the linkages among agents 
which are important to bringing about technological and institutional adaptations.  
Throughout the history reviewed here, suppliers were extremely important as originators 
of or collaborators in product innovations.  This suggests that two networks that are not 
included in the technological nexus are crucial to understanding technological adaptations 
to selection pressures.  The first is the manufacturer-supplier relationship.  Second and 
less obvious is the relationship between suppliers and consumers of the end-product.  
This raises an interesting question for further study, especially in relation to innovation in 
the automobile industry today: how do suppliers collect and interpret information from a 
selection environment to which they are not directly connected?   
Finally, events that arise outside the system, like WWI or the Panic of 1907, may 
directly alter the selection environment, stimulate agent responses that directly or 
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indirectly influence it, or alter the resources available to certain firms for innovation.  
Such events can be critical in enabling, altering, or halting the process of embedding. 
In addition, this research suggests some ideas that would complement the nexus 
concept.  First, particular individuals with high visibility, resources and influence might 
serve as ‘nexus champions,’ promoting institutional and technological co-adaptations in 
much the same spirit as ‘product champions’ promote specific innovations.  Examples 
from this historic review include the role of Albert Pope in championing the Good Roads 
movement and Henry Ford’s role in championing the rights of the independent 
manufacturers during the Selden patent dispute.  Second, the combination of the 
boundary spanning nexus role, exogenous events, and the effects of system structure and 
properties yields synergies that produce greater impact on variation and selection than the 
sum of the impact of each process occurring in isolation.  This typical feature of complex 
system dynamics is illustrated by the multiple factors and processes that initiated the 
second transitional phase from 1918-1926. 
6.5 Other Factors 
This section 6.5discusses factors related to niche-regime interaction that were 
important in facilitating the transition to motor vehicles, including the role of the 
compatibility of the automobile with existing regimes, the stability of existing and 
emerging regimes, and the role of exogenous events.  I find that the diffusion of the 
motor vehicle is more consistent with a fit-stretch pattern of gradual unfolding and 
adaptation than one of niche proliferation and rapid regime renewal.  I also find that the 
combination of instabilities in multiple existing regimes provided opportunities for the 
emerging automobile industry.  While a process of alignment was increasing the stability 
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of the automobile industry during the first specific phase, I find support for the argument 
that a stable regime did not coalesce until the second specific phase when the technology 
abandoned the last vestiges of carriage styling and automobile production techniques 
became fully aligned with new, higher level rules in the TIEC. 
6.5.1 Compatibility and Fit-Stretch 
Section 2.4.2 described a diffusion pattern of hybridization that Geels (2002) 
asserts may occur in unstable regimes.  In this process, new technologies are merged with 
existing ones to solve particular problems in the existing regime with a minimum of 
disruption to that regime.  Continuous development eventually leads to the articulation of 
new functionalities related to the novelty’s capabilities and new technical designs are 
tailored to these functions.  Over time, the hybrid technology’s form and function co-
evolve through a fit-stretch pattern as illustrated in Figure 2-2.   
Although problems were arising with the expanding scale of the carriage-based 
transportation regime in urban use, the regime was still relatively stable, particularly for 
serving rural transport.  However, the development and diffusion of motor vehicles shows 
many parallels with the hybridization pathway and fit-stretch pattern. 
The first gasoline-powered vehicles can easily be described as a combination of a 
new technology with elements of the existing regime.  Some of the vehicles built during 
the emergent phase consisted of a small gasoline internal combustion engine attached 
under a carriage’s floorboards and connected to the wheels using a chain drive adapted 
from bicycles.  Even after commercial production began in the transitional phase, many 
automobiles were constructed using bicycle wheels attached to bodies produced by 
carriage manufacturers.  Indeed, most of the inexpensive vehicles that first penetrated the 
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mass market were still merely motorized horse buggies (Flink, 1988).  The design 
gradually evolved, departing from the restrictions dictated by horse power and taking 
greater advantage of the options and capabilities afforded by the gasoline engine.  By 
1910, when the first dominant design emerged, the engine had been moved to the front 
and enclosed under a hood; a steering wheel had replaced the tiller; and a rotating shaft 
had replaced the chain drive.  The last vestiges of carriage styling disappeared with the 
emergence of the second dominant design incorporating the all-steel closed body in 
introduced in 1923 and the integrated design of the stylists’ car in 1927. 
With the cumulative effects of a century of innovation in the firearms, sewing 
machine, and bicycle industries, the manufacture of automobiles also required only that 
skills and knowledge be “transferred from existing uses to new ones” (Rosenberg, 1963).  
These manufacturing processes then evolved to meet the specific needs of the technology 
and were soon providing improvements to machine tools that diffused to other industries.  
Eventually, an entirely new production system was developed by the industry that was 
suited to the requirements of high-volume, high-quality, low-cost production.  Again, the 
last vestige of manufacturing techniques inherited from the carriage industry disappeared 
with adoption of all-steel bodies. 
Vehicle design was also tailored to the physical infrastructure of existing regimes.  
Practical automobiles were capable of negotiating rough roads and could be repaired by 
mechanics experienced with stationary engines and farm machinery.  Gasoline vehicles 
gained a market advantage over steam and electricity in part because fuel was widely 
available through a dispersed system established for the production and distribution of 
kerosene for lighting and heating.  Beginning during the first specific phase, the 
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requirements of the automobile were then imposed on the infrastructure.  Roads were 
improved and gasoline of predictable quality became available at dedicated stations.  In 
1923, a fuel additive was developed to enable higher compression ratios.  By the late 
1920s, road improvements made faster, year-round driving possible, and these 
capabilities were reflected in a new dominant design that was lower to the ground and 
incorporated all-steel closed bodies 
Combining this description with the findings of section 6.3, it appears that the 
diffusion of the automobile is more characteristic of Geels’ (2002) hybridization 
mechanism described in section 2.4.2 and the general fit-stretch pattern shown in Figure 
2-2 than niche proliferation.   Indeed, one could argue that the gradual unfolding of the 
automobile regime represented an internal transition (see section 2.6) for the carriage and 
bicycle industries.  Indeed, the bicycle industry clearly went into rapid senescence with 
the emergence of motor vehicles and many manufacturers adapted to automobile 
manufacturing.  However, supporting the argument for internal transition would require a 
more thorough study of the disruption to the carriage industry, specifically an analysis of 
the number of firms that adapted to automobile manufacture, the number that failed, and 
the number of new firms that arose from outside either the carriage or bicycle industries. 
6.5.2 Regime Stability 
As discussed in section 6.3, problems had emerged in rail and draft animal 
regimes by 1900.  Business practices of the railroads were becoming misaligned with the 
trend toward Progressivism, while the success and growth of the carriage regime 
combined with increasing population densities was causing difficulties continuing on that 
trajectory.  Meanwhile, the emerging bicycle regime was facing technological limits just 
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as its success was altering consumer perceptions and creating demand for greater 
performance.  These instabilities did provide opportunities for the emerging automobile 
industry, but mainly through their combination.  The emerging misalignments in multiple 
regimes provided an opportunity for electric cars to enter the urban niche.  Meanwhile, 
the combination of misalignments in multiple regimes and the articulation of a new 
functionality opened a new niche for touring and later contributed to wider diffusion.  In 
addition, the automobile itself was aligned with increasing individualism; this was 
particularly true for gasoline cars since touring conveyed a sense of freedom never before 
experienced. Again, the coincidence of developments and processes in multiple regimes 
and within niches is critical to understanding the emergence of the motor vehicle. 
As the automobile industry developed, the success of the Ford Motor Company 
can be partially attributed to the alignment of Fordism with evolving higher-level rules 
within the TIEC regarding capitalism, mechanistic reductionism, and the value of 
efficiency.  This success in turn reinforced those trends.  A process of embedding, as 
discussed in section 6.3.5, began in the transitional phase and continued through the 
specific phase, bringing the technology, industry, institutions and infrastructure into 
further alignment.  Development of aligned physical infrastructures for roads and 
refueling began periods of significant growth late in the first specific phase and became a 
major factor in the second transitional phase.   
Although many institutions were still in their infancy and dedicated physical 
infrastructure lagged behind diffusion of the automobile, the trend toward alignment gave 
the industry some stability in the first specific phase.  However, this stability was 
undermined by an exogenous event – the post-war recession – and by evolving consumer 
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preferences that became misaligned with the existing dominant product design.  Four 
factors contributed to this misalignment: 1) the increasing influence of women in the 
automobile market; 2) market saturation; 3) road improvements; and 4) the introduction 
of mass produced all-steel closed bodies.  The first of these is an exogenous development 
in the TIEC.  The second and third factors can be attributed to the success of the 
automobile.  The fourth is a breakthrough innovation.  Once the automobile had been 
redefined and a new dominant design had emerged, the product and consumer 
preferences were realigned, marking the start of the second specific phase. 
In chapter 2, I asserted that a socio-technical regime is understood to exist when a 
technology and sector have achieved the specific phase and when the stability of that 
specific phase is supported by the alignment of institutions and existing physical 
infrastructure with the dominant product design, production processes, and organizational 
forms.  Although supporting rules, organizations, and physical infrastructures were 
certainly co-evolving with the automobile during the first specific phase, one could argue 
that a regime did not coalesce until the second specific phase.  This is consistent with 
Nieuwenhuis and Wells’ (2007) argument that true mass production did not occur until 
the development of the all-steel closed-body car in 1923.  At that point, the production 
process was completely aligned with the ‘new’ rules regarding capitalism, mechanistic 
reductionism, and efficiency.  This argument is also consistent with the gradual unfolding 
of the regime as presented in section 6.5.1, which describes the complete break of the 
technology design from the old regime with the introduction of the stylists’ car, the GM 
La Salle, in 1927.  This marks the completion of the fit-stretch pattern as shown in Figure 
2-2.  In this interpretation, the industry might be considered to have experienced a 26-
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year transition, with the period from 1910-1918 representing a lull in the era of ferment.  
However, without a measurable definition of ‘alignment’ and ‘stability,’ the 
determination of whether an industry is in the specific phase or has achieved the status of 
a regime remains a subjective one. 
6.5.3 Role of Exogenous Events 
In this research, exogenous events or developments are understood as external 
forces that arise with no direct causal linkages to the regime or technology of interest.  
This research identified four notable exogenous developments during the period of this 
study. 
First, the Panic of 1907 occurred just as the high-priced touring market was 
saturating and likely contributed to the drop in sales in this price bracket in 1908.  
Therefore, it also contributed to the shakeout phenomenon by contributing to the failure 
of firms manufacturing these vehicles in 1908, when the highest number of firms exited 
the industry.  Thus, the interaction of a random event and developments in the selection 
environment influenced variation and further reinforced the trend toward less expensive 
vehicles and the emerging dominant design.  In addition, by reducing sales of high-priced 
cars and likely influencing the financial position of Alexander Malcomson, the Panic of 
1907 also serendipitously supported Henry Ford’s efforts to gain financial control of the 
Ford Motor Company.   Finally, funding for the ALAM’s Mechanical Branch was cut as 
a result of the panic and its work was transferred to the SAE in 1910. 
Second, the influenza epidemic of 1920 took the lives of John and Horace Dodge.  
The Dodge widows eventually sold the firm to bankers who were unable to manage it 
successfully.  In 1928, this presented an opportunity for Chrysler to expand its 
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distribution and sales network, add production capabilities, achieve economies of scale in 
production and research, and reduce competition.  With the purchase of Dodge, Chrysler 
became the third largest U.S. automaker. 
Third, WWI and the post-war recession had both immediate and co-evolutionary 
impacts on the industry.  Many small firms that were struggling, particularly those 
manufacturing larger vehicles, converted to war-time production of trucks and continued 
in this market after the war.  The industry’s response to the nation’s call for help in the 
war effort also demonstrated the feasibility of both year-round road travel and long-haul 
trucking for freight transport.  This led to increased federal funding for road construction 
and shifted consumer perceptions of motor vehicle use.  Then, many firms did not survive 
the post-war recession.  Those that did were fundamentally altered as this event triggered 
a transitional phase. 
Finally, the increasing role of women in motor vehicle market decisions also 
factored into the initiation of a transitional phase.  This role reinforced the shift in 
consumer preferences toward closed bodies, lower clearance, and design for style. 
6.6 Conclusions 
6.6.1 Research Questions 
This research supports the assertion that niche markets play a significant role in 
the emergence of a new technology.  For the automobile industry, competing 
technological configurations first found applications in niche markets.  These niches 
served to demonstrate the feasibility of the technology relative to niche market needs and 
the technology’s limitations.  They also served to demonstrate the relative advantages of 
alternative technological approaches compared to each other and to the existing regime.  
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Firm capabilities and reputations were established in the niche and networks were formed 
for financing, manufacturing, and sales.  The technology was initially extremely 
immature, and user feedback assisted manufacturers in improving the product’s 
performance relative to users’ needs. 
However, this study also demonstrated that the role of niche markets was not 
consistent with the assertions of the niche hypothesis and that the process of niche 
branching, niche accumulation or niche proliferation is not an accurate description of the 
transition to motor vehicles.  The product was improved within niche markets, but only as 
defined by niche market requirements; the core requirements for the mass market, 
particularly the need for a combination of high quality and low cost, were not being 
addressed.  Further, the initial niche market for gasoline motor vehicles, the wealthy 
touring market, did not widen; by 1907 it was actually saturating.  In addition, prices 
were not reduced in this niche market; they were in fact rising.  Meanwhile, the market 
for mid-priced cars, which represented more functional uses but still consisted of wealthy 
consumers, was growing slowly.  However, product and process improvements were 
again geared toward the needs of this market for higher quality and power. 
Instead, cost reductions from learning-by-doing and scale economies were 
realized simultaneously with a product redefinition that moved the automobile out of the 
wealthy niches into the mass market.  Subsequently, product improvements for the mass 
market were accomplished in the mass market.  While learning from users and learning-
by-doing were important in this innovative process, it also involved a wider set of 
learning mechanisms, with spillovers and learning-by-interacting with suppliers figuring 
prominently.  For the gasoline motor vehicle, niche branching into the urban niche 
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occurred after diffusion to the mass market.  Finally, the transition to automobiles is more 
appropriately described as a process of unfolding consistent with the mechanism of 
hybridization, where elements of old regimes are combined with new technologies. 
This research finds that that the technological nexus concept is useful in 
understanding the co-evolution of technology and institutions, but also finds that it does 
not provide a complete description of this process.  Important factors not included in the 
technological nexus include supplier networks, exogenous events, and feedbacks arising 
from system structure and properties.  Due to system dynamics, the combination of these 
factors yields synergies that produce greater impact on variation and selection than the 
sum of the impact of each process occurring in isolation. 
In conclusion, the product requirements for niche markets are, by definition, 
distinctly different from those of mass markets.  Therefore, learning-by-interacting with 
users in niche markets is inadequate for understanding the needs of the mass market.  
Instead, new technologies diffuse to mass markets simultaneously with a redefinition of 
the product that specifies appropriate functional requirements for the mass market.  For 
example, the computer was originally conceived as a technology for scientific 
applications, but moved into the mass market after being redefined to provide functions 
like word processing that were valuable to a wider market.  The underlying process of 
redefinition is likely to be unique for each technology, though general patterns may 
emerge.  For the automobile, this redefinition was the result of the personal beliefs, 
values, experience, and inspiration of the entrepreneurs.  Finally, supplier networks and 
linkages to other industries and regimes are critical to understanding the innovations that 
improve performance relative to mass market needs and facilitate diffusion. 
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6.6.2 Implications for Theory 
The goal of this dissertation was to answer specific policy-relevant questions 
regarding the role of niche markets in the transition to new socio-technical regimes.  This 
research did not attempt to develop a new model of innovation or a complete theory of 
technological transitions, but rather used concepts and insights from several bodies of 
theory to investigate the research questions.  However, this research has important 
implications for the theory of socio-technical transitions. 
First, this research found that the QE and MLP theories of socio-technical 
transitions would benefit from a richer description of innovation as provided by the 
mechanisms of learning described in section 2.5.2.   
Second, evolutionary theories generally assert that innovation is triggered by new 
scientific or technical breakthroughs and relegate social and institutional issues to the role 
of ‘focusing devices.’  In QE theory, social and institutional issues are actively addressed 
by ‘heterogeneous engineers’ to realize successful designs.  In the MLP, these issues 
provide opportunities for new technologies to serve as a solution, thereby creating a 
niche.  Thus, transitions occur when processes on different levels link up and reinforce 
one another.  This research has shown that social and institutional issues can trigger an 
era of ferment and even serve as the basis of an innovation, such as scientific 
management or Fordism.  This finding is consistent with the description of innovation 
presented in section 2.6, where of the role of the entrepreneur is to create value by 
exploiting any change in the TIEC – technical, institutional (economic, social, etc.), or 
ecological. Thus, the role of social and institutional factors in innovation could be even 
more central than the description found in the QE and MLP theories. 
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Third, the QE and MLP theories tend to focus on a single existing regime, though 
the theories themselves do not preclude the influence of multiple regimes.  Meanwhile, 
this research found that the combination of misalignments in multiple regimes and other 
developments in the TIEC were critical to understanding why the automobile industry 
emerged when it did and in the particular niche markets that it did.  Therefore, these 
theories would benefit from a more explicit accounting of the interactions among 
multiple regimes and niches. 
Fourth, in chapter 5, I found that firm histories, the personal beliefs and 
perspectives of firm leaders, and corporate structures and culture – i.e., firm-specific rules 
– shaped individual firm strategies for innovation and their adaptive capabilities.  These 
firm-specific rules had a large impact on the development of the technology and the 
industry as a whole.  This finding supports the use of a behavioral approach with a micro-
focus in the analysis of innovation and socio-technical change.  Thus, theories of socio-
technical transition would benefit from the incorporation of concepts from micro-level 
theories, such as research in the sociology of entrepreneurship, institutional logic, and 
institutional entrepreneurship, among others. 
6.6.3 Implications for Policy 
Complex co-evolutionary systems present difficult challenges for policy-makers. 
Agents are widely dispersed throughout a network with diffuse connections that are often 
obscure.  Meanwhile, the elements of the TIEC and the attributes of the product and 
production system are continually changing and adapting.  These features combine to 
complicate the identification of targets for regulations, incentives, and sanctions.  
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Influencing such systems requires complex decision-making and complex, adaptive 
policy strategies (Rycroft and  Kash, 1999). 
In addition to local problems, the expansion of the current transportation regime 
based on personal gasoline ICE vehicles is posing large-scale problems, including 
dependence on a finite fossil resource that is concentrated in regions outside our control 
and contributions to global climate change through the emission of greenhouse gases.  
Alternative technologies currently available to solve these problems all fall short of the 
existing regime on one or a number of functional requirements such as cost, performance, 
reliability, fuel availability, convenience, and social acceptability.  Current research and 
policy aim to alleviate these deficiencies. 
Though many efforts are underway to improve the tools available for analysis, 
policies generally fail to account for the difficulties presented by co-evolutionary 
systems.  For example, the existence or lack of opportunities, technological or 
institutional, arising outside the regime of interest typically is not represented in policy 
analyses.  Further, models used for these analyses typically do not consider the potential 
for conditions such as consumer and societal valuations to change or for new 
opportunities to arise in the TIEC.  Because of these facts, niche management and other 
policies may be slow or insufficient to bring alternative technologies into widespread use 
and may yield unexpected and suboptimal results.   
Below I use two cases to illustrate how co-evolutionary issues not considered in 
typical policy-making can yield unexpected and unsatisfactory results.  First, the failure 
of ZEV mandates to bring electric vehicles into widespread use illustrates the 
shortcomings of niche management when new opportunities arise within the TIEC due to 
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co-evolutionary effects of the regulation itself.  Second, the outcome of CAFE legislation 
is used to illustrate how failure to account for changing consumer preferences due to co-
evolutionary effects can erode the benefits of policy.  Both policies altered the selection 
environment by specifying functional requirements for new vehicles.  This discussion is 
not intended to provide a thorough policy analysis, but rather to illustrate the policy 
implications of the co-evolutionary perspective. 
6.6.3.1 California’s ZEV Mandate 
In 1990, the California Air Resources Board (CARB) realized it would have 
serious difficulty meeting federally-mandated air quality goals under the Clean Air Act.  
In response, CARB passed low-emission vehicle (LEV) regulations establishing state-
level exhaust emission standards that were more stringent than those established at the 
national level.  The regulations also established the Zero Emission Vehicle (ZEV) 
program, which required that 2% of new vehicles sold in the state beginning in 1998 have 
zero emissions.  The fraction beginning in 2003 was set at 10%.  In 1990, the battery-
powered electric vehicle was the only vehicle capable of meeting the ZEV criteria of zero 
tailpipe and zero evaporative emissions.  
Because auto manufacturers claimed they could not meet the 1998 deadline, 
CARB delayed implementation until 2003, but the 10% rule for that year remained.  
After the original LEV regulations were drafted, Honda and Toyota offered hybrid 
electric vehicles for sale in the U.S.  In part due to this new technological opportunity, 
CARB revised the ZEV rules in 2001, creating two new categories of standards for 
partial ZEVs (PZEVs) and advanced technology partial ZEVs (AT-PZEVs).  To be 
certified as a PZEV, a vehicle must meet the most stringent LEV emission standard 
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(super ultra-low emission or SULEV85) and have no evaporative emissions.  Provisions 
were made for manufacturers to claim partial credit toward the ZEV mandate for the sale 
of both types of PZEVs, but a fraction of the ZEV mandate had to be met with AT-
PZEVs.   
In 2002, manufacturers challenged the legality of the revised mandate and 
implementation was delayed by the courts pending the outcome of the suit.  California 
further revised the ZEV rules, hoping to put an end to the legal battle and restore the 
program by 2005.  Negotiated with the auto manufacturers, the new rules allow more 
credits from PZEVs but require that manufacturers produce a minimum number of fuel 
cell and electric vehicles – when they become economically feasible.  
The goal of the LEV regulation was to bring the state into compliance with the 
Clean Air Act.  Meanwhile, the official goal of the ZEV mandate was to promote the 
development of advanced technology for zero emissions.  In total, the policy may be seen 
as two-pronged.  The LEV standards served a short-term goal of doing better with 
existing technology until an alternative was commercially available; functional 
requirements (emission standards) were established that were attainable in the near-term.  
The ZEV mandate was intended to serve the longer term goal of developing the 
alternative technology; zero emissions represented a long-term goal for the functional 
requirements of automobiles.   
In general, setting targets in terms of functional requirements allows industry to 
determine the most cost effective technology available to meet policy goals.  However, 
                                                 
85 As modified in 2004, the LEV regulations contain standards for certifying vehicles as low emission 
(LEV), ultra-low emission (ULEV), and super ultra-low emission (SULEV) vehicles. For passenger cars, 
ULEV tailpipe emissions are reduced by 50-84% compared to federal Tier 1 emissions while SULEV 
tailpipe emissions are reduced by 76%-97%. 
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the ZEV mandate was widely regarded as a policy to promote one particular technology – 
electric vehicles – and this interpretation is supported by the most recent policy revision 
that specifies requirements for electric and fuel cell vehicles.  Essentially, CARB officials 
attempted to use the opportunity presented by short-term local problems with moving 
forward in the current regime to create a niche for electric vehicles, which could serve as 
a solution to a long-term global problem.  Proponents of the original rules were optimistic 
that a niche market would be created, eventually leading to commercially viable models.  
But after fifteen years, the rules had not been implemented and the market was still non-
existent.  As a means for advancing electric vehicle technology, the regulation had failed.   
Using the lessons and language from this dissertation, we can propose a plausible 
explanation of what happened and why.  First, automakers actively sought to alter the 
selection environment by lobbying for a delay in implementation and then challenging 
the legality of the regulations under federal law.  Lobbying efforts claimed that the state-
level rules were misaligned with the technology’s and industry’s capabilities.  The legal 
challenge claimed that state-level rules were misaligned with federal-level rules.   
Second, automakers responded to the altered selection environment by developing 
innovations within the existing socio-technological paradigm that required no adaptation 
on the part of users.  As a result, before the 2003 effective date of the ZEV mandate, 
many conventional gasoline vehicles were capable of meeting the stringent SULEV 
emission standard established in the LEV regulations.  Incremental improvements in 
electronic engine and catalytic control technologies were able to meet the overarching 
goals of the ZEV program – reducing automotive emissions.  In fact, exhaust from a 
certified SULEV may be cleaner than the ambient air in major cities like Los Angeles.  
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Therefore, as an air quality policy, the LEV regulation was extremely successful in 
meeting its short-term goal.  But if policy-makers hoped that the ZEV provision of the 
regulation would serve the longer term goal of facilitating a transition to a new 
technological paradigm, then this part of the policy has been a failure. 
While electric or fuel cell vehicles may appear to be superior technologies for 
solving long-term problems as the transportation system continues to expand in scale, 
incremental improvements yielded products that were “good enough” at solving the 
short-term problem of meeting State Implementation Plans for the Clean Air Act. In 
addition, this solution was compatible (aligned with) with existing use systems 
(infrastructure and rules).  Because these incremental improvements realigned the 
technology with new rules, both legislative and normative, regarding ‘clean’ vehicles, 
this success at least temporarily eliminated an opportunity for niche creation and eroded 
political support for longer-term goals. 
At this point, it remains to be seen whether hybrid electric technology will 
achieve high volume production through niche accumulation or other mechanisms, 
thereby yielding technological improvements and cost reductions in battery and 
component technologies that can be incorporated in full electric vehicles.  Such a 
pathway would be consistent again with Geels (2002) hybridization mechanism and the 
fit-stretch pattern. 
6.6.3.2 CAFE 
In 1973, OPEC production cuts and the Arab oil embargo resulted in a dramatic 
increase in petroleum fuel prices as well as shortages at gasoline stations.  In an effort to 
decrease U.S. dependence on foreign oil, Congress passed the Energy Policy and 
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Conservation Act (EPAct) of 1975, which included regulations known as the Corporate 
Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards for light vehicles. Under CAFE, the sales-
weighted fuel economy of each manufacturer’s fleet of new vehicles must meet or exceed 
the CAFE standard, or the manufacturer must pay fines.  When the standards were 
established, pick-up trucks were used primarily as work vehicles.  Policy-makers set 
lower targets for light trucks in order to maintain the features and capabilities necessary 
to perform in that role.  Figure 6-1 shows that, following passage of CAFE, the new car 
fleet average fuel economy rose from 15.8 mpg in 1978 to 28.6 mpg by 1988.  It hovered 
at or below that value until 2002.  New light truck average fuel economy increased from 
















Cars Light Trucks Light Vehicles
 
Figure 6-1 Average Fuel Economy of New Light Vehicles 
Source: Sales weighted laboratory composite values calculated from 
U.S. EPA (2007b) Appendix E  
Since the establishment of CAFE, the composition of the light vehicle market has 
changed. Figure 6-2 shows that while the market share of pick-up trucks has remained 
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stable at about 15%, the market share of cars has decreased from about 80% to 50% 
while vans and sport utility vehicles have increased from 6% to 32%.  Initially, most of 
the growth in this last category was in medium sized vans and SUVS.  Since 1990, nearly 






















Cars Vans & SUVs Pick-ups
 
Figure 6-2 Market Share of Cars, SUVs, and Pick-ups 
Source: U.S. EPA (2007b) Appendix E 
Apparently, market preferences have shifted since the institution of CAFE 
standards.  To try to understand why, consider the physical attributes of these vehicles.  
Figure 6-3, Figure 6-4, and Figure 6-5 show the EPA rated fuel economy, the sales-
weighted average weight and horsepower-to-weight ratio for the same three classes of 
vehicles as well as the fleet average.  The horsepower-to-weight ratio, or power density, 
generally indicates a vehicle’s ability to accelerate and is therefore a good measure of 
performance or functional capability.  In 1975, cars and pick-ups weighed essentially the 
same and had nearly equal performance.  The industry’s first response to meeting the new 
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standards was to switch to smaller engines and lighten the vehicles by decreasing their 
overall size; decreasing the thickness, and thus the strength, of structural components; 
decreasing insulation; and lightening other components where possible.  The resulting 
cars and trucks were lighter and more fuel efficient, but they were also less powerful as 
witnessed by the drop in power density, as well as noisier, less comfortable, and, many 
argue, less safe.  However, once the CAFE standards were met, technical progress turned 
toward improving these attributes within the constraints of the regulation.  Changes in 
frame and body design have increased strength, while improvements in engine design 
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Figure 6-3 Average Fuel Economy of New Light Vehicles 
Source: Sales weighted laboratory composite values calculated from 

















Cars Vans & SUVs Pick-ups Light Vehicles
 
Figure 6-4 Average Weight of New Light Vehicles 


















Cars Vans & SUVs Pick-ups Light Vehicles
 
Figure 6-5 Average Power Density of New Light Vehicles 
Source: U.S. EPA (2007b) Appendix E 
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What is more significant, however, is that the weight and performance of cars has 
diverged from that of light trucks.  Despite weight increases since 1987, cars have 
remained substantially lighter than they were in 1975.  Vans and SUVs are about the 
same weight as they were in 1980, and pick-ups are considerably heavier than they were.  
Most interestingly, the average light vehicle has returned to about the same weight as it 
was in 1975.  In 1975, the performance of both truck classes was slightly better than that 
of cars, but cars now show a considerably higher power density than either truck class. 
Based on what we have learned about functional definitions and co-evolutionary 
systems, we can propose a tentative theory for what has happened.  In setting different 
standards for cars and light trucks, the CAFE policy actually created a functional 
distinction that did not exist and essentially defined a new class of vehicles.  Cars were 
restricted to vehicles capable of achieving a certain fuel economy given 1970s 
technology.  The attributes that made it difficult for light trucks to meet the more 
stringent car standard fulfilled a functionality that also was available in cars prior to 
CAFE, for example towing boats, campers, and trailers.  To fulfill this function, 
consumers began showing increased preferences for features on vans and SUVs, of which 
there were very few models in 1975.  Manufacturers responded by tailoring this class of 
vehicles into a set of products better suited to fulfill the functionalities no longer available 
in cars as well as those not available on pickup trucks.  Eventually, this vehicle attained a 
set of attributes consistent with a new functional definition and likely incorporated some 
new functions as well.  Meanwhile, the functional requirements and attributes of the car 
changed as well, becoming perhaps more divergent from both classes of light trucks.  
While the state of technology today might allow cars to meet both the CAFE standard for 
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cars and the functions initially shifted to vans and SUVs, a sufficient solution already 
exists and may appeal to a new set of preferences that have evolved with the product. 
Although CAFE successfully raised the average fuel economy of both cars and 
light trucks, the results in improving light vehicle fleet fuel economy were less than 
would be expected given market conditions at the time of promulgation.  The policy did 
induce innovation, but it also altered the TIEC, resulting in the co-evolution of consumer 
preferences, firm strategies, and the technology.  Meanwhile, the policy remained static 
except for minor adjustments in the actual value of the standard.  As a result, the positive 
effects of the policy continued to be eroded until about 2004.  While it is only conjecture, 
the reversal of this trend is likely due to high fuel prices brought on by several factors, 
including hurricane Katrina, difficulties at refineries in meeting new fuel formulation 
standards, the war in Iraq, and market speculation in oil futures.  Further, the CAFE 
standard for light trucks was revised upward in 2006. 
Again, this explanation of the outcomes of CAFE does not represent a thorough 
analysis and would obviously benefit from a careful analysis of the data and other 
evidence.  But it does serve to illustrate unintended consequences of policy intervention 
in co-evolutionary systems. 
6.6.3.3 Summary 
In light of this research, effective policy must consider the functional 
requirements of the technology as defined by consumer demands and preferences; 
potential strategies of firms in responding to policy and the market; and the potential for 
new innovations and developments in the TIEC to alter either consumer preferences or 
firms’ entrepreneurial opportunities, or both.  In addition, policy should provide for 
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feedback and adaptation to changing realities.  This last consideration is extremely tricky 
since leaving policies open for adaptation could mean allowing the potential for revisions 
that run contrary to the policy’s original goals, especially if political influences change. 
In addition, this chapter has repeatedly highlighted the role of multiple 
developments and processes occurring within niches, within multiple regimes, and within 
the wider TIEC in the emergence of the motor vehicle, its diffusion into wider markets, 
and the initiation of new transitional phases or eras of innovative ferment.  These 
developments include:  
1) new scientific or technological breakthroughs; 
2) difficulties moving forward within the existing regime(s) due to: 
a. problems arising from the expanding scale and scope of the existing 
regime(s); 
b. approaching technological limits, real or perceived, of the existing paradigm; 
3) shifting consumer preferences; 
4) misalignments between wider developments in the TIEC (e.g. cultural values, 
world views, etc.) and the existing regime(s); and 
5) unexpected events. 
This result can be interpreted from two perspectives, one passive and one active.  
In the passive interpretation, new technologies emerge and transitions occur when 
multiple developments and misalignments result in a more favorable selection 
environment.  In the active interpretation, transitions occur when entrepreneurs exploit 
the opportunities presented by multiple developments and misalignments.  While the 
difference is subtle, it leads to two different and complementary strategies.  First, 
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policymakers need to develop adaptive policies as discussed above.  This requires that 
they gather sufficient information to sense and respond to the challenges these 
developments pose to existing policy regimes.  Second, policymakers should be taking 
the active role of entrepreneur, searching for, linking, and exploiting opportunities as they 
arise.    
6.7 Future Research 
This research examined the mechanisms of innovation and processes of co-
evolution in the transition to motor vehicles.  The findings presented in this chapter raised 
several questions for additional research that would add depth to the current study.  
Meanwhile, the goal of this research is to inform policy aimed at influencing such a 
transition from the current regime.  Therefore, another natural extension of this research 
would add breadth.  This leads to two agendas for future research regarding innovation 
and transitions in the automobile industry.  
6.7.1 Agenda for Adding Depth 
This research found support for the argument that the gradual unfolding of the 
automobile regime represented an internal transition for the carriage and bicycle 
industries that evolved into a distinct regime in 1926.  Two follow-on studies are 
suggested to further explore this argument.  The first would apply the framework used in 
this study to examine the response of the carriage industry during the same era to 
determine how disruptive this transition was to the existing regime.  Specifically, did the 
regime adapt or did it enter senescence?  The second study would develop quantifiable 
definitions and appropriate measures of ‘alignment,’ and ‘stability’ and a definition of 
‘regime’ based on these measures.  This definition would be developed using a set of 
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industries that have experienced misalignments, instabilities, and transitions.  It would 
then be applied to the automobile history to determine when that industry achieved the 
status of a regime. 
A third study that would add depth to the current research would examine the 
questions raised regarding producer-supplier relationships.  Suppliers were identified as a 
major source of innovation between 1900 and 1927.   This study would focus on 
suppliers that provide parts and components directly to manufacturers (tier one) in the 
current era.  Specifically, this study would address whether suppliers continue to be 
major originators or collaborators in innovation; how suppliers stay in touch with the 
needs of end-consumers; and how the producer-supplier relationship influences 
innovative behavior. 
6.7.2 Agenda for Adding Breadth 
This agenda consists of three studies.  The first would apply the analytic 
framework used in the current study to a more contemporary era for the automobile 
industry beginning in the 1970s.  This study would examine: 1) sources of instability and 
the onset of transitional and specific phase(s); 2) changes in consumer preferences and 
the product functional definition; 3) the emergence of a dominant design; and 4) 
processes of innovation and adaptation.  
The second study would make a more rigorous examination of adaptive consumer 
preferences in the same timeframe.  This study would take advantage of the wealth of 
data available and augment the framework used in the current research with statistical 
analysis. This research would examine how consumers make purchasing decisions, how 
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consumer preferences change in this co-evolutionary context, and how these preferences 
and processes are manifested in the market.   
The third and final study would apply the lessons learned in the current research 
and the two more contemporary studies outlined in this section to analyze recent policy 
measures, including the Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards and the 
California Zero Emission Vehicle (ZEV) mandates. 
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Appendix A: Vehicle Sales and Registrations, 1900-1930 
 
 Automobiles (1,000s) Trucks and Buses (1,000s) Ford (1,000s) 
 Sales Registrations Sales Registrations Sales* 
1900 4.1 8.0    
1901 7.0 14.8    
1902 9.0 23.0    
1903 11.2 32.9    
1904 22.1 54.6 0.7 0.7 1.7 
1905 24.2 77.4 7.0 1.4 1.7 
1906 33.2 105.9 0.8 2.2 1.6 
1907 43.0 140.3 1.0 2.9 8.4 
1908 63.5 194.4 1.5 4.0 6.4 
1909 123.9 306.0 3.2 6.1 10.6 
1910 181.0 458.4 6.0 10.1 18.7 
1911 199.3 618.7 10.6 20.8 34.5 
1912 356.0 901.6 22.0 42.4 78.4 
1913 461.5 1190.4 23.5 67.7 168.3 
1914 548.1 1664 24.9 99.0 248.3 
1915 895.9 2490.9 74.0 158.5 472.4 
1916 1525.5 3617.9 92.1 250.0 730.0 
1917 1745.7 5118.5 128.1 391.1 656.2 
1918 943.4 6160.4 227.2 605.5 498.3 
1919 1651.6 7576.9 224.7 897.8 941.0 
1920 1905.5 9239.2 321.7 1107.6 463.5  
1921 1468.0 10493.7 148.0 1281.5 971.6 
1922 2274.1 12273.6 269.9 1569.5 1306.6 
1923 3624.7 15102.1 409.2 1849.1 2019.0 
1924 3185.8 17612.9 416.6 2176.8 1929.1 
1925 3735.1 20068.5 530.6 2587.5 1920.1 
1926 3692.3 22200.2 608.6 2932.2 1565.3 
1927 2936.5 23303.5 464.7 3110.2 424.4 
1928 3775.4 24688.6 583.3 3326.4 750.3 
1929 4455.1 26704.8 881.9 3583.9 1870.3 
1930 2787.4 26749.9 575.3 3715.1 1451.6 
 
* Ford data for 1904-1917 is for cars only for the model year ending in July of the year given.  
Data for 1918-1930 is for the calendar year and includes trucks. 
 
Sources: Industry – L.P. Cain (2006) Tables Df343-346 and Df339-342; Ford – Nevins and Hill 
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Emergent phase – the emergent phase of a technology begins with the first practical 
application of a new idea (an innovation).  This phase is characterized by radical 
innovation, flexible production capacity, niche markets, and the emergence of new 
firms.  See Table 2-1. 
Exogenous factor - exogenous factors (events or developments) are external forces that 
arise with no identifiable causal linkages to the regime or technology of interest. 
Experimental niche –non-commercial exploration of a technology in a temporary 
societal experiment where it is protected from market selection pressures and from 
the engineering and use practices established by the existing socio-technical regime. 
Fordism –the production system developed at the Ford Motor Company between 1908 
and 1913 entailing large volume production of a single product with centralized 
control.  Elements include highly standardized parts, extensive use of specially-
designed single-purpose machinery, minute subdivision of labor, and the automated 
flow of materials and work (continuous motion). 
Hybridization – the merging of functions, features, and technologies, both old and new, 
from multiple regimes to solve particular problems or provide new functions through 
symbiosis. 
Industrial combination – an aggregation of corporations under a central or controlling 
corporation.  Use of the term ‘combination’ around 1900 was preferred among 
businessmen over the term ‘trust,’ which implied the existence and exercise of 
monopolistic powers. 
Institutions – any form of social construct or constraint on the interaction between 
human agents and between human agents and the physical artifacts in a system.  
Institutions include organizations and rules. 
Mass markets – application domains that are large in scale and scope and that are 
characterized by functionalities with wide appeal.  Demand is sufficient to allow high 
volume production, resulting in economies of scale.  Competition is based mainly on 
price and quality. 
Niche branching – the use of a radical innovation in subsequent application domains or 
market niches. 
Niche hypothesis – The assertions of the quasi-evolutionary and multi-level perspective 
literature regarding the fundamental role of niches in technological transitions. 
Niche markets – distinct application domains that are small in scale and scope and that 
are characterized by specific functional requirements.  Because of the special 
functional requirements of the niche, users are willing to accept higher cost or lower 
 
512 
performance on other non-essential functionalities compared to those attained with 
any existing products available in established (mass) markets. 
Regime optimization – incremental improvement within an existing regime. 
Regime renewal – radical innovations that depart from the existing trajectory and require 
a change in the architecture and rules of the existing regime and therefore in the 
behavior of various actors. 
Regime instability – an existing technology looses viability due to emerging 
misalignments between the elements of the system, including the technology, rules 
and other institutions, and infrastructure.  Regime instability may also involve 
exogenous factors. 
Retention – the embedding of technologies in engineering practices, production systems, 
organizational routines, consumption and usage patterns, and supporting and 
complimentary systems that result in the stability of search activities and the patterns 
of technological change. 
Rules – cognitive, normative, or legislative constraints on human interactions and the 
interactions between human agents and the physical elements of a system.  Rules may 
be formal or informal and include legislation, economic rules, legal contracts, social 
conventions, moral codes, world views, and shared knowledge and beliefs. 
Sectoral system – a set of new and established products for specific uses and the set of 
agents carrying out market and non-market interactions for the creation, production, 
sale and use of those products.   
Selection - “[a]ny framework in which agents interact in order to choose between 
competing patterns of behaviour” (Metcalfe, 1995). Selection involves social, 
political, and market mechanisms and is shaped by institutions and infrastructure. 
Senescent phase – the phase of a product’s lifecycle when a new innovation begins to 
dominate that product’s market. The old technology finds application only in niche 
markets where it holds a performance advantage or where heritage design is required.  
Innovation slows or stops and is tailored to the needs of niche users.  Eventually, 
firms are unable to survive and the industry ceases to exist.  See Table 2-1. 
Socio-technical regime – a socio-technical regime is understood to exist when a 
technology and sector have achieved the specific phase and when the stability of that 
specific phase is supported by the alignment of institutions and existing physical 
infrastructure with the dominant product design, production processes, and business 
model. 
Specific phase – the phase of a product’s lifecycle when products proliferate around a 
dominant design and ever more emphasis is given to process innovation.  There is 
little product differentiation and competition in mass markets is based primarily on 
cost and quality.  See Table 2-1. 
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Spillover – an innovation that originates outside the sectoral system – in other industries, 
institutions or other countries.  Spillovers may involve either a transfer of knowledge 
(knowledge spillovers) or economic benefits (rent spillovers).  This research is 
concerned with knowledge spillovers that arise outside the motor vehicle sector. 
Strategic niche management (SNM) – the creation, development, and controlled phase-
out of protected spaces for the development and use of promising technologies by 
means of experimentation.  SNM is a policy recommendation that arises from the 
quasi-evolutionary literature. 
Synthetic innovation – “creating new and enhanced technological products and 
processes with previously unattained performance by combining components, 
knowledge, and capabilities in ways that deliver synergism” (Rycroft and Kash, 
1999). 
Technological nexus – the set of institutional linkages between selection and variation.  
Agents acting in the technological nexus role link selection and variation by 
translating information from both realms; shaping interactions; and harmonizing 
social and market needs with the results of scientific and technological research.  
These actions result in the mutual adaptation of the technology and institutions. 
TIEC – technical, institutional, and ecological complex – the larger system within which 
a sectoral system is embedded and which serves as the sectoral system’s environment.  
It includes physical artifacts, agents, and institutions; elements include meso- and 
macro-level constructs including physical infrastructures, regimes, regionally or 
nationally established rules, cultural values and culturally learned patterns of 
behavior, etc.  See section 2.6 and Figure 2-3. 
Transitional phase – the phase of a product’s lifecycle when a dominant design begins 
to coalesce as users’ needs, product features, design, and components become 
standardized.  The product diffuses into mass markets.  Innovation slows, becomes 
incremental, and is focused on cost reduction and quality enhancements.  See Table 
2-1. 
Variation – the purposive and guided, yet inherently stochastic, generation of diversity 
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